JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellant / 1 st Respondent / Plaintiff against the Decree and Judgment dated 05.12.2000, in A.S.No.21 of 1995 on the file of Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tanuku (for short, ‘the 1 st Appellate Court’) reversing the decree and judgment dated 30.06.1995, in O.S.No.535 of 1980 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Tanuku (for short, ‘the Trial Court’). 2. The Appellant/1 st Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.535 of 1980 for cancellation of the registered exchange deed dt.28.08.1989 executed by the Defendants 1 and 2 in favour of 3 rd Defendant and for possession of the plaint schedule property to the Plaintiff after evicting the 3 rd Defendant, and therefore, for determination of future profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery of possession. The 1 st Respondent / Appellant is the 3 rd Defendant and Respondents 2 and 3/Respondents 2 and 3 are the Defendants 1 and 2 in the said suit. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit in O.S.No.535 of 1980 is expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: Sri Padala Veereddi, S/o Tatayya Pedda Venkatareddy, gifted the plaint schedule property to the Plaintiff diety through a registered gift deed dated. 21.9.1970. Since the date of the gift, the plaint schedule property was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the Plaintiff diety. The 3 rd Defendant is the 1 st Defendant's cousin's brother. Defendants 1 to 3 colluded with the dishonest intent to cause loss to the Plaintiff. They created a fraudulent and collusive registered exchange deed dated 28.08.1989, which transferred the plaint schedule property in exchange for the 3rd Defendant’s less fertile and less valuable property. Defendants 1 and 2 never acted as trustees for the Plaintiff's diety and had no rights to execute the exchange deed dated 28.08.1989 while misrepresenting themselves as trustees. Defendants 1 and 2 have acted detrimental to the interest of the Plaintiff's diety. On 28.08.1989, Defendants 1 and 2 delivered possession of the plaint schedule property to 3 rd Defendant. The Plaintiff's sole trustee demanded possession of the plaint schedule property from the 3 rd Defendant. Defendants 1 and 2 have acted detrimental to the interest of the Plaintiff's diety. On 28.08.1989, Defendants 1 and 2 delivered possession of the plaint schedule property to 3 rd Defendant. The Plaintiff's sole trustee demanded possession of the plaint schedule property from the 3 rd Defendant. However, the 3 rd Defendant has failed to comply with this demand. 5. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement, while the 3 rd Defendant filed a separate statement. The salient assertions articulated in the written statements of all the Defendants are as follows: Manda Ramireddy was never the sole trustee to the Plaintiff's diety, nor did he manage its affairs or festivals; the original gift deed was not entrusted to him. The Plaintiff diety was established by the Late K. Satyanarayanareddy in January 1970, who served as its trustee, obtained a patta for coconut trees from the Grama Panchayat, Pittalavemavaram, for the diety’s benefit and collected donations until his death, during which he was recognized as the sole trustee. The property was gifted to the deity at his request, with possession and the original deed entrusted to him. Following his demise, the 1 st Defendant took over as the sole trustee. In 1987, the 1 st Defendant’s house was damaged in a fire, during which all important documents were stored at the house of M.Ramireddy, a friend of the 1 st Defendant. M. Rami Reddy then stole the original gift deed dated 31.03.1970, along with personal documents. The 1 st Defendant sought help from local elders to recover the stolen documents. The 2 nd Defendant assisted the 1 st Defendant in his duties but was never a trustee himself. It is incorrect to state that Defendants 2 and 3 acted as trustees of the Plaintiff diety. The allegation that Defendants 1 to 3 colluded with dishonest intent to cause loss to the Plaintiff diety and created a fraudulent registered exchange deed dt.28.08.1989 by transferring the plaint schedule property to 3 rd Defendant while taking the latter's less valuable property is false. Before 1985, the 3 rd Defendant's father cultivated the diety's land as a tenant, paying only one bag of paddy per year. The land presently held by the deity was yielding two bags of paddy per year. Therefore, the exchange of lands in 1989 was beneficial and profitable for the Plaintiff's diety. Before 1985, the 3 rd Defendant's father cultivated the diety's land as a tenant, paying only one bag of paddy per year. The land presently held by the deity was yielding two bags of paddy per year. Therefore, the exchange of lands in 1989 was beneficial and profitable for the Plaintiff's diety. That same year, the land was levelled, and a permanent cattle shed with cement walls and two rooms was constructed. In light of these facts, the Defendants request that the suit be dismissed with costs. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court has framed the following issues: (i) Whether Sri Manda Rami Reddy is a single trustee and has local stands to file the suit? (ii) Whether the exchange deed dt.28.08.1989 was brought into existence as pleaded by the Plaintiff and is liable to be cancelled? (iii) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for possession of the plaint schedule property? (iv) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to future profits? (v) Whether the 1 st Defendant is a single trustee of the Plaintiff diety? (vi) To what relief? 7. During the trial, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and marked Ex.B.1. 8. After the conclusion of the trial and considering the arguments presented by both parties, the Trial Court, in O.S.No.535 of 1989, decreed the suit with costs. However, the Trial Court determined that mesne profits would be adjudicated through a separate application. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the 3 rd Defendant filed an Appeal in A.S.No.21 of 1995 on file of the 1 st Appellate Court. The 1 st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration: i. Whether the exchange deed dt.28.08.1989 is liable to be cancelled? ii. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for possession of plaint schedule property along with profits? 10. The 1 st Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, allowed the appeal without costs by its judgment dated 05.12.2000, thereby dismissing the suit in O.S.No.535 of 1989 without costs. Assailing the same, the 1 st Respondent/Plaintiff preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. 10. The 1 st Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, allowed the appeal without costs by its judgment dated 05.12.2000, thereby dismissing the suit in O.S.No.535 of 1989 without costs. Assailing the same, the 1 st Respondent/Plaintiff preferred the present Second Appeal. 11. I heard Sri P. Durga Prasad, learned Counsel representing the Appellant / 1 st Respondent / Plaintiff and Sri V. Malik, learned Counsel for the1 st Respondent / Appellant / 3 rd Defendant. 12. Based on the Appellant’s contentions, the following substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal: (a) Whether the 1 st Appellate Court is right in upholding the alienation made by a person claiming to be a defacto trustee in the absence of any Trust deed or implied agreement authorizing the trustee to alienate the lands? (b) Whether the Indian TRUSTS ACT continues to govern a religious endowment not covered by the Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act? 13. Before delving into the matter, since the appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C. 14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on the decision in Kasivisweswara Swami Temple, Rep. by the Executive Officer V. Syed Peeru Saheb S/o Syed Gafoor & ors , [ 2021 0 Supreme(AP) 596 ] , wherein this Court referred to several precedents to examine the scope of Section 100 of the C.P.C.: 73. In Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B.Koil and others, (2004) 5 Supreme Court Cases 762. In Para-26 of this ruling, it is observed: “26. To say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible." 74. Further reliance is placed on H.P.Pyarejan vs Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs.and others, (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 496 where the essential question is in relation to the application of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. Further reliance is placed on H.P.Pyarejan vs Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs.and others, (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 496 where the essential question is in relation to the application of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. In para-16 of this ruling, in the context of the duty of the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC, it is stated: “16. …. Under Section 100 of the Code (a amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves reappreciation of evidence (See panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997)4 SCC 713 and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 )…..” 15. In light of the settled legal principle and prior to addressing the rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides, it is pertinent to first outline the following facts, which are either admitted or undisputed: The land shown in the plaint schedule is an extent of Ac.0.10 cents, situated under R.S.No.185/1 in Pittalavemavaram village. This land originally belonged to Padala Veeri Reddy, who transferred ownership of the land through a registered gift deed dated 21.09.1990 (Ex.A.3) to the Plaintiff deity. The record indicates that Defendants 1 and 2, styling themselves as trustees of the Plaintiff deity, executed the original of Ex.A.4, an exchange deed dated 28.08.1989 transferring the scheduled land to the 3 rd Defendant. 