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2025 DIGILAW 333 (RAJ)

MOOL CHAND v. STATE AND ORS

2025-02-12

GANESH RAM MEENA

body2025
ORDER : GANESH RAM MEENA, J. 1. This criminal revision petition has been preferred by the complainant petitioner under section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC against the Judgment dated 31.08.2006 passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate-Ist Class, Niwai, District Tonk (for short, ‘the trial Court’), in Original Criminal Case No. (473/2002) 162/2004, State vs. Ratan Lal whereby the trial court acquitted the accused respondent No. 2 from the charges under sections 279, 337 & 304A IPC by giving him the benefit of doubt. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the complainant Mool Chand (PW4) submitted a handwritten report (Ex.P3) before the SHO, Police Station Dattwas, District Tonk to this effect that on 01.08.2002 at 7.30 pm, a motorcycle RJ-26 TM-8150 was going from Kothoon towards Dattwas at a very high speed, which was being driven by Ratan Lal Sarpanch of Dattwas and behind him Kalyan Mal Meena of Rajdhirajpura was sitting. When one Gyarsi Baiwa Sahajya Ram resident of Mahapura alias Turkeya was walking towards her house, Ratan Lal Meena who was driving the motorcycle at a high speed in rash and negligent manner, hit Gyarsi, as a result of which she sustained injuries and fell down. Ratan Lal and the other person who was sitting behind him also fell down. Shankar Meena, Ramesh Meena who happened to be on the spot came forward to help Gyarsi. They took Gyarsi in a jeep, which was coming from Dattwas, to Kareda for treatment and during treatment she died. On the basis of aforesaid handwritten report (Ex.P3), an FIR No. 21/2002 (Ex.P7) was registered for the offences punishable under sections 279 and 304A IPC. 3. The police after investigation submitted the charge- sheet before the competent court against the accused respondent No.2 for the offences under sections 279, 337 and 304A IPC. 4. The learned trial court after taking cognizance, framed the charges against the accused respondent No.2 for the aforementioned offences. The accused denied the charges and opted for trial. 5. The prosecution to prove its case examined 10 documents and exhibited 10 documents. 6. Thereafter, the statement of the accused respondent No.2 was recorded under section 313 CrPC and in defence no documents were exhibited. 7. The learned trial court vide judgment dated 31.08.2006 acquitted the accused respondent No.2 from the charges levelled against him. 8. 5. The prosecution to prove its case examined 10 documents and exhibited 10 documents. 6. Thereafter, the statement of the accused respondent No.2 was recorded under section 313 CrPC and in defence no documents were exhibited. 7. The learned trial court vide judgment dated 31.08.2006 acquitted the accused respondent No.2 from the charges levelled against him. 8. Learned counsel for the complainant petitioner submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.08.2006 passed by the learned trial court is contrary to the facts and evidence available on record. Counsel further submits that the learned trial court has committed serious illegality in passing the impugned judgment of acquittal by not considering the fact that the accused respondent No. 2 has committed offences punishable under sections 279, 337 & 304A I.P.C. Counsel also submits that the accused respondent No.2 drove the motorcycle rashly and negligently and collided with the deceased-Smt. Gyarsi, who was walking on her side i.e. left side of the road. In the said accident deceased-Smt. Gyarsi sustained serious injuries and succumbed to those injuries but the learned trial court did not consider this aspect of the matter that the accident in question occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused respondent No.2. Counsel also submits that while passing the impugned judgment the learned court has itself observed that the accident in question had been caused by the accused respondent No. 2, as a result of which Smt. Gyarsi received serious injuries and subsequently died. It was also held by the learned court below that prosecution succeeded to prove the accident but the learned trial court has wrongly drawn inference to this effect that blood stains were found in the middle of the road, whereas this fact is not sufficient to provide the benefit of doubt to the accused respondent No.2. Counsel also submits that in the present case, the accident had occurred in a very surprising manner wherein the motorcycle in question was found to be lying on the wrong side of the road and the deceased Smt. Gyarsi had taken the last breath of her life on that spot right there. This fact was specifically supported by the statements of eye-witness PW1 Shankar, who in his statement has categorically deposed that the motorcycle was driven by the accused respondent No.2 in a rash and negligent manner. This fact was specifically supported by the statements of eye-witness PW1 Shankar, who in his statement has categorically deposed that the motorcycle was driven by the accused respondent No.2 in a rash and negligent manner. This witness further specifically stated that accused respondent No.2 was going on the side of Datwas and deceased Smt. Gyarsi was coming from the side of Datwas, which clearly indicates that the accident had occurred on the wrong side of the road and impliedly it was negligence on the part of the accused respondent No.2 but the learned trial court did not apply its judicial mind while passing the impugned judgment in view of the above mentioned facts & evidence. Counsel further submits that the learned trial court has also committed serious error in not considering the statements of PW2 Lala Ram, PW3 Ladu, PW4 Mool Chand and PW5 Pala Ram who have specifically stated in their statements that the motorcycle was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused respondent No.2 which resulted in serious injuries to Smt. Gyarsi. On the contrary on behalf of the accused respondent No.2 no evidence in defence has been produced to controvert the statements of prosecution witnesses. further, the statement of PW1 Shankar has been appreciated in deciding in question no. 1 but while deciding the question No. 2 his statement has not been admitted which is self contradictory interpretation by the learned court below. Counsel further submits that the leaned trial court has wrongly taken into consideration Ex. P2- the site plan prepared by the police in which place of accident has not been shown specifically, to add to this, there are several infirmities in the site plan such as- the names of the owners of land having been wrongly mentioned, the place where the motorcycle was found lying has not been mentioned clearly, the place of recovery of the dead body has also been shown to be nearby an agriculture land parallel to the road which in reality is much farther from the road. Above mentioned infirmities ruined the integrity of the site plan Ex. P2. In view of the above mentioned facts & circumstances of the present case, the impugned judgment passed by the learned court below is not legally sustainable and deserves to be set aside. 