JUDGMENT : 1. This Second Appeal, under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C'), has been filed by the Appellant/Respondent/Plaintiff against the Decree and Judgment dated 07.04.2009, in A.S.No.302 of 2008 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Guntur (for short, ‘the 1st Appellate Court’) reversing the decree and Judgment dated 22.09.2008, in O.S.No.735 of 2005 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Guntur (for short, ‘the trial Court’). 2. The Appellant/Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.735 of 2005 seeking recovery of Rs.3,98,800/- being the principal and interest from the Defendant based on the promissory note. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is practical to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: The 1st Defendant is the wife, and Defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of Shaik Abdul Rahiman, who borrowed a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-from the Plaintiff under a promissory note dated 08.08.2004, executed for his family's necessities. Shaik Abdul Rahiman agreed to repay the borrowed amount with interest at 24% per annum to the Plaintiff or his order upon demand. Shaik Abdul Rahiman passed away on 19.11.2005 without settling the debt under the promissory note. The Defendants 1 to 3, as legal heirs, inherited the estate of the deceased. Despite repeated demands, they have failed to repay the debt from the deceased's estate, which is in their possession. As such, the Defendants are liable to pay the principal amount, along with accrued interest and costs, from the estate of the deceased towards the discharge of the debt under the suit promissory note. 5. In the written statement, the Defendants refuted all the plaint averments and contended that Plaintiff could not lend Rs.3,00,000/- to Shaik Abdul Rahiman, the husband of the 1st Defendant and father of Defendants 2 and 3, or anyone else. They asserted that Shaik Abdul Rahiman did not need to borrow such a large sum for family necessities during his lifetime. He worked in the railways, earning a monthly salary of Rs.5,300/-. The Defendants further claimed that Mahaboob Basha, the father of the Plaintiff, had a history of lending money to others. They asserted that Shaik Abdul Rahiman did not need to borrow such a large sum for family necessities during his lifetime. He worked in the railways, earning a monthly salary of Rs.5,300/-. The Defendants further claimed that Mahaboob Basha, the father of the Plaintiff, had a history of lending money to others. Specifically, V. Venkateswarlu, who worked alongside Shaik Abdul Rahiman at the Railways in Guntur, was introduced to Mahaboob Basha by Shaik Abdul Rahiman. Venkateswarlu borrowed Rs.70,000/- from Mahaboob Basha but failed to repay the debt. It led to disputes between Mahaboob Basha and Shaik Abdul Rahiman, with the Defendants alleging that Plaintiff fabricated the suit promissory note to gain wrongful benefits. The Defendants maintain that the deceased Shaik Abdul Rahiman did not execute any promissory note in favour of Plaintiff during his lifetime, and as such, Plaintiff is not entitled to the claimed amount. Consequently, they argue that the suit should be dismissed. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues: i. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover of suit amount as prayed for? ii. Whether the suit promote dated 08.08.2004 is true, valid and binding upon the estate of the deceased Shaik Abdul Rahiman, which is in the hands of the Defendants? iii. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? iv. To what relief? 7. During the trial, P.Ws.1, 2 & 4 were examined (the chief affidavit of PW.3 was eschewed) and marked Ex.A.1 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, DW.1 was examined, and no documents were marked. 8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs against the estate of the deceased Shaik Abdul Rahiman, which is in the hands of Defendants 1 to 3 being his legal heirs for Rs.3,98,800/- with interest on Rs.3,00,000/- at 12% per annum from the date of suit, till the date of decree and thereafter at 6% per annum from the date of the decree, till realization. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendants filed an Appeal in A.S.No.302 of 2008 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following point for consideration: Whether the evidence before the trial Court was sufficient to hold that the Plaintiff was entitled for the decree? 10. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendants filed an Appeal in A.S.No.302 of 2008 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following point for consideration: Whether the evidence before the trial Court was sufficient to hold that the Plaintiff was entitled for the decree? 10. The 1st Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, allowed the Appeal by its Judgment and Decree dated 07.04.2009. Assailing the same, the Plaintiff preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. Heard Sri. T. Lakshmi Narayana, learned Counsel representing the Appellant/Plaintiff, and Sri G.L.Nageswar Rao, learned Counsel representing the Respondents/Defendants. 12. Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff put forth an argument that the Defendants failed to present evidence proving the Plaintiff's incapacity to lend the debt amount. The Defendants' claim of a separate transaction and the fabrication of the promissory note was unsupported. D.W.1's testimony contradicted the pleadings, with inconsistencies regarding the Plaintiff's financial capacity and work history. The Defendants did not seek expert opinion on the promissory note nor provide independent evidence to challenge the Plaintiff's residence in Guntur or the transaction there. The Plaintiff provided consistent evidence, and under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a presumption favors the Plaintiff. The appellate Court erred in focusing on irrelevant issues like the Defendants' residence. 13. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondents/Defendants contends that the 1st Appellate Court evaluated the facts of the case and reached the correct conclusions. The reasons given by the 1st Appellate Court do not require any modifications. 14. Based on the Appellant’s contentions, the following substantial questions of Law is involved in this Second Appeal: i. Whether in the place of residence of the creditor is relevant, in the absence of any iota of evidence on behalf of the Defendants regarding the residence of the creditor, in a suit for recovery of money based on a promissory note? ii. Whether the suit for recovery based on a promissory note is maintainable at the place of execution of the promissory note? 15. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 of C.P.C., this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. 16. ii. Whether the suit for recovery based on a promissory note is maintainable at the place of execution of the promissory note? 15. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 of C.P.C., this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. 16. Since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of Law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in terms of Law. 17. In Mallanaguoda v. Ninganagouda, (2021) 16 SCC 367 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 10. The first appellate Court is the final Court on facts. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the Judgment of the first appellate Court should not be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100CPC unless there is a substantial question of Law. The High Court committed an error in setting aside the Judgment of the first appellate Court and finding fault with the final decree by taking a different view on factual findings recorded by the first appellate Court……. 18. In K.N. Nagarajappa v. H. Narasimha Reddy, (2021) 18 SCC 263 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 14. Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction which a High Court derives under Section 100 is based upon its framing of a substantial question of Law. As a matter of Law, it is axiomatic that the findings of the first appellate Court are final. However, the rule that sans a substantial question of Law, the High Courts cannot interfere with the findings of the lower Court or concurrent findings of fact is subject to two important caveats. The first is that if the findings of fact are palpably perverse or outrage the conscience of the Court, in other words, it flies in the face of logic that given the facts on the record, interference would be justified. The first is that if the findings of fact are palpably perverse or outrage the conscience of the Court, in other words, it flies in the face of logic that given the facts on the record, interference would be justified. The other is where the findings of fact may call for examination and be upset, in the limited circumstances spelt out in Section 103 CPC. 15. Section 103 CPC reads as follows: “103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.—In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the Appeal— (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower appellate Court or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of Law as is referred to in Section 100." 16. In the Judgment in Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab S.E.B. [Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab S.E.B., (2010) 13 SCC 216 : (2010) 4 S.C.C. (Civ) 861], this Court held as follows : (S.C.C. pp. 228-29, paras 26-28) “26. Thus, it is evident that Section 103CPC is not an exception to Section 100CPC, nor is it meant to supplant it; rather, it is to serve the same purpose. Even while pressing Section 103CPC in service, the High Court has to record a finding that it had to exercise such power because it found that finding(s) of fact recorded by the Court (s) below stood vitiated because of perversity. More so, such power can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and with circumspection, where the core question involved in the case has not been decided by the Court (s) below. 