ORDER : Farjand Ali, J. 1. The petitioners have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the very registration of FIR No. 24/2023 at Police Station Pipar City, Jodhpur Rural, which alleges the commission of offences under Sections 447, 504, 506, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 66-E of the Information Technology Act, 2000. 2. At the very threshold of the proceedings, the learned Public Prosecutor placed on record a detailed factual report dated 06.02.2025, as submitted by the Station House Officer (SHO) concerned. A careful perusal of the said report reveals that, following a comprehensive investigation, the allegations under Sections 504, 506, and 120-B of the IPC, as well as Section 66-E of the IT Act, were found to be unsubstantiated. The investigation agency, however, has concluded that the petitioner, Heer Devi, is culpable solely under Section 447 of the IPC. The report has been taken on record and considered appropriately. 3. Since the investigating agency itself has not found sufficient material to invoke Sections 504, 506, and 120-B of the IPC and Section 66-E of the IT Act, there remains no necessity for this Court to delve into the validity of these charges. However, in the interest of ensuring fairness and preventing misuse of the criminal justice system, it is hereby directed that the prosecution agency shall not revive or reintroduce these offences against the petitioner at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. 4. I have meticulously considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both parties and have thoroughly examined the materials placed before this Court. At this juncture, it is imperative to consider the scope and application of Section 447 of the IPC, which prescribes punishment for criminal trespass in the following terms: "Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both." 5. The essence of this provision lies in the act of unlawful entry upon another’s property with an intent to commit an offence, intimidate, insult, or annoy the rightful possessor. The essence of this provision lies in the act of unlawful entry upon another’s property with an intent to commit an offence, intimidate, insult, or annoy the rightful possessor. It is a well-settled legal principle that, in order to establish the offence of criminal trespass, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the complainant was in exclusive possession of the disputed property and that the accused, without lawful justification, forcibly entered with the requisite intent to cause harm, intimidation, or annoyance. Moreover, it is a settled proposition of law that where the question of possession itself is disputed or where civil litigation regarding ownership or occupation is pending, the invocation of Section 447 of the IPC becomes highly contentious. The prosecution must adduce cogent evidence to demonstrate that the entry into the property was accompanied by a criminal intent. Mere physical presence on a disputed property, devoid of such intent, does not suffice to attract the penal consequences under this provision. 6. Upon careful scrutiny of the materials on record, including the order dated 31.01.2019 passed by the Board of Revenue in a petition filed by the petitioner Heer Devi, it is manifestly evident that civil disputes between the parties are pending before various judicial forums. The Board of Revenue has categorically restrained both parties from alienating or transferring the property in any manner. The land in question is an open land, and litigation regarding its proprietary rights is actively ongoing before competent authorities. 7. In cases involving open lands subject to bona fide disputes, the mere act of stepping onto the land cannot, by itself, constitute the offence of criminal trespass unless it is unequivocally established that such entry was with the explicit intent to commit an offence, intimidate, insult, or annoy the lawful possessor. The definition of criminal trespass, as encapsulated in Section 441 of the IPC, underscores the necessity of proving such intent. 8. In the present case, although the investigating agency has sought to invoke Section 447 of the IPC against the petitioner, the only basis for doing so appears to be the petitioner’s physical presence on the disputed agricultural land. The investigation report is conspicuously silent on whether such entry was accompanied by any criminal intent directed toward the complainant, Smt. Nirmala Devi W/o Dinesh Kumar. The investigation report is conspicuously silent on whether such entry was accompanied by any criminal intent directed toward the complainant, Smt. Nirmala Devi W/o Dinesh Kumar. In the absence of such material, the very foundation of the prosecution’s case under Section 447 of the IPC becomes untenable. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that, in the absence of substantive evidence to demonstrate that the petitioner’s entry onto the disputed property was actuated by any criminal intent as required under Section 447 of the IPC, the continuation of criminal proceedings would be wholly unjustified. More significantly, in cases where bona fide disputes regarding proprietary rights and possession are already pending before competent civil courts, the invocation of criminal law should not be permitted as an instrument of harassment. Permitting such an approach would amount to an abuse of the process of law and an impermissible encroachment upon the domain of civil adjudication. 10. The settled principle of law dictates that where civil litigation is pending between parties, one party cannot be allowed to invoke the criminal machinery as a tool to exert undue pressure or to settle civil disputes under the garb of criminal allegations. The criminal justice system cannot be misused to usurp matters that are essentially civil in nature, particularly when the question of possession remains unresolved before a civil court. 11. In light of the above, the instant Miscellaneous Petition deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, FIR No. 24/2023, registered at Police Station Pipar City, Jodhpur Rural, along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, is hereby quashed and set aside. The Station House Officer (SHO) concerned is directed to submit a closure report before the trial court within a period of forty (40) days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 12. In consequence, the stay petition also stands disposed of.