ORDER : (G. BASAVARAJA, J.) State has preferred this Criminal Revision Petition against the judgment of acquittal dated 20 th January 2017 passed in CC No.658 of 2008 by the Civil Judge and JMFC, Sullia, Dakshina Kannada (for short referred to as the ‘trial Court’) which is confirmed by the V Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangaluru sitting at Puttur in Criminal Appeal No.5031 of 2017 dated in 14 th December, 2018. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as per their status and rank before the trial Court. 3. Brief facts leading to this revision petition are that Police Sub-Inspector of Subrahmanya Police Station filed charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 342 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is alleged by the prosecution that PW1-Smt. Savitha Nayak is the wife of accused No.1 Jagadeih Nayak. He marked PW1 in the year 1999 as per Hindu customs and traditions and have begotten a girl child which is aged 7 years. Accused No.2 & 3 are brother and sister-in-law of accused No.1. It is alleged that, in furtherance of common intention since two years from the date of their marriage, accused No.1 joined hands with accused 2 & 3, forced PW1 to bring dowry of Rs.50,000/- from her parents’ house and in that regard they subjected PW1 to mental and physical harassment and many-a-times have also wrongfully confined PW1. It is further alleged that the accused have deposited the gold ornaments of PW1 which was given by her parents at the time of marriage, in a Bank locker in the name of the son of accused 2 & 3 so as to cause mental harassment to PW1. It is further alleged that on 12 th February, 2008 at about 7.00 am, accused No.1 kicked PW1 on her stomach and voluntarily caused hurt to her chest and pushed her to wall holding her tuft. Thereafter, all the accused thrown PW1 out of the house cautioning her to come back home only with dowry and closed the door on her back. Then she was admitted to Kadaba CHC Hospital where she had given the statement to the State House Officer, Subrahmanya. Thereafter, all the accused thrown PW1 out of the house cautioning her to come back home only with dowry and closed the door on her back. Then she was admitted to Kadaba CHC Hospital where she had given the statement to the State House Officer, Subrahmanya. On investigation, Investigating Officer has submitted charge sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 342 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Case was registered in CC No.658 of 2008. Upon issuance of summons, accused appeared and were enlarged on bail. Upon hearing, the trial Court framed charges against the accused for alleged commission of offences. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To prove the guilt of the accused, sixteen witnesses have been examined as PWs1 to 16 and seventeen documents were marked as Exhibits P1 to P17. On closure of prosecution side evidence, statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded and the accused have totally denied the prosecution evidence. One Giridhara Nayak has been examined as DW1 and got marked twelve documents as Exhibits D1 to D12. Having heard the arguments, the trial Court acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, the State preferred appeal before the Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.5031 of 2017. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the appellate Court by judgment dated 14 th December, 2018. Being aggrieved by the judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Court which is affirmed by the appellate Court, the State has preferred the present revision petition. 4. Sri M.R. Patil, learned High Court Government Pleader, appearing for the State would submit that the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court which is confirmed by the trial Court are illegal and contrary to law, evidence and material on record. He would submit that both the Courts below have not properly appreciated the evidence of prime witnesses PWs.1 to 7, 10 & 13 to 16 and have also not considered that the evidence of PWs.1 & 2 are corroborated by the evidence of PW13-Medical Officer. The courts below have not considered the evidence of PW1-Kum. He would submit that both the Courts below have not properly appreciated the evidence of prime witnesses PWs.1 to 7, 10 & 13 to 16 and have also not considered that the evidence of PWs.1 & 2 are corroborated by the evidence of PW13-Medical Officer. The courts below have not considered the evidence of PW1-Kum. Ambika who is the child witness, but wrongly discarded the evidence on the ground that she has no proper knowledge about the incident and that she is a tutored witness. PWs1 & 2 have not considered the letter written by PW1-Savitha Nayak to her parents regarding the harassment given by the accused to her. On all these grounds, he sought to allow the revision petition and to convict the accused. 5. As against this, Smt. Saksha Bhagavan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-accused, would submit that both the courts below have appreciated the evidence on record in accordance with law and facts and that there are absolutely no ground to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court which is confirmed by the appellate Court and hence sought for dismissal of the revision petition. 6. Having heard the arguments of the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused, the only point that needs to be addressed in this revision petition is, Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court which is affirmed by the appellate Court is capricious, illegal and suffers from legal infirmities requiring this Court to intercede? 7. Before adverting to the actual facts of the case and appreciation of evidence, it is necessary to refer the dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding scope and power of Appellate Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. 