JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant- State under Section 378 (1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Presiding Officer & Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 6, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, (hereinafter referred to as "the learned Trial Court") in Sessions Case No. 41 of 2007 on 18.02.2009, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents for the offence punishable under Sections 498 (A), 306 , 114 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code , 1860 ( IPC ) as well as Sections 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Dowry Act . 1.1 The respondents are hereinafter referred to as “the accused” as they stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 1.2 During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 expired and hence the appeal qua the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 was abated. 2. The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under: 2.1 The accused No. 1 was married to deceased Pinkyben in the year 2001 and the accused Nos. 2 and 3 are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased Pinkyben respectively. Two months after the marriage, the accused would taunt Pinkyben about housework and tell her that she did not bring enough dowry and would demand dowry from her. On 25-07-2006, Pinkyben was so fed up of the mental and physical harassment, that she sprinkled kerosene on her body and set herself ablaze and was immediately rushed to the Vadilal Sarabhai Hospital, Ahmedabad for treatment. That she expired on 26-07-2006 at 01-00 Hrs due to her burn injuries. The complainant Ganpatbhai Maftaji Chauhan (Marvadi), the father of deceased Pinkyben filed the complaint under Sections 498-A , 306 and 114 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 before the Additional Police Commissioner, K-Zone, Ghatlodiya, Ahmedabad City, which was registered at Sola High Court Police Station I-C.R.No.217 of 2016. The complainant Ganpatbhai Maftaji Chauhan (Marvadi), the father of deceased Pinkyben filed the complaint under Sections 498-A , 306 and 114 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 before the Additional Police Commissioner, K-Zone, Ghatlodiya, Ahmedabad City, which was registered at Sola High Court Police Station I-C.R.No.217 of 2016. 2.2 The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the connected witnesses and collected the necessary documents and after completion of investigation the police filed the chargesheet against the accused before the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ahmedabad (Rural) and as the said offences against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Ahmedabad (Rural) as per the provisions of Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the case was registered Sessios Case No. 41 of 2007. 2.3 The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code. A charge at Exh. 3 was framed against the accused and the statements of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 4 and 6, wherein, the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4 The prosecution produced twelve oral evidences and fourteen documentary evidences to bring home the charge against the accused and after the learned Additional Public Prosecutor filed the closing pursis, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 were recorded, wherein, the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution on record. The accused refused to step into the witness box or examine witnesses on their behalf and stated that a false case has been filed against them. After the arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned trial Court by the impugned judgment and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from all the charges leveled against them. 3. After the arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned trial Court by the impugned judgment and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from all the charges leveled against them. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgement and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and during cross-examination, nothing adverse has been elicited in favour of the respondent. The case has been proved beyond reasonable doubts and the prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondent and the judgement and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal and without any basis in the eyes of law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Mr. Utkarsh Sharma, for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. Jwalant Vora for learned advocate for the respondents - accused. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Mr. Utkarsh Sharma has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case and has submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned trial Court has not appreciated the direct and indirect evidence in the case. The prosecution has fully proved the case beyond reasonable doubts but the learned trial Court has relied on minor contradictions and has given undue weightage with regard to the place of incident. That the order passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, improper and perverse and is required to be quashed and set aside and the appeal of the appellant must be allowed. 6. Learned advocate Mr. That the order passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, improper and perverse and is required to be quashed and set aside and the appeal of the appellant must be allowed. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Jwalant Vora appearing for the respondents- original accused submits that the judgment and order has been passed after appreciation of all the evidence and the learned Court has appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and hence, the appeal of the appellant-State must be rejected. 7. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in acquittal appeals in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 : AIR 2006 SC 831 , this Court stated; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (emphasis supplied) From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.. 8. The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. 8. The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened. There is no inhibition to re appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after re appreciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere in the same. 9. As the appeal pertains to a case under Section 306 of the IPC , it would be appropriate to reproduce the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Awase vs The State of Madhya Pradhesh Criminal Appeal No. 221/2025 (@ SLP(Cr) No. 11868/2023) passed on 17 th January, 2025 which is as under: 11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing who Firstly - instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly - engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly - intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 13. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438], the appellant remarked to the deceased that 'go and die' and the deceased thereafter, committed suicide. This Court held that:- "3. ...Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. …" 14. In Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2010) 8 SCC 628 , this Court held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306 . 15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal , (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court held as under:- “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC , the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. [Emphasis supplied] 16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC . 17. M. Mohan vs. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 followed Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , wherein it was held as under:- 41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record where-from an inference of the appellant accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.” Thereafter, this Court in Mohan (supra) held:- 45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.” [Emphasis supplied] 10. In light of the above settled principles of law, the evidence on record of the case is appreciated and the prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 1 Ganpatbhai Mafataji Chauhan at Exhibit 9. The witness is the complainant and father of the deceased, who has stated that his daughter Pinky was married to the accused No. 1 and she was residing in her matrimonial home with the accused. That he does not know what happened to his daughter and she expired due to burn injuries but he does not know for what reason she was burnt. That when he returned from his work in the midnight, his brother told him about the incident and when he went to the V.S Hospital on the next day, his daughter Pinky had expired. That he did not do anything and he did not file any complaint but he had affixed his signature as per the say of the police. That he did not tell the police why his daughter was burnt and has merely identified his signature on the complaint, which is produced at Exhibit 14. That he did not do anything and he did not file any complaint but he had affixed his signature as per the say of the police. That he did not tell the police why his daughter was burnt and has merely identified his signature on the complaint, which is produced at Exhibit 14. The witness has been declared hostile and has been cross-examined at length by the learned APP and nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his daughter was married in the community marriage and there is no give and take of any item during a community marriage. A community marriage takes place only when both the parties agree and they do not have to incur any expenditure. That when he received the news of his daughter being burnt, he did not go but his son went and he had gone for his job and when he returned at 01:00 a.m., he got the news and he went to the hospital. That he does not have any information about any physical and mental harassment to his daughter Pinky. 10.1 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 2 Dasrathbhai Prabhatbhai Rabari at Exh.17 and Prosecution Witness No. 3 Rajubhai Bhikhabhai Desai at Exh.23. Both the witnesses are the panch witnesses of the panchnama of the place of offence which is produced at Exhibit 18. Both the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and have stated that they had merely affixed their signatures on the panchnama and the panch slips and have not gone to the place of incident. 10.2 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 4 Samdaben Jesingbhai at Exhibit 24 and the witness is the paternal aunt of deceased Pinkyben. The witness has stated that the marital life of Pinkyben was good in the beginning but thereafter she had a fight with her in-laws and they had demanded Rs.2000/- as dowry. That she did not have a child after five years of marriage and she was being tortured for the same. She resides in Mehendi Kuva and Pinkyben resided at Chandlodiya and hence she does not know why she was burnt. That she did not have a child after five years of marriage and she was being tortured for the same. She resides in Mehendi Kuva and Pinkyben resided at Chandlodiya and hence she does not know why she was burnt. That her son's friend came and told her that Pinky was burnt and she was taken to Vadilal Hospital and when Pinky went to the hospital she saw bandages on the body of Pinkyben and she was shouting “Save me, Save me”. They were not allowed to go inside and after some time Pinkyben expired. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the accused were demanding money from Pinkyben and they demanded an amount of Rs. 2000/- to Rs.3000/-. The accused were getting Pinkyben treated as she did not have a child and Pinkyben was very unhappy as she did not have a child. One day prior to the incident, a son was born inthe home of Mukeshbhai, the brother of the accused No. 1 and she did not have any conversation with the accused Nos. 2 and 3 about Pinkyben not having a child. Pinkyben had taken this step because of the child that was born to the younger brother Mukeshbhai and at the time of the incident she was at her home. When she went to the hospital she was informed that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 were not at home and they did not know, how the incident had occurred. That the in-laws had sat with them outside and they did not restrain her from going inside and the cremation ceremony of Pinky was done at her matrimonial home by both, the in-laws and the member of parental home of Pinkyben. That whenever she met Pinkyben on any occasion she was happy with her husband and Pinkyben would not tell her anything but would tell her father. 10.3 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 5 Basirbhai Dosabhai Vohra at Exhibit 25 and the witness was working as an In-Way PSI in the Sola High Court Police Station on 25-07-2006 when he received information that Pinkyben Mukeshbhai, aged 22 years, resident of Ram Malav Nagar, Chandlodia was admitted to the VS Hospital and she had expired at 01-00 Hrs. That he went to the VS Hospital and did the procedure for the Inquest Panchnama and registered the Accident Death and filed the report which is produced at Exhibit 26. As per the report produced at Exhibit 26, on 25-07-2006 at around 17.30 hours, Pinkyben was preparing food on the Wick Primus stove and it burst and her clothes caught fire and she was burnt and brought to the hospital and she expired on 26-07-2006 at 01-00 Hrs. The information was registered at Sola High Court Police Station as Janva Jog No. 86 of 2006 on 25-07-2006 and it was been investigated by Additional Police Commissioner, “A” Division and the Accident Death No. 31 of 2006 was also registered. 10.4 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 6 Rohit Chimanlal Jariwala at Exhibit 28 and the witness was working as the Medical Officer at V.S. Hospital on 26-07-2006 and had conducted the postmortem on the dead body of deceased Pinkyben. The postmortem note is produced at Exhibit 29 and as per Column No. 17, there were 2 degree to 3 degree burns of hands and neck including face, scalp hairs were burnt, eyebrows and eyelashes were burnt up to roots and 2 degree to 3 degree burns of front of chest and abdomen including external genital region, 2 degree to 3 degree burns of whole back of the body including back of neck and gluteal region, 2 degree to 3 degree burns of both upper limbs including palms and auxiliary hairs burnt up to root, 2 degree to 3 degree burns of both lower limbs excluding sole of feet. The bruise of above described burns were red and inflamed and all the injuries were antemortem. The cause of death as per their opinion was shock as a result of burns and its complications. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the treatment papers of Pinkyben had come earlier. 10.5 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 7 Kantibhai Kikabhai Rathod at Exhibit 33 and the witness is the Additional Commissioner of Police, who has recorded the complaint of the complainant, which is produced at Exhibit 14. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that a Janva Jog was registered on 25-07-2006 in which it was mentioned that Pinkyben was burnt while she was cooking. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that a Janva Jog was registered on 25-07-2006 in which it was mentioned that Pinkyben was burnt while she was cooking. In the inquest panchrama, it is mentioned that Pinkyben was burnt while she was cooking and the complaint was filed on 26-07-2006, but there is no reason for delay in filing the complaint and the place and time of filing the complaint is mentioned in the complaint. 10.6 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 8 Chandgiri Pujgiri Gosai at Exhibit 37 and the witness was working as a PSI in the Sola High Court Police Station and he had registered Janva Jog No. 86 of 2006. That he had drawn the panchnama of the place of offence and had collected the necessary mudamal from the place of offence. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that in the Janva Jog, the information was that Pinkyben was cooking on a wick-primus stove and she was burnt and he had not collected the treatment papers of Pinkyben. 10.7 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 9 Nizamudddin Bavuddin Nagori at Exhibit 38 and the witness has partly investigated the offence and had collected the post-mortem note from the V.S. Hospital and filed the charge sheet. 10.8 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 10 Bhikhabhai Ganpatbhai Chauhan at Exhibit 39 and the witness is the brother of the deceased who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his sister was married in the community wedding and out of his three sisters, only the wedding of Pinkyben was in the community wedding. His sister Pinky did not have any children and he had never asked her about the same. 10.9 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 11 Kokilaben Kapurji at Exhibit 40 and the witness has stated that she is known to deceased Pinkyben and the accused and Pinkyben was married for about 5 to 6 years and she did not have any children. That, she was burnt but she does not have any information about the same and she does not know whether Pinkyben was mentally and physically harassed by the accused. That, she was burnt but she does not have any information about the same and she does not know whether Pinkyben was mentally and physically harassed by the accused. The witness has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile and has been cross-examined at length by the learned APP but nothing to support the case of the prosecution has come on record. 10.10 The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 12 Vijaysinh Laxmansinh Chauban at Exhibit 42 and the witness is the Investigating Officer who has narrated in detail the entire procedure that was undertaken by him during investigation. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that the information of the Janva Jog was given by VS Hospital and the same is produced at Exhibit 47 and as per the same, deceased Pinkyben was cooking on the wick primus stove and she was burnt. The complaint was filed on 26-07-2006 but no reason for delay in filing of the complaint was given by the complainant. 11. On minute appreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution, it has emerged on record that on 25-07-2006, the incident had taken place at the house of deceased Pinkyben and she was immediately rushed to the V.S.Hospital where the Janva Jog was registered, wherein it was mentioned that Pinkyben was cooking on the wick primus stove and she had suffered accidental burns. The Janva Jog was investigated by Prosecution Witness No. 5 Bashirbhai Dosbhai Vora and the report is produced at Exhibit 28, which states the same thing and thereafter Pinkyben died during treatment on 26-07-2006. The evidence that has emerged on record is that immediately after the incident, Pinkyben was taken to V.S.Hospital for treatment but no documents regarding the treatment have been produced on record and there is nothing on record to show what was the history given by Pinkyben to the doctor. Moreover, while Pinkyben was under treatment, it appears that no efforts were made to get her dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate and thereafter Accident Death number was registered but it is pertinent to note that the documents of Janva Jog and Accident Death have not been produced on record. Moreover, while Pinkyben was under treatment, it appears that no efforts were made to get her dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate and thereafter Accident Death number was registered but it is pertinent to note that the documents of Janva Jog and Accident Death have not been produced on record. The Investigating Officers would have recorded the statements of the complainant, the family members of deceased Pinkyben and it is not clear as to what was stated by them in the first instance. The complainant, the father of deceased Pinkyben has not supported the case of the prosecution and the complaint is not proved and there is no clear evidence that Pinkyben was ever subjected to any mental and physical harassment by the accused. What has emerged on record is that one day prior to the incident, a child was born at the younger brother's house of the accused No. 1 and deceased Pinkyben was married for about five years but she did not have children and she was undergoing treatment for the same. That she was unhappy about not having a child and there is nothing on record to suggest that immediately prior to the incident, the accused had intentionally abetted, instigated, aided or goaded the deceased to commit suicide. 12. In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of Mahendra Awase (supra), the learned trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in extending benefit of doubt and acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against him. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of extending benefit of doubt and acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 13. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 13. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 6, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, in Sessions Case No. 41 of 2007 on 18.02.2009 is hereby confirmed. 14. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.