JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested vide FIR No. 136 of 2022, dated 27.06.2022, registered at Police Station Bhuntar for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been asserted that the petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition bearing Cr.MP(M) No. 2057 of 2023, which was dismissed on 11.12.2023 on the ground that the DNA of the hair recovered from the socks of the petitioner matched with the DNA of the deceased. He filed one more bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1452 of 2024, which was also dismissed. The prosecution has examined 20 witnesses out of 42 witnesses cited by the prosecution. The completion of the trial is likely to take some time. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions, which the Court may impose; hence, the petition. 2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that deceased Shakuntla Devi was residing alone after the death of her husband. The informant, Shakuntla Devi’s daughter, received a call on 26.6.2022 at 11.41 p.m. She picked up the phone but could not hear what was being said on the other side. She called back. The call was received by some person who revealed that Aunty was pelting the stones and that she should be counselled. The informant inquired as to what he was doing in the middle of the night. The informant suspected that somebody was quarrelling with her mother. She called Jugdei and asked her to verify the facts. Jugdei went to the spot and found the dead body of Shakuntla. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police picked up the articles lying on the spot. The accused revealed on inquiry that he had run away with Kaushalya. Shakuntla scolded him. The police checked the call detail record of the petitioner and found that the petitioner was in the vicinity of the area where the dead body was found. He had thrown his mobile phone when he was apprehended. He could not give any satisfactory reason for throwing the mobile phone. The police arrested the petitioner. Shakuntla scolded him. The police checked the call detail record of the petitioner and found that the petitioner was in the vicinity of the area where the dead body was found. He had thrown his mobile phone when he was apprehended. He could not give any satisfactory reason for throwing the mobile phone. The police arrested the petitioner. He got recovered the stone that was used for hitting the deceased. He also stated that he could get one bedsheet, one silver necklace, two silver bangles, and one mobile phone recovered. However, these articles were not recovered as they were washed away in the flowing water. The cause of death, as per the postmortem report, was head injury caused by blunt force. 217.15 mg % ethyl alcohol was found in the blood of the deceased. As per the report of analysis, the DNA from the hair of the socks of the petitioner matched with the DNA from the blood of the deceased. The police prepared the challan and presented it before the Court of Learned Sessions Judge on 22.07.2023. 20 witnesses have been examined out of 42 witnesses, and the matter is now listed on 03.03.2025 and 04.03.2025 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. Hence, the status report. 3. I have heard Mr. Karan Kapoor, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 4. Mr Karan Kapoor, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that there is an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial. Twenty witnesses have been examined out of 42 witnesses cited by the prosecution. The trial is not likely to conclude soon; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgments of Madan versus State of H.P., 2024:HHC:5778 and Athar Parwez versus Union of India, 2024 INSC 995, in support of his submission. 5. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed two bail petitions, which were dismissed by this Court. There is no change in the circumstances. Keeping in view the number of witnesses, the trial is likely to take some time, and there is no delay in the progress of the trial; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. There is no change in the circumstances. Keeping in view the number of witnesses, the trial is likely to take some time, and there is no delay in the progress of the trial; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier approached this Court by way of Cr.MP(M) No. 2057 of 2023 and Cr.MP(M) No. 1452 of 2024, which were dismissed by this Court. It was held in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605 that once a bail application has been dismissed, subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J. only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 8. Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673 , wherein it was observed: - 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [ (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed: 30. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551 that successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstance, which means the change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstance. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutatory principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But, the power to decide such subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere unconnected with the facts of a case. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But, the power to decide such subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. The petitioner claimed that the trial is not being conducted expeditiously. This is not supported by the material on record. The prosecution has examined 20 witnesses out of 42 witnesses, which shows that the trial is progressing at a normal pace. The order sheets also do not show that there was any undue delay in the progress of the trial; therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail on the grounds of the delay. 15. In Madan (supra), the Court had noticed that the trial under POCSO was to be concluded within one year, and the prosecution had examined 16 out of 33 witnesses within one and a half years. No outer limit has been prescribed by the Legislature for completing the trial under Section 302 of IPC, and this judgment will not assist the petitioner. 16. Similarly, in Athar Parwaz (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed that the charge was not framed for more than two years. Hence, it was held that there was a delay in the progress of the trial. 16. Similarly, in Athar Parwaz (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed that the charge was not framed for more than two years. Hence, it was held that there was a delay in the progress of the trial. In the present case, not only has the charge been framed, but almost half the witnesses have been examined by the prosecution; therefore, no assistance can be derived from this judgment. 17. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 18. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.