Judgment : This appeal has been filed under Section 378 of Cr.P.C by the State against the judgment dated 14.06.2004 passed by the JMFC, Chachoda, Distt. Guna, in Case No.462/1990 after taking leave to file appeal vide order dated 12.12.2005 passed in M.Cr.C.No.3785/2004. Vide impugned order dated 14/06/2004 the respondents have been acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 353, 332 of IPC. 2. Prosecution story, in short, is that on 29.03.1990 at 8.10 O'clock respondents Ripudamansingh Thakur, Hemraj Singh, Ramjeevan, Harnamsingh, Ramjeevan Meena son of Rahuvir, brother of Sheelchand Jain namely Gudda, Kanhaiyalal, Hemraj Meena and others were stopping the vehicles passing through AB Road and shouting slogans against the police. When the police party tried to make them understand, stone pelting started, due to which, Head Constable Hridesh Kumar at the right side of chest, Head Constable Surendra Singh at his shoulder and Bajrajsingh on wrist of right hand and knee of right leg sustained injuries. The accused persons also pelted stones on the vehicles, due to which their glasses were broken, at that juncture, complainant Bajrangsahay Dubey, the then Station House Officer Chachoda, in self defence and to disperse the crowd, fired in air from his 315 bore rifle, as a result of which the crowd dispersed. When the complainant went to call extra police force and SDM at the spot, accused Harnam Singh pelted brick at the backside of his head. Brick was also pelted by accused Ripudamansingh which hit on the number plate of jeep. Others also tried to make the crowd understand, but they did not understand. Government Jeep of SDOP was also damaged in the incident. After returning to police Station, FIR was registered. Injured were medically examined. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the concerned Court. 3. The respondents abjured their guilt. They took the plea that they have been falsely implicated in the matter due to political pressure. However, no defence evidence was adduced by them. 4. The learned JMFC, on appreciation of evidence placed on record, acquitted the respondents from the aforesaid charges. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the State that acquittal of respondents from the charges levelled is not based on cogent grounds. However, no defence evidence was adduced by them. 4. The learned JMFC, on appreciation of evidence placed on record, acquitted the respondents from the aforesaid charges. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the State that acquittal of respondents from the charges levelled is not based on cogent grounds. Head Constable Hridesh Kumar (PW-2) supported the prosecution story and stated that when they tried to make the respondents understand, they pelted stones due to which Town Inspector, he himself, Head Constable Surendra Singh and Brijnarayan sustained injuries. The Government Jeep of SDOP was also damaged in the incident. Surendra Singh (PW-3) has also supported the prosecution story. Even though, learned trial Court acquitted the respondents from the charges. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned judgment. 7. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the record. 8. As per the statement of Dr. S.R. Soni (PW-1), there was one injury each on the bodies of Bajrang Sahay and Brijraj, but Dinesh and Surendra Singh did not sustain any visible injuries. It also reveals from the testimony of this witness that all injuries found on the bodies of the injured Bajrang and Brijraj were simple in nature. 9. In the present case, the identity of the accused persons as the miscreants who pelted stones at the police party has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Hirdesh Kumar (PW-2) in his statement named Ripudaman Singh, Harnam Singh, Kanhaiyalal, Ramjeevan, Hemraj (resident of Khatoli) and one Hemraj (resident of Beenagaon) as being present at the spot, while Surendra Singh (PW-3) named Ripudaman, Gudda, and Kanhaiyalal as being present on the spot, and Bajrang Sahaya (PW-6) named Ripudaman and Harnam Singh, however, none of these witnesses have named all of the accused persons in their statements. The evidence of these witnesses reveals that at the time of the incident, there was a mob of 150–200 persons and they were pelting stones. When there was a mob of 150– 200 persons who were pelting stones, how these witnesses identified the accused persons is not clarified by these witnesses specially when the accused persons were not known to these persons earlier. Hirdesh (PW-2) stated in Para 17 that he identified 5 to 7 persons in the mob who had gathered at the spot, but he did not name the persons to whom he identified. 10. Hirdesh (PW-2) stated in Para 17 that he identified 5 to 7 persons in the mob who had gathered at the spot, but he did not name the persons to whom he identified. 10. Surendra Singh (PW-3) stated categorically in Para 5 that when they reached the spot, the mob started pelting stones and the stones were being pelted from all sides, but he could not see who was pelting stones at whom. He further stated that when aerial firing took place, the mob scattered. He also stated in Para 8 that a chakka jam (traffic blockade) was created at the spot before they reached there. In Para 10, he categorically admitted the suggestion that he cannot say that who caused the injury by throwing stones from the mob. 11. Bajrang Sahay (PW-6) stated in his examination-in-chief that when they reached the spot, the mob started pelting stones. In Para 2, he stated that as per his information, Ripudaman, Harnam and others were on the spot, but the source of this information has not been specified by this witness. In Para 3, he stated the names of the present respondents that these names were mentioned in the FIR, but he has not clarified how he gathered information regarding the identities of these persons allegedly present in the mob; therefore, the identity of the accused persons as the miscreants who pelted stones at the police party has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. 