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2025 DIGILAW 327 (AP)

Peraipalli Suban Basha v. State Of A. P.

2025-02-21

Y.LAKSHMANA RAO

body2025
ORDER: Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J. This Revision has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C .’) challenging the judgment dated 05.05.2011 in Crl.A.No.55 of 2011 on the file of the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal, whereby and whereunder the conviction and sentence of simple imprisonment for a term of one year and fine of Rs.5,000/- imposed for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the IPC’) by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Allagadda, in C.C.No.236 of 2008, dated 24.03.2011, was confirmed. 2. I have heard the arguents of Sri B.S. Reddy, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri K. Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the respondent. 3. The learned counsel for the revisionist, while reiterating the grounds raised in the revision, submitted that the learned Appellate Court failed to see that the evidence on record would not constitute any offence for the alleged offence charged; the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 4 did not inspire any confidence; no independent witness was examined to corroborate the testimony of PW.1; PWs.3, 5 and 7, being the independent witnesses, did not support the case of the prosecution, therefore, the learned Courts below ought to have given benefit of doubt to the revisionist. It is further submitted that the de facto complainant died on 20.05.2014, and to that effect, a photocopy of the death certificate was filed. The revisionist and the de facto complainant were blessed with one daughter who had already got married. The revision was filed in the year 2011 and 14 years have passed by, and urged to show some leniency towards the revisionist and requested to modify the sentence already undergone. Alternatively, however, the learned counsel for the revisionist volunteers that an amount of Rs.10,000/- may be imposed as a measure of penance and urged to dispose of the revision. 4. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Respondent Nos.1 to 9 and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 5. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.55 of 2011 dated05.05.2011, passed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? I have perused the record. 5. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.55 of 2011 dated05.05.2011, passed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 6. It is apposite to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C ., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP , AIR 1962 SC 1788 , at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub- section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 8. It is further apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar , (2002) 6 SCC 650 ] wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 &13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. The prosecution, to prove the guilt of the revisionist, examined PWs.1 to 10 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.8. Some portions of the evidence of PWs.1 and 5 are marked as Exs.D.1 and D.2. PW.1 deposed that she was the legally wedded wife of A.1 and she was a physically challenged woman. Her marriage was performed with revisionist on 13.05.2007 at Allagadda. For the marriage, cash of Rs.50,000/- and twelve (12) tulas of gold were presented to the revisionist as dowry. After marriage, she joined the house of the revisionist. PW.1 deposed that she was the legally wedded wife of A.1 and she was a physically challenged woman. Her marriage was performed with revisionist on 13.05.2007 at Allagadda. For the marriage, cash of Rs.50,000/- and twelve (12) tulas of gold were presented to the revisionist as dowry. After marriage, she joined the house of the revisionist. For two (2) months, she lived happily with the revisionist. Thereafter, the revisionist began abusing and beating her for silly reasons, also demanded three (3) tulas of gold jewels, and cash of Rs.50,000/- as additional dowry. The demand was complied. In the mean time, she delivered a female child on cesarean conducted by a male doctor. On this ground, the revisionist harassed her. Three months prior to complaint, the revisionist demanded Rs.50,000/- and sent away the victim from the house. The revisionist threatened her with dire consequences, if she failed to meet his demand and also stated that another marriage would be performed to A.1. As such, adverting to the above complaint, a case in Cr.No.89 of 2008 under Sections 498-A and 506 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, was registered. 10. The learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court relied on the evidence of PWs.2 and 4, who had supported the case of PW.1. The learned Trial Court acquitted A.2 to A.6, who are the in-laws and relatives of PW.1, but found guilty the revisionist. 11. In Major Singh v. State of Punjab , [ (2006) 10 SCC 499 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Paragraph No.12 as under: “It is well settled that minor discrepancies and minor defects in the prosecution case is not a good ground for rejecting the entire prosecution case.” 12. In Namburi Karunasree v. State of Andhra Pradesh , [ 2007 (1) ALD (Crl.) 599 (A.P.) ], the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held at Paragraph No.26 as under: "Minor variations in the evidence of a witness, which do not effect the credibility of the evidence, cannot be the basis to discard the intrinsic value of the evidence.” 13. In Namburi Karunasree v. State of Andhra Pradesh , [ 2007 (1) ALD (Crl.) 599 (A.P.) ], the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held at Paragraph No.26 as under: "Minor variations in the evidence of a witness, which do not effect the credibility of the evidence, cannot be the basis to discard the intrinsic value of the evidence.” 13. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , [ 2004 (5) SCC 334 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Paragraph No.10 as under: “When the harassment was constantly hearing and harassing his wife as he was wholely dis-satisfied with the dowry given at the time of the marriage he was demanding more money and some other articles from the parents. So, the charge under Section 498-A IPC has been proved and conviction under Section 498-A IPC has been upheld.” 14. A careful perusal of the omissions in Ex.D.1, it can be held in clear terms that those omissions are minor and immaterial and they cannot shake the version of PW.1. Normally, the offence under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is committed within four walls. In such circumstances, even the testimony of a sole witness/victim of matrimonial harassment is sufficient to convict the accused, if such evidence is trust worthy, voluntary and inspiring confidence. In this case, PWs.1, 2 and 4 supported the case of prosecution. There are no material irregularities in conducting the trial. There was no misreading of evidence. There were no perverse findings. The learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence in correct perspective and convicted the revisionist. Therefore, the conviction under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ shall be maintained. 15. It has to be noted that PW.1, the de facto complainant/wife of the revisionist, died on 20.05.2014. The revision was filed in the year 2011 and nearly 14 years have passed by. A daughter was blessed to PW.1 and the revisionist and she had even got married and living happily with her husband. All the responsibilities of unmarried daughter of revisionist and P.W.1 was taken care by the revisionist being a father. 16. Right to speedy trial, which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision, is part of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as held in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ]. 16. Right to speedy trial, which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision, is part of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as held in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ]. This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar, [2000 (1) BLJR 37]. The occurrencetook place about 18 years ago. The revisionist has been facing mental agony and trauma of the protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment for a long period of 18 years. The revisionist had already undergone 10 days of imprisonment. Therefore, it is appropriate and proportionate that the sentence is required to be reduced to the period of sentence of imprisonment already undergone by the revisionist. The learned counsel for the revisionist volunteers that an amount of Rs.10,000/- may be imposed excluding the amount of Rs.5,000/- already paid by the revisionist at the time of preferring the appeal, as a measure of penance. The said voluntary statement of the learned counsel for the revisionist is recorded and approved. 17. In view of obtaining peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of one year simple imprisonment imposed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Allagadda, and as confirmed by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal, is modified to the sentence of imprisonment already undergone by the revisionist, while ordering the revisionist to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) more towards fine, within two months (2) from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, in default, the revisionist shall undergo three months (3) simple imprisonment. The learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Allagadda, is directed to take follow-up steps. 18. Accordingly, the present Criminal Revision Case is disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.