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2025 DIGILAW 329 (HP)

Parkash Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-03-10

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 25.09.2014 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court) vide which, the judgment passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur (learned Trial Court) convicting and sentencing the petitioner (accused before learned Trial Court) was upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’). It was asserted that the informant, Dina Nath (PW1), and his son Sunil Dutt (PW7) were returning from Shimla in a bus bearing registration No. HP-10-0388, which was being driven by the accused. Sunil Dutt had sustained a fracture earlier in an accident, and he had gone to Shimla to get himself examined. When the bus reached Namhol at 12-12:15 pm, the accused drove it towards the other side of the road and hit a truck coming from the opposite direction. 5-6 persons sustained injuries in the accident. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police regarding the accident. An entry (Ext. PW6/A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI- Ram Nath (PW8), HC Prakash Chand, HHC Harbans Singh (PW5) and HHC Kamal Lal went to PHC Namhol for verification of the information. Ram Nath (PW8) recorded the statement of the informant Dina Nath (Ext. PW1/A), which was sent to the Police Station where FIR (Ext. PW8/A) was registered. ASI Ram Nath conducted the investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW10/B). He took the photographs of the spot (Ext. P1 and Ext. P2) whose negatives are Ext. P3 and Ext. P4. He filed an application for conducting the medical examination of the injured and obtained the MLCs of Sujata (Ext. PA), Vatani Devi (Ext. PB), Sunil Dutt (Ext. PD), Rikhi Ram (Ext. PE), and Prakash Chand (Ext. PF). He also collected X-rays of Sujata (Ext.PG, PG1 and PG2), Vatani Devi (Ext. PH and PH1), and Sunil (Ext. PJ, PJ1 to PJ4). ASI-Ram Nath seized the bus vide memo (Ext. PW4/B). PA), Vatani Devi (Ext. PB), Sunil Dutt (Ext. PD), Rikhi Ram (Ext. PE), and Prakash Chand (Ext. PF). He also collected X-rays of Sujata (Ext.PG, PG1 and PG2), Vatani Devi (Ext. PH and PH1), and Sunil (Ext. PJ, PJ1 to PJ4). ASI-Ram Nath seized the bus vide memo (Ext. PW4/B). Sher Singh (PW3) mechanically examined the bus and found that it had no mechanical fault in it. He issued the report (Ext. PW3/A). ASI Ram Nath recorded the statement of witnesses as per their version and arrested the accused. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Dina Nath (PW1), Vatani Devi (PW2) and Sunil Dutt (PW7) were travelling on the bus. Sher Singh (PW3) mechanic, conducted the mechanical examination of the bus. Rakesh Kumar (PW4) was driving the truck. HHC Harbans Singh (PW5) is the witness to the recovery of the truck. Constable Geeta Ram (PW6) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Ram Nath (PW8) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the bus. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not lead any evidence in defence. 6. The Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. The mechanic did not find any fault in the vehicle. It was proved by the medical evidence that the occupants had sustained simple and grievous injuries. The defence version that the accident occurred due to the mechanical fault in the vehicle was not believable. The spot map showed that the vehicle was being driven towards the wrong side of the road, which constituted negligence on the part of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and sentenced him under: Under Section 279 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and sentenced him under: Under Section 279 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Under Section 337 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 500/-. Under Section 338 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by learned Sessions Judge Bilaspur. Learned Sessions concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the testimonies of the witnesses corroborated each other. The site plan showed that there was sufÏcient space towards the left side of the bus, and the bus was being driven towards the right side of the road. The defence version that the accident had taken place due to a mechanical defect was not proved. Driving the bus after leaving 10.5 feet of space towards the left side of the road constituted negligence, which caused simple and grievous injuries to the occupants of the vehicle. Learned Trial Court had imposed a lenient sentence. Hence, the appeal filed by the petitioner/accused was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by learned Sessions Judge, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition asserting that learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence. The accident had taken place on a blind curve from where the oncoming trafÏc could be seen at a distance of 2-4 feet. Dina Nath Kaundal (PW1) stated in his cross-examination that he was not aware whether the brakes were applied, which is highly improbable because the passenger would feel the jerk caused by the application of the brake. PW2 stated that she was deposing about the registration number of the vehicle after being told by the police and the witnesses, which affected her credibility. There is no evidence of high speed. Learned Trial Court erred in not granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. There is no evidence of high speed. Learned Trial Court erred in not granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence. It was duly proved that the accident had taken place on a blind curve. The plea of the petitioner that there was a mechanical defect in the vehicle due to which the bus was dragged towards the right side of the road was plausible. The driver of the truck corroborated this version and the learned Courts below erred in rejecting it. There was no rashness or negligence of the accused. She submitted in the alternative that learned Trial Court had erred in not granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Therefore, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, supported the judgments passed by learned Courts below. He submitted that the defence version regarding the mechanical defect in the vehicle was not proved by any satisfactory evidence. The mechanic specifically stated that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident. This Court will not interfere with the finding of facts while exercising revisional jurisdiction, and there is no patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law in the judgments of learned Courts below; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 wherein it was observed: “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex-facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with the law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 15. