JUDGMENT : BUDI HABUNG, J. Heard Mr. Vijay Jamoh, learned counsel for the appellant. I have also heard Mr. R. L. Thungon, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This appeal has been preferred under Section 96 read with Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and section 15 (2) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Acts, 2021, against the Judgment and Decree dated 03.03.2023, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Capital Complex, Yupia, in Money Suit No. 84 of 2022. The learned court has imposed a cost of Rs 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) and directed the payment of Rs 61,00,000/-(Rupees Sixty one lakhs) only, with interest at 3.5% per month on the principal sum from January 2019 until date of filing of the suit, and interest at 6% per annum on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of decree, with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree to the date of the payment. 3. The brief fact of the case is that on 10.12.2019, the appellant executed a Promissory Note stating that he had borrowed an amount of Rs. 1,70,00,000/- (One Crore Seventy Lakhs) from the respondent at an interest rate of 3.5% per month in October, 2018. The note stipulated that the interest amount would be counted from the month of January, 2019. The appellant agreed to repay the amount in instalments as outlined in the promissory note, with the interest amount to be calculated at the time of final payment. The appellant repaid the loan amount on an instalment basis, and by the time of filing Money Suit No. 84/2022, he had already paid a total amount of Rs. 1,09,00,000/- (One Crore Nine Lakhs), which was duly acknowledged and accepted by the respondent. 4. However, aggrieved by the fact that the total loan amount was not repaid within the stipulated time, the respondent filed Money Suit No. 84/2022, before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Capital Complex, Yupia. The respondent claimed an amount of Rs. 3,26,80,000/- (Rupees three crore twenty-six lakhs eighty thousand) after deducting the paid amount of Rs. 1,09,00,000/- (One Crore Nine Lakhs) along with the cost of Rs. 50,000/- for litigation costs. 5. The suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement. The respondent claimed an amount of Rs. 3,26,80,000/- (Rupees three crore twenty-six lakhs eighty thousand) after deducting the paid amount of Rs. 1,09,00,000/- (One Crore Nine Lakhs) along with the cost of Rs. 50,000/- for litigation costs. 5. The suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Capital Complex, Yupia, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The court directed the defendant/appellant to pay Rs. 61,00,000/- (Rupees sixty-one lakhs) to the plaintiff, with interest at the rate of 3.5% per month on the principal sum from January 2019 until the date of filing of the suit. Additionally, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the principal sum adjudged was to be paid from the date of the suit to the date of decree, along with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree until the date of payment. 6. The appellant, being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order, has preferred this Regular First Appeal on the following grounds, among others: (i) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) failed to appreciate that in the appellant/defendant partially admitted and partially denied the statements in the plaint. The appellant admitted an amount of Rs 1,70,00,000/-(One crore seventy lakhs), while and a repayment of Rs 1,09,00, 000/-(One Crore nine lakhs), while denying the remaining claims in the Plaintiff’s money suit. (ii) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) overlooked the appellant’s strong objection to the interest claimed by the respondent/plaintiff. (iii) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) did not consider that for a case to be disposed under Order XII, Rule 6, the admission must be categorical. Unless the admission is clear, unambiguous, and unconditional, the court should not exercise discretion to deny the valuable right to contest the claim. (iv) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) based the impugned Judgment on the promissory note, which should only be regarded for collateral purposes, necessitating a trial of the money suit. (v) The impugned judgement and decree dated 03- 03-2023 are legally flawed, as the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) awarded pre-suit interest at 3.5% per month from January 2019 until the suit filing, which is impermissible and contrary to public policy. (v) The impugned judgement and decree dated 03- 03-2023 are legally flawed, as the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) awarded pre-suit interest at 3.5% per month from January 2019 until the suit filing, which is impermissible and contrary to public policy. (vi) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) failed to appreciate that section 34 CPC does not empower the court to award pre-suit interest and should have framed issues under Order XIV, Rule 1, 2 to address these matters. (vii) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) did not frame issues under Order XIV, Rule 1, 2 of the CPC regarding the preliminary objections raised by the appellant related to the written statement and interest on the promissory note. (viii) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) overlooked the appellant’s objection to the interest claimed by the respondent/plaintiff, arguing that the claim of the promissory note’s binding nature on the appellant is legally erroneous, making the allowances of I.A No/262/2022 erroneous and contrary to law. (ix) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) failed to appreciate that the appellant denied the interest on the promissory note, as settled law indicates that disputed factual questions requires a trial. (x) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) overlooked that the loan amount was unrelated to a mercantile or commercial transaction. The interest rate of 3.5% per month from January 2019 until the suits filing on 25.08.2022 is exorbitant and impermissible under the law. (xi) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) denied justice to the appellant by imposing a cost of Rs. 10,000 and an interest rate of 3.5% per month resulting in annual interest of 42%, which is legally untenable. (xii) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) has failed to acknowledge that the amount taken by the appellant/defendant was not a loan from the respondent/plaintiff but derived from the appellant’s share in the land compensation credited to the SLVM by the Government of India. 