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2025 DIGILAW 325 (GAU)

Angad Paul S/o Late Bhawani Paul v. Sulekha Chanda W/o Shri Ranadhir Chanda

2025-02-25

DEVASHIS BARUAH

body2025
JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. M. Baruah, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. Mr. K.K. Dey, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent. 2. This is an appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 26.07.2011 passed by the Court of the learned Civil Judge No. 2, Cachar at Silchar (hereinafter referred to as, the learned First Appellate Court”) in Title Appeal No. 51/2005 whereby the appeal was dismissed thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 12.07.2005 passed by the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Cachar at Silchar (hereinafter referred to as, “the learned Trial Court”) in Title Suit No. 172/1997. 3. It is seen from the records that the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide an order dated 22.09.2011, admitted the present appeal by formulating as many as 7 (seven) substantial questions of law. The said 7 (seven) substantial questions of law are reproduced herein under: “ A . Whether the finding of the courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse although Biswajit Paul was not arrayed as a party in view of the fact that as per evidence of the plaintiff Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul ousted her from the land and it is proved by defendant/appellant that the defendant No. 1 Naresh Ghatowar transferred the land vide Ext-A Sale Deed dated 30.03.90 as well as Ext. B, C and D swarnlipies in favour of Angad Paul defendant/appellant as well as Biswajit Paul? B. Whether the finding of the courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse although the legal heirs of Rajani Mohan Das and Nayan Chand Das, who were admittedly original owners of the land except Subodh Ch. Das were not arrayed? C. Whether finding of the courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse in not arraying the State of Assam as a party since it was proved that the land was declared as celling surplus and was made khas and proposal for settlement was made in favour of Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul? C. Whether finding of the courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse in not arraying the State of Assam as a party since it was proved that the land was declared as celling surplus and was made khas and proposal for settlement was made in favour of Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul? D. Whether the courts below were right in heavily relying on the report of the amin Commissioner who having admitted that he had not shown either in the map or in the report the boundary of the suit land not there was direction to measure/survey the suit land or the land of the khatian? E. Whether the appellate court below was correct in applying Section 68 of the Evidence Act in holding that Ext. A to D are not legally proved as the said documents are required to be attested compulsorily inasmuch as the documents ext. A to D are not required by law to be attested? F. Whether the finding of the appellate court below is perverse in holding that Ext. A as proved before the appellate court regarding proposal for recommendation of allotment of land measuring 4B 16K 16CH of land under Dag No. 38/224 (Kha) and 224 (GA) of Mouza Disha Grant Ph-Lakhipur does not cover the suit land although new dags come out of original Dag No. 38? G. Whether courts below failed to consider the fact that the alleged transfer in 1975 as claimed by plaintiff/respondent is in violation of Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971, for which the tenant’s interest in the land is forfeited as per Section 50 of the Act and whether the findings of the court below are vitiated? H. Any other question(s), which may be allowed to be raised at the time of hearing.” The question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether any of the 7 (seven) or all of the 7 (seven) substantial questions of law are involved in the instant appeal. To ascertain the said aspect, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the brief facts which led to the filing of the instant appeal. 4. To ascertain the said aspect, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the brief facts which led to the filing of the instant appeal. 4. One Ganga Charan Roy was in possession of a plot of land described in the Schedule to the plaint as tenant under the original owner i.e., the defendant No. 3 since the time of his predecessor on payment of rent to the landlord. The said Ganga Charan Roy and his predecessor acquired the status of occupancy tenant in respect to the suit land under the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971. The plaintiff claimed that she had purchased the tenancy rights over the land vide a registered sale deed bearing deed No. 4280 of the year 1975 dated 26.07.1975 from the said Ganga Charan Roy. It is the further case of the plaintiff that after purchase of the said plot of land, the plaintiff cultivated on the suit land. In that regard, the plaintiff also attorned to the owner of the land, i.e. the proforma defendant No. 3, who realized rent at the rate of Rs. 100/- annually. It is therefore the case of the plaintiff that on the basis of the said registered deed of sale as well as upon attorning to the proforma defendant No. 3, the plaintiff acquired the status of an occupancy tenant. 