12. One more important facet revealed from the prosecution story is that the FIR (Exh. P-7) was lodged on the basis of Rajnamcha Sanha No. 1222 dated 29.03.1990, which is vivid from the perusal of the FIR, however, the said Rojnamcha Sanha, which was the original FIR/report, has not been filed/exhibited or proved in this case by the prosecution for the reasons best known to it. Therefore, the suppression of this important document by the prosecution creates adverse inference against it. In this regard, ample cross-examination was conducted by the defence with Hridesh Kumar (PW-2), Surendra Singh (PW-3), and Bajrangsahay (PW-6). They stated that the entries regarding Ravangi (departure) and wapasi (return) were made in the Rojnamcha Sanha, but such records have not been filed/ exhibited or proved in this case. No satisfactory reason for such suppression has been assigned by them during cross-examination. Therefore, the suppression of the important document becomes fatal to the prosecution's case. 13. They stated that the entries regarding Ravangi (departure) and wapasi (return) were made in the Rojnamcha Sanha, but such records have not been filed/ exhibited or proved in this case. No satisfactory reason for such suppression has been assigned by them during cross-examination. Therefore, the suppression of the important document becomes fatal to the prosecution's case. 13. To establish the offence under Section 353 and 332 of the IPC, the prosecution was required to prove that the witnesses were public servants and were discharging their official duties at the time of the incident. However, no documentary evidence to that effect has been adduced by the prosecution during the trial. Though the witnesses have stated that they were performing their official duties, but the concerned Rojnamcha Sanha entries as well as their duty certificates ought to have been produced, exhibited, and proved by the prosecution which might be available to them. However, the prosecution failed to bring such material evidence on record, which also raises doubt regarding the veracity of the prosecution’s case. 14. It is also pertinent to mention that no independent witness, though could have been available, has been made a witness in this case. In this regard, the learned Trial Court has considered the evidence on record in proper and lawful manner and has rightly culminated the case in acquittal. 15. It is trite law that in an appeal against acquittal, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused stands strengthened, and if such presumption arises from the material available on record, it must prevail. Mere doubt, however grave, cannot take the place of legal evidence. If the Trial Court has adopted a view which is neither perverse nor unlawful, then the judgment of acquittal cannot be set aside merely on the ground that a different conclusion could have been drawn from the evidence and material on record. 16. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, (2016) 14 SCC 151 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also the rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is also the rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B., (2023) 6 SCC 605 Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that it is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt. Unless finding of the trial Court is found to be perverse or illegal/impossible, it is not permissible for the appellate Court to interfere with the same. 17. In the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal and held that “there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 18. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 18. In case of H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered and summarized the principles that need to be kept in mind while deciding the appeal against acquittal as follows : “8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 19. Recently in case of Mallappa & others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 the Hon'ble Apex Court has again summarized the principles while deciding the appeal against acquittal which are as follows :- "42.Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarised as : (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive — inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the trial court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the trial court." 20. In light of the foregoing discussion and the legal principles laid down in the aforementioned cases, the acquittal of the present respondents rests on cogent and well-reasoned grounds, warranting no interference. This Court is of the considered view that the acquittal of respondents from the charges under Sections 147, 353, and 332 of the IPC is based on sound legal reasonings, and no perversity or illegality is apparent in the impugned judgment. 21. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. The order of the trial Court as regards disposal of seized property is hereby affirmed.