JUDGMENT : (Muralee Krishna S., J.) These writ appeals are filed by the 1st respondent in W.P.(C) No.20797 of 2023 and W.P.(C)No.25628 of 2023 who is the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.18555 of 2024, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the common judgment dated 04.06.2024 of the learned Single Judge, whereby W.P.(C)Nos.20797 of 2023 and 25628 of 2023 were allowed and W.P.(C) No.18555 of 2024 was dismissed. 2. The 1st respondent is a Consumer Co-operative Society (‘Society’ for short) started functioning on 11.11.1963. The membership of the society is confined to the staff of the Regional Engineering College, Kozhikode (NIT). The Society has been running a consumer store dealing with provision stores, stationery and textile items. The appellant was appointed as a Salesman in the society on 16.08.1976. On 21.11.2000, the Unit Inspector, Kunnamangalam Unit conducted an inspection in the office of the store of the Society and noticed misappropriation of funds by manipulation of records and vouchers. On getting the report, the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies issued a show cause notice to the Society on 29.11.2000. Then, the President and Board Members of the Society conducted an inspection and found that misappropriation of the fund of the Society had been committed by the appellant as well as an Attender by name Gopinathan. Thereafter, the department officers as well as auditors also conducted an inspection and found large scale misappropriation of funds of the Society which according to them was committed by the appellant and the other employee. A statutory inspection under Section 66 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (‘the Act’ for short) was conducted as per order dated 23.03.2001 by appointing the Unit Inspector, Kunnamangalm Unit and he submitted Ext.P2 report dated 20.03.2002 to the Joint Registrar. On the basis of the said report, the Joint Registrar ordered enquiry under Section 68(1) of the Act as per Ext.P3 order dated 31.01.2003 and appointed the Assistant Registrar (G), Kozhikode as the Enquiry Officer. 2.1. On the basis of the enquiry conducted, the disciplinary sub-committee formed by the society issued Ext.P5 order dated 25.04.2002 terminating the service of the appellant, finding that he misappropriated the fund of the Society. The Society then filed A.R.C. No.10 of 2001 before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies for recovery of the misappropriated amount from the appellant. 2.1. On the basis of the enquiry conducted, the disciplinary sub-committee formed by the society issued Ext.P5 order dated 25.04.2002 terminating the service of the appellant, finding that he misappropriated the fund of the Society. The Society then filed A.R.C. No.10 of 2001 before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies for recovery of the misappropriated amount from the appellant. Challenging Ext.P5, the appellant filed A.R.C. No.123 of 2011 before the Co-operative Arbitration Court (Northern), Kozhikode (‘Arbitration Court’ for short). As per Ext.P6 award dated 28.05.2018 the Arbitration Court set aside the punishment of termination of service imposed on the appellant and directed to pay him all service benefits, including back wages. Challenging Ext.P6 award, the Society filed A.P No.83 of 2018 before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (‘Tribunal’ for short). The appellant filed Ext.P7 cross-objection before the Tribunal claiming 18% interest on the amount awarded. 2.2. As per Ext.P9 judgment dated 24.05.2022, the appeal filed by the Society was allowed and the cross-objection filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Tribunal. Challenging Ext.P9 judgment of the Tribunal, the appellant filed W.P.(C)No.24868 of 2022 before this Court. As per Ext.P10 judgment dated 17.10.2022 this Court set aside Ext.P9 judgment of the Tribunal and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. As per Ext.P11 judgment dated 25.02.2023, the Tribunal partly allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-objection with a direction to pay to the appellant 80% of the back wages from the date of termination till superannuation, together with 9% interest from the date of termination till payment. 2.3. Challenging the judgment in the appeal, the Society filed W.P.(C)No.20797 of 2023 and challenging the judgment in the cross-objection, the appellant filed W.P.(C)No.18555 of 2024. Meanwhile, on the basis of an application filed by the Society, the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies issued an order dated 26.02.2001 attaching the landed properties of the appellant. After Ext.P11 judgment by the Tribunal, the Joint Registrar issued an order dated 07.07.2020 lifting the attachment. Challenging the order of the Joint Registrar, the society filed W.P.(C)No.25628 of 2023. All three writ petitions were disposed of by the learned Single Judge as per the common judgment dated 04.06.2024, remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Liberty was given to the Tribunal to remand the matter to the Arbitration Court if found necessary for proper disposal of the case on merits. 3. All three writ petitions were disposed of by the learned Single Judge as per the common judgment dated 04.06.2024, remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Liberty was given to the Tribunal to remand the matter to the Arbitration Court if found necessary for proper disposal of the case on merits. