JUDGMENT : Muralee Krishna S., J. 1. The appellant who is the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.43404 of 2024 filed this appeal under Section 5 (i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 , against the judgment dated 16.12.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the appellant challenging Ext.P4 order dated 28.11.2024 issued by the 2 nd respondent transferring him from Shirdi Airport Site to Manipur International Airport site and also claiming reliefs pertaining to payment of salary in arrears to him was closed holding that nothing survives in the writ petition. 2. The appellant entered service in the 2 nd respondent Kerala Industrial and Technical Consultancy Organisation (KITCO) Ltd. in the year 2005 as a Consultant Grade-II. He was promoted as Consultant Grade-I in 2009, Senior Consultant Grade-II in 2013 and Senior Consultant Grade-I in 2017. As per Ext.P1 order dated 24.06.2023, he was transferred to Shirdi as Project Director-Shirdi Airport and Head-West Region. While he was working at Shirdi, as per Ext.P4 order dated 28.11.2024 he was transferred to the Site of International Airport Project at Manipur with effect from 16.12.2024. Apart from challenging this transfer order, in the writ petition, the appellant pleaded that as per Ext.P7 e-mail communication dated 29.04.2020 salary of the employees of the 2 nd respondent was reduced by 20%, claiming loss in the financial year 2019-2020. It was assured in Ext.P7 that the financial condition will be reviewed after six months and if the position improves, the deducted amount shall be disbursed. According to the appellant, the 2 nd respondent appointed new employees with full wages and even then did not review the deduction of the salary of the existing employees as promised in Ext.P7. Therefore, the appellant filed W.P.(C)No.43404 of 2024 and sought a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4 transfer order and Ext.P7 communication regarding the deduction of salary of employees by 20% and other consequential reliefs. 3. Therefore, the appellant filed W.P.(C)No.43404 of 2024 and sought a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4 transfer order and Ext.P7 communication regarding the deduction of salary of employees by 20% and other consequential reliefs. 3. When the writ petition came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge directed the 2 nd respondent to remit the salary of the appellant for two months forthwith to enable the appellant to join his transferred place at Imphal, taking into consideration the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant wants to go and join at Imphal and due to non-payment of salary for four months, he was unable to move out because of financial difficulty faced by him. In compliance with the direction of the learned Single Judge the Managing Director of the 2 nd respondent appeared before the Court on 13.12.2024 and produced proof of remittance of Rs.2,98,378/- as salary to the appellant. Noting these facts, the learned Single Judge closed the writ petition and granted the appellant time till 23.12.2024 to join his transferred place at Imphal. It is thereafter the appellant filed the above writ appeal. 4. On 20.12.2024 when this writ appeal was taken up for consideration, the learned Senior Government Pleader took notice on admission for the 1 st respondent. We directed the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent to file counter affidavit of the 2 nd respondent, since the writ petition was closed at the admission stage without the counter affidavit of the 2 nd respondent being placed on record. Having considered the submissions made at the Bar, we granted an interim order permitting the appellant to continue as Project Director, Shirdi Airport, Maharashtra in case he has not already been relieved. 5. The 2 nd respondent filed counter affidavit producing therewith Annexures R2(a) to R2(d), specifically denying the pleadings in the writ petition as well as in the writ appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Standing Counsel for the 2 nd respondent and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant has been working at Shirdi Airport Site from the year 2023 onwards as a Project Director. He is a very efficient staff and the persons who entrusted the contract to KITCO are very much satisfied with the work of the appellant. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant has been working at Shirdi Airport Site from the year 2023 onwards as a Project Director. He is a very efficient staff and the persons who entrusted the contract to KITCO are very much satisfied with the work of the appellant. It will take more than three years to complete the work of the project now undertaken at Shirdi Airport. The appellant is not willing to go to Imphal due to dangerous working conditions at Manipur. Moreover, the nonpayment of 20% of salary as per Ext.P7 communication issued by the 2 nd respondent, the appellant finds it difficult to move to Manipur. By way of Exts.P14 to P16 e-mail communications, some similarly placed employees at Imphal have informed the 2 nd respondent about the threat they are facing at Imphal. Though the appellant informed the 2 nd respondent by Ext.P17 request to reconsider his transfer, it was not considered favourably. The working atmosphere of the employees worsened after the taking over of the charge by the present Managing Director and hence the workers started agitation. Some of them filed complaints before the Labour Commissioner and before the Government and now the Government intends to take over the 2 nd respondent Company. Moreover, as per the order dated 21.01.2025, the Labour Commissioner prevented transfer and other actions against the employees till the meeting by the Minister for General Education and Labour is being conducted in pursuance to the complaints filed by the employees. If the transfer order is not set aside, it will cause irreparable hardships to the appellant. 8. The learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent submitted that it is true that a decision was taken on 21.01.2025 by the Labour Commissioner restraining the 2 nd respondent from effecting further transfers or other actions of any kind against the employees till the completion of the meeting scheduled by the Minister of General Education and Labour. But the Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act to take such a decision. Moreover, it is after the issuance of Ext.P4 transfer order, the said decision was taken by the Labour Commissioner and hence it is not applicable to the case of the appellant. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that for 20 years, i.e., from 2005 to 2023 the appellant was working in the Headquarters at Kochi. Moreover, it is after the issuance of Ext.P4 transfer order, the said decision was taken by the Labour Commissioner and hence it is not applicable to the case of the appellant. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that for 20 years, i.e., from 2005 to 2023 the appellant was working in the Headquarters at Kochi. He was transferred to Shirdi since his service was necessitated therein. Now, his service is required at Imphal and hence he was transferred to that place by virtue of Ext.P4 transfer order. In Annexure R2(d) appointment order dated 01.10.2005 by which the appellant was appointed in KITCO, there is a clause that he is liable to be transferred all over India without payment or any other allowance other than travelling allowance or such other compensatory allowance as may be admissible from time to time. At the time of joining the 2 nd respondent Company, the appellant agreed the conditions in Annexure R2(d) by endorsing in his handwriting. Hence now he cannot turn around and claim to be retained at Shirdi. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani [ (1989) 2 SCC 602 ] and Union of India v. Deepak Niranjan Nath Pandit [ AIR 2020 SC 1492 ] in support of her contention that an employee holding transferable job cannot claim retainment in a particular station since transferring of an employee is a matter to be decided by the management. As far as Ext.P7 communication pertaining to the deduction of salary of the employees, the learned counsel submitted that the said decision was taken by the management on the recommendation of the Internal Committee of Senior Officers in which the appellant was also a party. It is also argued by the learned counsel that an appeal is not maintainable against KITCO since the share of the government in the company is only 3% and that issue is under consideration of the Apex Court in SLP No.9327 of 2024. 9. The learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the decision taken by the Labour Commissioner is applicable to the transfer of the appellant also since he will come under the definition of workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Government is taking speedy steps to take over the 2 nd respondent. 10. 9. The learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the decision taken by the Labour Commissioner is applicable to the transfer of the appellant also since he will come under the definition of workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Government is taking speedy steps to take over the 2 nd respondent. 10. The appellant who was appointed in the 2 nd respondent Company continued in the Head office of the Company at Kochi, from 14.10.2005 till he was transferred to Shirdi on 10.07.2023. He is challenging Ext.P4 transfer order by which he was transferred from Shirdi to Manipur stating that the service conditions at Manipur are dangerous. He further claims that due to the deduction of salary by virtue of Ext.P7 communication and also due to non-payment of salary for the last few months he is financially in a difficult situation to move to Manipur. 11. The decision for deduction of 20% of the salary of the employees was taken in the year 2020. According to the respondents, the appellant was also a party to the said decision, being one of the members of the Internal Committee of Senior Officers which recommended the management to reduce the salary. The financial condition of the Company has not improved and hence the decision could not be reviewed after six months as mentioned in Ext.P7. It is contended by the 2 nd respondent that a new entrant to the company is recruited with Cost to Company (CTC) having no additional benefits. Therefore, no deduction in salary was made to the new appointees. 12. From Ext.P7 it is evident that the decision for deduction of 20% of the salary payable to the employees, was intimated to the appellant by the Internal Committee of Senior Officers. The decision was taken considering the financial condition of the company. The appellant has not disputed the contention in the counter affidavit of the 2 nd respondent that the loss of the Company touched to Rs.12.80 Crores as on 30.11.2024. The appellant did not challenge the decision to reduce the salary till the filing of the writ petition. No statutory violation was pointed out by the appellant in the decision to reduce the salary of the employees to meet the financial condition of the Company. The appellant did not challenge the decision to reduce the salary till the filing of the writ petition. No statutory violation was pointed out by the appellant in the decision to reduce the salary of the employees to meet the financial condition of the Company. After the filing of the writ petition, the monthly salary arrears due to the appellant was paid by the 2 nd respondent as directed by the learned Single Judge on a submission by the counsel for the appellant that if the salary is paid, the appellant is ready to move to Imphal. Accordingly, a sum of Rs.2,98,378/- was paid to the appellant by the 2 nd respondent towards salary arrears. In such circumstances, we do not find any sufficient reason in the contention of the appellant that he is not in a position to move to Manipur due to non-payment of salary. 13. It is trite that interference of the Court in an order of transfer by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of an employee holding a transferable post without any violation of statutory provision is not permissible unless it is proved that a transfer order was suffering from mala fides. The appellant has no claim that Ext.P4 transfer order was issued in violation of any statutory provision. As noticed above, his contention is that the working condition at Manipur is bad and some other employees who had already posted therein have complained about the working condition to the 2 nd respondent. 14. In Atmaram Sungomal Poshani [(1989) 2 SCC 602] the Apex Court held thus: “Transfer of a Government servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the other is an incident of service. No Government servant or employee of Public Undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the Public administration. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to the competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to the competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. If the order of transfer is not stayed, modified or cancelled the concerned public servant must carry out the order of transfer. In the absence of any stay of the transfer order a public servant has no justification to avoid or evade the transfer order merely on the ground of having made a representation, or on the ground of his difficulty in moving from one place to the other. If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance to the transfer order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant Rules, as has happened in the instant case. The respondent lost his service as he refused to comply with the order of his transfer from one place to the other”.