ORDER : K. MANMADHA RAO, J. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following relief: “……to issue a Writ Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus by declaring the action of the respondent No.1 in dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner and confirming the orders of R3 is illegal and unconstitutional and consequently set aside the orders of R1 Memo No5554/M I1/20173 and the orders of R3 D dis proceedings No 6401/R32/2015 dtd 25.4.2017 by making it clear that in the name of sublease there was evasion of taxes and the authorities have to proceed to recover the taxes evaded and prosecute the concerned for the violation of law and pass……” 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner being aggrieved by the orders passed by 1st Respondent dated 09.03.2018 in the Revision filed by the Petitioner, which was upheld the order passed by the 3 rd respondent dated 25.04.2017, having failed to appreciate the issues raised by the Petitioner in regard to the loss caused to exchequer to the tune of hundreds of crores of rupees and violation of rules regarding sub leases of mines of black galaxy granite. The Petitioner having noticed the large scale violation rules leading to loss of hundreds of crores of tax, approached the Hon'ble court and filed PIL No. 112 of 013 making a specific complaint regarding illegal mining by the unofficial respondents and the said PIL was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 23.2.2012 directing the respondents to conduct inquiry on the complaints dated 23.2.2012 and 23.2.2012 submitted by the petitioner. Pursuant to the above order, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Ongole, has submitted a detailed report dated 03.12.2013 to the 3rd Respondent and also to the Collector and District Magistrate, Ongole to take appropriate and necessary action on the representations dated 22.02.2012 and 23.10.2012. Thereafter, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology has submitted a report dated 03.12.2013. Basing on the same, the District Collector, Ongole issued proceedings dated 14.02.2014 with a direction to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ongole and the Tahsildar, Chimakurthy, to take necessary action and pass resumption orders. It is further stated that, during the enquiry it was revealed that the M/s. Anand Granites Exports Pvt.. Basing on the same, the District Collector, Ongole issued proceedings dated 14.02.2014 with a direction to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ongole and the Tahsildar, Chimakurthy, to take necessary action and pass resumption orders. It is further stated that, during the enquiry it was revealed that the M/s. Anand Granites Exports Pvt.. Ltd., i.e., 6 th respondent herein has obtained mining lease in respect to the land measuring Ac. 14.55 cents situated in Sy.No. 933/1, 933/2 and 960 of Chimakurthi village and Mandal, Prakasam District, for a period of 15 years under the Mining Lease Agreement dated 14.12.1993 and also obtained another lease agreement dated 27.11.1991 to an extent of Ac.2.57 cents in Sy.No.980/4 and 981/5 of Chimakurthi Village and Mandal, Prakasam District for a period of five years. The said company has again obtained another lease deed in the year 1991 for a period of five years for excavating the galaxy granite in the same village to an extent of Ac. 4.47 cents situated in Sy No. 980/1, and 576/2.The 6th Respondent has entered into a sub-lease agreements dated 14.12.1993 with 7th Respondent and with 8th Respondents dated 27.11.1991 with clear terms and conditions which envisage that the original lease holder shall take 30% of the mineral extracted and the remaining 70% has to be taken by the sub-lease holder. It is also recited in the conditions stipulated in the said sub-lease agreement that the technical assistance and excavating personnel and their expenditure shall be borne by the sub-lease holder. It is further stated that the license obtained by the lease holder for excavating the mineral is not transferable under the rules. Further the rule 12(5)(h) (viii) of AP Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 clearly stipulates that "the lessee shall not assign, sublet, transfer otherwise dispose of the lease without obtaining the previous sanction in writing of the 3rd Respondent. The said sub lease holders i.e., 7th and 8th respondents have conveniently evaded the royalty and sales-tax to be paid for their share and incurred loss to the public exchequer by manipulating the declared value of the granite, particularly the 70% share going to the sub-lessees. The said sub lease holders i.e., 7th and 8th respondents have conveniently evaded the royalty and sales-tax to be paid for their share and incurred loss to the public exchequer by manipulating the declared value of the granite, particularly the 70% share going to the sub-lessees. Subsequently, the 3rd Respondent has passed the order vide D.Dis proceedings No 6401/R3-2/2015 dated 25.4.2017 with a finding that 'the business transaction between 6th Respondent, 7th Respondent and 8th Respondent is only a commercial contract and the same will not fall under the category of sub-lease. The terms and conditions of the sub-lease agreement entered into between 6th respondent, 7th respondent and 8th respondent has been filed and in which it is very clear that the said arrangement is nothing but a sub-lease”. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the 3rd Respondent, the Petitioner has preferred revision before the 1st Respondent. The Petitioner has approached this Hon'ble court when the same officer who was the Director was the Principal Secretary and there will be conflict of interest as he will be in the process of adjudicating the appeal filed against his own order. The said writ petition as disposed of by this Hon'ble court directing the respondent government to see that the same officer is not part of the adjudicatory process of the appeal filed by the Petitioner. It is further stated that the 1st Respondent, without going into the merits of the case upheld the decision of the 3rd Respondent in memo No5554/M.I(1)/2017(3), by exonerating 6th Respondent and the other two sub-lease holders who evaded the sales tax and income tax to the 1st Respondent. Hence, the present writ petition came to be filed. 3. The counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents No. 1 to 4.While denying the allegations made in the petition, inter alia, it is stated that, the Deputy Director of Mines & Geology, Guntur vide Prods.No.6512/Q/1993, dated 17-11-1993 has granted a Quarry Lease for Black Galaxy Granite over an extent of 14.55 Acres in favour of 6 th Respondent for a period of 15 years and the same was executed before the Asst. Director of Mines & Geology, Ongole vide Prods.No.3343/Q/1991, dated 14-12-1993 upto 13-12-2008. Director of Mines & Geology, Ongole vide Prods.No.3343/Q/1991, dated 14-12-1993 upto 13-12-2008. Subsequently, the 1 st renewal of above quarry lease was granted by the 3 rd Respondent vide Prods.No.3551/R3-1/2007, dated 08-07-2011 for further period of 20 years and the same was executed before the Asst. Director of Mines & Geology, Ongole. It is stated that, as per available records in this office, the 3rd Respondent vide Memo.No.8719/R3-1/2012, dated: 15-03-2012 while enclosing a Xerox copy of representation of the petitioner on 23-02-2012 made against the 6th Respondent M/s Anand Granites Exports Pvt. Ltd. and a Xerox copy of contractor supply entered in between the 7th Respondent i.e. M/s Imperial Granites Pvt. Ltd. and 6 th respondent and also another Representation of the petitioner and a Xerox copy of contract for supply in between the 8" Respondent i.e. M/s Pokarna Granites Ltd. and respondent instructed the Assistant Director of Mines & Geology, Ongole to submit detailed report in the matter. Accordingly, the then Asst. Director of Mines & Geology, Ongole has requested the lease holders i.e. 6 th to 8th respondents to submit their reply on the petition of petitioner. Inturn, the 6 th to 8 th respondents have submitted their explanations on the representation of petitioner, the 6 th respondent through letter dt.26-04-2012 informed that, the agreement entered in between 8 th respondent and 6th respondent is only an agreement to sell the product derived from the quarry with certain terms and conditions. The 7 th respondent is only buyer and there was no bar under the Act or the rules for entering in to contract of sales and supply of Mineral Black Granite. Further they also informed no title, ownership or possession was passed on to the 7th respondent and finally they requested that, representation of the petitioner can't be entertained by the Dept. Further it is stated that, this office is not aware of the contract for supply entered by 6 th to 8 th respondents as neither 6 th respondent nor 7 th respondent/ 8th respondent brought to the notice of the Department earlier. Even the petitioner has also not brought to the notice of department earlier, but after a long gap i.e, 16 years later, the petitioner has brought now to this office. It is further stated that, the 3rd Respondent vide D.Dis. Even the petitioner has also not brought to the notice of department earlier, but after a long gap i.e, 16 years later, the petitioner has brought now to this office. It is further stated that, the 3rd Respondent vide D.Dis. Prods.No.6401/R3-2/2015, dated: 25-04-2017 has issued orders for disposal of the Petitioner representations and stated that, on a careful consideration of the representation and subsequent representations submitted by the Petitioner and on examining the contents of the Contract for Supply, it is hereby observed that, the Contract in question is only a Supply Contract and the intention to Sub-Lease or Sub-Let the Mining Lease granted in favour of the 6th Respondent i.e. M/s Anand Granites Exports Private Limited, doesn't exist. With these observations, the representation dated: 23-02-2012 and subsequent representations filed by the Petitioner are hereby considered and rejected and no further action need be taken on the said representations. Further, the 1 st respondent has conducted personal hearing on 21-12-2017 duly giving reasonable opportunity for personal hearing to the Petitioner. After having heard arguments, the 