5. In the year 1995, as stated in the plaint, the defendant No. 1 approached the plaintiff to cultivate the agricultural land as engaged labourer. The plaintiff allowed the defendant No. 1 to cultivate the said land and paid his remuneration. In the next year also, the plaintiff allowed the defendant No. 1 to cultivate on the said land. However, in the year 1997, the plaintiff in good faith engaged defendant No. 1 to cultivate the land with a condition that the defendant No. 1 would provide the paddy in the field after harvesting. However, the defendant No. 1 did not provide the paddy and the plaintiff came to learn that the defendant No. 1 had entered into a secret settlement with the defendant No. 2 to grab the paddy over the land. However, the defendant No. 1 did not provide the paddy and the plaintiff came to learn that the defendant No. 1 had entered into a secret settlement with the defendant No. 2 to grab the paddy over the land. It is under such circumstances, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration to the effect that the plaintiff had occupancy rights in respect to the land described in the Schedule to the plaint under proforma defendant No. 3 at an annual rate of Rs. 100/- and for confirmation of possession; for khas possession against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by evicting them from the land described in the Schedule to the plaint in the event they are or any of them are found in possession; for declaration that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have no right, title and possession over the land described in the Schedule to the plaint and any documents created by them in respect of the same is illegal, collusive and void; for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from entering into the suit land described in the Schedule to the plaint and/or in any way disturbing the plaintiff, her men, employees and agents in peaceful enjoyment of the same by growing and harvesting paddy, in any manner whatsoever. It is very relevant to take note of the land described in the Schedule to the plaint as the same has relevance to the substantial questions of law so formulated by this Court. Under such circumstances, the Schedule to the plaint is reproduced herein under: “SCHEDULE All the piece and parcel of jote right land measuring an area of 8 B 1 K 8 Ch ( eight bigha one katta and eight chataks) appertaining to 33(k), 37 (Uma) 39 (Uma) and 39 (Ja) of Pe_deem lease patta No. 47/20 of Mouza Dicsa Grant Phargona and P.S. Kakhipur District Cachar. Bounded as under:- North:- Land of Ram Swarup Robidas and land of Kartic Deb South:- Road. East:- Land of Bonomali Roy and Ranadhir Chanda West:- Land and tilla of Bir Bauri. 6. Pursuant to the filing of the suit and summons being issued, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed their written statement. In the written statement, various pleas were taken as regards the non maintainability of the suit. East:- Land of Bonomali Roy and Ranadhir Chanda West:- Land and tilla of Bir Bauri. 6. Pursuant to the filing of the suit and summons being issued, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed their written statement. In the written statement, various pleas were taken as regards the non maintainability of the suit. It is relevant at this stage to observe that amongst the pleas, one of such plea was that the State of Assam was a necessary party in the suit since the suit land is the land acquired by the State under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act, 1972. It is further relevant to take note of that though in the written statement another preliminary objection was taken as regards the non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties but there was no mention as to who are the other persons who ought to have been arrayed as defendants to the suit. In the said written statement, it is the case of the defendant that the land along with other lands of Mouza Dicsa Grant, Ph-Lakhipur appertaining to Re-deem lease Patta No. 47/202 was issued in the names of Nayan Chand Das and Rajani Mohan Das both sons of Late Krishna Charan Das of Beranga Village and on their demise the entire lands devolved upon their heirs viz. Phani Bhusan Das, Monomohan Das, Pabitra Kumar Das amongst others. It was further mentioned that the entire suit land along with other lands in the suit patta had been made khas by the State of Assam under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act, 1972 and as such, Ganga Charan Roy, the alleged vendor of the plaintiff had no right, title, interest or possession over the suit land or on any portion and as such, he had no right or authority to make any such illegal transfer in favour of the plaintiff. It was further mentioned that the suit land being a ceiling surplus land, the State of Assam and the heirs of Nayan