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2025 DIGILAW 315 (AP)

S. Nagamanemma v. State Of Andhra Pradesh

2025-02-20

SUBBA REDDY SATTI

body2025
ORDER : (SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J.) Since the issues involved in the above writ petitions are interrelated, they are disposed of by this common order. 2. W.P.No.26984 of 2024 is filed impugning G.O.Rt.No.729, Agriculture & Cooperation (AGRI.I) Department, dated 14.11.2024 issued by the Special Chief Secretary to the Government i.e. respondent No.1, posting one Smt. D.M.F. Vijaya Kumari, DDA/DPM, NTR District (APCNF) as in-charge District Agriculture Officer (DAO), NTR District, with immediate effect and further directing the Director of Agriculture of Andhra Pradesh, to post the petitioner in a non-focal post, immediately due to the allegations levelled against her, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 3. W.P.No.29759 of 2024 is filed impugning G.O.Rt.No.766, Agriculture and Operation (Vig.I) Department, dated 11.12.2024 issued by respondent No.1 i.e. Special Chief Secretary to the Government of A.P., suspending the petitioner in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 8 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 (for short 'the Rules'), as illegal and arbitrary. 4. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed as Agricultural Officer (AO), on 02.07.1992. Subsequently, the petitioner was promoted to Assistant Director on 06.01.2006 and further promoted to Deputy Director of Agriculture, on 14.06.2017. After the formation of the new District, the petitioner was posted to NTR District. The Deputy Director of Agriculture is the highest cadre post in the District. After assuming the charge as Deputy Director of Agriculture, the petitioner, in the discharge of her duties, conducted various rides, and division-wise awareness camps, was appointed as Inquiry Officer against Mandal Agricultural Officer, Veerlapadu Mandal, and acted per the rules. Some of the erring officers in the department influenced the Dealers? Association and provoked them to give false and fabricated complaints against the petitioner. Acting upon the said complaints, the petitioner was asked to appear before the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was also discriminated against and not allowed to take part in the promotion process, though she is part of the said Committee. Appointing another person, as in charge and respondent No.1 directing the Director of Agriculture, AP, Guntur to post the petitioner to any non-focal post is stigmatic and hence, G.O.Rt.No.729 is liable to be set aside. 5. Suspension of the petitioner, pending the inquiry is without application of mind. Appointing another person, as in charge and respondent No.1 directing the Director of Agriculture, AP, Guntur to post the petitioner to any non-focal post is stigmatic and hence, G.O.Rt.No.729 is liable to be set aside. 5. Suspension of the petitioner, pending the inquiry is without application of mind. Hence, G.O.Rt.No.766 dated 11.12.2024, impugned in W.P.No.29759 of 2024 is also liable to be set aside. 6. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent No.2 on his behalf as well as on behalf of respondent No.1, in W.P.No.26984 of 2024. 7. It is very unfortunate, that when the proceedings issued by respondent No.1 are under challenge, respondent No.1 is expected to file a counter affidavit, but not respondent No.2. However, since respondent No.2 filed counter affidavit even on behalf of respondent No.1, this Court, at this juncture is not going into that aspect. 8. In the counter affidavit, it was contended inter alia, that the Krishna District Fertilizers, Pesticide and Seeds Retail Dealers Welfare Association, Vijayawada, made a complaint against the petitioner before respondent No.2. In the complaint it was alleged that the petitioner has been insisting the subordinate staff to collect money and gifts from the Fertilizers, pesticides and Seeds dealers. Since the subordinate officers are not agreeing to the said act, the petitioner has been collecting Rs.10,000/- to Rs.15,000/- from each shop, depending upon the area and the turnover. If the dealers are not meeting her demands, they are being threatened to seize stocks or suspend their licenses, etc. The petitioner is also demanding diesel for the vehicle during visits as inspection of the outlets. b) During the inquiry conducted on the complaint of M/s. Jai Hanuman Pesticides & Seeds, Ammireddygudem, Gamapalgaudem Mandal, it was alleged that the petitioner demanded Rs.5,00,000/- from the said dealer to continue the license. When the dealer failed to pay the amount, the petitioner cancelled the license. c) Therefore, respondent No.2 appointed one Sri V.D.V. Krupa Das, Joint Director of Agriculture (Inputs) to conduct an inquiry on the complaints of the association. The inquiry officer submitted a report dated 