1" Respondent i.e. Government of A.P., Industries & Commerce (Mines.I) Department Memo.No.5554/M.I(1)/2017-3, dated: 09-03-2018 has disposed off the Revision application filed by the Petitioner and stated that, the Revisional Authority has observed that in the recitals of the "Contract Supply" document the quarry lease holder has a contract of selling the blocks on certain terms and conditions of procuring the machinery and manpower for quarry operations. In view of the investment made on the above certain share of blocks are given to the raising contractor at the rate of production cost. The advance which is repayable is given by the raising contractor to the quarry lease holder as means of performance security. The recitals and various clauses does not fit into the classification of lease as the lease hold rights over the lease property has not been parted with. Nowhere in the recitals and covenants of the documents the intention of sublease or sublet has been expressed and representation of the Revision applicant that, the agreements are subleases cannot be considered and hence the Revisional authority is hereby upheld the Proceedings of the 3rd Respondent i.e. Director of Mines & Geology, Ibrahimpatnam vide Prods.No.6401/R3-2/2015, dated.25-04-2017.In view of the above, it is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the same. 4. The counter affidavit of 6 th respondent has been filed. 4. The counter affidavit of 6 th respondent has been filed. While denying the allegations made in the petition, reiterated the contents made in the counter of the respondents No.1 to 4. It is stated that, the petitioner along with Ravipudi Lakshmi Narayana filed O.S.No. 186 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole against the Deponent and his family members and others, seeking partition of land covered by ADO 100. It is true that D-3 (Respondent No.6 herein) filed a money suit against this respondent on the file of Additional Junior Civil Judge, and obtained a decree and became final and this respondent has also not satisfied the decree. It is stated that O.S.No.464 of 1995 filed for partition by Pamidi Narasimha Rao against this Deponent and others. The said suit was decreed and the decree became final. Thereafter, the matter was compromised before the Lok Adalat in I.A.No.2360 of 2001 in O.S.No.464 of 1995. In the said compromise, the Writ Petitioner appeared as witness and deposed on behalf of this respondent’s mother, the Petitioner in I.A.No.2260 of 2001 before the Lok Adalat bench. It is further stated that Sri Ravipudi Lakshmi Narayana the 1st plaintiff in O.S.No.186 of 2003 as General Power of Attorney holder of M/s. Pokarna Limited, filed O.S.No.16 of 2003 before the Vacation Civil Judge Court, Ongole (Court of the District Judge, Ongole) against Sri Pamidi Narasimha Rao and the Deponent herein and others, seeking to declare that the Award made before the Lok Adalat on 10.01.2003 in 1.A.No.2368 of 2001 in O.S.No.464 of 1995 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge Court, Ongole is null and void and ineffective. It is also stated that this Respondent filed O.S.No.20 of 2004 on the file of the Court of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ongole against the Petitioner for recovery of a sum of Rs.81,653/-, The Petitioner filed a Written Statement admitting that he was working with this Respondent Company as commission agent and marker of stones. The suit in OS. No 20 of 2004 was decreed on 31.08.2005. Since the decretal amount was not paid, Execution Petition was filed in the year 2012 and then onwards the present false and frivolous allegations are being made against the Company and its Directors by the Petitioner. The suit in OS. No 20 of 2004 was decreed on 31.08.2005. Since the decretal amount was not paid, Execution Petition was filed in the year 2012 and then onwards the present false and frivolous allegations are being made against the Company and its Directors by the Petitioner. It is further stated that the Petitioner also filed PIL No.112 of 2013 before this Hon'ble Court and this Hon'ble Court directed the District Collector and the Director of Mines & Geology to dispose of his representations. The Petitioner also filed Contempt Case for non-implementation of the order. 5. The 7 th respondent has also filed counter affidavit stating that this Respondent has only entered into supply agreement with Respondent No.6, dt.07-08-1995. It is only an agreement to sell the product derived from the quarry with certain terms and conditions. There is no bar under the rules barring supply agreement. It is relevant to submit that as per the Covenant 8(6) of lease deed executed in Form G read with Rule 12(5)(h) of APMMC Rules, 1966, "the lessee shall not assign, sub-let, transfer otherwise dispose of the lease without obtaining approvals nor in writing from the Director of Mines and Geology. Nowhere the above condition speaks that a lessee is granted quarry lease by the Government cannot enter into agreement for supply or for raising, therefore, agreement entered into by this respondent with Respondent No.6 cannot be called as illegal. This Writ Petitioner has no way