16. The Plaintiff deity is represented by a single trustee, Sri Manda Rami Reddy, who is examined as PW.1. He testified that his grandfather, Manda Rami Reddy, son of Narsi Reddy, was the trustee of the temple and had exclusive possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. However, based on the evidence adduced, the 1 st Appellate Court observed that apart from the interested testimony of PW.1, there was no independent evidence on record to establish that Manda Rami Reddy had ever been the trustee of the Plaintiff's temple. After a thorough evaluation of the evidence, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that PW.1 had failed to establish that he and his grandfather served as trustees of the Plaintiff deity before 1989. On the other hand, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff deity was founded by the late Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy in 1970. After a thorough evaluation of the evidence, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that PW.1 had failed to establish that he and his grandfather served as trustees of the Plaintiff deity before 1989. On the other hand, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff deity was founded by the late Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy in 1970. In March of that year, Satyanarayana Reddy obtained a coconut tree patta from the Gram Panchayat of Pittalavemavaram for the benefit of the Plaintiff deity. At his request, the late Padala Veeri Reddy gifted the schedule property. After the death of Satyanarayana Reddy, the 1 st Defendant assumed the role of trustee and managed the affairs of the Plaintiff deity. In support of their claim, the Defendants relied on Ex.B.1, a patta granted by the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat of Pittalavemavaram, which indicates that Satyanarayana Reddy was the trustee of the Vigneswaraswamy Temple, Kattavaripalem. 17. On the other hand, there is an admission by PW.2, Padala Satyanarayana, acknowledging that the 1 st Defendant's father managed the temple. DW.4, Manda Surreddy, testified that K. Satyanarayana Reddy was responsible for overseeing the temple's affairs and had issued the Ex.B.1 patta, which he signed. Based on this evidence, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that K. Satyanarayana Reddy was the trustee of the Plaintiff's temple until his death. As per PW.1's testimony, the Assistant Commissioner of the Endowments Department in Eluru issued Ex.A.1 proceedings, dated 06.11.1989, which reflects that PW.1 was appointed as the trustee of the temple for the first time on 26.10.1989. As rightly observed by the 1 st Appellate Court, PW.1 failed to provide any documents to substantiate that he held the trustee position before 26.10.1989. Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not adduce any oral evidence to demonstrate that the 1 st Defendant did not act as trustee of the Plaintiff's deity. PW.2's testimony corroborates the Defendants' assertion that the 1 st Defendant's father managed the temple. 18. The testimony of DW.3, Guttula Suryanarayana, indicates that the schedule land was in his possession at the time of the exchange deed. According to the terms of the exchange deed, the 3 rd Defendant has been in possession of the schedule property, while the Plaintiff's temple holds the land transferred by the 3 rd Defendant in exchange for the schedule land. According to the terms of the exchange deed, the 3 rd Defendant has been in possession of the schedule property, while the Plaintiff's temple holds the land transferred by the 3 rd Defendant in exchange for the schedule land. The 1 st Appellate Court also took into consideration the pre-existing disputes between PW.1 and the 3 rd Defendant at the time of the suit's filing. PW.1's evidence reveals that his mother acquired land to the south of the schedule land, and they subsequently filed a suit against the 3 rd Defendant concerning drainage issues, a matter that even reached the High Court. Based on this evidence, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that PW.1 filed the suit against the Defendants primarily to harass the 3 rd Defendant due to their prior disputes. 19. The 1 st Appellate Court further noted that according to Ex.A.4, following the transfer of the respective lands, the 3 rd Defendant constructed structures on the plaint schedule land and made improvements. No evidence was adduced to suggest that Defendants 1 to 3 acted in collusion or engaged in fraudulent conduct. Additionally, since the Plaintiff’s temple was not under the control of the Endowments Department, the Defendants were not required to seek permission from the Commissioner to transfer the plaint schedule property to the 3 rd Defendant. 