07.10.2024. The Inquiry Officer, prima facie opined that the allegations levelled against the petitioner seem to be true. c) Therefore, respondent No.2 appointed one Sri V.D.V. Krupa Das, Joint Director of Agriculture (Inputs) to conduct an inquiry on the complaints of the association. The inquiry officer submitted a report dated 07.10.2024. The Inquiry Officer, prima facie opined that the allegations levelled against the petitioner seem to be true. d) Further, forty-four employees of the Agriculture Department, NTR District, working under the petitioner?s control made a complaint dated 19.08.2024 requesting the intervention of respondent No.2 in restoring the professional, respectful and collaborative working environment in the Agriculture Department, NTR District. The employees alleged illegal collection practices / unethical conduct etc., against the petitioner. e) Smt. V.V. Vijaya Lakshmi, Additional Director of Agriculture and Director, ATMA, A.P., Guntur was appointed to conduct an inquiry. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 24.09.2024 and opined that the administration of NTR District is not at all running as per the rule book due to irrelevant steps introduced by the petitioner, which are hurting the self-respect of the staff and leading to divisionary activities and opined that there is prima facie case to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner as per the Rules. f) Since both the Inquiry Officers opined that there are prima facie allegations against the petitioner, respondent No.2 appraised the issue to respondent No.1, the appointing authority of the petitioner, with a request to appoint in charge. Respondent No.1, after considering the material issued G.O.Rt.No.729 dated 14.11.2024 appointing Smt. D.M.F. Vijaya Kumari, as incharge District Agriculture Officer, and further directed respondent No.2 to post the petitioner to any non-focal post. 9. The District Collector also, based on the request of respondent No.2, conducted an inquiry and submitted a report dated 22.11.2024. Thereafter, respondent No.2 submitted the proposal to respondent No.1 to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Respondent No.1, in turn, initiated disciplinary proceedings and issued G.O.Rt.No.766 dated 11.12.2024, suspending the petitioner, pending inquiry. The respective Inquiry Officers in the aforementioned inquiries issued notices to the petitioners and thereafter submitted reports. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 10. The petitioner filed a reply to the counter affidavit, elaborating the averments made in the writ affidavit while disputing some of the averments of the counter affidavit. 11. Heard Sri Peeta Raman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ramalingeswara Rao, learned Government Pleader for Services-II, for the respondents. 12. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 10. The petitioner filed a reply to the counter affidavit, elaborating the averments made in the writ affidavit while disputing some of the averments of the counter affidavit. 11. Heard Sri Peeta Raman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ramalingeswara Rao, learned Government Pleader for Services-II, for the respondents. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the contentions of the writ affidavits would further contend that appointing another officer as in charge, in the place of the petitioner and direction by respondent No.1 to respondent No.2 to post the petitioner in any non-focal post is stigmatic. The order does not contain any reasons. The petitioner was not issued any notice regarding the irregularities. 13. Per contra, learned Government Pleader for Services-II would submit that based upon the complaints of the Dealers? Association and the employees, two different Inquiry Officers were appointed. The respective Inquiry Officers submitted their reports. After considering the reports, respondent No.2 submitted a report to respondent No.1, the appointing authority of the petitioner. Thereafter, initially, G.O.Rt.No.729 dated 14.11.2024 was issued appointing Smt. D.M.F. Vijaya Kumar, as in charge DAO with a direction to respondent No.2 to transfer the petitioner to any non- focal post. Thereafter, G.O.Rt.No.766 dated 11.12.2024 was issued suspending the petitioner, pending the inquiry. He prayed to dismiss the writ petitions. 14. The points for consideration are: 1. Whether G.O.Rt.No.729 dated 14.11.2024 suffer from any illegality or arbitrariness? 2. Whether G.O.Rt.No.766 dated 11.12.2024 suffer from any illegality or arbitrariness? 15. Shorn of all the details, there is no dispute regarding the petitioner?s appointment as Deputy Director Agriculture of NTR District, her discharging duties till issuance of G.O.Rt.No.729 dated 14.11.2024 and thereafter, her suspension vide G.O.Rt.No.766 dated 11.12.2024. 16. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the posting of Smt. D.M.F. Vijaya Kumari, DDA/DPM, NTR District (APCNF) as in charge DAO, NTR District and further directing the Director of Agriculture of Andhra Pradesh, to post the petitioner in the non-focal post, by issuing G.O.Rt.No.729 dated 14.11.2024, is stigmatic. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and Others , [ (2009) 2 SCC 592 ] 17. The facts in Somesh Tiwari’s case are that the appellant therein is an officer of the Indian Revenue Service. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and Others , [ (2009) 2 SCC 592 ] 17. The facts in Somesh Tiwari’s case are that the appellant therein is an officer of the Indian Revenue Service. He was transferred based on a complaint. The appellant made representation stating that he was undergoing some treatment and he had to be retained at Bhopal. Based on the complaints made by the employees, the Assistant Commissioner, Directorate of Vigilance conducted an inquiry and the authority found that the allegations against the appellant are not found to be true but the recommendations are still pending.However, the appellant was transferred from Bhopal to Shillong. The appellant made a representation. However, the same was not considered. Therefore, the appellant filed OA before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench. The Central Administrative Tribunal directed the respondent authorities to consider and take a decision on the appellant?s representation, within four weeks and further directed the authorities not to disturb the petitioner from the present place of posting, till such time. Since the appellant?s representation was rejected, the appellant filed another O.A. Pending the said O.A., while considering promotion, posting and transfer, the appellant was transferred from Shillong to Ahmedabad, on administrative grounds. The Tribunal dismissed said O.A., aggrieved by which the appellant filed a writ petition. Pending the writ petition, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant since he has not joined the post at Ahmedabad. At that juncture, the High Court granted an interim order and eventually, the transfer order was set aside. However, the High Court directed, not to pay salary for fifteen days. Assailing the said order, the appellant approached the Hon?ble Apex Court. The Hon?ble Apex Court, at paras 16 and 17, observed as under: “Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order.There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save in cases wherein inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds – one attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. Mala fide is of two kinds – one attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal. 17. An enquiry was initiated against the appellant in terms of the allegations contained in an anonymous letter. Having regard to the directives of the Central Vigilance Commission, no enquiry could have been initiated against him but it is beyond any doubt or dispute that in the said enquiry, the allegations were found to be untrue. Despite the same not only an order of transfer was passed but to a station, which according to the respondents themselves, was “harsh”.” 18. Eventually, the Hon?ble Apex Court held as under: 24. We, keeping in view the fact, that on the one hand the appellant did not join his posting at Ahmedabad, although no order of stay was passed and on the other wholly unwarranted and reprehensible conduct on the part of the authorities of the respondents, are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if during the period from 28-12-2005 till his joining his post at Bhopal, the appellant is treated to be on leave and the respondents are directed to pass an appropriate order invoking the leave rules applicable in this behalf. It is ordered accordingly.” 19. The law concerning the applicability of the doctrine of precedents is well settled. It has been consistently held that a judgment is only an authority for what it decides and not what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. To fully understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is always necessary to see what were the facts of the case in which the decision was given and what was the point decided. 20. In the case of The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. To fully understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is always necessary to see what were the facts of the case in which the decision was given and what was the point decided. 20. In the case of The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. AIR 1968 SC 647 by referring to the observations made by Earl of Halsbury LC in Quinn Vs. Leathem, 1901 AC 495, it was stated thus: “12...A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v.Leathem, 1901 AC 495. "Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." 