ORDER : Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J. De-facto complainant preferred the revision under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) questioning acquittal of respondent Nos.1 and 2 by the judgment dated 11.06.2008 in Sessions Case No. 507 of 2007 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Guntur. 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionist and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the respondent. 3. Sri Ismail, the learned counsel for the revisionist submits that even though the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on merits, it would not take away the right of the revisionist in preferring the revision and arguing the matter on merits. 4. Smt. Sumathi, learned counsel representing Smt. Harija Akkineni, counsel for the respondent No.1 and 2 submitted that the revision is not maintainable in the view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Ramachandran v. V.N. Rajan, [ (2009) 14 SCC 569 ]; the registry should have tagged this revision petition along with appeal, when the appeal was heard by the learned Division Bench and urged to dismiss the revision as not maintainable. 5. Mr K. Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor also submits in similar lines with the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 7. Now the small point for consideration is: Whether this revision case is maintainable in view of dismissal of the Appeal, on merits, preferred by the State against the judgment in S.C.No.507 of 2007 dated 11.06.2008? 8. Before going into the merits of the matter, it is brought to the notice of this court that the state had preferred an appeal against the impugned judgment before the Division Bench and the said appeal was dismissed on merits. In that event, indeed, pendency of this revision ought to have been brought to the notice of the learned Division Bench and this revision ought to have been tagged with the Criminal Appeal, when the Criminal Appeal was coming for disposal. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Ramachandran v. V.N. Rajan at para Nos. 15 to 24 and 32 held as follows: “15. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Ramachandran v. V.N. Rajan at para Nos. 15 to 24 and 32 held as follows: “15. We cannot find fault with the learned Single Judge in proceeding ahead with the revision as it was never brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge that the appeal against the same judgment which was impugned in the revision had already been filed. It was for the appellant-accused to point out that on the date when the revision was heard the fate of the criminal appeal filed impugning the same judgment was sealed because of the refusal on the part of the Division Bench to condone the delay. In fact, it was up to the Government Pleader who was a common party in both the revision and the appeal to point out to the learned Single Judge about the dismissal of the condonation of delay application. Very strangely, the Government Pleader did not do that. 16. Again, we are at a loss to understand as to how the criminal revision was left out and was not mentioned before the Division Bench deciding the question of condonation of delay in appeal which was filed against the same judgment. In this appeal, however, the first question which has been raised is about the dismissal of the statutory appeal preferred by the State and its effect on the pending revision. The appellant-accused, however, has conveniently avoided to state in the special leave petition as to when he came to know about the dismissal of the condonation of delay application in filing the appeal and how. We cannot, therefore, find fault with the learned Single Judge's judgment who was never apprised of the dismissal of the condonation of delay application. 17. Similarly, since the order refusing to condone the delay is not challenged before us, it will not be possible for us to go into that aspect also. But we must observe that it was the duty of the State counsel to point out that a revision was already pending against the same judgment which was challenged in appeal but which appeal was delayed by more than 800 days at the time when the application for condonation of delay was considered by the Division Bench. But we must observe that it was the duty of the State counsel to point out that a revision was already pending against the same judgment which was challenged in appeal but which appeal was delayed by more than 800 days at the time when the application for condonation of delay was considered by the Division Bench. Since the appellant-accused had not raised the question about the continuability of the revision before the High Court, we would not ordinarily allow the counsel for the appellant-accused to raise that question before us. 18. Though, we must say that an awkward situation has arisen wherein an appeal against the judgment had failed, though only on the question of limitation, yet, a revision against the same judgment, however, continued and was allowed also and all this happened because of the casual attitude on the part of the State Government tas also the appellant-accused in not pointing out the proper facts to the Courts, both to the Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge. 19. The question is undoubtedly important, and hence, though raised for the first time before us, we propose to decide the same. An incongruous situation has arisen where, though the appeal against the acquittal has been dismissed by not allowing the condonation of delay in filing the same, yet, the revision filed against the said judgment by the private complainant has not only survived but such revision has also been allowed. 20. We must observe that the Division Bench in not allowing the condonation of delay has effectively dismissed the appeal in the sense that it has not allowed the State Government to proceed with the appeal for which there was a provision. This was a prosecution not based on a private complaint but on the police report. Therefore, the State Government had a right under Section 378(2) CrPC to file an appeal and very conspicuously the private party did not have that right. The private complainant, therefore, could only excite the general powers of revision by the High Court. 