9. Above mentioned infirmities ruined the integrity of the site plan Ex. P2. In view of the above mentioned facts & circumstances of the present case, the impugned judgment passed by the learned court below is not legally sustainable and deserves to be set aside. 9. Per-contra, the learned Public Prosecutor assisted by the counsel for the accused respondent No.2 while opposing the aforementioned submissions made on behalf of the complainant petitioner submits that the learned trial Court after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and after considering the evidence placed on record before it, has rightly passed the impugned judgment of acquittal. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial court requires no interference of this Court. 10. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the complainant petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor and the counsel appearing for the accused respondent No.2 at bar, gone through the impugned judgment and scanned and scrutinized the entire material made available to the Court including the record of the case. 11. Upon a perusal of the impugned judgment, one discernible observation is that on the basis of the statements of the witnesses, no such evidence has been produced so as to suggest that the accident was caused by the jeep. In-fact, all the witnesses have clearly denied such suggestion and have further even more clearly stated that the accident was caused by one Ratanlal, by his motorcycle. PW-7-Ramesh, who had helped the deceased-victim at the time of the accident and had appeared as an eye-witness to the incident, during his examination, stated that the concerned jeep reached the location/spot of the accident after the accident had already taken place. Yet another pertinent observation is that the site map of the said location does not show a portrayal of Mool Chand Meena’s field anywhere around the accident location, however, during examination before the trial Court, Mool Chand himself appeared as PW-4 and deposed that Ratan caused the accident and hit his mother right by his field. Further during his cross-examination, Mool Chand stated that at the time of the accident, he was at his place and by the time he reached the spot, several other people had gathered around his mother and made her lie down near a well. Further during his cross-examination, Mool Chand stated that at the time of the accident, he was at his place and by the time he reached the spot, several other people had gathered around his mother and made her lie down near a well. Lastly, he testified that he did not, by his own eyes, see the accident occur and was instead told about the occurrence of the same by the villagers. At this stage, it is also pertinent to note that, on the site plan, the Investigating Officer has not shown the portrayal of a well anywhere around the location, so as to assert the existence of any such well, next to which Mool Chand’s mother was made to lie down in an unconscious state. Thus, as per the facts of the case to be taken into consideration, in line with the statements of the witnesses, it can be concluded that victim- Gyarsi’s house and Mool Chand’s well was located somewhere near the spot where the accident took place and furthermore, Gyarsi was actually coming from the other side of the road, where one other well was located. However, the Investigating Officer has made absolutely no portrayal of any such location in the site plan drafted by him. Site plan is one of the most important piece of evidence to be taken into consideration by the Courts in determining the guilt of the accused, especially in accident cases. Now as per the record of the case, the site plan shows blood spatter in the middle of the road, near the spot of occurrence of the accident. This raises a doubt as to the actual spot of occurrence of the accident. So far as observation made by the trial court in its judgment that the accused-respondent was going towards Datwas and the deceased-Gyarsi was going towards the other side, coming from the side of Datwas, meaning-thereby that the motorcycle was being driven on the other side of the road, opposite to which the deceased was said to have been walking. To this effect, the person sitting behind Ratanlal, i.e., Kalyan, in his statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C had stated that the deceased- Gyarsi out of nowhere jumped in front of their motorcycle, thereby causing the accident, which resultanted in causing injuries to himself and Ratanlal and which also resulted in Gyarsi’s death. 12. To this effect, the person sitting behind Ratanlal, i.e., Kalyan, in his statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C had stated that the deceased- Gyarsi out of nowhere jumped in front of their motorcycle, thereby causing the accident, which resultanted in causing injuries to himself and Ratanlal and which also resulted in Gyarsi’s death. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a multitude of cases including K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2024 INSC 642); Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 2024 INSC 258 ) has adjudicated on the scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 397 read with section 401 CrPC. The dictum as laid down is that revisional jurisdiction shall be exercised where the exercise of revisional power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the Subordinate Courts. The High Court, under statutory obligation, ought to be loath in interfering with the decision of the lower Court, merely on hypothesis, imagination and far-fetched reasons which in law amount to interdicting the trial against the accused person. Thus, self- restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice staring the Court in the face. It is thus trite law that Section 397 CrPC vests the Court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior Court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to only set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well founded error and hence it will not be appropriate for the Court to scrutinise an order, which upon the face of it is a token of careful consideration and appears to be in accordance with law. If we probe into the well established principles of criminal jurisprudence in regard to the law on revision in criminal cases, it emerges that revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous or there is no compliance with the provisions of law or the finding recorded is based on no evidence or the material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. The High Court should not unduly interfere. 13. The Court is of the considered view that the learned trial court has not committed any material irregularity or illegality in passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. 14. Accordingly, the criminal revision petition filed by the complainant petitioner is without any substance and accordingly stands dismissed. The impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.08.2006 passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate- Ist Class, Niwai, District Tonk in Original Criminal Case No. (473/2002) 162/2004, State vs. Ratan Lal is affirmed. 15. The Registry is directed to send back the record of the case to the trial court forthwith.