27. There is no prohibition on entertaining a second appeal, even on a question of fact, provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous approach to the matter, i.e. that the findings of fact are found to be perverse. However, the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower courts. However, the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower courts. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 ]; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 ] and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 : (2010) 4 S.C.C. (Civ) 738] .) 28. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the Law. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. Further, if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjecture and surmises, the Judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and, thus, stands vitiated. (Vide Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan [Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 498] .)” (emphasis supplied) 17. In a recent judgment of this Court, Narayan SitaramjiBadwaik v. Bisaram [Narayan SitaramjiBadwaik v. Bisaram, (2021) 15 SCC 234 ], this Court observed as follows, in the context of the High Courts' jurisdiction to appreciate factual issues under Section 103IPC : (S.C.C. p. 238, para 11) “11. A bare perusal of Section 103CPC clearly indicates that it provides for the High Court to decide an issue of fact, provided there is sufficient evidence on record before it, in two circumstances. First, when an issue necessary for the disposal of the Appeal has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or by both the courts below. And second, when an issue of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court (s) below by virtue of the decision on the question of Law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 19. And second, when an issue of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court (s) below by virtue of the decision on the question of Law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 19. In Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy, (2021) 12 SCC 529 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 14. In the background of the legal position and on reasserting the position that there is very limited scope for reappreciating the evidence or interfering with the finding of fact rendered by the trial court and the first appellate Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary for us to take note as to whether in the instant facts, the High Court has breached the said settled position…………………... 15.………………. When such divergent findings on fact were available before the High Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, though reappreciation of the evidence was not permissible, except when it is perverse, but it was certainly open for the High Court to take note of the case pleaded, evidence tendered, as also the findings rendered by the two courts which were at variance with each other and one of the views taken by the courts below was required to be approved. 20. The Plaintiff testified as PW.1 and examined PW.2, Shaik Habib Basha (scribe), and PW.4, M. Ravi Kumar (one of the attestors of Ex.A.1). PWs.1, 2, and 4 clearly stated that Shaik Abdul Rahiman borrowed Rs.3,00,000/- from the Plaintiff on 08.08.2004, executing Ex.A.1 promissory note, agreeing to repay with 24% annual interest. The evidence of PW.3 is eschewed due to his failure to appear for cross-examination. 21. The 1st Defendant is the wife, and Defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of Shaik Abdul Rahiman, who passed away on 19.11.2005. The Defendants assert that the deceased did not need to borrow such a large sum from Plaintiff and that Plaintiff could not lend it. The Trial Court, after a detailed evaluation of the Plaintiff and his witnesses, accepted the Plaintiff’s case. However, the 1st Appellate Court assessed the evidence differently, disregarding the cross-examination of DW.1, who admitted she was unaware of whether the Plaintiff’s family had the financial capacity to lend such substantial sums, or whether the Plaintiff had worked in Saudi Arabia for eight years. However, the 1st Appellate Court assessed the evidence differently, disregarding the cross-examination of DW.1, who admitted she was unaware of whether the Plaintiff’s family had the financial capacity to lend such substantial sums, or whether the Plaintiff had worked in Saudi Arabia for eight years. In this context, the 1st Appellate Court should have considered the evidence of PW.1 and his witnesses. PW.1 testified that he worked in Saudi Arabia for some time before returning to his native place, where he worked as a Moulana in a mosque in Railpet, Guntur, for six months and is currently serving as a Moulana in Donakonda. He further stated that his father-in-law sold lands and gave his wife Rs.1,50,000/-, which she subsequently gave to him. In addition to that amount, he lent the available amounts to Shaik Abdul Rahiman. Given the evidence of PW.1 and DW.1's lack of knowledge regarding the Plaintiff's financial capacity, the 1st Appellate Court should have supported the Trial Court's well-reasoned findings. 