21. Firstly, we must clarify that when the Division Bench considered the question of condonation of delay in filing the appeal against acquittal, though technically it was deciding the application under Section 378(3) CrPC, it was actually the whole appeal itself which was before it. 21. Firstly, we must clarify that when the Division Bench considered the question of condonation of delay in filing the appeal against acquittal, though technically it was deciding the application under Section 378(3) CrPC, it was actually the whole appeal itself which was before it. In this behalf it will have to be seen that the limitation for filing such appeal at the instance of the State Government against acquittal is provided by Article 114 of the Limitation Act. 22. It is undoubtedly true that sub-section (3) of Section 378 CrPC specifically provides that the appeal under sub-sections (1) and (2) cannot be entertained except with the leave of the High Court and, therefore, an application for leave in such appeal filed by the State Government is a must. The limitation for filing the appeal is 90 days from the date of the order while the same article provides for 30 days of limitation from the date of grant of special leave. Therefore, what was before the High Court was the appeal itself and the petitioner prayed the condonation of delay of 801 days in filing the appeal against acquittal. When the High Court declined to grant that permission, it, in effect, refused to entertain the appeal against the order of the trial court, thus making it final. 23. Now, obviously, if the judgment was rendered final by the Division Bench of the High Court then there could not be any subsequent order to the contrary by the Single Judge even if the effect of the pendency of the revision was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. There is no review power under the Criminal Procedure Code to the criminal court including the High Court. Such a review power exists only in this Court. As such, once the High Court had passed the order refusing the condonation of delay of appeal and thereby awarding the finality to the trial court's judgment, that order could be considered and upset only by this Court on a proper appeal having been filed in this Court by the State Government. As against the State Government, the order of the trial court acquitting the appellant- accused had become final. Therefore, the only course left open then in law was to challenge that order refusing to condone the delay in filing appeal against acquittal. 24. As against the State Government, the order of the trial court acquitting the appellant- accused had become final. Therefore, the only course left open then in law was to challenge that order refusing to condone the delay in filing appeal against acquittal. 24. It is an admitted fact that such appeal challenging the order passed by the Division Bench was never filed and the order of the Division Bench became final and has remained final till today. Under such circumstances, in our considered opinion, the revision against the same order could not have been entertained, much less allowed upsetting the finality of the trial court's judgment, which finality was confirmed by the order of the High Court by refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal against the same trial court judgment. That would be the true import of the appellate powers of the High Court. 32. In this particular case, we are of the clear-cut opinion, that since the trial court’s judgment was given the effect of finality by the Division bench of the High Court then the learned Single Judge of that Court could not have reversed that effect and upset that position.” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 ] at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP, AIR 1962 SC 1788 , at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP, AIR 1962 SC 1788 , at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub- section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 12. It is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 , wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub- section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 13. Therefore, as per the above three judgments, re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible as second Appellate Court in deciding this revision. In Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam, [MANU/PH/4362/2013] it is held at para No.16 as under: “As is apparent from the reasoning propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was held that once an appeal against acquittal stood dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench, revision against acquittal cannot be entertained. It is pertinent to mention herein that this law has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the year 2009 much after the remand having been made. Seriousness with which the Hon'ble Supreme Court treated this matter against the State Government is evident from the following observations:-- Again, as we have already pointed out the finality confirmed by the Division Bench should not be upset by the judgment of the Single Bench of the same Court. Such incongruous results would follow if we allow the revision to be entertained and decided. Such incongruous results would follow if we allow the revision to be entertained and decided. In this case, undoubtedly, the revision was not only entertained but also admitted by the High Court. We have only to express that the attitude on the part of the State Government counsel as also the appellant-accused was extremely casual. We also do not understand as to why, when appeal was filed along with the application for condonation of delay against the judgment of acquittal, the revision pending against the same judgment of acquittal was not joined with the appeal. Ordinarily, that should have been done. It is all the result of colossal casual-ness even on the part of the Registry of the High Court which has resulted in such incongruous situation. We, however, cannot blame the learned Single Judge for proceeding with the revision as he was never apprised of the dismissal of the appeal.” 14. The facts in K. Ramachandran were that appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation for not establishing sufficient cause, whereas, in the instant case appeal preferred by the state in Crl.A.No.416 of 2010 was dismissed on merits on 17.03.2010 by the Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, when an appeal against acquittal had been dismissed by the Division Bench either on the ground of delay or on merits and pendency of the revision was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench, there cannot be any subsequent order by this Court while dealing with this revision case. 15. The judgment of the Division Bench in appeal has become final. This Court sitting in revision against the order of acquittal of the respondents No.1 and 2 cannot go beyond the judgment of the Division Bench. Ergo, nothing survives in the revision. For the above reasons, the revision is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.