Chand Das and Rajani Mohan Das are necessary parties in the suit and without impleading them, the suit cannot be proceeded with. It was further mentioned that there was never any partition amongst the heirs of Rajani Mohan Das and Nayan Chand Das. It was further mentioned that there was never any partition amongst the heirs of Rajani Mohan Das and Nayan Chand Das. There is also an existing L.P. School namely Dicsa Labour Basti Venture L.P. School since, 1977 within the boundary of the suit land and Naresh Ghatoar also donated 1 Bigha of land to the State of Assam for the said L.P. School. It was further mentioned that the entire suit land was in the exclusive possession of the defendant No. 1 beyond the period of limitation, and he has been openly, peacefully and without interruption beyond the period of limitation, occupying/possessing the entire suit land along with other lands in exercise of his own right, title and interest and adversely against the others including the plaintiff. It was further averred that the defendant No. 1 on receipt of valuable consideration sold/transferred/delivered possession of the land in total 4 Bighas 17 Kathas in favour of the defendant No. 2 and his brother Biswajit Paul on receipt of a valuable consideration pursuant to 4 (four) Swaranlipis and delivered khas possession of the same to them within specific boundaries. The defendant No. 2 thereupon have been in open, peaceful and possessing the land mentioned in the written statement without any interruption and cultivating the same. 7. On the basis of the pleadings, 7 (seven) issues were framed by the learned Trial Court which reads as under: “1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Is the suit defective for non-joinder of the heirs of Narayan Das and Rajani Mohan Das? 3. Has the plaintiff acquired occupancy right over the suit land? 4. Had the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 illegally trespassed into the suit land and possessing the same? 5. Has the defendant No. 1 acquired any right over the suit land by way of adverse possession? 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree as prayed for? 7. What other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to?” 8. On behalf of the plaintiff 3 (three) witnesses were examined and 5 (five) documents were exhibited and on behalf of the defendant 2 (two) witnesses were examined and 4 (four) documents were exhibited. 6. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree as prayed for? 7. What other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to?” 8. On behalf of the plaintiff 3 (three) witnesses were examined and 5 (five) documents were exhibited and on behalf of the defendant 2 (two) witnesses were examined and 4 (four) documents were exhibited. It is relevant to take note of that immediately after the cross-examination of PW1, an application was filed under Order XXVI Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the Code”) by the plaintiff for appointment of an Amin Commissioner to relay the registered deed No. 4280 dated 26.07.1975 and the land Khatian No. 15 of Mouza Dicsa Grant-Lakhipur and also to relay the land of deed No. 165 dated 11.05.1992 in the name of the State of Assam and to report, as to whether, the land of deed No. 165 dated 11.05.1992 in the name of the State of Assam is included within the suit land. 9. It is further taken note of that pursuant to the said application being filed, the learned Trial Court issued the said commission and a report was submitted by the Amin Commissioner stating inter alia that the land contained in Deed No. 165 dated 11.05.1992 which was in respect of the L.P. school is different from the suit land. It is further relevant to take note of that the certified copy of the Khatian wherein the name of Ganga Charan Roy was mentioned as the tenant being Khatian No. 15 was exhibited as Exhibit No. 5 vide the order dated 03.05.2005 by the learned Trial Court. On the basis of the said evidence, the learned Trial Court vide the judgment and decree dated 12.07.2005 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 10. It is relevant to take note of that while deciding the Issue No. 2 which pertains to, as to whether, the suit suffered from non-joinder of necessary parties, the learned Trial Court came to a categorical finding that as no relief was claimed against all the legal heirs of Narayan Das and Rajani Mohan Das, the question of the suit being bad for non-joinder of the legal heirs of Narayan Das and Rajani Mohan Das did not arise. In respect to issue No. 3, which is an issue of importance in the instant case and more particularly, in view of the substantial questions of law being formulated, the learned Trial Court on the basis of Exhibit-1- which is the deed of sale; Exhibit-2- which is the lease deed; Exhibit-3- which are the rent receipts; Exhibit-4- which is the Kacha Khatian and Exhibit-5- which was the certified copy of the Khatian No. 15 arrived at a finding that the plaintiff was an occupancy tenant under the proforma defendant No. 3. It is further seen that the learned Trial Court had also dealt with the Exhibits- A, B, C and D which were exhibited by the defendants. The