(emphasis supplied) 15. In Union of India v. S.L Abbas [(1993) 4 SCC 357] the Apex Court held thus: “Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration.”(emphasis supplied) 16. In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd v. Shri Bhagwan [ (2001) 8 SCC 574 ] the Apex Court held thus: “It is by now well-settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public Undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the Tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they are the Appellate Authorities substituting their own decision for that of the Management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.”(emphasis supplied) 17. In State of U.P v. Gobardhan Lal [(2004) 11 SCC 402] the Apex Court held thus: “It is too late in the day for any Government Servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or Rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision”. 18. This Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision”. 18. In Deepak Niranjan Nath Pandit [AIR 2020 SC 1492] the Apex Court while considering the transfer of an Assistant Commissioner of Customs, GST and Central Excise from Mumbai to Bhubaneswar held thus: “The High Court, in interfering with the order of transfer, has relied on two circumstances. Firstly, the High Court has noted that as a result of the stay on the order of transfer, the headquarters of the respondent will remain at Mumbai and even if he is to be suspended, his headquarters will continue to remain at Mumbai. The second reason, which has weighed with the High Court, is that the spouse of the respondent suffers from a cardiac ailment and is obtaining medical treatment in Mumbai. In our view, neither of these reasons can furnish a valid justification for the High Court to take recourse to its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in passing an order of injunction of this nature. Significantly, the High Court has not even found a prima facie case to the effect that the order of transfer was either mala fide or in breach of law. The High Court could not have dictated to the employer as to where the respondent should be posted during the period of suspension. Individual hardships are matters for the Union of India, as an employer, to take a dispassionate view. However, we are categorically of the view that the impugned order of the High Court interfering with the order of transfer was in excess of jurisdiction and an improper exercise of judicial power. We are constrained to observe that the impugned order has been passed in breach of the settled principles and precedents which have consistently been enunciated and followed by this Court. The manner in which judicial power has been exercised by the High Court to stall a lawful order of transfer is disquieting. We express our disapproval”. 19. We are constrained to observe that the impugned order has been passed in breach of the settled principles and precedents which have consistently been enunciated and followed by this Court. The manner in which judicial power has been exercised by the High Court to stall a lawful order of transfer is disquieting. We express our disapproval”. 19. In Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and others [ 2024 SCC Online SC 279 ] the Apex Court held thus: “In view of the foregoing enunciation of law by judicial decisions of this Court, it is clear that in absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. In the sequel of the said settled norms, the scope of judicial review is not permissible by the Courts in exercising of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”(emphasis supplied) 20. This Court in Mayadevi M.P and another v. Canara Bank and others [ 2015 (4) KHC 874 ] held that an order of transfer cannot be interfered with in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order of transfer. It is far too late in the day to assert that, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with an order of transfer of an employee as if it is sitting in appeal over such an order issued by the employer. The scope of judicial review in this area is very limited. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, this Court cannot interfere with an order of transfer of an employee. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. Therefore, a mere assertion in the writ petition that the orders of transfer are 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot therefore sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. The concept being basically different, this Court cannot even draw an inference that the order of transfer issued by the employer is vitiated by mala fides or on extraneous considerations or with oblique motives unless it is specifically pleaded in the writ petition with reliable materials, which are sufficient to draw an inference of any vitiating circumstances influencing such an order of transfer. 21. Again, in Nixy James v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation [ 2023 (3) KLT 893 ] , this Court held that the law is too well settled that transfer is an incidence of service and the employee has no legal right in this regard. It is also well settled that, unless the orders of transfer are vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides, Courts should be loathe to interfere with them. 22. Admittedly, the appellant has been working at Kochi from 2005 onwards. He was transferred to Shirdi in the year 2023. As per Ext.P4 he was transferred to Manipal which according to the 2 nd respondent is due to administrative reasons. Though he claims that the transfer has caused him personal difficulty, he has no case that the order was issued in violation of any statutory provision. As noticed above, in the writ petition, the appellant has not raised any specific allegation that Ext.P4 transfer order was issued with mala fides. A pleading to that effect is completely absent in the writ petition. The materials on record do not show any statutory violation in the transfer order. So also, there are no materials to say it as vitiated by mala fides. 23. Having considered the pleadings and the materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no sufficient circumstance to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the result, the writ appeal fails and accordingly stands dismissed.