22. It is undisputed that the Plaintiff is a native of Donakonda. At the same time, the deceased Shaik Abdul Rahiman worked as a kalasi in the Railways at Guntur and was getting Rs.5,300/- per month towards his salary. The 1st Appellate Court observed that, at the time of filing the suit, both the Plaintiff and Defendants resided in Donakonda. The 1st Appellate Court further noted that, although the cause of action occurred in Guntur, the Plaintiff could have filed the suit in Donakonda, where both parties reside. 23. Since the Defendants reside in Donakonda, the Plaintiff could have filed the suit there. However, the fact that the Plaintiff chose to file the suit in Guntur does not justify the 1st Appellate Court’s conclusion that the Guntur Court lacks jurisdiction. The 1st Appellate Court overlooked that a suit based on a promissory note can be filed where the Defendants reside or where the cause of action arose. The Plaintiff's decision to file the suit in the jurisdiction where the cause of action occurred does not negate the jurisdiction of the Court there. The issue now is determining whether the promissory note transaction occurred in Guntur. 24. PW.1 testified that he had resided in Guntur for some time, had worked as a Moulana in a mosque, and that the suit transaction had occurred in Guntur. The issue now is determining whether the promissory note transaction occurred in Guntur. 24. PW.1 testified that he had resided in Guntur for some time, had worked as a Moulana in a mosque, and that the suit transaction had occurred in Guntur. PW.2, a resident of Guntur, stated that Shaik Abdul Rahiman requested him to scribe Ex.A.1 promissory note and that the transaction took place at PW.1's house in Guntur. Similarly, PW.4, a resident of Guntur, confirmed that the transaction occurred at PW.1's house in Guntur. The Trial Court accepted the consistent testimonies of PWs.1, 2, and 4 and concluded that the transaction took place in Guntur. However, the 1st Appellate Court reversed this finding based on minor discrepancies in the evidence of PWs.1, 2, and 4. On reviewing DW.1's evidence, it appears that the 1st Appellate Court misinterpreted her testimony. DW.1 did not dispute that PW.1 resided in Guntur; she only stated that the Plaintiff filed the suit in Guntur, expecting the Defendants would be unable to travel there. As DW.1 did not challenge the core details provided by PWs.1, 2, and 4, the 1st Appellate Court erred in discarding their evidence without providing adequate reasoning. 25. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to the version of DW.1 in cross-examination, here under: I do not know whether Plaintiff is performing Namaz in the Mosque situated at Railpet, Guntur or not. I do not know whether the Plaintiff was working in Mosque, Railpet to perform Namaz by the date of scribing pronote Ex.A1. I do not know PW.2. I do not know whether PW.2 is a native of Donakonda and residing in Guntur. 26. At this stage, it is pertinent to reference the pleas raised in the written statement, where the Defendants claim that Mahaboob Basha is the Plaintiff's father. They further allege that one V. Venkateswarlu worked as a Kalasi in the Railways at Guntur alongside Shaik Abdul Rahiman, who introduced him to the Plaintiff's father. The Defendants contend that on recommendation by Shaik Abdul Rahiman, the Plaintiff's father lent Rs.70,000/- to Venkateswarlu. According to the Defendants, Venkateswarlu failed to repay the debt, leading to disputes between the Plaintiff's father and Shaik Abdul Rahiman, and they claim that the suit promissory note was subsequently fabricated. The Defendants contend that on recommendation by Shaik Abdul Rahiman, the Plaintiff's father lent Rs.70,000/- to Venkateswarlu. According to the Defendants, Venkateswarlu failed to repay the debt, leading to disputes between the Plaintiff's father and Shaik Abdul Rahiman, and they claim that the suit promissory note was subsequently fabricated. It is important to note that the Defendants have not specifically pleaded whether the Plaintiff’s father obtained Shaik Abdul Rahiman’s signature at the time of the alleged transaction to fabricate the suit promissory note. 27. Plaintiff had no opportunity to prove the allegation by examining Plaintiff's father, as DW.1 herself admitted that Plaintiff's father had lost his mental capacity following the death of his younger brother. The Defendants chose not to examine any additional witnesses to support their defence regarding the alleged fabrication of Ex.A.1. Moreover, DW.1 did not dispute her husband's signature on Ex.A.1 as the executant. She testified that she did not know whether the signature on Ex.A.1 belonged to her husband. Without perusal of the signature on the copy of the suit promissory note, she should not have presented such a defence. Before making her written statement, she should have verified whether Ex.A.1 contained her husband's signature as the executant. DW.1 did not provide proper instructions for drafting her written statement. Additionally, she did not assert that the suit promissory note transaction occurred in Donakonda, thereby challenging the jurisdiction of the Court at Guntur. Given that the evidence of PWs.1, 2, and 4 establishes that the suit transaction took place in Guntur, and no contradictions were raised during their cross-examination, there is no valid reason for the 1st Appellate Court to discard their evidence and depart from the Trial Court's findings. 