learned Trial Court while deciding the issue No. 3 categorically opined that as the value of the property which was included in these Exhibits being Exhibits- A, B, C and D were above Rs. 100/- and the said Exhibits were not registered documents, the said Exhibits were not admissible in law as per Section 17 (1)(b) read with Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. In respect to the issue No. 4, the learned Trial Court categorically came to a finding that the defendants had no right, title or interest to remain in possession of the suit property and it is the plaintiff who was the occupancy tenant over the said Schedule land and as such, the said issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff. On the basis of that, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit thereby declaring that the plaintiff is the tenant in respect of the land described in the Schedule to the plaint under the proforma defendant No. 3 and the plaintiff is entitled to khas possession of the Schedule land by evicting the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. 11. Being aggrieved, an Appeal was preferred by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No. 51/2005. It is relevant at this stage to take note of that while the said appeal was pending, an application was filed under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code for adducing additional evidence. On the basis of the said application, the additional evidence was adduced by 2 (two) witnesses. It is relevant at this stage to take note of that while the said appeal was pending, an application was filed under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code for adducing additional evidence. On the basis of the said application, the additional evidence was adduced by 2 (two) witnesses. First, by the defendant No. 2 whereby he brought on record the minutes of the meeting dated 07.05.2008 being marked as Exhibit A and information slip which is Exhibit-B. These 2 (two) documents were further proved through a Patwari from the Office of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Lakhipur Circle Camp, Silchar being the Appellant Witness No. 2. The learned First Appellate Court vide the judgment and decree dated 26.07.2011 dismissed the said appeal by confirming to the findings of the learned Trial Court. In addition to that, the learned First Appellate Court have also duly taken note of the evidence which were brought during the Appellate Stage and came to a categorical finding that the land which was mentioned in Exhibit A was not the suit land. 12. In the present Appeal, the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide an order dated 22.09.2011 had framed 7 (seven) substantial questions of law as noted herein above. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court now take the substantial questions of law so formulated one by one: A. Whether the finding of the learned Courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse although Biswajit Paul was not arrayed as a party in view of the fact that as per evidence of the plaintiff, Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul ousted her from the land and it is proved by defendant/appellant that the defendant No. 1 Naresh Ghatowar transferred the land vide Ext-A Sale Deed dated 30.03.90 as well as Ext. B, C and D swarnlipies in favour of Angad Paul defendant/appellant as well as Biswajit Paul? B, C and D swarnlipies in favour of Angad Paul defendant/appellant as well as Biswajit Paul? This substantial question of law so formulated is on the question of perversity in the decision of both the learned Courts below pertaining to issue No. 3, on the basis that Biswajit Paul was not arrayed as a party though the plaintiff in her evidence stated that both the defendant No. 2 and Biswajit Paul had ousted her from the land and it was proved by the defendant, that the defendant No. 1 and Naresh Ghatowar transferred the land vide Exhibit A sale deed dated 30.03.1990 as well as Exhibits- B, C and D swarnlipies in favour of the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and Biswajit Paul. First and foremost, it is pertinent to observe that Exhibits A, B, C and D so adduced by the defendants in the suit was not admissible in law as was rightly observed by the learned Court below and as such, the question of the Exhibit Nos. A, B, C and D being proved do not arise. Be that as it may, from the judgments passed by both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, the concurrent findings of facts show that the plaintiff was the occupancy tenant over the suit land. The findings of facts arrived at is also to the effect that the plaintiff allowed the defendant No. 1 to cultivate in the suit land. The pleadings as well as the evidence of the plaintiff are also clear that the defendant No. 1 had no authority but he created certain documents in favour of the defendant No. 2. Taking into account that the plaintiff is the occupancy tenant over the land and the defendants having failed to prove that the defendant No. 1 had any right over the suit land, any transfer made by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 or to any person