20. After appreciating the evidence on record, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that it did not accept the Plaintiff’s claim that the 3 rd Defendant had encroached upon the plaint schedule property. The 1 st Appellate Court specifically noted that no such allegation was made in the plaint, and as a result, the Plaintiff was not permitted to introduce evidence on this matter due to the absence of proper pleadings. The 1 st Appellate Court also highlighted a specific provision under the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act regarding the removal of encroachments. According to Section 83 of the Act, the Assistant Commissioner has the authority to report encroachments to the Deputy Commissioner, who is empowered to order the eviction of such encroachments. The 1 st Appellate Court pointed out that PW.1 had not followed this procedure. Additionally, the 1 st Appellate Court observed that PW.1’s active involvement in filing the suit stemmed from prior litigation with the 3 rd Defendant. The 1 st Appellate Court pointed out that PW.1 had not followed this procedure. Additionally, the 1 st Appellate Court observed that PW.1’s active involvement in filing the suit stemmed from prior litigation with the 3 rd Defendant. Furthermore, the 1 st Appellate Court noted that no surrounding ryots were examined to establish that the plaint schedule land was more valuable than the land transferred by the 3 rd Defendant to the temple. 21. As evident from the record, the Trial Court failed to evaluate the evidence adduced adequately. The Trial Court noted that Padala Veeri Reddy gifted the plaint schedule property for the purpose of 'Dhoopa Deepa Nyvedyam'. However, the fact that the land was allocated to the temple for this purpose does not imply that only the income realized from the schedule land may be used for the 'Dhoopa Deepa Nyvedyam'. Similarly, it cannot be concluded that the yield from exchanged land is ineligible for the same purpose. 22. Based on the decision reported in 1993 (2) ALT page 48 (Employees Association V. Chennakeswaswamy temple), the Trial Court held that the exchange deed by Defendants 1 and 2 is liable to be cancelled. In the citation, it is held that: “the sale of any immovable property belonging to a religious institution or endowment shall be null and void unless such sale is affected with prior to sanction of the commissioner”. 23. The 1 st Appellate Court found fault with the Trial Court's observations, noting that, as of the date of Ex.A.4, the exchange deed, the Plaintiff's deity had not yet been taken over by the Endowments Department, and the Plaintiff's temple remained under private management. 24. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff relied on the decision in The Commissioner of Endowments and Ors V. Vittal Rao and Ors. , 2005 0 AIR(SC) 454wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court distinguished the public temple or private trust and observed that: 21. In the earlier round of litigation, it was specifically held that the gift deed did not create an endowment, the temple in question was not a public temple, and the land was absolutely gifted to Gunnaji. In a private trust, the beneficiaries are specific individuals and in a public trust, the beneficiary is the general public as a class. In a private trust, the beneficiaries can be ascertained whereas in a public trust, they are incapable of ascertainment. In a private trust, the beneficiaries are specific individuals and in a public trust, the beneficiary is the general public as a class. In a private trust, the beneficiaries can be ascertained whereas in a public trust, they are incapable of ascertainment. In the present case, the ascertained individual was Gunnaji. This position is clear from the decision in Deoki Nandan vs. Murlidhar, [ (1956) SCR 756 ] 25. The Trial Court, in disregarding the pleas raised by both parties, observed that it was not for consideration whether the Endowments Department had taken over the temple or whether Defendants 1 and 2 had the right to represent the temple or execute any exchange deed or documents concerning the property, which had been gifted for the specific purpose of 'Dhoopa Deepa Nyvedyam'. The Trial Court failed to recognize that an issue had been framed regarding whether the 1 st Defendant was the sole trustee of the Plaintiff's deity. This Court has no hesitation in holding that the Trial Court failed to address the issues at hand in the suit properly. The Trial Court disposed of the matter based on the incorrect assumption that the plaint schedule property belonged to the Endowments Department. 26. After reviewing the evidence on record, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that, at the time of the execution of the exchange deed, the temple was not under the management of the Endowments Department. The evidence adduced shows that the 1 st Defendant's father had managed the temple, and according to Ex.A.5 proceedings, the Plaintiff's temple was registered for the first time under Section 43 of the Endowments Act. The property in question was exchanged on 28.08.1989. Upon further evaluation, the 1 st Appellate Court determined that the Plaintiff's deity had not been taken over by the Endowments Department before 03.10.1989, and the evidence indicated that the Plaintiff's deity was founded by K. Satyanarayana Reddy in 1970. 