7. For the reasons stated above, the appellant seeks to set aside the impugned judgement and decree dated 03.03.2023 in Money Suit No. 84/2022, issued by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Capital Complex, Yupia. 8. While contesting the judgment dated 03.03.2023, the appellant’s counsel admitted the loan amount in the Money Suit No. 84/2022, confirming repayment of Rs. 1,09,00,000/- (One Crore Nine Lakhs). 8. While contesting the judgment dated 03.03.2023, the appellant’s counsel admitted the loan amount in the Money Suit No. 84/2022, confirming repayment of Rs. 1,09,00,000/- (One Crore Nine Lakhs). The counsel further stated that the appellant remains willing to repay the loan with interest according to prevailing rules. 9. The appellant’s counsel argued that the impugned judgment was based on admission, with no trial conducted beforehand. A trial is necessary, as the promissory note cannot serve as conclusive evidence without a trial. Additionally, since the judgement was issued, the appellant has paid Rs. 61,00,000/- (Rupees sixty-one lakhs) of the principal, which the respondent accepted. The only remaining dispute is the interest rate of 3.5% from the loan date until the suit was filed. 10. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following decisions: (i) Nutan Kumar Vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda , reported in 1993 0 Supreme (All) 310. The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “ 107 . The observations of the Supreme Court in Manna Lal Khetan, (1977) 2 SCC 424 : (supra), para 20 may also be quoted usefully on the point under discussion. "It is well established that a contract which involves in its fulfilment the doing of an act prohibited by statute is void. The legal maxim 'A' pactis provatorum publico juri non deroga-tur means that private agreements cannot alter the general law. Where a contract express or implies, is expressly or by implication forbidden by statute, no court can fend its assistance to give it effect. (See Mellis v. Shirley LB) What is done in contravention of the provisions of an Act of the legislature cannot be made the subject of an action." (ii) Himani Alloys Ltd Vs. Tata Steel Ltd reported in (2011) 15 SCC 273 , the relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “ 10. It is true that a judgment can be given on an admission contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short, the discretion should be used only when there is a clear admission which can be acted upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India [ 2000 (7) SCC 120 ], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [ 2010 (4) SCC 753 ] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha [ 2010 (6) SCC 601 ]. There is no such admission in this case.” 11. Mr. R. L. Thungon, the learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the condition under section 34 of the CPC are contingent upon Section 3 of the Indian Interest Act, 1978 . He argued that Section 3 (1) (a) of the Indian Interest Act, 1978 serves as an exception to Section 3. Section 3 (1) (a) is reproduced below: “ 3. Power of Court to allow interest- (1)In any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say, (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings” 12. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the defendant/appellant has not denied but rather has fairly admitted the averments made by the plaintiff in his written statement. Referring to paragraph 5 of the plaint, the learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff expected the defendant to return the loan amount by 31.12.2018; however, there was no indication of repayments. When the defendant failed to return the loan, the plaintiff began contacting him via mobile phone and even visited the defendant’s residence, where the defendant repeatedly assured him that the loan amount would be returned. Theses false assurances continued, and finally, on 10.12.2019, the defendant executed a Promissory Note, which has not been denied by the defendant; therefore, it is treated as admission. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the plaintiff’s contention in paragraph 14 regarding the loan taken by the defendant/appellant and the calculation of the loan amount, along with the interest, has also not been denied by the defendant/appellant. In fact, in paragraph 10 of the written statement filed by the defendant, he stated that with regard to the statement made in paragraph 14 of the plaint, the answering defendant partly admits and partly denies it. The defendant has not specifically denied the statements made in Para 3, 4, and 5 of the plaints; rather, he has partly admitted and partly denied the contentions made in those paragraphs. 14. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the plaintiff’s claim for interest at the rate of 3.5% per month has not been denied in the defendant/appellant’s written statement. He referenced Order XIII Rule 3, which stipulates that the defendant must specifically address such allegation of fact in the plaint’s claim, rather than making general denials, except regarding damages. 15. He further stated that denials must be specific and not evasive. According to Order VIII Rule 5, any allegation of fact in the plaint that is not specifically denied or impliedly denied in the defendant’s pleadings shall be taken as admitted, except against a person under disability. 16. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the respondent has cited the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Gian Chand and Brothers and Anr Vs. Rattan Lal Alias Rattan Singh reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 . The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “ 23. The said aspect can be looked from another angle. 16. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the respondent has cited the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Gian Chand and Brothers and Anr Vs. Rattan Lal Alias Rattan Singh reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 . The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “ 23. The said aspect can be looked from another angle. Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order VIII form an integral code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. It is obligatory on the part of the defendant to specifically deal with each allegation in the plaint and when the defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. It is clearly postulated therein that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiffs but he must be specific with each allegation of fact (see Badat and Co., Bombay v. East India Trading Co.). 24. Rule 4 stipulates that a defendant must not evasively answer the point of substance. It is alleged that if he receives a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received, and that if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. Rule 5 deals with specific denial and clearly lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted against him.” 17. The respondent’s counsel argued that there has been no denial of the 3.5%monthly interest rate or of the Promissory Note, thus the trial court correctly awarded interest at that rate until the suit was filed. 18. The respondent’s counsel further asserted that the principal amount awarded to the plaintiff is consistent with the Indian Interest Act, and since the Promissory Note and the 3.5% interest rate have not been challenged, they are considered admitted by the defendant. 19. 18. The respondent’s counsel further asserted that the principal amount awarded to the plaintiff is consistent with the Indian Interest Act, and since the Promissory Note and the 3.5% interest rate have not been challenged, they are considered admitted by the defendant. 19. To support of his argument, the respondent’s counsel referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in Secretary/General Manager, Chennai, Central Cooperative Bank Limited and Anr Vs. S. Kamalaveni Sundaram , reported in 2011(1) SCC 790 . The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “ 13. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) empowers the court to award interest for the period from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and from the date of the decree to the date of payment where the decree is for payment of money. Section 34 of the CPC does not empower the court to award pre-suit interest. The pre-suit interest would ordinarily depend on the contract (express or implied) between the parties or some statutory provisions or the mercantile usage...” 20. While refuting the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the granting of interest is against the public policy, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that equitable jurisdiction cannot be invoked against statutory provisions and public policy. 21. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied pon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Sharma Vs. Santosh Kumari , reported in (2007) 8 SCC 600 . The relevant paragraph is reproduced below: “ 26. In England, the Court of Equity exercises jurisdiction in equity. The courts of India do not possess any such exclusive jurisdiction. The Courts in India exercise jurisdiction both in equity as well as law but exercise of equity jurisdiction is always subject to the provisions of law. If exercise of equity jurisdiction would violate the express provisions contained in law, the same cannot be done. Equity jurisdiction can be exercised only when no law operates in the field. 27. A court of law cannot exercise its discretionary jurisdiction de'hors the statutory law. Its discretion must be exercised in terms of the existing statute. 28. If exercise of equity jurisdiction would violate the express provisions contained in law, the same cannot be done. Equity jurisdiction can be exercised only when no law operates in the field. 27. A court of law cannot exercise its discretionary jurisdiction de'hors the statutory law. Its discretion must be exercised in terms of the existing statute. 28. In Shamsu Suhara Beevi v G. Alex and Another [ (2004) 8 SCC 569 ], this Court, while dealing with a matter relating to grant of compensation by the High Court under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act in addition to the relief of specific performance in the absence of prayer made to that effect either in the plaint or amending the same at any later stage of the proceedings to include the relief of compensation in addition to the relief of specific performance, observed: "11. …Grant of such a relief in the teeth of express provisions of the statute to the contrary is not permissible. On equitable consideration court cannot ignore or overlook the provisions of the statute. Equity must yield to law". 