JUDGMENT : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J. 1. In this Writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dt. 08.09.2023 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj. According to the petitioner, this order has been communicated to the petitioner through an email dt. 29.09.2023 of the District Mining Officer, Sahibganj. 2. According to the petitioner, in this email, as attachments, show- cause notices dt. 04.01.2022 and 07.02.2022 were enclosed and in paragraph 8 of the writ petition, this is specifically adverted to. It is contended that the show-cause notices dt. 04.01.2022 and 07.02.2022 were never served on the petitioner prior to the passing of the impugned order on 08.09.2023 by the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj. 3. The Writ petition had been filed on 09.01.2024 and was initially listed on 29.04.2024, on which date, it was adjourned to 30.4. 2024. 4. On that day, a Division Bench of this Court recorded an additional ground also pleaded by the petitioner based on Clause (2) to Section 4A of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 which authorizes the State Government to prematurely terminate a mining lease. It is recorded therein that petitioner contended that there has to be a notification in the Official Gazette authorising a person to do an act or all acts on behalf of the State Government; that such power has to be conferred by the State Government on the Deputy Commissioner by issuing such a notification; but without issuing such a notification, the Deputy Commissioner had exercised the power of the State Government to prematurely terminate the mining lease of petitioner invoking sub-rule (5) of Rule 22 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004. The Court had directed the matter to be posted to 9.5.2024 by permitting the counsel for respondents to counter affidavit on this point. 5. When the matter was listed on 20.1.2025, this Court noted that the respondents had not chosen to file a counter affidavit from 30.4.2024 till that date; and as a last chance, granted one more week’s time to the respondents to file a counter affidavit in the matter. It was made clear that if counter affidavit was not filed by that date, the right of the respondents to file counter affidavit shall stand forfeited. Matter was then adjourned to 06.02.2025 i.e. today. 6. It was made clear that if counter affidavit was not filed by that date, the right of the respondents to file counter affidavit shall stand forfeited. Matter was then adjourned to 06.02.2025 i.e. today. 6. However, the counsel for the respondents states that the counter affidavit has not been filed in spite of the peremptory order passed on 20.1.2025 and seeks further time to file a counter affidavit. 7. Since the respondents had ample time to file the counter affidavit from 30.4.2024 to 6.2.2025 and, in spite of having been given ample opportunities to file a counter affidavit, have refrained from doing so, in view of the order dt. 20.1.2025, their right to file a counter affidavit stands forfeited. 8. The allegation of the petitioner that the notices dt. 04.01.2022 and 07.02.2022 were not served to the petitioner prior to the order dt. 08.09.2023 as alleged in paragraphs 8 and 16 of the Writ petition, remained unrebutted. Therefore, we hold that the impugned order has been passed in brazen violation of principles of natural justice. 9. Moreover, the notice dt. 07.02.2022 gives a mere seven days, though Rule 22(5) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 mandates the period of 30 days to file a reply to a show-cause notice. This also vitiates the impugned order. 10. An officer of the rank of the Deputy Commissioner is expected to know this provisions of the law and comply with the same and not act in total disregard of the same, as has been done in the instant case. 11. More particularly, Section 4A(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 confers the power to cancel a mining lease at a premature stage, but that power is vested only in the State Government. Rule 22 (5) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 enables the competent authority to terminate prematurely the lease granted to a party. Rule 2(14) of the said Rules defines “competent authority” to be the State Government or such other officer authorized by it. Assuming for the sake of argument that the said power can be delegated by the State Government, Section 26(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 requires the State Government to issue a notification making such delegation to any officer or authority subordinate to the State Government. Assuming for the sake of argument that the said power can be delegated by the State Government, Section 26(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 requires the State Government to issue a notification making such delegation to any officer or authority subordinate to the State Government. In spite of a specific assertion made by petitioner that there is no such notification issued by the State Government by which the power vested in the State Government under Section 4A to prematurely terminate the mining lease has been delegated to the Deputy Commissioner, the respondents have not produced any such notification making such delegation. 12. The invocation of Rule 22(5) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 by the Deputy Commissioner to prematurely terminate the mining lease granted to petitioner, runs contrary to Section 4A(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. 13. Therefore, it has to be held that the Deputy Commissioner had no power to cancel prematurely the mining lease granted to the petitioner. 14. Counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner has an alternative remedy in the form of an appeal. 15. This submission is without any merit, because, when there is a blatant violation of principles of natural justice, or, when there is a challenge to the very jurisdiction of the authority who passed an adverse order to a party, it is settled law that alterative remedy cannot be a bar to entertain a Writ Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India [ Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks , [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] ]. 16. We, therefore, hold that the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj had no jurisdiction to pass the order dt. 08.09.2023 terminating prematurely the mining lease of the petitioner and also that the said order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 17. Accordingly, the said order is quashed and the petitioner is permitted to exercise rights under the mining lease up to 19.12.2026. He is also granted liberty to claim damages from the respondents for preventing it from conducting mining operations from 08.09.2023 onwards till date. The respondents shall also pay cost of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner. 18. With the aforesaid directions and observations, the Writ petition is allowed. 19. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.