27. The learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff relied on the decision in M. Venkatapathi Naidu V. The Andhra Pradesh Endowments Tribunal and another , [ 2022 6 ALD 14 ] , this Court held that: 25. In the present case, the contention is that the very sale of the land under the deed of sale dated 29.10.1982 is violative of the provisions of the Act, 1966 rendering the said document null and void. In the present case, the contention is that the very sale of the land under the deed of sale dated 29.10.1982 is violative of the provisions of the Act, 1966 rendering the said document null and void. This is a question which would have to be answered by the Tribunal. If the Tribunal were to hold that the said deed of sale is null and void, the contention of Sri V. Venu Gopala Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Mutt that there is no requirement for cancellation of the deed of sale would have to be upheld. However, if the Tribunal were to conclude that the application for declaration filed by the Mutt is hit by a limitation or by any lacuna in the framing of the application or joinder of parties or on the ground that all the necessary permissions had been obtained and there is no violation of the provisions of the Act, 1966, the application would have to fail. 26. In such circumstances, this Court cannot hold that the Endowment tribunal is devoid of jurisdiction, and consequently, this petition has to fail and is accordingly dismissed. 27. This Court has not gone into the merits of the case or the objections raised by the petitioner. All these issues and all such other issues that may be raised by the parties are left open for a decision by the Endowment Tribunal, which shall dispose of O.A. No. 394 of 2017 before it within 4 months from the date of receipt of this order. 28. Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff further relied on the decision in Kasivisweswara Swami Temple, Rep. by the Executive Officer V. Syed Peeru Saheb S/o Syed Gafoor & ors , [ 2021 0 Supreme(AP) 596 ] , wherein it is contended as follows: 21. ….………….the Appellant is a Religious Institution governed by the provisions of the A.P.Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (A.P. Act 30 of 1987, for short), and in view of the specific bar under Section 151 of this Act, the civil Court could not have entertained a dispute of this nature. The learned Counsel for the Appellant further contended that given the constitution of the Endowments Tribunal under Section 162 of this Act, empowered to decide such disputes, in terms of Section 87 thereunder, there is a clear bar for the civil Court to consider this dispute. The learned Counsel for the Appellant further contended that given the constitution of the Endowments Tribunal under Section 162 of this Act, empowered to decide such disputes, in terms of Section 87 thereunder, there is a clear bar for the civil Court to consider this dispute. Thus, it is contended that the decrees and judgments of both the Courts below are bad in law. 22. Section 151 of the A.P. Act 30 of 1987 reads thus: “151. Bar of Jurisdiction. - No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters of dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act. 23. Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 requires that there shall be a dispute relating to the administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters. Such dispute is amenable for determination or decision under this Act, namely Act 30 of 1987. In such an event, no suit or other legal proceeding in respect thereof shall be instituted in any Court of law. It further states that except in terms of provisions of this Act, such dispute cannot be determined or decided. 24. In order to consider this question of jurisdiction, pleadings play a vital role. As seen from the written statement of the Appellant, no objection was raised as a defence as to maintainability of the suit before the trial Court, nor any specific issue was settled; therefore, nor the trial Court nor the appellate Court was called upon to consider such question…………… 31. Further, Act 30 of 1987 came into force on 21.04.1987. The suit was instituted in this case on 29.01.1987. Therefore, the institution of the suit was prior to coming into force of A.P.Act 30 of 1987. 32. Viewed from these factors and contingencies, the contention of Sri M. Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned Counsel for the Appellant, in this respect, cannot stand. 29. This is not a suit for seeking declaration but only seeking cancellation of the exchange deed. As already noted, the Act 30 of 1987 came into force on 21.04.1987. The present suit was instituted on 24.11.1989. Therefore, the suit was filed after coming into force with Act 30 of 1987. 30. 29. This is not a suit for seeking declaration but only seeking cancellation of the exchange deed. As already noted, the Act 30 of 1987 came into force on 21.04.1987. The present suit was instituted on 24.11.1989. Therefore, the suit was filed after coming into force with Act 30 of 1987. 