thereafter would be of no consequence as the defendant No. 1 did not have the authority to do so. In addition to that, this Court also observes that in the written statement there is no plea being taken that the suit is bad for non-joinder of Biswajit Paul. In addition to that, this Court also observes that in the written statement there is no plea being taken that the suit is bad for non-joinder of Biswajit Paul. It is a well settled principle of law that unless and until specific averments with details are not made in the written statement as regards non-joinder of parties, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties [ Laxmishankar Harishankar Bhatt Vs. Yashram Vasta (Dead) by LRs. (1993) 3 SCC 49 ]. Under such circumstances, the first substantial question of law so formulated is not involved in the instant appeal. B. Whether the finding of the learned Courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse although the legal heirs of Rajani Mohan Das and Nayan Chand Das, who were admittedly original owners of the land except Subodh Ch. Das were not arrayed? The second substantial question of law is, as to whether, the finding of the learned Courts below on issue No. 3 is perverse on the ground of not impleading the legal heirs of Rajani Mohan Das and Nayan Chand Das. It is a well settled principle of law that to be a perverse decision, the decision should be such that the learned Courts below have not taken into account the relevant materials while arriving at the said decision. It is seen that the learned Trial Court have duly addressed this issue while deciding the issue No. 2 and held that as there was no relief being sought against the legal heirs of Rajani Mohan Das and Nayan Chand Das, the non-impleading of them in the suit would not make the suit bad. This Court is also of the opinion that the decision in respect to the issue No. 2 by both the learned Courts below cannot be said to be perverse, to become a substantial question of law involved in the instant Appeal. Under such circumstances, the second substantial question of law so formulated is not involved in the instant appeal. C. Whether finding of the Courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse in not arraying the State of Assam as a party since it was proved that the land was declared as ceiling surplus and was made khas and proposal for settlement was made in favour of Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul? C. Whether finding of the Courts below on issue No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff/respondent is perverse in not arraying the State of Assam as a party since it was proved that the land was declared as ceiling surplus and was made khas and proposal for settlement was made in favour of Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul? The third substantial question of law is, as to whether, the decision in respect to issue No. 3 is perverse for not arraying the State of Assam as a party on the basis that it was proved that the land was declared a ceiling surplus and was made khas and proposal for settlement was made in favour of Angad Paul and Biswajit Paul. At the outset, it is relevant to observe that the concurrent findings of fact clearly show that the land was not a Government land. No documents were exhibited at the learned Trial Court which would show that the land was a ceiling surplus land. Merely, on the basis of minutes of the meeting wherein same land with different Dag No. was shown would not be evidence to show that the land was a ceiling surplus land. Therefore the substantial question, with great respect, was framed on wrong promises. Be that as it may, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the evidence of Appellant Witness No. 2 who states that it is a ceiling surplus land. In the opinion of this Court, such evidence cannot be regarded as proof that the suit land was a ceiling surplus land. It is further observed that a land can be made ceiling surplus on the basis of orders/statement published as per the provisions of the relevant statute. As such sans any documentary evidence, the evidence of the Appellant Witness No. 2 was of no effect. Rather, the Amin Commission's report which was an evidence before the learned Trial Court makes it clear that the suit land was not a Government land. Considering the above, State of Assam cannot be said to be a necessary party to the suit, for which, the third substantial question of law is not involved. Rather, the Amin Commission's report which was an evidence before the learned Trial Court makes it clear that the suit land was not a Government land. Considering the above, State of Assam cannot be said to be a necessary party to the suit, for which, the third substantial question of law is not involved. D. Whether the learned Courts below were right in heavily relying on the report of the Amin Commissioner who having admitted that he had not shown either in the map or in the report the boundary of the suit land nor there was direction to measure/survey the suit land or the land of the khatian? The fourth substantial question of law pertains to, as to whether, the learned Courts below were erred in law in relying