JUDGMENT : (M.S. Sonak J.) 1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Rule. The rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties. 3. This Petition is concerned with the assessment year 2014-2015. 4. By instituting this Petition, the Petitioner challenges the impugned intimation under Section 143 (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Exhibit-D) and the impugned order dated 12 February 2021, made by the commissioner under Section 264 of the I.T Act, 1964 dismissing the petitioner’s revision against the impugned intimation dated 8 July 2013. 5. Upon reviewing the impugned order dated 12 February 2021, we find that the commissioner has effectively declined to exercise revisional jurisdiction on the following two grounds: A.- because the Petitioner has an alternate remedy of instituting an Appeal against the impugned intimation dated 8 July 2015. B- because intimation dated 8 July 2015 under Section 143 (1) of the IT Act, 1961 is not an ‘order’ revisable under Section 264 of the IT Act. 6. Regarding the first ground, we refer to the provisions of Section 264 of the IT Act, 1961, in which no such limitation is to be found or based on which the commissioner could have declined to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. Coordinate Bench, in the case of Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 23(1), Mumbai, (2021)127 Taxmann. Com 819 (Bombay), in similar circumstances where the commissioner had declined to exercise revisional jurisdiction because the order was appealable and the assessee had chosen not to institute an Appeal, held that revision authority could not have refused to exercise its revision jurisdiction on such a ground. 7. The discussion relevant to the above issue in paragraph 19, 20 and 21 is transcribed below for the convenience of reference:- “….19. What is relevant for our purposes is section 264 (4)(a) of the Income Tax Act. Under this section, the Principal Commissioner is mandated not to revise any order in two situations: first where an appeal that lies to the Commissioner (Appeals) but has not been made and the time within which such appeal may be made has not expired or second, where the assessee has not waived his right of appeal. Under this section, the Principal Commissioner is mandated not to revise any order in two situations: first where an appeal that lies to the Commissioner (Appeals) but has not been made and the time within which such appeal may be made has not expired or second, where the assessee has not waived his right of appeal. What emerges is that in a situation where there is an appeal that lies to the Commissioner appeals and which has not been made and the time to make such an appeal has not expired in that case the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner cannot revise any order in respect of which such appeal lies. The language is quite clear that the two conditions are cumulative viz: there should be an appeal which lies but has not been made and the time for filing such appeal has not expired in such a case the Principal Commissioner cannot revise. However, if the time for making such an appeal has expired then it would be imperative that the Principal Commissioner would exercise his powers of revision under section 264. The other or second situation is when the Petitioner assessee has not waived his right of appeal; even in such a situation the Commissioner cannot exercise his powers of revision under section 264 (4) (a). In clause (a) of section 264 (4), in the language between filing of an appeal and the expiry of such period and the waiver of the assessee to his right of appeal there is an "or" thereby meaning that there is an option i.e either the assessee should not have filed an appeal and the period of filing the same should have expired or he should have waived such right. Therefore, there are two situations which are contemplated in said sub-section (4) (a) of section 264. The section cannot be interpreted to mean that for the Principal Commissioner to exercise his powers of revision under section 264 not only that the time for filing the appeal should have expired but also that the assessee should have waived his right of appeal. We are afraid that, that is not how the section can be read. In the facts of the case, Petitioner has not filed appeal against order under section 143 (1) under section 246-A of the Income Tax Act and the time of 30 days to file the same has also admittedly expired. We are afraid that, that is not how the section can be read. In the facts of the case, Petitioner has not filed appeal against order under section 143 (1) under section 246-A of the Income Tax Act and the time of 30 days to file the same has also admittedly expired. In our view, once such an option has been exercised, a plain reading of the section suggests that it would not then be necessary for Petitioner to waive such right. That waiver would have been necessary if the time to file the appeal would not have expired. 