30. Given the ongoing dispute between the parties regarding the administration and management of the institution, and considering that the Endowments Tribunal had already been constituted at the time the suit was filed, it follows that, pursuant to Section 162 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the Tribunal is indeed competent to resolve any dispute, question, or matter concerning a charitable institution, religious institution, or any institution as defined by the Act. 31. Turning to the facts of the present case, no such pleas were initially raised. The contentions in question were only introduced during the hearing of the Second Appeal. As seen from the pleadings of both parties and the evidence adduced, it can be seen that none of the parties objected to the suit's maintainability before the Trial Court or the 1 st Appellate Court was called upon to consider such question. 32. In Kasivisweswara Swami Temple’s case, referred to supra, this Court further held as follows: 25……………… In such an event, the bar of jurisdiction as such for a civil Court to entertain a suit of this nature cannot arise, that too when it is sought to be raised for the first time in this second appeal, without there being any basis in the pleadings nor any foundation laid, either at the trial or later in the appeal. In light of the observations made by this Court, this Court is not inclined to uphold the contention raised in this regard. 33. The learned Counsel for the Appellant, per his convenience, asserts that if the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act are deemed inapplicable, the Defendants 1 and 2 would still be governed by the Indian TRUSTS ACT . He argues that, unless there is specific authorization within the trust to empower the trustee to sell the lands, no presumption of alienation can be made, particularly given that Section 36 of the TRUSTS ACT imposes restrictions on the trust's ability to dispose of property. However, the Appellant cannot adopt such an inconsistent stance during the hearing of the Second Appeal. However, the Appellant cannot adopt such an inconsistent stance during the hearing of the Second Appeal. The Appellant must clarify whether the provisions of the Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, or the Indian TRUSTS ACT apply in this case. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant in Kasivisweswara Swami Temple’s case, referenced above, highlights that when there is a dispute regarding whether private individuals manage an institution or constitute a public temple, Section 151 of Act 30 of 1987 empowers the Endowments Tribunal jurisdiction to resolve such matters. In light of this, the Appellant's arguments concerning the applicability of the provisions of the TRUSTS ACT are unsustainable. 34. The matter at hand revolves around a significant dispute between the parties regarding the classification of the Plaintiff temple as on the date of exchange deed, whether it is a private institution or a religious institution governed by the provisions of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987. Upon reviewing the available records, the 1 st Appellate Court concluded that, as of the date of the Ex.A.4 exchange deed, the Plaintiff deity had not yet been taken over by the Endowments Department; the exchange deed, executed by Defendants 1 and 2, who were serving as trustees at that time, was deemed valid. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's temple was only registered under Section 43 of the Endowments Act in 1989, after the execution of the exchange deed. Upon careful consideration of the submissions made by both parties, the 1 st Appellate Court has rendered its decision 35. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court discerns no infirmity, much less perversity or illegality, in the judgment rendered by the 1 st Appellate Court. As rightly observed by the 1 st Appellate Court, the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court are not based on the appreciation of evidence on record. The Trial Court's Judgment is erroneous and cannot be sustained. The 1 st Appellate Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has appropriately set aside the Judgment of the Trial Court. Consequently, the findings of the 1 st Appellate Court do not call for interference by this Court. The Second Appeal lacks merit in its entirety. 36. The Trial Court's Judgment is erroneous and cannot be sustained. The 1 st Appellate Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has appropriately set aside the Judgment of the Trial Court. Consequently, the findings of the 1 st Appellate Court do not call for interference by this Court. The Second Appeal lacks merit in its entirety. 36. In these circumstances, finding no such questions that require consideration in the Second Appeal, which is a much less substantial question of law as pointed out for the Appellant, this Second Appeal has to be dismissed. 37. As a consequence, this Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The judgment and decree dated 05.12.2000 of learned Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tanuku, A.S.No.21 of 1995 stands confirmed. Miscellaneous pending applications, if any, shall stand cancelled.