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Arbitration Courts were established after the incorporation of Section 70A and Section 70B in the Act by way of amendment with effect from 02.01.2023. It was prior to the incorporation of those provisions the society filed the complaint before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. After the establishment of the Arbitration Court, A.R.C. No.123 of 2011 was filed by the appellant before that Court. Considering all the facts and evidence, Ext.P6 award was passed by the Arbitration Court on 28.05.2018. In Ext.R1(b) judgment dated 09.08.2007 passed by this Court in W.P.(C)No.13655 of 2024, it was found that the appellant was not working in a managerial capacity. In Ext.P6 award, the Arbitration Court directed the Society to pay full back wages to the appellant from the date of termination of service till superannuation. From Ext.P6 award of the Arbitration Court and Ext.P11 judgment of the Tribunal, it is clear that the enquiry against the appellant was conducted violating principles of natural justice. The Arbitration Court rightly set aside the order of termination of service of the appellant. It was the duty of the employer to produce the book of accounts to prove the alleged misappropriation of money by the appellant which was not done by the Society. The learned counsel vehemently argued that in the case of reinstatement of an employee, payment of full back wages is the Rule and the Tribunal went wrong in properly deciding these aspects. The learned counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee [ (1980) 3 SCC 459 ] to argue that the domestic enquiry conducted against the appellant was vitiated by violation of natural justice. In that judgment the Apex Court held that a regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter’s explanation is obtained. In that judgment the Apex Court held that a regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter’s explanation is obtained. In the absence of such an enquiry in that case, the Court held that the Rules of natural justice was violated and hence the impugned order of dismissal was held as rightly set aside by the High Court. The learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora [ (1997) 3 SCC 72 ] and the judgment of this Court in Arpookara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. T.M George [2025 KHC Online 1519] to argue that the jurisdiction of this Court in departmental enquiries and findings are very limited. 5. The learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 argued that while passing Ext.P11 judgment in pursuance to the direction of this Court in Ext.P10 judgment, the Tribunal once again failed to consider the evidence on record. In Ext.P6 award of the Arbitration Court there was no direction to pay interest on the back wages directed to be paid to the appellant. No such request was also made before the Arbitration Court by the appellant. But overlooking that aspect, the Tribunal directed the 1st respondent to pay 9% interest on the 80% of back wages ordered to be paid to the appellant. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. [ (1970) 1 SCC 764 ] the learned counsel argued that the judgment of the Tribunal directing to pay interest on back wages is vitiated due to absence of reasoning. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P Agrawal [ (2007) 2 SCC 433 ] to argue that Appellant is not entitled for back wages. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. Shri P.P. Mundhe [ (1975) 2 SCC 661 ] the learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal ought to have given the Society an opportunity to adduce evidence if it found the evidence adduced before the Disciplinary authority or Arbitration Court as insufficient. 6. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. Shri P.P. Mundhe [ (1975) 2 SCC 661 ] the learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal ought to have given the Society an opportunity to adduce evidence if it found the evidence adduced before the Disciplinary authority or Arbitration Court as insufficient. 6. The issue for consideration in these writ appeals is whether the impugned judgment passed in writ petitions by the learned Single Judge is suffering from any illegality, which warrants interference? 7. The appellant was appointed as an employee in the 1st respondent Society on 16.08.1976. Including the appellant, there were six permanent and four temporary employees working in the Society. According to the Society, with effect from 12.06.1982 the appellant was exercising the duties of the Manager, since he was the senior most among the staff. According to the appellant after Ext.R1(1) judgment dated 09.08.2007 in W.P.(C)Nos.13655 of 2004 and 5053 of 2006, the dispute regarding the post of the appellant is no more res integra since in the said judgment, this Court held that the appellant is not the Manager. 8. The allegation against the appellant is that on a surprise inspection initially conducted by the Unit Inspector of Kunnamangalam Unit on 21.11.2000 some malpractices and misappropriation of money were detected in the society and it is the appellant as well as an Attender by name Gopinathan have committed these malpractices. Subsequently, a statutory inspection under Section 66 of the Act was also conducted by the Unit Inspector and a report was filed by the Joint Registrar on 20.03.2002. In the enquiry conducted by the Assistant Registrar it was found that the appellant and Gopinathan misappropriated money from the Society and it has to be recovered from them. As per Ext.P4, the Joint Registrar issued an order dated 15.07.2010 to recover an amount of Rs.1,23,922/- from the appellant. In Ext.P5, the sub-committee constituted for disciplinary action accepted the domestic enquiry report and found that 17 charges were proved against the appellant. Hence the committee unanimously decided to dismiss the appellant from service with effect from 08.01.2001, the date from which the appellant was kept under suspension. 