ORDER : (Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J.) The Revision has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) against the concurrent conviction for the alleged offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’). The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bhimavaram in C.C NO.35 of 2009 on 23.12.2009, convicted and sentenced the Revisionist for the offence under Section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine Rs.3000/-. The said judgment was confirmed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Bhimavaram in Criminal Appeal No.1 of 2010, on 27.10.2010. 2. Sri. I.V.N Raju, learned Counsel for the Revisionist, while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 suffers from discrepancy and interestedness; ingredients of section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ were not proved beyond reasonable doubt; the learned Trial Judge erred in finding that the Revisionist while driving vehicle turned at his back which resulted in causing alleged accident; the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the fact that P.W.2 to P.W.5 being independent witnesses, did not support the case of the prosecution; material omissions in the evidence of P.W.1 went against the case of the prosecution; the learned Courts below failed to see that P.W.1 being the son of the deceased, narrated that the deceased was throwing the waste material on the extreme left side of the road, whereas the alleged accident occurred in the middle of the road as per the scene of the offence. 3. It is further argued that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate that P.W.1 did not properly identify the Revisionist/Accused as the driver of the crime vehicle; the Courts below failed to appreciate the settled law in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra , [ AIR 1972 SC 221 ] and requested to allow the Revision. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the Revisionist, who is now aged more than 50 years, has been suffering from serious health complications because of post pandemic Covid-19 and requested to show leniency in imposing sentence, in case this Court comes to the conclusion that both the learned Courts below had found guilty on the correct lines. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the Revisionist, who is now aged more than 50 years, has been suffering from serious health complications because of post pandemic Covid-19 and requested to show leniency in imposing sentence, in case this Court comes to the conclusion that both the learned Courts below had found guilty on the correct lines. He further submitted that 20 years passed by from the date occurrence and lenient view may be taken by ordering the sentence to that he already undergone. 5. Per contra, Sri Somayaji, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Magistrate and the Appellate Court had properly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and there was direct witness who supported the case of prosecution. The judgment relied on by the learned Counsel was negated by the learned Trial Court as prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; the learned Trial court rightly found the Revisionist guilty and appropriately sentenced, confirming the same the learned Appellate Court also on correct lines being the Court of Appeal, having the power to appreciate the evidence, confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate duly apppreciating the evidence on correct perpective and it is urged to dismiss the Revision as there are no material irregularities committed by the learned Courts below and there is no miscarriage of the justice. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by both the counsels. I have perused the record. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl. A. No.1 of 2010 dated 27.10.2010, passed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Bhimavaram, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 7. As seen from the record, the prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.10 to prove the guilt of the Revisionist. P.W.1, the son of the deceased, was de- facto complainant, categorically testified that the on 27.05.2005, at about 4:45 A.M, when his mother was dropping the waste material on the road side, the Revisionist being the driver of the crime vehicle, drove in rash and negligent manner and directly hit his mother and the vehicle ran over her body; As a result, her mother died instantaneously. It is trite that mere relation is not a ground to through away the evidence of direct witness whose evidence is trustworthy, inspiring confidence and truthful. 8. In the cross examination of P.W.1, there was no reference that deceased suddenly came across the road. Although P.W.1 could not say the exact speed of the tractor being illiterate one, he in clear terms testified that the vehicle was driven in high speed and negligent way. In the cross examination it was also elicited that the revisionist was looking back while driving and he directly hit mother of P.W.1. As rightly pointed out by the learned Trial Court that the accused being responsible driver was not supposed to look back while driving. Nothing concrete was elicited from the evidence of P.W.1 that he was speaking falsehood and he had not witnessed the occurrence of the accident. The evidence of P.W.1 remained not shattered. P.W.2 also deposed in similar lines to P.W.1. In the cross- examination of P.W.2 also, nothing concrete was elicited to disbelieve his version. Although the remaining witnesses, who happened to have seen the occurrence, had not supported the case of the prosecution, testimony of one or two witnesses who happened to be the direct witnesses and whose evidence is trustworthy and inspiring confidence of the Court, can be sustained. The concurrent findings about the rash and negligent driving of the Revisionist were recorded by the learned Magistrate and the Appellate Court. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. The State of Maharashtra at Paragraph No.4 held as under: “It must be said that there is really no good evidence on the side of the prosecution to show how exactly the accident took place All that P.W. 2 Vijay Kumar, the friend of the deceased, was able to say was that the deceased left him at point B. Since the deceased came under the left front wheel, it can be only inferred that he must have crossed the road to the Western Side. That seems to be borne out by the F.I.R. of P.W.lDayanand who says that when he was standing near point C he saw Ravikant going by the C.P. Tank Road towards tin batti, that is, towards the North and at that time he saw the bus dashing against him with its left side mudguard. That seems to be borne out by the F.I.R. of P.W.lDayanand who says that when he was standing near point C he saw Ravikant going by the C.P. Tank Road towards tin batti, that is, towards the North and at that time he saw the bus dashing against him with its left side mudguard. The High Court has, in one place, held that while Ravikant was going along the road from South to North he was suddenly dashed by the bus coming from behind. In the first place, it is rather difficult to hold that Ravikant would be walking in that street from South to North some 14' away from the Western Korb of the road. Secondly in his evidence before the Court Dayanand, P.W 1 did not stick to this case in the F.I.R. He stated that Ravikant was actually crossing from the Western side of the road to the Eastern Side of the Road If that is true, it will only mean that Ravikant was not dashed from behind as he was going towards North but the impact took place when he was going towards North but the impact took place when he was crossing the road from West to East. The High Court was not quite clear on the point and so it observed at another place "that was precisely the reason why he (appellant) could not see the man walking ahead of him or trying to cross the road in front of his bus " If Ravikant was walking along the street in front from South to North and the bus was coming from behind, it can be legitimately said that the Driver of the Bus would see him in front ahd if be dashed against Ravikant as he was walking along, that would undoubtedly amount to negligence on the part of the Driver. It may have been, perhaps fool-hardy on the part of Ravikant to walk in the middle of the road about 14' away from the Korb. But that would not justify the Bus Driver knocking him down after taking due note that he was walking straight in front of the Bus But the case assumes a different complexion of we agree with the sole eye witness in the case Dayanand P.W. 1 that at the time if the impact Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus there was every possibility of his dashing against the bus with out the Driver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If a person suddenly crosses the road the Bus Driver, however slowly may be driving may not be in a position to save the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the Bus Driver was negligent.” 10. The learned Trial Court has referred about this judgment and rightly held that the judgment is not applicable inasmuch as the facts and circumstances of the instant case are totally different. Had the Revisionist driven the vehicle in normal speed as expected, he would have controlled the tractor when the deceased being the old lady crossing the road. It is not the case of the Revisionist that the old woman suddenly came on the road. Even otherwise, in the case of old lady crossing the road, in the facts and circumstances of the case, one cannot say that she came suddenly or abruptly on to the road. When such is not a case, the decision in Mahadeo Hari Lokre supra is not applicable to the present case on hand. There was no material irregularity either in the procedure or the law in this case. The findings of the learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court are not perverse. Both the Courts below had appreciated on correct lines and found the Revisionist guilty under Section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.’ 11. In State of A.P v. Rajagopal Rao , [ (2000) 10 SCC 338 ] , where a bus driver was convicted under S. 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ in connection with an accident which resulted in the death of one person, it is held that the High Court erred in allowing respondent bus driver's revision petition and upsetting concurrent findings of fact of lower courts without considering evidence on record and without indicating how lower courts were wrong in reaching their conclusions and without giving any reasons as to why the revision was being allowed. 12. 12. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dulichand v. Delhi Administration , [ AIR 1975 SC 1960 ] wherein at Paragraph No.4 it is held as under: “…Now the jurisdiction of the High Court in a Criminal Revision Application is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a re- appreciation of the evidence, but even so, the learned Single Judge of the High Court who heard the revision application, examined the evidence afresh at the instance of the appellant. This was, however, of no avail, as the learned single Judge found that the conclusion reached by the lower Courts that the appellant was guilty of gross negligence was correct and there was no reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellant. The learned single Judge accordingly confirmed the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and dismissed the revision application…” 13. In State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu , [ AIR 1979 SC 663 ] , wherein at Paragraph Nos.9 and 29 it is held as under: “9. So far as the first point is concerned, it is to be emphasised that although the revisional power of the High Court under S. 439 read with Sec. 435 of the Code the Criminal Procedure, 1898 is as wide as the power of Court of Appeal under S. 423 of the Code, it is now well settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 439 is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of this Court in Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose (1973) 4 SCC 10 : ( AIR 1973 SC 799 ) and Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (1973) 2 SCC 583 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 ). In the latter case viz. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of this Court in Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose (1973) 4 SCC 10 : ( AIR 1973 SC 799 ) and Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (1973) 2 SCC 583 : ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 ). In the latter case viz. Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (supra) this Court following its earlier decision in the Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose (supra) held that in spite of the wide language of S. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which empowered it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any findings, sentence or order recorded or passed by any inferior court situate within the limits of its jurisdiction and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court and in spite of the fact that under S. 439 of the Code it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a court of appeal under S. 423 of the Code the High Court is not expected to act under S. 435 or S. 439 as if it is hearing an appeal. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which in informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system. 29. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the aforesaid judgment and order of the High Court acquitting Gopinath Patra and Niranjan Naik and convict them for the offences with which they were charged and held guilty by the trial court. Keeping, however, in view the fact that the said respondents are likely to lose their jobs and must have gone through a lot of mental and financial strain during the prolonged proceedings before the courts lasting for over fourteen years, we think that a consolidated fine of Rs. 10,000 in case of each of the respondents will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly while remitting the substantive sentence of imprisonment, we impose a sentence of fine of Rs.10,000 on each one of the said respondents viz. Gopinath Patra and Niranjan Naik. In default of payment of fine, each one of the said respondents shall undergo imprisonment for a period of six months. Accordingly while remitting the substantive sentence of imprisonment, we impose a sentence of fine of Rs.10,000 on each one of the said respondents viz. Gopinath Patra and Niranjan Naik. In default of payment of fine, each one of the said respondents shall undergo imprisonment for a period of six months. The fine shall be deposited within a period of two months from today failing which the aforesaid respondents shall surrender themselves to their bail bonds to undergo the aforesaid imprisonment imposed on them in default of payment of fine.” 14. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar , (2002) 6 SCC 650 at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re- appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 15. In the instant case, the prosecution proved the guilt of the revisionist beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence charged. Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the revisionist. Similarly, the learned Appellate Court also confirmed the same. Re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in this revision case as laid down in the decisions in Dulichand, Nakula Sahu and Bindeshwari Prasad Singh 16. In Ismail v. Police Sub Inspector, Hospet , [2013 (1) RCR (Criminal) 826] , in regard to the offence punishable under Section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ the Hon’ble Apex Court having noted the age of the appellant was 74 years and the medical certificate established that the appellant's movement was fairly restricted, the sentence to undergo 15 days imprisonment already suffered by Ismail was held to be the proper sentence. 17. In State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi , [ (2015) 5 SCC 182 ] it was held that the Revisionist therein would not be entitled to the benefit of probation as he was professional driver, so no leniency or compassion can be shown towards a professional driver unless mitigating circumstances were proved to be existing. 18. Coming to the quantum sentence imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court, the offence took place in the year 2005 and nearly 20 years passed by. 18. Coming to the quantum sentence imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court, the offence took place in the year 2005 and nearly 20 years passed by. The learned Counsel for the Revisionist submits that the Revisionist is now more than 50 years old and has been suffering from severe ailments because of post pandemic effect due to Covid-19. The revisionist’s right to get speedy trial as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India is being infringed. The record shows that Revisionist had only undergone 10 days imprisonment. 19. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly conceded that there was no prior or subsequent antecedents against the Revisionist that he involved in the similar offence. The Revisionist was not a professional driver. He was a driver driving tractor in village. Undeniably, right to speedy trial, which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision is part of a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar , [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ] . Undeniably, right to fair trial and right to speedy trial is one of the fundamental rights of the accused person. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar , [2000 (1) BLJR 37] . Taking into account totality of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, imposing of rigorous imprisonment of one year is highly excessive and not proportionate to the gravity of the case. In view of the fact that Revisionist had already paid Rs.3000/- amount fine at the time of referring the Revision, not being professional driver and he was driving tractor as peasant, imposition of three months simple imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. 20. In view of the submissions of both the learned Counsel and the observations of this Court, this Criminal Revision Case is disposed of confirming the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ while reducing the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year to simple imprisonment for three (03) months. The sentence already undergone by the Revisionist shall be set off. There shall be no order as to costs. The sentence already undergone by the Revisionist shall be set off. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.