8. In the case of MOTIRAM PADU JOSHI & OTHERS v.STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2018 SCC ONLINE SC 676, at paragraph 23 of the judgment, it is held thus: “23. While considering the scope of power of the appellate court in an appeal against the order of acquittal, after referring to various judgments, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007)4 SCC 415 , this Court summarised the principle as under:- “42. While considering the scope of power of the appellate court in an appeal against the order of acquittal, after referring to various judgments, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007)4 SCC 415 , this Court summarised the principle as under:- “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 9. In the case of MUNISHAMAPPA & OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & CONNECTED APPEALS reported in 2019 SCC ONLINE 69, at paragraph 16 of the judgment it is held as under: “16. The High Court in the present case was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. In the case of MUNISHAMAPPA & OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & CONNECTED APPEALS reported in 2019 SCC ONLINE 69, at paragraph 16 of the judgment it is held as under: “16. The High Court in the present case was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. In such a case, it is well settled that the High Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because it opines that a different view is possible or even preferable. The High Court, in other words, should not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because two views are possible. The interference of the High Court in such cases is governed by well-established principles. According to these principles, it is only where the appreciation of evidence by the trial court is capricious or its conclusions are without evidence that the High Court may reverse an order of acquittal. The High Court may be justified in interfering where it finds that the order of acquittal is not in accordance with law and that the approach of the trial court has led to a miscarriage of justice. …” 10. In the case of HARI RAM & OTHERS v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN reported in 2000 SCC ONLINE 933, at paragraph 4 of the judgment, it is observed thus: “4. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan on the other hand contended that the power of the High Court while hearing an appeal against an order of acquittal is in no way different from the power while hearing an appeal against conviction and the Court, therefore was fully justified in re-appreciating the entire evidence, upon which the order of acquittal was based. The High Court having examined the reasons of the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PWs 6 & 7 and having arrived at the conclusion, that those reasons are in the realm of conjectures and there has been gross miscarriage of justice and the mis-appreciation of the evidence on record is the basis for acquittal, was fully entitled to set aside an order of acquittal and no error can be said to have been committed. It is too well settled that the power of the High Court, while hearing an appeal against an acquittal is as wide and comprehensive as in an appeal against a conviction and it had full power to re- appreciate the entire evidence, but if two views on the evidence are reasonably possible, one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal, merely because it feels that it would sitting as a trial court, have taken the other view. While re- appreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence requires that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of the learned trial Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice.…” 11. In the case of STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. KISTOORA RAM reported in 2022 SCC ONLINE 684, at paragraph 8 of the judgment it is held as under: “8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 12. In the case of MAHAVIR SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH reported in (2016)10 SCC 220 , at paragraph 12 of the judgment, it is observed thus: “12. In the criminal jurisprudence, an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is convicted by a competent court after a full-fledged trial, and once the trial court by cogent reasoning acquits the accused, then the reaffirmation of his innocence places more burden on the appellate court while dealing with the appeal. In the criminal jurisprudence, an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is convicted by a competent court after a full-fledged trial, and once the trial court by cogent reasoning acquits the accused, then the reaffirmation of his innocence places more burden on the appellate court while dealing with the appeal. No doubt, it is settled law that there are no fetters on the power of the appellate court to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence both on facts and law upon which the order of acquittal is passed. But the court has to be very cautious in interfering with an appeal unless there are compelling and substantial grounds to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court while passing an order has to give clear reasoning for such a conclusion.” 13. It is also necessary to mention here as to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court as to burden of proof in offence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. In the case of NANJUNDAPPA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 2022 LIVELAW (5) 489, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Stricto Sensu would not apply to criminal cases. 14. I have carefully examined the material placed before this Court. The trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and at paragraphs 50 to 52, has observed as under: "50. In may view that, the over all oral and documentary evidence does not prove the guilt of the accused Persons to bring home their guilt for the offences punishable U/Sec 498A, 323, 342 R/w 34 IPC and Sec.3, 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act since there is no single iota of evidence to the accused persons have subjected the PW1 to any kind of cruelty, as there are sufficient evidence have been brought on record in the defence evidence through the EXD1 and 2 Bank Pass books and EXD3 a book showing the food ration to show that the accused NO.1 has looked after both PW1 and 2 well during their stay with him with love and affection. Further, the EXD4. the previous statement of PW1 during the legal proceedings in Cri. Misc. NO.31/2008 as the Accused NO.1 has not given any sort of ill treatment to her in his house at Subramanya, it is complete go by to her own case. Further, the EXD4. the previous statement of PW1 during the legal proceedings in Cri. Misc. NO.31/2008 as the Accused NO.1 has not given any sort of ill treatment to her in his house at Subramanya, it is complete go by to her own case. It