9. In Ext.P6 award, the Arbitration Court found the domestic enquiry conducted against the appellant as not valid. Hence the committee unanimously decided to dismiss the appellant from service with effect from 08.01.2001, the date from which the appellant was kept under suspension. 9. In Ext.P6 award, the Arbitration Court found the domestic enquiry conducted against the appellant as not valid. The reason for reaching that conclusion by the Arbitration Court is that none of the witnesses examined from the side of the Society was cross-examined by the appellant and in fact the statements of the witnesses were not taken on oath. The Domestic Enquiry Officer examined before the Arbitration Court as DW1 deposed that though so many documents were examined by him at the time of enquiry, none of them were seen in the file at the time of evidence. No distinct charges were made against the appellant. The Arbitration Court further found that though the appellant filed an appeal before the Board of Directors of the Society he was not given a chance for personal hearing which is denial of natural justice. 10. It is true that as per Ext.P10 judgment, Ext.P9 judgment of the Tribunal was set aside by this Court for the reason that it was not passed on merits by considering the evidence on record. However, in Ext.P11 judgment, the Tribunal once again considered the matter on merits. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment reads thus: “13. Going through the award, it is manifestly clear that the enquiry report was not proved by adopting methods known to law. That part, as rightly held by the learned Arbitrator, it is uncharitable to place the entire blame on the plaintiff who was only a worker. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was entrusted with the duties of Manager or Secretary of the defendant society. The defendant being a responsible body, they must be able to show documents or office orders to show that plaintiff was specifically entrusted with the managerial function since no paid Secretary was there. In the absence of any office order showing the entrustment of the work of the Secretary with the plaintiff, it is idle to contend that the plaintiff being the senior employee was looking after the day to day affairs of the defendant society. I reiterate here that the Board of Directors cannot wash their hands by putting the entire blame on the plaintiff, who was only a worker in the absence of materials. I reiterate here that the Board of Directors cannot wash their hands by putting the entire blame on the plaintiff, who was only a worker in the absence of materials. As long as there is no document to show that the plaintiff had acted as Manager or he was entrusted with supervisory jurisdiction, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was responsible for the alleged misappropriation. On going through the report filed by the enquiry officer, there is nothing to link the plaintiff for the alleged misappropriation. If a proper audit was conducted periodically, the real culprit would have come out of the bag. The attempt of the management to put the blame on the plaintiff cannot be approved or appreciated. The enquiry report is far from satisfactory as there is nothing to connect the plaintiff for the alleged misappropriation. There is nothing to show that plaintiff was handling cash and accounts of the society when there is an able management to perform the managerial functions, I reiterate here at the risk of repetition that there is no scrap of paper to show that the plaintiff was assigned with the work of Secretary as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. It is a mystery to hold that irregularities were noticed on a surprise inspection. That apart, there is no basis to conclude that the plaintiff and one Mr. Gopinathan alone are responsible for the same when 4 other staff were then working. Without proper evidence, it is cruel to punish the plaintiff, who has got good length of service and hence this Tribunal is of the view that the very initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff is wholly vitiated. The report filed by the enquiry officer is also vitiated for manifold reasons. The assistance of a legally trained person was denied to the plaintiff. The explanation filed by the plaintiff was not considered by the management and the enquiry officer. The findings of the enquiry officer are not supported with reasons worth acceptance. So this Tribunal is of the firm view that the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the plaintiff are wholly vitiated.” 11. The explanation filed by the plaintiff was not considered by the management and the enquiry officer. The findings of the enquiry officer are not supported with reasons worth acceptance. So this Tribunal is of the firm view that the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the plaintiff are wholly vitiated.” 11. In Vijay Narayan Vajpayee [ (1980) 3 SCC 459 ] the Apex Court held that a regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter’s explanation is obtained. In the absence of such an enquiry in that case, the Court held that the Rules of natural justice was violated and hence the impugned order of dismissal was held as rightly set aside by the High Court. 