28. From the 1st Appellate Court's Judgment, it is evident that the Judgment was based on surmises and conjectures. Even if it is assumed that both the Plaintiff and Shaik Abdul Rahiman were residents of Donakonda at the time of the Ex.A.1 suit transaction, it cannot be concluded that the suit promissory note transaction should not have taken place in Guntur. It is not the Law that a promissory note transaction must occur at the place where the parties reside. 29. It is well-established in Law that a mere denial of the receipt of consideration does not constitute a valid defence. It is not the Law that a promissory note transaction must occur at the place where the parties reside. 29. It is well-established in Law that a mere denial of the receipt of consideration does not constitute a valid defence. Defendants have failed to present any substantial reason or evidence to challenge the credibility of the testimonies of PWs.1, 2 and 4 regarding executing the Ex.A.1 promissory note. The evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 4 was consistent regarding executing the Ex.A.1 promissory note by Shaik Abdul Rahiman at Guntur. Despite extensive cross-examination, nothing emerged to undermine the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 4 about executing the promissory note. The Plaintiff and his witnesses possess no motive to fabricate the suit promissory note; similarly, PWs.2 and 4 have no compelling reason to testify falsely against the Defendant's interests, as they would derive no benefit from endorsing the Plaintiff's claim unless there exists a kernel of truth within it. The evidence adduced by Plaintiff is adequate to substantiate the integrity, legitimacy, and binding nature of the suit promissory note denoted as Ex.A.1. Furthermore, Shaik Abdul Rahiman has executed a promissory note. The Defendants failed to establish the circumstances under which Shaik Abdul Rahiman executed Ex.A.1 without receipt of consideration amount without payment. Furthermore, any rebuttal could have been based either through direct evidence or by proving the preponderance of probabilities. In this instance, the Defendants failed to rebut the presumption even by the preponderance of probabilities. 30. The Defendants version does not effectively rebut the presumption established under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘N.I. Act'). In light of the defence presented and the evidence submitted, the Defendants failed to discharge the initial burden of proof to demonstrate the non-existence of consideration. Moreover, no other evidence refutes the presumption provided under Section 118 of the N.I. Act. 31. In the light of aforesaid discussions, this Court finds that the Ex.A.1 promissory note transaction is valid and binding on the Defendants, who are admittedly enjoying the estate of the deceased Shaik Abdul Rahiman. For the above reasons, this Court discerns perversity in the Judgment rendered by the learned 1st Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the 1st Appellate Court are inconsistent with established legal principles. Furthermore, the 1st Appellate Court failed to consider the evidence on the record following the well-settled principles of Law. 32. For the above reasons, this Court discerns perversity in the Judgment rendered by the learned 1st Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the 1st Appellate Court are inconsistent with established legal principles. Furthermore, the 1st Appellate Court failed to consider the evidence on the record following the well-settled principles of Law. 32. Upon a thorough examination of the evidence on record, this Court concludes that the trial Court has duly evaluated the evidence in its proper context and rendered its findings with accuracy and in alignment with the material on record. The conclusions reached by the trial Court are grounded in a sound interpretation of the evidence and do not warrant any interference. The Judgment and decree of the learned 1st Appellate Court are set aside. Consequently, the substantial questions of Law raised in this Second Appeal are adjudicated in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents. 33. As a result, this Second Appeal is allowed without costs, consequently, the Judgment and decree dated 07.04.2009 passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Guntur in A.S.No.302 of 2008, are hereby set aside. The Judgment and decree, dated 22.09.2008 passed by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Guntur, in O.S.No.735 of 2005, are restored. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand closed.