concerned with the commercial transaction taking place between the sellers and purchasers. It is stated that the necessity of obtaining permission of the Director of Mines and Geology arises only when the lessee intended to sub- lease, the lease granted in his favour to a third party. Here, there is no sub-lease entered into between the respondent for obtaining any permission from the Director of Mines and Geology. The Director of Mines and Geology has rightly given a finding that the business transaction between the Respondents 6 and 7 is only commercial contract and the same will not fall under the category of sub-lease confirmed by the Revisional Authority. The Director of Mines and Geology has rightly given a finding that the business transaction between the Respondents 6 and 7 is only commercial contract and the same will not fall under the category of sub-lease confirmed by the Revisional Authority. It is further stated that the quarry lease is granted by the State Government through its competent authority i.e., Director of Mines and Geology to Respondent No.6 and the proceedings read that only after obtaining all the approvals from the all the authorities, the said quarry leases are granted. Orders passed by the Revisional Authority is a speaking order after calling for various reports, legal opinion and the remarks of the Director of Mines and Geology and the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology and the Writ Petition needs to be dismissed as the orders passed are speaking orders. 6. The 8 th respondent has filed the counter affidavit stating that the conclusion of agreements between the answering respondent and the respondents No.6 & 7, evasion of tax in respect of sharing of 30% and 70%, about illegal mining, the matter should have been referred to Vigilance & Enforcement department and fraud running into 100s of crores is all incorrect and false. There is no illegal mining at all, the quarrying took place in respect of the agreement entered by the 6 th respondent with the answering respondent, for a short period of 4 months basing on the lease granted by the department only. The other averment that the 6th respondent deposed in O.S.No.186 of 2003, about sub-lease is only about dispute between this respondent and the 6th respondent only. It is also relevant to state that the Government also entered agreements with the third parties in respect of the Choutpalli and Venkatapuram Quarries on Raising-cum-sale contract basis. So, there is nothing wrong in entering into contract for supply by the respondent No.6 with this answering respondent. The quarry operations done as per the reply notice given by the 8th respondent to the 6th respondent is only 5 months in respect of Ac.2.50 cents in Sy.No.980/4 and 981/5 and inspect of Ac.4.47 cents in Sy.No.980/1, 980/7 and 576/2. When the petitioner has civil litigation with 6th respondent he is not supposed to file the present writ petition in personal capacity styling as a protector of the public exchequer. When the petitioner has civil litigation with 6th respondent he is not supposed to file the present writ petition in personal capacity styling as a protector of the public exchequer. If the petitioner has any public interest he should have filed the public interest litigation, as he filed previously basing on the same only the order under challenge was passed. There is no personal interest as per the contents of the affidavit filed along with the present writ petition and if no personal interest is involved the writ petition is not maintainable and on this ground alone the writ petition has to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 7. Heard Sri K.S. Murthy, learned Senior counsel representing Sri Ponnada Srivyas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; learned Government Pleader for Mines, Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri C.Sumon, learned counsel; Sri N.Madhava Rao, leaned Standing counsel and learned Government Pleader for GAD appearing for the respondents. 8. On hearing, Sri K. S Murthy, learned Senior counsel, while reiterating averments made in the petition, argued that the 6th Respondent has entered into a sub-lease agreements dated 14.12.1993 and 27.11.1991 with 7 th and 8 th Respondents with clear terms and conditions which envisage that the original lease holder shall take 30% of the mineral extracted and the remaining 70% has to be taken by the sub-lease holder. It is also recited in the conditions stipulated in the said sub-lease agreement that the technical assistance and excavating personnel and their expenditure shall be borne by the sub-lease holder. He submits that the license obtained by the lease holder for excavating the mineral is not transferable under the rules. The rule 12(5)(h) (viii) of AP Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 clearly stipulates that "the lessee shall not assign, sublet, transfer otherwise dispose of the lease without obtaining the previous sanction in writing of the 3rd Respondent. The said sub-lease holders i.e. 7th and 8th respondents have conveniently evaded the royalty and sales-tax to be paid for their share and incurred loss to the