on the report of the Amin Commissioner, it is seen that the Amin Commissioner had submitted the report and in view of the provisions of Order XXVI Rule 10(1) of the Code would be an evidence which is required to be taken note of by the learned Trial Court. It is further seen that in spite of the Amin Commissioner being cross-examined, the learned Trial Court did not think it necessary for going for a further commission. This Court has also perused the Amin Commissioner's report along with the enclosures therein as is available from the records which cannot be said to be a perverse report. The findings therefore arrived at by the learned Courts below cannot be said to be perverse. Considering the above, the fourth substantial question of law is not involved in the instant appeal. E. Whether the learned Appellate Court below was correct in applying Section 68 of the Evidence Act in holding that Ext. A to D are not legally proved as the said documents are required to be attested compulsorily inasmuch as the documents Ext. A to D are not required by law to be attested? The fifth substantial question of law is, as to whether, the learned Appellate Court below was correct in applying Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thereby holding Exhibits A to D are not legally proved on the ground that the said documents are required to be attested compulsorily. A to D are not required by law to be attested? The fifth substantial question of law is, as to whether, the learned Appellate Court below was correct in applying Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thereby holding Exhibits A to D are not legally proved on the ground that the said documents are required to be attested compulsorily. The said in the opinion of this Court is not a substantial question of law, taking into account that Exhibits A to D being not registered documents, which is otherwise compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) would not affect the property in view of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Consequently, the fifth substantial question of law is not involved in the instant appeal. F. Whether the finding of the learned Appellate Court below is perverse in holding that Ext. A as proved before the appellate court regarding proposal for recommendation of allotment of land measuring 4B 16K 16CH of land under Dag No. 38/224 (Kha) and 224 (GA) of Mouza Dicsa Grant Ph-Lakhipur does not cover the suit land although new dags come out of original Dag No. 38? The sixth substantial question of law is, as to whether, the findings of the learned Appellate Court below is perverse in holding that Exhibit A as proved before the learned Appellate Court below regarding proposal for recommendation of allotment of land admeasuring 4 Bighas 16 Kathas 16 Chataks under Dag No. 38/224(Kha) and 224(Ga) of Mouza Dicsa Grant Ph- Lakhipur does not cover the suit land although the new Dag’s come out from the original Dag No. 38. With due respect, the said substantial question of law cannot be said to be involved inasmuch as there is no evidence led that out of the suit Dag i.e. Dag No. 38, Dag Nos. 224(Kha) and 224(Ga) had come into existence. This Court finds it relevant to observe that the question of perversity would have arisen if there was any material to show that Dag No. 224 (Kha) and 224 (Ga) are new Dags created from Dag No. 38, which being not there, the said substantial question of law is not involved in the Appeal. This Court finds it relevant to observe that the question of perversity would have arisen if there was any material to show that Dag No. 224 (Kha) and 224 (Ga) are new Dags created from Dag No. 38, which being not there, the said substantial question of law is not involved in the Appeal. G. Whether learned Courts below failed to consider the fact that the alleged transfer in 1975 as claimed by plaintiff/respondent is in violation of Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971, for which the tenant’s interest in the land is forfeited as per Section 50 of the Act and whether the findings of the court below are vitiated? The seventh substantial question of law is, as to whether, the transfer in 1975 as claimed by the plaintiff is in violation of the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Act, 1971, for which, the tenant's interest in the land is forfeited as per Section 50 of the said Act and whether the findings of the learned Courts below are vitiated. It is a settled proposition of law that to be a substantial question of law, the same has to arise out of pleadings, issues and questions involved in the suit. The question raised herein was never at any point a question during the Trial or the Appeal and as such, the substantial question of law so formulated cannot be said to be involved in the instant appeal. 13. Taking into account the above, this Court finds that all the substantial questions of law so formulated are not involved in the instant appeal. 14. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 11,000/-. In addition to that, the plaintiff would be entitled to costs throughout the proceedings. 15. The Registry shall return the records to the learned Courts below.