is also to note that, EXD5 and 6 School fee receipts for having paid fee by the accused no.1 toward the education of his daughter PW2. LIC policy in the name of the PW2, further more, he had constructed new house out of his earning. It is not to be treated for his posh full life, since, there is no single evidence have been placed on record by the prosecution to show that, the accused had led his posh full life, so the wife and daughter who are none other than the PW1 and 2 are alone beneficiaries since the accused No1 and the 2 and 3 are not residing together and they are living separately. These are all defence evidence demolishes the whatever evidence placed on record by the prosecution alleging that the accused NO.1 had subjected his wife and child to cruelty. Moreover, the fact that, since the Accused NO.1 is not so intelligent in all the business as admitted by the PW6 in her evidence during the cross examination that could be seen at page 2 in 3rd paragraph it is extracted for the purpose of brevity as So it is natural that a elder brother will have to take care of his brother who is not mentally sound. That itself does not give right to the wife to see for the complete separation of her husband's family members from showing such natural love affection by the relatives. Further more, the DW1 Giridhara Nayak who is the son of the A2 and 3 whose name was initially had inserted as an accused and later stage, his name was deleted in the form of further statement of PW1, that his oral evidence itself goes to show, that, the arraigning the A2 and 3 as accused persons in the instant case is for the reason best known to the PW1 to6 and the PW17 which is not made clear. Therefore, that all the documentary evidence that corroborates with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses it. Therefore, that all the documentary evidence that corroborates with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses it. Therefore, prosecution cannot deny these official documents it is so relevant as to the entries made by the official u/s 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. 51. Coming to the physical cruelty is concerned, as already discussed when the PW1 herself had admitted in the judicial proceedings in the above mentioned case registered under the provisions of prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as the accused NO.1 did not subject her to any sort of cruelty, in this regard, I have gone through the relevant provision that speaks about this fact; Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ;- Relevancy of certain evidence for providing in subsequent proceeding, the truth of facts there in stated. Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceedings or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found. or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable: Provided - that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; That the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine; That the questions in issue are substantially the same in the first as in the second proceedings. 52. On reading of the provision, that the statement that was given by the PW1 in the above judicial proceedings is relevant for the consideration it goes to the root of the matter as relevant with respect to the alleged fact of cruelty alleged to have committed by the accused NO.1. That, the EXP15 wound certificate also does not any vital role in deciding the case in favour of the prosecution in respect of the points for the determination, accordingly, the EXD8 is the invitation card showing the house warming ceremony that was held on 15/2/2008 just 2 days prior to the alleged FIR lodged against the accused persons. That, the EXP15 wound certificate also does not any vital role in deciding the case in favour of the prosecution in respect of the points for the determination, accordingly, the EXD8 is the invitation card showing the house warming ceremony that was held on 15/2/2008 just 2 days prior to the alleged FIR lodged against the accused persons. Therefore, it is argued that, the intention of the PW1 with the instigation of PW6 and her husband Vinayaka Kamath to send all the accused persons to jail on the very day of house warming ceremony so to prevent them from doing it. From the evidence it is also can be seen that, a person who had spent more than 5 lakhs towards construction of the new house, whether he can demand dowry of Rs.50.000 only after completion of the said construction from his wife after leading long life, it is the question and doubt that created in the mind of the Court. It is also Of course, whatever may be the intention behind launching the prosecution, but it is to say that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the alleged act of the accused persons attracting the penal provisions U/Sec 498A, 323, 342 R/w 34 IPC and Sec.3, 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act beyond all reasonable doubt due to insufficient evidence, therefore, by extending the benefit of such doubt in favour of the accused persons, I answer these points NO.1 to 4 in the negative." 15. The appellate Court has re-appreciated the evidence on record and has come to the conclusion that there are no grounds to interfere with the finding given by the trial Court. 16. On re-evaluation of the evidence of prosecution witnesses as also the observation made by the trial Court and the appellate Court, I am of the considered opinion that both the courts have properly appreciated the evidence on record in accordance with law and facts. I do not find any error/legal infirmity in the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court which is confirmed by the appellate Court. Accordingly, the point arose for consideration is answered in the negative. I do not find any error/legal infirmity in the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court which is confirmed by the appellate Court. Accordingly, the point arose for consideration is answered in the negative. In the result, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER i) Revision petition dismissed; ii) Judgment of acquittal dated 20 th January 2017 passed in CC No.658 of 2008 by the Civil Judge and JMFC, Sullia, Dakshina Kannada (for short referred to as the ‘trial Court’) which is confirmed by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangaluru sitting at Puttur in Criminal Appeal No.5031 of 2017 dated in 14 th December, 2018, are confirmed.