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Learned Courts below held that the petitioner was negligent because he was driving the vehicle towards the right side of the road. This conclusion was based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. The informant- Dina Nath (PW1), stated that the accused left sufÏcient space towards his side and hit the truck on the other side of the road. The site plan (Ext. PW10/B) shows that the bus had left its side and was being driven towards the other side. The width of the road was 25 feet at the place of the accident. The site plan (Ext. PW10/B) shows that the bus had left its side and was being driven towards the other side. The width of the road was 25 feet at the place of the accident. 10/½ feet of space was available towards the left side of the bus, whereas only 2 feet of space was available towards the left side of the truck. The photograph (Ext. P2) shows that the bus had crossed the dividing white marks. Its right tyre is towards the right side of the divider, marked by white lines. This evidence clearly shows that the bus had left its side and was being driven towards the right side of the road. Rule 2 of the Rules of Road Regulation 1989 provides that a driver of a motor vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the trafÏc which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. Therefore, the driver of a motor vehicle is supposed to drive the vehicle towards the left side of the road. In the present case, the accused had breached this duty by driving the vehicle towards the right side of the road, which shows his negligence. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71 that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 17. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar, 2008 H.L.J. 399 that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar, 2008 H.L.J. 399 that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 18. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj, 2009 Cri. L.J. 1922 and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side while going from Dangri to Kangoo there was a 7 ft. kacha portion and on the other side, there is an 11 ft. of kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is apparent also from the fact that after he was hit the injured fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on its wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses who state that they were on the extreme left side and the motorcycle which was coming from the opposite side hit them. It does not need the genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 19. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses who state that they were on the extreme left side and the motorcycle which was coming from the opposite side hit them. It does not need the genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 19. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had breached the Rule of the Road Regulation while driving the bus towards the right side of the road after leaving sufÏcient space towards the left side. 20. It was submitted that there was a mechanical defect in the vehicle, which led to the accident. Learned Courts below had rightly pointed out that Sher Singh (PW3) mechanic specifically stated that there was no mechanical fault in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10-0388. His statement does not corroborate the defence version regarding the mechanical defect in the vehicle. 21. Sher Singh (PW3) stated in his cross-examination that there was a blind curve at the place of the accident, and the vehicles were visible from a distance of 2-4 feet. Ms Sheetal Vyas learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the accident had taken place on a blind curve where there was no visibility, and it was a circumstance beyond the control of the accused. This submission overlooks the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was that the vehicle was being driven towards the right side of the road. Since the width of the road was 25 feet on the spot, the accident would not have taken place had the bus been driven towards the left side of the road. Hence, the place of accident being a blind curve will not help the petitioner. 22. Sher Singh (PW3) stated in his cross-examination that an emergency brake was applied, due to which the bus skidded towards the right side. He also stated that the vehicle can skid because of the sudden application of the brake due to the damage in the lining spring. It was submitted that the sudden application of the emergency brake led to the accident. This submission cannot be accepted because the site plan (Ext. PW10/B) specifically mentions that there were no skid marks on the spot to suggest that any attempt was made to apply the brakes. The photographs (Ext. It was submitted that the sudden application of the emergency brake led to the accident. This submission cannot be accepted because the site plan (Ext. PW10/B) specifically mentions that there were no skid marks on the spot to suggest that any attempt was made to apply the brakes. The photographs (Ext. P1 and P2) also do not show any skid marks on the spot, and this hypothetical possibility that the vehicle can skid because of the damage to the lining spring has not been established by the circumstances on record. 23. Further, the accused nowhere stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he applied the brakes or there was damage to the lining spring that dragged the bus towards the right side of the road. Therefore, the plea regarding the dragging of the bus cannot be accepted merely because of some hypothetical answer given by the mechanic. 24. Nothing was brought on record to show why the accused had to apply the emergency brake. As has been noticed above, had the bus been driven towards its left side, there would not have been any necessity to apply any brake, and there would not have been any accident. Thus, the proximate cause of the accident was not the application of the brake but not driving the bus towards the left side of the road. 25. Sher Singh, the mechanic, stated that he had not checked the lining springs of the vehicle because they were inside the front and rear wheels. He volunteered to say that the fault could be detected by driving the vehicle. The vehicle was driven by the accused. This part of the cross-examination shows that he had not checked the lining spring, and his testimony regarding the damage to the lining spring is not acceptable. 26. Rakesh Kumar (PW4) stated in his cross- examination that the accused applied emergency brake and the bus was dragged towards the right side due to the skidding. He and the accused had checked the front wheel lining spring and found that it was damaged. The accident was caused due to the damage to front wheel lining spring. 27. The testimony of this witness is not at all acceptable. Learned Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that he was trying to help the accused. It is not shown that he is a mechanical expert. The accident was caused due to the damage to front wheel lining spring. 