public exchequer by manipulating the declared value of the granite, particularly the 70% share going to the sub-lessees. He submits that the terms and conditions of the sub-lease agreement entered into between 6th to 8 th respondents, has been filed and in which it is very clear that the said arrangement is nothing but a sub-lease. He submits that the terms and conditions of the sub-lease agreement entered into between 6th to 8 th respondents, has been filed and in which it is very clear that the said arrangement is nothing but a sub-lease. He further submits that, being aggrieved by the order passed by the 3rd Respondent, the Petitionerhas preferred revision before the 1st Respondent. he submits that, the 1st Respondent, without going into the merits of the case upheld the decision of the 3rd Respondent in memo No5554/M.I(1)/2017(3) by exonerating 6th Respondent and the other two sub-lease holders who evaded the sales tax and income tax to the 1st Respondent. 9. Learned Senior Counsel submits that, it is pertinent to note that the 6th respondent had categorically deposed before the First Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Court, Ongole, in O.S.No. 186 of 2003 that a sub-lease in respect of his mining lease agreement obtained from the Government of Andhra Pradesh was entered. In Spite of this, the 1st and 3rd Respondents gave a finding that this is not sublease. The issue of evasion of tax was sidestepped, which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the statute. 10. To support his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri K.S. Murthy, has placed reliance on Notification No.34/SO/2015 which was published in The Telangana Gazette, wherein, the Public Interest Litigation Rules, 2015- para(10), reads as under: 10. The Petitioner(s) while filing a Public Interest Litigation Petition under Clause (e) of Rule 4 shall:- (a) annex to the petition an affidavit stating that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique reason in filing the Public Interest Litigation. (b) file an affidavit undertaking to pay costs as ordered by the court, if it is ultimately held that the petition is frivolous or has been filed for extraneous considerations or that it lacks bona fides. (c) file an undertaking that he/it will disclose the source of his/its information, leading to the filling of the ( Public Interest Iitigation, if and when called upon by the Court, to do so. (d) annex to the petition, a copy of the registration certificate and an authorization resolution to file a PIL s filed by an Association or any other like body. (d) annex to the petition, a copy of the registration certificate and an authorization resolution to file a PIL s filed by an Association or any other like body. (e) file an undertaking that in case he seeks to withdraw the petition or fails to attend the case by himself or through his advocate, he will bear the costs incurred by the respondent and pay such amount of additional costs as may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (f) in case, the party seeks to withdraw a PIL Petition after it is admitted, he shall do so by moving 11. Per contra, learned Government pleader appearing for the official respondents while reiterating the contents made in the counter affidavit of respondents No.1 to 4, submits that, in view of investment made on certain share of blocks are given to raising contractor at the rate of production cost. The advance which is repayable is given by the raising contractor to the quarry lease holder as means of performance security. The recitals and various clauses does not fit into the classification of lease as the leasehold rights over the lease property has not been parted with. He submits that nowhere in the recitals and covenants of the documents the intention of sublease or sublet has been expressed and representation of the Revision applicant that, the agreements are subleases cannot be considered and hence the revisional authority has upheld the proceedings of the 3 rd respondent vide impugned proceedings dated 25.4.2017. Therefore there is no illegality in the order passed by the 3 rd respondent and therefore opposed for allowing the writ petition and prayed to dismiss the same. 12. Whereas, learned Standing counsel appearing for the 5 th respondent and learned Government Pleader for GAD have also opposed for allowing the writ petition and prayed to dismiss the same. 13. On the other hand, Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents No.6 to 8, while denying the contents made by the petitioner, argued that, pursuant to the orders of the learned Division Bench, the Director of Mines and Geology i..e, the 3 rd respondent herein has conducted the proceedings by issuing notice to all the parties concerned including the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner participated in the inquiry and that the enquiry went on long time on various dates at Hyderabad as well as at Vijayawada. After a detailed enquiry, the 3 rd respondent rejected the representations of the petitioner stating that the contract of supply in question is only a supply contract and there is no intention to sublease the mining lease in favour of any one. He submits that the 3 rd respondent on the administrative side exercised his power as directed by the Hon’ble Division Bench and passed the order, and that, such an administrative order, when it is not under APMMC Rules, is not revisable under Rule 35(a)( e) under APMMC Rules. Learned Senior counsel further submits that the supply agreement does not amount to sub lease of the lease land in favour of 7 th and 8 th respondents as alleged. There is no violation of Rule 12(5)(h)(viii) of APMMC Rules. 