ORDER : (B. S. BHANUMATHI, J.) This revision under Section 115 CPC is directed against the order and decree, dated 30.08.2023, dismissing I.A.No.153 of 2023 in O.S.No.173 of 2011 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Chodavaram, filed by the defendants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 read with Section 151 CPC to condone delay of 1978 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 21.08.2017, passed in the above suit. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 3. The case of the defendants, as stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, in brief, are as follows: The suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants seeking partition of the suit schedule property. As no written statement was filed on behalf of the defendants, the trial Court set the defendants ex parte and passed decree, dated 21.08.2017, in favour of the plaintiffs. The 1 st defendant is an old lady and unable to move out of the bed and for the said reason, the other defendants 2 to 4 were looking after her health and welfare, and therefore, the written statement could not be filed in the stipulated time due to spread of the corona pandemic. As her health further deteriorated, the defendants could not file petition to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 21.08.2017. Non-filing of the petition to set aside the ex parte decree is neither wilful nor wanton. Hence, this petition to condone the delay of 1978 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 21.08.2017. 4. As her health further deteriorated, the defendants could not file petition to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 21.08.2017. Non-filing of the petition to set aside the ex parte decree is neither wilful nor wanton. Hence, this petition to condone the delay of 1978 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 21.08.2017. 4. The 2 nd respondent filed counter opposing the petition and contending as follows: The plaintiff filed the suit in the year 2011; that the defendants 1 to 4 received the suit summons and engaged their counsels and filed their written statement and contested the same and subsequently in the final decree petition also the defendants received the court notices and they were set ex parte in the final decree petition on 03.08.2018 and 12.10.2018; that the petitioners/defendants having knowledge about the suit proceedings and also final decree proceedings, wilfully and wantonly did not contest in the suit and also in the final decree petition; that after a lapse of 12 years period from the date of the suit, now the defendants filed the present petition with all false allegations with a view to drag on the proceedings and to avoid delivery of the decree schedule properties to the DHr; that all other allegations are false; that the delay of 1978 days is abnormal; that day-to-day’s delay was not explained; that no medical certificate in proof of ill-health was filed; that there are no valid reasons and that the petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. After hearing both parties, the trial Court dismissed the petition on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown to condone abnormally long delay of 1978 days. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants preferred this revision petition. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that though the petitioners have stated in their affidavit that they could not file the written statement in time due to Corona, it is a mistaken fact as they had filed written statements as recorded in the judgment of the trial Court which is sought to be set aside. However, she submitted that a preliminary decree passed by the trial Court is erroneous as no share was allotted to the defendants, though the suit is for partition. However, she submitted that a preliminary decree passed by the trial Court is erroneous as no share was allotted to the defendants, though the suit is for partition. She further submitted that since the defendants are illiterate and the 1 st defendant is an old and sick person, the suit could not be effectively prosecuted and therefore the delay may be condoned, to provide a fair opportunity to decide the merits, rather than passing the decree ex parte. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2/plaintiff No.2 submitted that the reason stated for their delay i.e., the petitioners could not file the written statement in time is a false statement and further reason stated for non filing of the written statement is due to ‘Corona’ pandemic is yet another false statement since the preliminary decree was passed on 21.08.2017 and the period of Corona is during 2020 and thereafter. Nextly, he submitted that the merits of the decree cannot be challenged in the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act or under Order IX rule 13 CPC as they can be challenged only in appeal and placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs & others Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) , [[2024] 4 S.C.R 241] where in at para No.26 the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to consider the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act. He further submitted that the first petitioner is not an old woman to ignore the proceedings. He further submitted that it is not only in the suit, the petitioners appeared, they had received notice in the final decree petition and on commissioner’s appointment and also further these petitioners appeared before the Commissioner at the time of the final decree proceedings and that these petitions were filed in a casual manner after filing of the execution petition just to protract the execution proceedings. Under these circumstances, he submitted that the petitioner certainly failed to show sufficient cause for condoning exorbitant delay of 1978 days. He further submitted that it is not only in the application under section 5 of Limitation Act, the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause, but also in the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 petition. He placed reliance on the decisions in (i) Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. He further submitted that it is not only in the application under section 5 of Limitation Act, the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause, but also in the petition under Order 9 Rule 13 petition. He placed reliance on the decisions in (i) Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. and others etc Vs State of UP , [(2019) 5 ALT (SC) 298] (ii) G. Saraswathi Vs. G. Malleswari , [(2022) 0 Supreme (AP) 383] with regard to appreciation of the ‘sufficient cause’ for the absence in the suit proceedings. He further submitted that since the judgment was passed with reasons, regular appeal should be filed and the remedy is not to file petition under Order IX rule 13 CPC 9. In reply, the learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the trial Court disposed of only petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act, and therefore, the arguments regarding petition under Order IX, rule 13 CPC need not be considered. 10(a) In Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. (1 supra), it was held at para No.26 as follows: “26. In reply, the learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the trial Court disposed of only petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act, and therefore, the arguments regarding petition under Order IX, rule 13 CPC need not be considered. 10(a) In Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. (1 supra), it was held at para No.26 as follows: “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” b. In Baljeet Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. (2 nd supra), it was held at para No.8 as follows: “8…….It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. (2 nd supra), it was held at para No.8 as follows: “8…….It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” c. In G. Saraswathi vs. G. Malleswari (3 rd supra), this Court referred the decision in Parimal Vs. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” c. In G. Saraswathi vs. G. Malleswari (3 rd supra), this Court referred the decision in Parimal Vs. Veena [ (2011) 3 SCC 545 ], wherein it was held at para Nos.13 & 16 as follows: "13. "Sufficient cause" is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been "not acting diligently" or "remaining inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (Vide Ramial v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 361 ], Lonand Gram panchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [ AIR 1968 SC 222 ], Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood [ (1992) 1 SCC 70 ] and Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. (2010) 5 SCC 459 ]. 16. In order to determine the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, the test that has to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely intended to remain present when the suit was called on for hearing and did his best to do so. Sufficient cause is thus the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application.” 10. Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application.” 10. It is settled principle of law that the length of delay is not the criterion, but sufficiency of the cause of the delay is the criterion to condone delay or not. 11. In the present case, it is the specific case of the revision petitioner that they could not file the written statement in time due to Corona, but it is false as pointed out in the arguments by the respondent No.2. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that since the defendants are illiterate and the 1 st defendant is an old and sick person, the suit could not be effectively prosecuted and therefore the delay may be condoned, to provide a fair opportunity to decide the merits, rather than passing the decree ex parte. Both the reasons stated for the delay are false. Then, they failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay. The defendants, having ample time and opportunity, did not pursue their case vigilantly. 12. Since petition under Order IX, rule 13 CPC is not under consideration, this Court does not go into the question whether the petitioners can file such petition or should file only appeal. 13. Thus, viewed from any angle, there appears neither ‘sufficient reason’ for condoning the delay nor any reason to adopt a lenient approach in favour of the revision petitioners. The trial Court rightly dismissed the petition and this Court is of the view that there are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. 14. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.