ORDER : (Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J.) The Revision has been preferred under Section 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C ’) against the judgment dated 01.03.2012 in Crl.A.No.204 of 2010 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Prakasam Division at Ongole, whereby and whereunder the judgment dated 20.10.2010 in C.C.No.235 of 2005 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Addanki, finding the revisionist guilty for the contravention under Section 7 (i) and 2 (ia) (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short ‘PFA Act’) read with Sub rule 28 Rule 49 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (‘the PFA Rules’) for the offences punishable under Section 16 (1) (a) (i) of ‘the PFA Act’ and convicted the revisionist under Section 255 (2) of ‘the Cr.P.C .,’ and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri Akurathi Ramakrishna, the learned counsel for the Revisionist, while reiterating the grounds raised in the revision, had argued that the shelf life of the packaged drinking water was 21 days as per the information on the sachet and according to PW.1, he had seized or purchased the packaged water sachets from the revisionist on 21.04.2005 and therefore, it could be said that after 21 days from 21.04.2005 i.e., after 12.05.2005, the said water should not be used for analysis, but as per Ex.P-9 analyst report, the water sample was analyzed on 19.05.2005 and therefore, the analysis had no value and the analyst report should not be used against the accused and further, the accused lost his valuable right under Section 13 (2) of ‘the PFA Act,’ but the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the same and convicted the revisionist erroneously and therefore, the conviction and sentence passed cannot be sustained. 4. 4. The learned counsel relied upon a decision of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Resham Singh v. State of Punjab , [1973 Crl.L.J 766] , for the proposition that conviction of accused on the report of public analyst was unsustainable, if the accused was deprived of his valuable right under Section 13(2) of ‘the PFA Act,’. 5. It is further argued that as on the date of purchasing the sample the revisionist did not manufacture any packaged drinking water for the purpose of sale and he was only conducting a trial run. Further, he contends that the accused did not fully establish the unit as on the date of sample and he did not commence any sale of his product. Further, he contends that the Food Inspector-P.W.1 demanded the revisionist for illegal gratification, when he failed to fulfill the demands; he was falsely implicated in this case. He further contends that though P.W.1 deposed that he purchased 36 sachets of packaged drinking water for Rs. 14.40 Ps, the cost of the each packets M.R.P. is Rs.1.50 Ps. Even the cash bill-Ex.P.2 is the printed form, though the case of the prosecution is that the accused manufactured adulterated drinking water in his unit M/s. Sri Surya Enterprises and the accused is the proprietor of the said firm. No material is available on record to show that as on the date of inspection, the accused established the unit and commenced his business. Further, he contends that the P.W.2 in his cross examination categorically deposed that as on the date of the inspection, M/s. Sri Surya Enterprises did not sell any of their products in Martur village. After obtaining permission he intended to commence the sales. Therefore, it is clear that the accused never manufactured any packaged drinking water for the purpose of sale and the P.W.1 intentionally collected the samples from the product produced at the time of trial run and he forcibly obtained the signature of the accused and filed all the material documents and foisted this false case and urged to allow the revision petition. 6. 6. Alternatively, it is submitted that the revisionist at the time of the alleged offence was aged about 27 years and was a new entrepreneur with lot of gusto started the business; nearly 20 years have passed by; he had suffered a lot of mental agony, he stopped the business and he is doing cultivation; now he is aged about 52 years; he has been suffering from seven aliments due to post Covid-19 complications and requested to consider the case of the revisionist sympathetically in the lines of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh , [AIR 1988 SCC 1789] , Des Raj v. State of Haryana , [1996 CRI.L.J.2720] , Haripapda Das v. State of West Bengal , [AIR 1999 SCC 1482] , Swaroopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan and requested to impose sentence which he had already undergone, while volunteering that the sentence of payment of fine of Rs.1,000/- may be enhanced to Rs.20,000/- as a measure of penance and urged to dispose of the revision. 7. Per contra, Sri K.Sandeep, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor argued that on two grounds, the revisionist had challenged the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court. However, the learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court had appreciated the evidence and found the revisionist indulged with the contravention of the Section 7 (i) and 2 (ia) (m) of ‘the PFA Act,’ r/w rule 49 (28) of ‘the PFA Rules,’ and committed the offence under Section 16 (1) (a) (i) of ‘the PFA Act,’ there was no misreading of the evidence; no perverse findings were recorded; there are no material irregularities to interfere with the impugned judgment; even though mediator-PW-2 did not support the case of the prosecution, the sole testimony of the Food Inspector, which is inspiring confidence, trust worthy and voluntary, hence the conviction should be sustained, and urged to dismiss the revision. 8. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 9. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.204 of 2010 dated01.03.2012, passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Prakasam Division, Ongole, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 10. I have perused the entire record. 9. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.204 of 2010 dated01.03.2012, passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Prakasam Division, Ongole, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 10. It is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar , [ (2002) 6 SCC 650 ] wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re- appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re- appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla , [ AIR 1951 SC 196 ] at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C ., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of AP , [ AIR 1962 SC 1788 ] , at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub- section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 13. The proved facts in brief of the case are that the revisionist/accused was the proprietor of M/s.Sri Surya Enterprises, a manufacturing unit of packaged drinking water, Martur and manufacturing Coolex Purities Dimmking Water. On21.04.2005, at about 12.30 hours, S.A.Viswanadha Reddy, the Food Inspector (PW.1) along with his Attender Sri B.Ch.Ramulu visited M/s. Sri Surya Enterprises. At that time, the accused was present and was looking after his business. The Food Inspector had disclosed his identity and purpose of his visit and called one T.Anjaneyulu (PW.2) to act as a mediator. On21.04.2005, at about 12.30 hours, S.A.Viswanadha Reddy, the Food Inspector (PW.1) along with his Attender Sri B.Ch.Ramulu visited M/s. Sri Surya Enterprises. At that time, the accused was present and was looking after his business. The Food Inspector had disclosed his identity and purpose of his visit and called one T.Anjaneyulu (PW.2) to act as a mediator. In the course of inspection, he found 30 cans of purified drinking water, each can containing 12 liters, and 500 sachets of purified drinking water, each sachet containing 250 ml., in packaged condition for sale purpose of human consumption with the label particulars on sachets and suspected the quality of the said purified water to be adulterated. 14. Further, it is proved that the Food Inspector had purchased 36 sachets for Rs.14.40 paise, and obtained Cash receipt (Ex.P-2) from the accused and served Form-VI notice (Ex.P-3) on the accused disclosing his intention to take the sample for analysis and obtained acknowledgment for the said service of notice and then, divided the said 36 sachets into three equal parts and kept each part into a clean, dry and empty plastic box separately without tampering those sachets and closed those boxes and then tied the same with twine and attired their label bearing Code number and serial No.ZIII/PKM/P1/20334 /2005 on each sample and wrapped in a thick brown paper and folded the ends neatly and affixed a paper slip bearing Code Number and Serial No. L(H)A ZIII/PKN/20334/2005 around each sample and obtained the signature of the accused and the mediator T.Anjaneyutu (PW.2) on each sample ensuring that both the paper slip and wrapper carry a part of the signatures and then tied each sample packet with twine both above and across and affixed four specimen impression seals with sealing wax duly covering the knot at the end. When he questioned, the accused disclosed that, he did not obtain the BIS Certification for manufacturing packaged drinking water and also did not obtain P.F.A. license. The Food Inspector prepared a Panchanama (Ex.P-5) for the proceedings that took place in lifting the sample and read over its contents to the accused in the presence of the mediator T. Anjaneyulu (PW.2) and the same was attested by the accused and T.Anjaneyulu (PW.2) 15. The Food Inspector prepared a Panchanama (Ex.P-5) for the proceedings that took place in lifting the sample and read over its contents to the accused in the presence of the mediator T. Anjaneyulu (PW.2) and the same was attested by the accused and T.Anjaneyulu (PW.2) 15. Furthermore, it is proved that on 23.04.2005, the Food Inspector had handed over one part of sample along with Form VII Memorandum (ExP-6) to the Public Analyst, Hyderabad, in person under acknowledgement (Ex.P-7) and deposited the other parts of the sample along with Form VII Memorandum with Local Health Authority-Zone-III, Guntur, under acknowledgment. On 28.05.2005 he received the Public Analyst report No. 163/2005, dated 12.05.2005 (Ex.P-9) along with covering letter No. 1226/SFL/2005, dated 19.05.2005 (Ex.P-10) through the Assistant Food Controller and L (H) A, Zone-III, Guntur. In his report, the analyst opined that the sample was without BIS Certification and thus violates Rule 49 (28) and also did not conform to the standards of Aerobic Microbial count and Coli form count, and it is therefore adulterated. 