14. Learned Senior Counsel Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, argued that, when the petitioner has civil litigation with the 6 th respondent, he is not supposed to file the present writ petition in personal capacity styling as a protector of the public exchequer. If the petitioner has any public interest, he should have filed the Public Interest Litigation, as he filed previously basing on the same only the order under challenge was passed. He submits that there is no personal interest as per the contents of the affidavit filed along with the present writ petition and if no personal interest is involved the writ petition is not maintainable and on this ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cots. 15. He submits that there is no personal interest as per the contents of the affidavit filed along with the present writ petition and if no personal interest is involved the writ petition is not maintainable and on this ground alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cots. 15. To support his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy has placed reliance on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai versus Roshan Kumar , Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 Supreme Court Cases 671, wherein it was held that Similarly, King v. Middlesex Justices(3), it was held that the words "person who shall think himself aggrieved" appearing in the statute governing the grant of licences to innkeepers mean a person immediately aggrieved as by refusal of a licence to himself, and not one who is consequently aggrieved, and that though the Justices had granted a licence to a party to open a public house, not before licensed, within a very short distance of a licensed public house, the occupier of the latter house could not appeal against such grant. Other instances of a restricted interpretation of the expression "person aggrieved" are furnished by R. v. Bradford on-Avon Urban District Council Ex Parte Boulton(4); Gregory v. Camden London (1) [1880] 14Ch.D.458,at p.465. (2) [1916] 1K B.7 (3) (1832) 37 R. R. 594-(1832) 3 & Ad. 938. (4) (1964) 2 All. E. R. 492. Borough Council(1); R. v. London O.E. Ex parte West-Minister Corporation(2); Regina v.Cardiff Justices Ex parte Cardiff Corporation(3). This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though (1) the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, in fringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter see The State of orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta(4); Calcutta . Gas Co. v. The State of West Bengal(5); Ram UmeshwariSuthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue, orissa(6); Gadda Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh(7); State of orissa v. RajasahebChandanmall(8); Dr. Gas Co. v. The State of West Bengal(5); Ram UmeshwariSuthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue, orissa(6); Gadda Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh(7); State of orissa v. RajasahebChandanmall(8); Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal & Co.(9)]. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, r even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject- matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of 'persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer-circle the. bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may not be "persons aggrieved. To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers', among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law. has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something" ? has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something" ? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on (1) United States v.Storer Broadcasting Co.351 U.S.192. (2) Kansas City Power & light Co. v. McKay 350 U. S. (ii) In another decision reported in Kishore Samrite versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2013) 2 Supreme Court Cases 398], wherein the Apex Court held that : “….Having discussed the abuse of process of Court and misuse of judicial process by both the petitioners, the issue of locus standi would obviously fall within a very narrow compass. The question of locus standi would normally be a question of fact and law both. The issue could be decided with reference to the given facts and not in isolation. We have stated the facts and the stand of the respective parties in some detail. Both, the appellant and respondent No.8, had filed their respective writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court as next friends of the three petitioners whose names have not been stated with complete correctness in both the writ petitions. There has been complete contradiction in the allegations made in the two writ petitions by the respective petitioners. According to the appellant, the three stated petitioners were illegally detained by the respondent no.6 while according to the respondent no.8 they were detained by the authorities. These contradictory and untrue allegations are the very foundation of these writ petitions. It may also be noticed that in both the writ petitions, baseless allegations in regard to the alleged incident of 3rd December, 2006, involving the respondent no.6, had also been raised. 