20. Also the argument of the Revenue to say that the Petitioner can still file the appeal by filing an application for condonation of delay, is in our view, not proper and would be a fallacious proposition as after the period of 30 days, there is no right of appeal but an appeal would rest on the discretion of the Appellate Authority to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown. We are also afraid that we are unable to agree with the reliance of the learned counsel for the Revenue on the case of Dwarka Nath (supra), inasmuch as that was a case where no appeal lay against the order of the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Commissioner and Therefore the Commissioner certainly had power to revise the said order. The said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In this case though an appeal lay before the Commissioner (Appeals), Petitioner has chosen not to file the same and the time to file the same has already expired. Therefore in our view the decision in the case of Dwarka Nath (supra)has no application to the facts of this case. 21. Before parting, we would also like to observe that in matters like these, where the errors can be rectified by the authorities, the whole idea of relegating or subjecting the assessee to the appeal machinery or even discretionary jurisdiction of high court, in our view, is uncalled for and would be wholly avoidable. The provisions in the Income- tax Act for rectification, revision under section 264 are meant for the benefit of the assessee and not to put him to inconvenience. That cannot and could not have been the object of these provisions. The provisions in the Income- tax Act for rectification, revision under section 264 are meant for the benefit of the assessee and not to put him to inconvenience. That cannot and could not have been the object of these provisions. We do not find any statement either in the impugned order or in the reply to state that the case of the Petitioner seeking remedy of the purported error was not bona fide….” 8. The revisional authority's reason for declining to exercise revisional jurisdiction is contrary to the law, as explained by Sayed (supra). 9. In so far as, the second reason is concerned, another Co- ordinate Bench in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Anderson Marine & Sons (P.) Ltd. , [2004 139 Taxman 16 (Bombay)] has held an intimation under Section 143 (1) is an order for the purposes of Section 264 of the I.T Act, 1961 and hence, the same is revisable. 10. The discussion relevant to the above issue in paragraph No. 6, which is transcribed bellow for the convenience of reference: - “….6. It is relevant to note that the Tribunal has accepted the argument canvassed on behalf of the assessee mainly on the reasoning that the intimation does not partake of the character of an order, as envisaged by the provisions of section 143 of the Act. It has not based its decision on any other consideration. We shall examine the matter only in that context. The immediate question that arises is, what is the purport of section 143 of the Act. Indeed, after the amendment of 1989 there has been a perceptible shift in the procedure regarding assessment. Section 143(1) is a provision regarding procedure of self assessment. The Assessing Officer has to scrutinize the return as filed by the assessee and send intimation with regard to deficit tax or interest or for refund, as the case may be. The first proviso to sub-section (1) postulates that even the acknowledgement of the return shall be deemed to be an intimation for the purposes of that provision where either no sum is payable by the assessee or no refund is due to be an intimation for berpandates that no intimation under the said sube section shall be sent after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the return is made. The scheme of this provision is that the return as filed by the assessee should be accepted at its face value being self-assessmen However, the said sub-section is without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2). Sub- section (2) of section 143 provides that on furnishing of the return, if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any claim of loss, exemption, deduction, allowance or relief made in the return is inadmissible, he can serve notice on the assessee specifying such claim of loss, exemption, allowance or relief, and require the assessee on the specified date to produce or cause to be produced any evidence or particulars specified therein or on which the assessee may rely in support of such claim. However, this power by virtue of the proviso to sub-section (2) is required to be exercised within 12 months from the end of the month in which the return is furnished. If the Assessing Officer invokes that power, then on further inquiry as referred to in sub- section (3), he would make an order in writing allowing or rejecting the claim or claims specified in the notice given to the assessee and make an assessment determining the total income or loss accordingly, and determine the surn payable by the assessee on the basis of such assessment. Indeed, the order passed under sub- section (3) of section 143 is 'regular assessment' within the meaning of section 2(40) of the Act which defines 'regular assessment' as meaning the assessment made under sub- section (3) of section 143 or section 144, Section 2(40) which defines 'regular assessment', was amended by the Finance Act, 1990, with effect from April 1, 1989, which corresponds to the amendment effected in section 143(1) of the Act. In other words, the procedure for assessment has been simplified so as to dispense with a regular assessment order to be passed by the Assessing Officer in every case. The question is, whether acceptance or acknowledgement of the return filed by the assessee and intimation sent for the purpose of section 143(1) is an assessment? The answer, in our opinion, is in the affirmative. It is nevertheless 'assessment. Assessment has been defined in section 2(8) as 'assessment includes reassessment'. Section 143, as a whole, is a provision regarding assessment. The question is, whether acceptance or acknowledgement of the return filed by the assessee and intimation sent for the purpose of section 143(1) is an assessment? The answer, in our opinion, is in the affirmative. It is nevertheless 'assessment. Assessment has been defined in section 2(8) as 'assessment includes reassessment'. Section 143, as a whole, is a provision regarding assessment. The modalities and procedure for