16. Furthermore, it is proved that on 10.06.2005, the Food Inspector submitted a detailed report (ExP-11) along with the copies of case documents to the Director, Food (Health) Administration, Hyderabad, requesting him to issue further orders and subsequently, on 05.09.2005, he received the letter dated 27.08.2005 (Ex.P-12) from the Director, Food (Health) Administration, Hyderabad, for institution of prosecution, against the accused for the contraventions mentioned under Sections 7 (i) and 2 (ia) (m) of ‘the PFA Act’, and for violation of Sub rule 28 of Rule 49 of ‘the PFA Rules,’ punishable under Section 16 (1)(a) (i) of ‘the PFA Act,’ for the sale of adulterated Coolex Purified Drinking Water. The revisionist had manufactured and sold adulterated Coolex Purified Drinking Water in violation of the provisions of ‘the PFA Act,’ and ‘the PFA Rules,’ and rendered him liable for punishment. P.W.2 and the revisionist belong to the same village and his failure to support the case of the prosecution is explicable. However, it must be stated that, the failure of P.W.2 to support the version of the prosecution was not of much significance, in view of the fact that the evidence of P.W.1 was quiet believable and unswerving. 17. Indubitably, after receiving the notice, the revisionist took no steps in put into effect of his right to get the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory. 17. Indubitably, after receiving the notice, the revisionist took no steps in put into effect of his right to get the sample analyzed by the Central Food Laboratory. In that situation, it is very difficult rather impossible to agree with the contention that the revisionist lost his right under Section 13(2) of ‘PFA Act.’ The decision in Resham Singh supra relied upon by the learned counsel for the revisionist is not applicable to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case. 18. Evidence is crystal clear that there was contravention of the provisions. There was no misreading of the evidence in finding the revisionist guilty by the trial court and the Appellate Court. There are no perverse findings. The learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence and found the revisionist guilty for the offences charged. There are no grounds to interfere with the conviction. Therefore, it is held that the conviction is maintained for the offence under Section 16(1) of ‘the PFA Act’. 19. Coming to the other submissions made by the learned counsel for the revisionist, the offence took place in the year 2005, nearly 20 years have passed by. The revisionist was 27 years at the time of commission of the offence. Record reveals that he was a new entrepreneur started the establishment with zeal and enthusiasm. Indeed, license and certification is required as per ‘the PFA,’ Act and ‘the Rules’, which he had not obtained. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Braham Dass supra in para Nos. 5 & 6 held as under: “5. Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had been acquitted by the trial court and the High Court while reversing the judgment of acquittal made by the appellate Judge has not make clear reference to clause (f). The occurrence took place about more than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point of time for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the Court should take strict view of such matter. 6. While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and sustain. 6. While dismissing the appeal, we would, however, limit the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and sustain. the fine along with the default sentence.” 21. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Des Raj supra in para Nos.8 & 9 held as under: “8. The respective arguments have been considered carefully. It is not disputed that the sample in question was taken on 29-8-1987 and the prosecution was launched against him on 9-10-1987. After a long and protracted trial the petitioner was convicted and sentenced by order dated November 7, 1992 which has been confirmed by the appellate Court by order dated November 17, 1995. In other words, the petitioner has been undergoing the turmoil of a criminal prosecution for the last about eight years. 9. Now, it is well settled that the right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Fundamental rights are not a teasing illusion to be mocked at. These are meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry trial, appeal, revision and retrial. This is how the Courts shall understand this right, and have gone to the extent of quashing the prosecution after such inordinate delay in concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 8 years or more without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 8 years or more without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. It is correct that although minimum sentence to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in view the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the mental agony which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to the fault of the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction.” 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Haripada Das supra in para No.6 held as under: “6. This appeal is directed against the conviction of the appellant under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling adulterated mustard oil. Although in the samples drawn by the Food Inspector, no impurity or objects injurious to health could be detected but it was found that the saponification value exceeded marginally than the prescribed limit and the B.R. reading also exceeded marginally than the prescribed limit. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering that the appellant was released on bail by this Court long back and because of the protracted litigation up to this Court he has also suffered a lot of mental agony and also financial hardship and also considering the fact that he had already undergone imprisonment for more than three weeks, we feel that in the facts of the case the ends of justice will be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone. We, however, direct that besides the fine imposed by the Courts below, the appellant will have to pay a fine Rs. 5,000/- within four weeks from today, in default he will have to undergo imprisonment for three months. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. The bail bonds stand discharged.” 23. The learned counsel for the revisionist as also relied on the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhapur in Swaroopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan in CRL.R.P.No.115 of 2007 dated 05.02.2025 wherein at page No.9 it is held as under: “9. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. The bail bonds stand discharged.” 23. The learned counsel for the revisionist as also relied on the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhapur in Swaroopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan in CRL.R.P.No.115 of 2007 dated 05.02.2025 wherein at page No.9 it is held as under: “9. This Court finds that the petitioner was a milk vendor and there is no reason available with it to disbelieve the report of the Public Analyst, wherein the sample of milk drawn from the petitioner was found to be Adulterated. However, in the opinion of this Court, since the incident relates to the year 1997 and the petitioner has suffered the agony and trauma of protracted trial for about 27 years coupled with the fact that the petitioner has spent some period in custody, it will be just and proper if the sentence awarded to him by the learned trial Court for the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is reduced to the period already undergone by him.” 24. The prosecution proved the guilt of the revisionist beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence charged. Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the revisionist. Similarly, the learned Appellate Court also confirmed the same. Re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in this revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh , D Stephens and K Chinnaswamy Reddy 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar , [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ] it is held that right to speedy trial which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision is part of a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In addition to the appeals the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar , [ (1999) 7 SCC 604 ] . The right of speedy trial of the revisionist is being violated because of delay in disposal of the revision within a reasonable time. Therefore, the delay is also one of the grounds to modify the impugned order. 26. As stated supra, the occurrence took place about 20 years ago. The right of speedy trial of the revisionist is being violated because of delay in disposal of the revision within a reasonable time. Therefore, the delay is also one of the grounds to modify the impugned order. 26. As stated supra, the occurrence took place about 20 years ago. The revisionist has been facing mental agony and trauma of the protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment for a long period of 20 years. Therefore, it is appropriate and proportionate that the sentence is required to be reduced to the period of sentence of imprisonment already undergone by the revisionist. 27. Following the principles laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Braham Dass and Haripada Das, it is a fit case where some lenience should be taken in regard to maintainability of the sentence of imprisonment. The learned Trial Court imposed Rs.1,000/- (thousand rupees only) which was confirmed by the learned Appellate Court. The learned counsel for the revisionist volunteered that the revisionist would pay Rs.20,000/- including the Rs.1000/- paid by the revisionist, while preferring the appeal before Appellate Court, as a measure of penance. The said voluntary statement is recorded and approved. 28. In view of the obtaining peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the revision is disposed of, while confirming and maintaining the conviction, but reducing the sentence which the revisionist had already undergone, and modifying the sentence of payment of fine by enhancing from Rs.1000/- to Rs.20,000/-. 29. The revisionist shall pay remaining fine of Rs.19,000/- within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order, before the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Addanki as the revisionist had already paid an amount of fine Rs.1000/- while preferring the appeal before the learned Appellate Court. In default of payment of Rs.19,000/- the Revisionist shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two (02) months. The bail bonds shall stand discharged after payment of enhanced fine amount. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.