47. Ordinarily, the party aggrieved by any order has the right to seek relief by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of that order. It may also be noticed that in both the writ petitions, baseless allegations in regard to the alleged incident of 3rd December, 2006, involving the respondent no.6, had also been raised. 47. Ordinarily, the party aggrieved by any order has the right to seek relief by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of that order. There could be cases where a person is not directly affected but has some personal stake in the outcome of a petition. In such cases, he may move the Court as a guardian or next friend for and on behalf of the disabled aggrieved party. Normally, a total stranger would not act as next friend. In the case of Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India [ (1992) 4 SCC 653 ], this Court held that a total stranger to the trial commenced against the convicts, cannot be permitted to question the correctness of the conviction recorded against some convicts unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognised by law, otherwise it would be unsafe or hazardous to allow a third party to question the decision against him. In the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [AIR (1982) SC 149], the Court stated, “but we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others.” Dealing with the question of the next friend bringing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court in the case of Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India [ (1992) 4 SCC 666 ], held as under : “We are afraid these observations do not permit a mere friend like the petitioner to initiate the proceedings of the present nature under Article 32 of the Constitution. The observations relied upon relate to a minor or an insane or one who is suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf; for example see : Sections 320(4)(a), 330(2) read with Section 335(1)(b) and 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The observations relied upon relate to a minor or an insane or one who is suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf; for example see : Sections 320(4)(a), 330(2) read with Section 335(1)(b) and 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that the two convicts are minors or insane persons but the learned counsel argued that since they were suffering from an acute obsession such obsession amounts to a legal disability which permits the next friend to initiate proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think that such a contention is tenable. The disability must be one which the law recognises.” (iii) And also placed reliance on a case of Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and others, MANU/SC/0532/1992], wherein, the apex Court held that “the question, “what PIL means and has been deeply surveyed, explored and explained not only by various judicial pronouncements in many countries, but also by eminent judges, jurists, activist lawyers, outstanding scholars, journalists and social scientists etc. with a vast erudition.” 16. Perused the material on record. 17. Admittedly, the 6 th respondent herein entered into a sub-lease in respect of the Mining Lease Agreement dated 14.12.1993 with the 7 th respondent with clear terms and conditions which envisage that the original lease holder shall take 30% of the mineral extracted and the remaining 70% has tobe taken by the sub-lease holder.A close reading of the agreement would show that it is a sub lease. Further, the main crux of the agreement is that all the expenses like payment of cess, tax, royalty everything will be done by Imperial Granites. The men and machinery would be employed by the sub-lessee. 30% of the extracted granite would be given to the Anand Granies free of cost. 70% of the extracted material would be purchased by the sub-lessee not at the market value, but at the actual price which is linked to expenditure on the mines. 18. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the tax payable to the Government on the 70% of the granite extracted which runs into thousands of cubic meters has caused loss of 100s of crores to the exchequer. 18. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the tax payable to the Government on the 70% of the granite extracted which runs into thousands of cubic meters has caused loss of 100s of crores to the exchequer. The said sublease holders i.e., 7 th and 8 th respondents have conveniently evaded the royalty and sales tax to be paid for their share and incurred loss to the public exchequer. 