12. In Ashok Kumar Arora [ (1997) 3 SCC 72 ] the Apex Court held thus: “At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non- observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is a catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to few decisions of this Court on this topic viz., State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.Sree Rama Rao[(1963) 3 SCR 25], State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao[ (1976) 1 SCR 521 ], Corporation of City of Nagpur and Anr. v. Ramachandra [ (1981) 3 SCR 22 ] and Nelson Motis v. Union of India and Anr.[ AIR 1992 SC 1981 ].” (Emphasis supplied) 13. v. Ramachandra [ (1981) 3 SCR 22 ] and Nelson Motis v. Union of India and Anr.[ AIR 1992 SC 1981 ].” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar [ (1970) 1 SCC 764 ] the Apex Court held thus: “Opportunity to a party interested in the dispute to present his case on questions of law as well as fact, ascertainment of facts from materials before the Tribunal after disclosing the materials to the party against whom it is intended to use them, and adjudication by a reasoned judgment upon a finding of the facts in controversy and application of the law to the facts found, are attributes of even a quasi-judicial determination. It must appear not merely that the authority entrusted with quasi-judicial authority has reached a conclusion on the problem before him : it must appear that he has reached a conclusion which is according to law and just, and for ensuring that end he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to its solution. Satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be, supported by the most cogent reasons that appeal to the authority. Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim by a quasi-judicial authority ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on grounds of policy or expediency. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for without recorded reasons the appellate authority has no material on which it may deter-mine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the decision was just.” 14. In J.K. Synthetics Ltd. [ (2007) 2 SCC 433 ] the Apex Court held that where reinstatement is a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment, neither back wages nor continuity of service nor consequential benefits, follow as a natural or necessary consequence of such reinstatement. In J.K. Synthetics Ltd. [ (2007) 2 SCC 433 ] the Apex Court held that where reinstatement is a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment, neither back wages nor continuity of service nor consequential benefits, follow as a natural or necessary consequence of such reinstatement. In cases, where the misconduct is held to be proved and reinstatement is itself a consequential benefit arising from imposition of a lesser punishment, award of back wages for the period when the employee has not worked, may amount to rewarding the delinquent employee and punishing the employer for taking action for the misconduct committed by the employer. That should be avoided. Similarly, in such cases, even where continuity of service is directed, it should only be for the purpose of pensionary/retirement benefits and not for other benefits like increment, promotions, etc. 15. In Cooper Engineering Ltd. [ (1975) 2 SCC 661 ] the Apex Court, after considering the evidence that has to be adduced by the management before the Labour Court on an issue of defective domestic enquiry, by relying on the judgment in Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd v. Management [ AIR 1973 SC 1227 ] held that even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself, about the legality and validity of the order, has to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action. 16. In the instant case, it is found by the Arbitration Court as well as the Tribunal that the domestic enquiry was not properly conducted and natural justice was violated by not giving an opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence or in other words there was no opportunity for the appellant to challenge the evidence of the witnesses, since the statements of the witnesses were not recorded on oath and instead their written statements were relied by the enquiry officer. The defects in the enquiry were properly analysed by the Arbitration Court as well as the Tribunal before reaching a finding that the enquiry was vitiated and therefore not valid. The defects in the enquiry were properly analysed by the Arbitration Court as well as the Tribunal before reaching a finding that the enquiry was vitiated and therefore not valid. It is true that the evidence on record has to be properly appreciated by the Arbitration Court or Tribunal before reaching a finding regarding the validity of the disciplinary proceedings. But if no sufficient evidence is available or if the available evidence itself is tainted due to violation of natural justice then there is no meaning in saying that the evidence was not appreciated by the Arbitration Court or the Tribunal. In Cooper Engineering Ltd. [ (1975) 2 SCC 661 ] there was no opportunity for the employer to adduce evidence before the Tribunal. It was in that circumstance the Apex Court held that the Labour Court ought to have first decided as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry violated the principles of natural justice and ought to have given the management an opportunity to adduce evidence to justify its decision. But in the instant case, the facts are different. The Society adduced evidence before the Arbitration Court. But, that evidence is found as insufficient to overcome the vitiating factors