27. The testimony of this witness is not at all acceptable. Learned Appellate Court has rightly pointed out that he was trying to help the accused. It is not shown that he is a mechanical expert. As already stated, the accused nowhere stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he had checked the front lining spring. He had not even pointed out any such damage to the mechanic who conducted the mechanical examination. Therefore, the testimony of this witness regarding the damage to the front lining spring was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 28. Vatani Devi (PW2) stated in her cross- examination that the accused applied the brakes on the curve, and the bus skidded towards the driver's side, leading to the accident. Her version is not supported by the circumstances on record because no skid marks were found on the spot. Secondly, even if her version is accepted as correct, no reason has been assigned for the application of the emergency brake.Hence, her testimony will not help the accused. 29. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle by leaving sufÏcient space towards the left side of the road. 30. It was submitted that Sunil Dutt had already suffered a fracture, and the fracture noticed by the Medical OfÏcer cannot be attributed to the present incident. This submission is not acceptable. MLC (Ext. PC), which was admitted by the accused, mentions that there was evidence of a fresh fracture of the shaft of the left femur. This report of the Medical OfÏcer clearly shows a fresh fracture, and it cannot be said that Sunil Dutt had not sustained any fresh fracture and that the Medical OfÏcer had only noticed the earlier fracture. Further, Vatani Devi’s MLC (Ext. PB), which was admitted by the accused, shows a grievous injury. Thus, it was duly proved on record that Sunil Dutt and Vatani Devi had sustained grievous injuries. 31. MLCs of Sujata (Ext. PA), Dina Nath Kaundal (Ext.PB) and Rikhi Ram (Ext. PE) show the simple injuries, which were caused within less than 6 hours of the examination. These MLCs were admitted by the accused, and it is duly proved on record that Sujata, Dina Nath and Rikhi Ram had sustained simple injuries. 32. 31. MLCs of Sujata (Ext. PA), Dina Nath Kaundal (Ext.PB) and Rikhi Ram (Ext. PE) show the simple injuries, which were caused within less than 6 hours of the examination. These MLCs were admitted by the accused, and it is duly proved on record that Sujata, Dina Nath and Rikhi Ram had sustained simple injuries. 32. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused had negligently driven the vehicle, and his negligence led to the accident, causing simple and grievous injuries to the occupants of the vehicle. Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court, and the conviction was rightly upheld by the learned Appellate Court. 33. It was submitted that learned Courts below erred in not granting the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highway are among the top killers of the country" the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju, (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 34. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 , wherein it was observed: - 6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in death of human beings.” 35. In State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh , (2012) 2 SCC 182 , it was held: - 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, must have better training in trafÏc laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] 36. Therefore, in view of these binding precedents, it is not permissible to grant the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act in an offence involving rash and negligent driving. 37. This Court held in State of H.P. vs. Sushil Kumar, 2010 (1) HLJ 298 that no leniency should be shown to a person convicting or for driving a vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. It was observed: “21. In so far as the sentence part is concerned, in my considered opinion, the learned trial Court has lost sight of the fact that there has been a spiralling increase in motor vehicular accidents in recent years. It was observed: “21. In so far as the sentence part is concerned, in my considered opinion, the learned trial Court has lost sight of the fact that there has been a spiralling increase in motor vehicular accidents in recent years. Thousands of valuable lives are being lost by a sheer act of rash and negligent driving, which is more than the loss of lives in any war between countries. 22. The Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 on the question of sentence in a case of an identical nature stated:- "13. While considering the question of a sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of an automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident; or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if is convicted of the offence for causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents, due to callous driving of automobiles." 23. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents, due to callous driving of automobiles." 23. Hon'ble Shri Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, as he then was, while speaking for the Court, in State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar, AIR 2002 Supreme Court 1529 , where the accused was held guilty for causing the death of four persons and the High Court took a lenient view in sentencing the accused, observed:- "We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court, below. It may create and set an unhealthy precedent and send wrong signals to the subordinate Courts which have to deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, Courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the Courts should have a deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers and it should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the Courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to the larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the most public face of the criminal justice system." 24. Therefore, on the examination of the matter in the above circumstances and on facts, I think no word is sufÏcient to criticize the conduct and prudence of the learned trial Magistrate dealing with the point of sentence in a shockingly reckless manner. Looking at the gravity of the offence, the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is wholly inadequate. The learned trial court has inflicted a fleabite sentence on the respondent who has not atoned adequately for his misadventure.” 38. In the present case, the occupants of the vehicle had sustained simple and grievous injuries. Learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence till the rising of the Court. The learned trial court has inflicted a fleabite sentence on the respondent who has not atoned adequately for his misadventure.” 38. In the present case, the occupants of the vehicle had sustained simple and grievous injuries. Learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence till the rising of the Court. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that this was a lenient sentence, and in the absence of the appeal by the State, nothing could have been done. Learned Trial Court had shown the leniency, and no further leniency is justified. 39. No other point was urged. 40. Consequently, the present revision fails, and the same is dismissed. 41. The present petition stands disposed of and so are the pending applications, if any.