22. I have heard both the learned counsel for the parties. Due consideration has been given to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Upon hearing and consideration, the only issues that emerges for the decision of this Court is whether the learned Civil Judge committed any error in passing an order interest at 3.5% per month on the principal amount until the filing of the suit. 23 . Admittedly, the defendant executed the promissory notes, and thus, the loan is not denied. According to the promissory notes, the defendant agreed to pay interest at 3.5% per month on the principal amount. The defendant did not contest the interest payable at this rate in his entire written statement. Having neither denied the execution of the promissory note nor the interest to be paid, the Trial Court passed the impugned order, directing the payment of Rs 61,00,000/-(Rupees Sixty-one lakhs), with interest at 3.5% per month on the principal sum from January 2019 until date of filing of the suit. Additionally, interest at 6% per annum on the principal sum was ordered from the date of the suit to the date of decree, with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree to the date of the payment. 24. Additionally, interest at 6% per annum on the principal sum was ordered from the date of the suit to the date of decree, with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree to the date of the payment. 24. The appellant contends that based on admissions in the written statement, the Court cannot pass an order without trial. The defendant had partially denied the claims; therefore, a trial is necessary. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the denial must be specific, and unless there is a specific denial, it is treated as an admission. 25. The defendant’s denial is not specific; however, it appears that granting interest at 3.5 % per month on principal sum effectively results in an annual interest rate of 3.5%X12= 42%, which seems exorbitant and inconsistent with the present bank interest rate and equitable considerations. Now, let us examine, what the law provides in this regard. Section 34 of CPC read as follows: 34. Interest. —(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, 1[with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum], from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit: 2. Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent. per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. 26. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the condition under section 34 of the CPC dependent on the provisions outlined in section 3 of the Indian Interest Act, 1978 . Section 3 (1) (a) of the Indian Interest Act, 1978 provides exception to Section 3, which is reproduced below: “ 3. 26. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the condition under section 34 of the CPC dependent on the provisions outlined in section 3 of the Indian Interest Act, 1978 . Section 3 (1) (a) of the Indian Interest Act, 1978 provides exception to Section 3, which is reproduced below: “ 3. Power of Court to allow interest- (1)In any proceedings for the recovery of any debt or damages or in any proceedings in which a claim for interest in respect of any debt or damages already paid is made, the Court may, if it thinks fit, allow interest to the person entitled to the debt or damages or to the person making such claim, as the case may be, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, for the whole or part of the following period, that is to say, (a) if the proceedings relate to a debt payable by virtue of a written instrument at a certain time, then, from the date when the debt is payable to the date of institution of the proceedings” 27. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) empowers the court to award interest for the period from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, and from the date of the decree to the date of payment, when the decree is for payment of money. Section 34 does not grant the court the authority to award pre- suit interest. However, it indicates that pre-suit interest ordinarily depends on the contract (express or implied) between the parties, on statutory provisions, or on the mercantile practices. Furthermore, it states that, in addition to any interest adjudged on the principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, further interest may be awarded at a rate not exceeding six per cent per annum, as deemed reasonable by the court, on the principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the court considers appropriate. In the instant case, the appellant had executed the promissory note agreeing to pay interest at 3.5% per month from January 2019. In the instant case, the appellant had executed the promissory note agreeing to pay interest at 3.5% per month from January 2019. Since the liability for the adjudged sum did not arise out of a commercial transaction, the respondent is not entitled to the interest rate applicable to the money lent under the written instrument, as it exceeds six per cent per annum or the current interest rate of nationalised bank. 28. Be that as it may, in light of the aforementioned facts and applicable law, I do not find that, on equitable grounds, the plaintiff/ respondent is entitled to interest at the rate of 3.5 % per month on the principal amount from January,2019 until the date of filing the suit. However, considering that the appellant agreed to pay interest at 3.5 % and that the law stipulates he is not entitled to an interest rate exceeding the current bank interest, the respondent is entitled for interest at the prevailing rate offered by Nationalized Banks, which is 9% per annum, from January,2019 until the date of filing the suit. 29. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree are modified to the extent indicated above. 30. As a result of the forgoing discussion, the appeal is partially allowed, and the direction given by the judgment and order dated 03.03.2023, issued by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Capital Complex, Yupia, for the defendant/ appellant herein to pay interest at the rate of 3.5% per month on the principal sum for the period from January 2019 until the date of filling the suit in Money Suit No. 84 of 2022 is hereby set aside. Consequently, it is modified as outlined above, while the remainder of the judgment and decree remains intact. 31. With the observation made above, this appeal stands disposed of. The parties shall bear their own costs. 32. The Trial Court Record shall be sent back.