assessment have been provided for in sub-section (1), which is different from the procedure under sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3) of the same provision. In both cases, it is a proceeding under the Act and the assessment accepted or made by the Revenue, as the case may be. In the latter case, ie, section 143(3), an order is passed; whereas in the former case, that is, section 143(1), it is an intimation or acknowledgement. Nevertheless, the intimation sent by the Assessing Officer, in law, will have to be understood as having the force of an order on self- assessment. Only this construction would be purposive construction. If the argument of the assessee was to be accepted that there is no order passed by the Assessing Officer, that would mean that there has been no assessment on the return filed by the assessee. Such construction would militate against the interest of the assessee. The construction put by us is reinforced by the legal fiction provided in the amended provision, which postulates that 'intimation' shall be deemed to be notice of demand issued under section 156 and all the provisions of the Act shall apply accordingly. On a plain reading of section 156 of the Act, notice of demand is served upon the assessee when any tax, interest, penalty, fine or other sum is payable in consequence of any order passed under the Act. To put it differently, issuance of notice of demand [read intimation under section 143(1) of the Act), presupposes that it is in consequence of an order having been passed under the Act. In that sense 'intimation' under section 143(1) would partake of the colour of an order passed under the Act. Understood thus, interference under section 263 of the Act by the Commissioner even against an intimation referable to section 143(1) is open. In that sense 'intimation' under section 143(1) would partake of the colour of an order passed under the Act. Understood thus, interference under section 263 of the Act by the Commissioner even against an intimation referable to section 143(1) is open. We are persuaded to take this view because if the Legislature had intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the Commissioner in respect of proceeding under section 143(1) of the Act, which is also an assessment and, therefore, in the nature of an order, it would have expressly made provision in that behalf, just as it has amended section 154 of the Act by the Finance Act, 1999, in respect of the provision for 'rectification of mistake' as a consequential amendment made to envelop the amended section 143(1) of the Act. It will be useful to advert to section 142 of the Act which enables the Assessing Officer to make inquiry before assessment, after the return of income under section 139 of the Act is filed by the assessee. Section 142 precedes section 143 and is not restricted only to the assessment order to be passed within the meaning of section 143(3) of the Act. In other words, on the filing of the return under section 139, if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that an in- appropriate claim has been made by the assessee in the return, before sending the intimation under section 143(1) he can make such inquiry and if he is satisfied in that inquiry about the inappropriate claim of the assessee, he can proceed in terms of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of section 143. This appears to be the scheme regarding the procedure of assessment of the return filed by the assessee. Accordingly, as already observed by us earlier, in both situations, it is the decision of the Assessing Officer whether to send intimation or to proceed under sub-section (2) of section 143. That is surely a process of taking a decision in the matter. Sending the intimation being a decision of acceptance of self-assessment is, therefore, in the nature of the order passed by the Assessing Officer for the purpose of section 263 of the Act. In the other situation, the action culminates with the order in writing under section 143(3) of the Act, which is indubitably amenable to section 263 of the Act. Sending the intimation being a decision of acceptance of self-assessment is, therefore, in the nature of the order passed by the Assessing Officer for the purpose of section 263 of the Act. In the other situation, the action culminates with the order in writing under section 143(3) of the Act, which is indubitably amenable to section 263 of the Act. On the above reasoning, the decisions relied upon on behalf of the respondent-assessee will be of no avail. The decision in the case of Smt. Prakashwati (supra) is on the proposition that no interference under section 263 is warranted in respect of summary assessment of a small assessee. In the first place, in that case the assessment years were 1984-85 and 1985-86, which is prior to the amendment of 1989. Secondly, as a fact it was found that in respect of the assessment year 1984-85 the assessee was liable to tax of Rs. 80 while in respect of the other year tax liability was of Rs. 475. The Allahabad High Court relying on the decision of our High Court in CWT v. Executors of Late D.T. Udeshi [1991] 189 ITR 319, declined to enter into reference under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act having regard to the smallness of the prejudice that was to be caused to the interests of the Revenue. The Court, therefore, found that invocation of power under section 263 was inappropriate. Even in the case of Nazir Singh (supra) a more or less similar position was noticed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, inasmuch as, the liability of the payment of the assessee was only around Rs. 1,300. It is in that backdrop, the Madhya Pradesh High Court took the view that section 263 of the Act was not available and ought not to have been invoked, in such cases. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has referred to the Board's Circular Nos. 4 dated July 8, 1986 and 176 dated August 26, 1987, which provide that no remedial action was necessary for summary assessment as the revenue loss, if any, was consciously suffered by the Government in utilising resources in scrutiny and investigation of larger cases. In that sense, this decision is also of no avail to the respondent. In our view, in the present case, the Tribunal has not based its opinion on the said circulars as such. In that sense, this decision is also of no avail to the respondent. In our view, in the present case, the Tribunal has not based its opinion on the said circulars as such. On the other hand, having regard to the case as made out by the Commissioner for exercising power under section 263, that the respondent-assessee was liable to pay income-tax to the extent of Rs. 49,23,078 being 30 per cent deemed income on the specified items, if that case is established, then obviously, it is not a case of smallness of the revenue involved as was the case before the Allahabad High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Although the respondent-assessee may be justified in contending that the decisions of the Madras High Court in Chidambaram Construction Co.'s case (supra), as well as of our High Court in the case of Rajkumar Dipchand Phade (supra) are not applicable because in those cases, the power was exercised under section 263 in respect of summary assessment made under unamended section 143(1) of the Act, however, for the reasons already recorded above, we find no substance in the argument of the respondent- assessee and in particular the reasons recorded by the Tribunal in taking the view that the Commissioner could not have exercised jurisdiction under section 263 in respect of the assessment under section 143(1) as applicable after April 1, 1989. As the Tribunal has proceeded to decide the matter on the solitary ground referred to above, it is not necessary for us to examine any other contention. On the other hand, we would think it appropriate while setting aside the impugned decision, to remit the case to the Tribunal to decide the same in accordance with law on merit…..” 11. In Gopal Vazirani Vs. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 161 taxmann.com 120 (Bombay) , another co-ordinate Bench, has held that an intimation under Section 143 (1) was amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 264 of the IT Act. 12. In Smita Rohit Gupta Vs. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, (2024) 158 taxmann.com157(Bombay) another Co-ordinate Bench, after distinguishing the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd , [ (2007) 161 Taxman 316 ] held that the revision would be maintainable against an intimation under Section 143 (1) of the IT Act, 1961. 13. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, (2024) 158 taxmann.com157(Bombay) another Co-ordinate Bench, after distinguishing the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd , [ (2007) 161 Taxman 316 ] held that the revision would be maintainable against an intimation under Section 143 (1) of the IT Act, 1961. 13. To the same effect the decision of the same Co-ordinate Bench in Hindalco Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2024) 158 taxmann.com 485 (Bombay) . 14. Accordingly, the second reason based upon which the commissioner declined to exercise the revisional jurisdiction is also not sustainable. 15. Mr. Sharma had relied on Hari Shankar vs Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SCC 698 to submit that there is a distinction between an Appeal and the revision and such distinction is a real one. Undoubtedly, there is a distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction. However, Hari Shankar (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that the revision will not lie under Section 264 of the IT Act, 1961 against an order which is appealable as long as the assessee prefers no such Appeal. In any event, Hari Shankar (supra) was not even dealing with the provision of Section 264 of the IT Act. 16. Mr. Sharma also argued that in this case, the Assessing Officer accepted the return submitted by the Assessee. Therefore, there could be no error in the intimation under Section 141 (1) of the IT Act. 17. No such universal inference can be drawn in tax matters. In any event, the revisional authorities exercising the revisional jurisdiction must look into this matter since this is a case where the revisional authority has virtually declined to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. We have found that the two reasons the revisional authority declined to exercise its jurisdiction were untenable. Therefore, the impugned order dated 12 February 2021 is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. 18. The Petitioner’s revision is now restored before the revisional authority, which shall decide such revision on its merits on and following law. 19. All parties’ contentions on merits are left open to be examined by revisional authority in the first instance. Needless to add, the revisional authority will hear the parties and pass a reason order. This exercise must be completed within three months of the uploading of this order. 19. All parties’ contentions on merits are left open to be examined by revisional authority in the first instance. Needless to add, the revisional authority will hear the parties and pass a reason order. This exercise must be completed within three months of the uploading of this order. 20. The Rule is made absolute in the above terms without any cost order. All concerned are to act on an authenticated copy of this order.