19. As seen from the impugned proceedings dated 25.04.2017, it is observed that, at the time of personal hearing, the case was called on 17.01.2017 wherein the petitioner and 3 rd respondent remained absent. During the course of hearing, the petitioner again requested time to file written arguments for which he needs a time of week and for serving a copy of the same on R.1, R.2 and R.3 as well. 20. It is also noticed in the impugned order, extracted hereunder: “During the personal hearing conducted on 04.02.2017 all the parties were present and the petitioner's advocate advanced he arguments. The main stay of his contention was that the agreement dt. 19.06.1996 between M/s. Pokarna Granites Limited and M/s. Anand Granites Exports Private Limited is an agreement to Sub Lease and that it is hotat material supply agreement. The fed to Sub Lease and submitted that there was no prior approval from DMG and that on the count of illegal mining penalties are to be imposed on the respondent. He further submitted that in the civil suit that is pending between the parties the respondent has agreed that they have been given a raising contract and that anything that is admitted in a civil court is binding on the parties. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 434 of 2016 dt.20.01.2016 with specific reference to paras 11,28 and 33 of the judgment, and submitted that prior consent of the appropriate authority is required when there occurs a transfer for lease for consideration. The counsel also relied on the judgments of the apex court in Manoharlalsharma case reported in (2014) 9 SCC 649 relating to Coal Block allocation, 2014 Law Suits SC 649, para 35, and 2014 Law Suits Kerala page 170 for the proposition that document. The counsel also relied on the judgments of the apex court in Manoharlalsharma case reported in (2014) 9 SCC 649 relating to Coal Block allocation, 2014 Law Suits SC 649, para 35, and 2014 Law Suits Kerala page 170 for the proposition that document. needs to be understood by its true contents and recitals and finally on the judgment reported in (2010) 8 SCC P 383 at Paras 28, 29, 30, 31 32, 36, for the propositions relating to Fraud and material suppression of facts. No written arguments were submitted by the petitioner a submitted during the hearing on 17.01.2017.” 21. Moreover, it is contended by the respondents counsel that the agreement between the 6 th and 7 th respondent is only a lease but not sub- lease. Further, the PIL filed by the petitioner on 1.7.2013 was disposed of by directing the authorities in pursuant to this, authorities held that there is no sublease, evasion of royalty. Further, the representation of the petitioner was rejected, appeal filed under rule 35A and representation was filed on21.11.2017 also rejected. 22. It is also to be noted that, on a perusal of the PIL No.112/2013, wherein it is observed that: “According to the Records and Report of the Revenue Divisional Office Ongole it has been established that S.Nos. 980/4 Ac.1-00 and 98115 Act Chimakurthy Village and Mandal are A.W. lands and were assigned The legal heirs of the assignee were sold to Sri P. Sreedhar Anand s/o Anand through Registered document. This is a clear cut case of violation of A.P. Assigned Bands (Prohibitions of Transfers) Act, 1972. This aspect should have been verified by the then MRO/Tahsildar soon after the information of registration received from the Sub Registrar. Further it should have also been verified thoroughly while recommending NOC to the applicant, and necessary action should have been initiated under the provisions of A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1972, But it has not been done at that time. In this regard it cannot be find faults with the actions of the Respondent in obtaining the NOC for the lands in question, presuming that he has purchased patta lands as the then M.R.O./Tahsildar who is competent authority have certified as private patta lands.” 23. In this regard it cannot be find faults with the actions of the Respondent in obtaining the NOC for the lands in question, presuming that he has purchased patta lands as the then M.R.O./Tahsildar who is competent authority have certified as private patta lands.” 23. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and on considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, in the present case, it is observed that, it is the personal grievance of the petitioner which will not be a ground to file a PIL and also the petitioner should not be having direct or indirect interest in the outcome of writ, but the writ petitioner herein is claiming so. In view of the above circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that, the petitioner has no locus standi to invoke the special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. Therefore, this Court found no merit in the instant writ petition and devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. 25. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as costs. 26. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications in the writ petition, shall stand closed.