21. A similar view was taken in Union of India vs. Amrit Lal Manchandra and others , [ (2004) 3 SCC 75 ] , and after referring to the decisions in London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. Vs. Horton , [ 1951 AC 737 ] , Home Office Vs. Dorcet Yacht Co., , [1970 (2) ALL ER 294] and Herrington Vs. British Railways Board , [ 1972 (2) WLR 537 ] , it was stated that observations of the Court must be read in the context in which they appear and that one additional or different fact may make a world of difference. Dorcet Yacht Co., , [1970 (2) ALL ER 294] and Herrington Vs. British Railways Board , [ 1972 (2) WLR 537 ] , it was stated that observations of the Court must be read in the context in which they appear and that one additional or different fact may make a world of difference. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: “15...Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret Page 14 of 16 Page 14 of 16 judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Pock Co. Ltd. v. Horton ( 1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judges." 22. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., , [1970 (2) All ER 294] , Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judges." 22. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., , [1970 (2) All ER 294] , Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v.British Railways Board ( 1972 (2)WLR 537 ) Lord Morris said: "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." 17. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 18. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 23. In the case at hand, respondent No.2 submitted a report to respondent No.1, based on the inquiry conducted by two separate Inquiry officers. As seen from the respective reports, the Inquiry Officer, who conducted an inquiry regarding the allegations made by the dealers? association, opined that the allegations levelled against the petitioner seem to be true. In the case at hand, respondent No.2 submitted a report to respondent No.1, based on the inquiry conducted by two separate Inquiry officers. As seen from the respective reports, the Inquiry Officer, who conducted an inquiry regarding the allegations made by the dealers? association, opined that the allegations levelled against the petitioner seem to be true. The Inquiry Officer further observed that the petitioner attended late for more than an hour to the inquiry, showing that she has no seriousness in her legitimate duties. 24. The other Inquiry Officer, enquired in respect of the complaints made by the employees and submitted a report, wherein it was observed that the Administration in NTR District is not as per the rule book due to irrelevant steps introduced by the petitioner as DAO, NTR District, which are hurting self-respect of the staff and leading to divisionary activities. 25. Thus, acting upon the said reports, respondent No.1 immediately appointed Smt. Vijaya Kumari, as in charge DAO of the NTR District, further directed respondent No.2 to post the petitioner to any non-local post. Thus, for the smooth running of administration, such an arrangement was made. 26. Of course, this Court is not recording any finding at this stage, as to whether the imputations leveled against the petitioner are held proved. However, respondent No.1, on examination of the matter took a decision. Respondent No.1, in fact, assigned reasons for the petitioner?s suspension under G.O.Rt.No.766 dated 11.12.2024. 27. Though Article 226 of the Constitution of India, confers no limited powers, such descriptive power has to be exercised with self-imposed limitations, by the Courts. If the suspension order suffers from mala fides or arbitrariness, or if the order is passed in violation of any statutory provisions, or if such suspension is a result of any arbitrary exercise and without reasonable grounds, definitely such exercise can be interdicted by the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India. 28. However, in the case at hand, as stated supra, reasons were assigned and after examining the issue, the impugned G.Os. were passed. 29. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any malice in law or malice in fact, in the facts and circumstances of the case. There are no merits in the writ petitions. Hence, both the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 30. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are dismissed. were passed. 29. Given the discussion supra, this Court does not find any malice in law or malice in fact, in the facts and circumstances of the case. There are no merits in the writ petitions. Hence, both the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 30. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are dismissed. The observations, if any made, are made only to render a decision in the above writ petitions and will not come in the way of the petitioner in future proceedings. No costs. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.