in the domestic enquiry. The Tribunal also re-appreciated the evidence adduced before the Arbitration Court. Hence the judgments of the Apex Court in Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar [ (1970) 1 SCC 764 ] and Cooper Engineering Ltd. [ (1975) 2 SCC 661 ] are not applicable to the case in our hand. 17. As noticed above, the Arbitration Court as well as the Tribunal analysed the materials and evidence on record and rightly found that the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant as not valid. No purpose will be served by remanding the matter once again to the Tribunal or to the Arbitration Court for considering the evidence on record, when there is absence of acceptable evidence adduced before the enquiry officer, especially when the opportunity to adduce evidence was not exercised properly by the Society. In such circumstance, we find no sufficient ground to remand the matter to the Tribunal as directed in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.20797 of 2023. 18. In Ext.P11 judgment the Tribunal reduced the back wages payable to the appellant as 80%. In such circumstance, we find no sufficient ground to remand the matter to the Tribunal as directed in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.20797 of 2023. 18. In Ext.P11 judgment the Tribunal reduced the back wages payable to the appellant as 80%. The reason stated by the Tribunal for reducing the back wages ordered by the Arbitration Court as 80% is absence of pleading that the appellant did not work for gain during the period of his absence from duty, due to suspension and subsequent termination till superannuation. It is worth to note that the society has no case that the appellant was employed elsewhere during this period. 19. In Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd v. Employees of Hindustan Tin works Pvt. Ltd. [ (1979) 2 SCC 80 ], the Apex Court held thus: “Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case, viz., to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages”. 20. In Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhypak Mahavidyalaya [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ], the Apex court held thus: “The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from relatives and other acquaintances to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments”. (emphasis supplied) 21. The Apex Court in Pradeep v. Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. [ (2022) 3 SCC 683 ] and this Court in Secretary, Perinthalmanna Taluk Co-operative Educational Society and another v. M.Satheeratnam [ 2018 (2) KLT 99 ] re-iterated/followed the dictum laid down in Deepali Gundu Surwase [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ]. 22. This Court in Arpookara Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. T.M George [2025 KHC OnLine 1519] by relying on the judgments of the Apex Court on the point held that ordinarily a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the period of absence from duty. It is the employer who has to plead and prove the same. 23. In Ext.P6 award, the Arbitration Court considered the rival contentions of the parties on merits and after analysing the evidence, adduced before it, found that the charges against the appellant is not sustainable. It is the employer who has to plead and prove the same. 23. In Ext.P6 award, the Arbitration Court considered the rival contentions of the parties on merits and after analysing the evidence, adduced before it, found that the charges against the appellant is not sustainable. It is an award passed on merits and not on technical grounds. Therefore, the decision of the Apex Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. [ (2007) 2 SCC 433 ] is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the absence of pleadings from the side of the society that the appellant was gainfully employed during the period of his absence from duty, there is no justification for the Tribunal to reduce the back wages payable to him. The judgment of the Tribunal is incorrect to that extent. While coming to the order of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies lifting the attachment order against the appellant is concerned, no interference is needed for the reason that the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant is found as vitiated and he is entitled for back wages. 24. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Arbitration Court has reached a right finding in Ext.P6 award dated 28.05.2018. Ext.P11 judgment of the Tribunal is incorrect to the extent of reducing the back wages payable to the appellant as 80%. So also, no interference is needed to the order dated 07.07.2020 passed by the Joint Registrar lifting the attachment over the property of the appellant. The impugned judgment of the learned single judge remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration was passed without properly appreciating the above legal and factual aspects and hence is liable to be set aside. Therefore, we are inclined to allow the Writ appeals. In the result, all the writ appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment dated 04.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) Nos.20797, 25628 of 2023 and 18555 of 2024 is set aside holding that the appellant is entitled for full back wages payable by the 1st respondent Society, from the date of his termination from service till the date of superannuation. The 1st respondent shall pay full back wages with 6% interest and other service benefits to the appellant within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.