JUDGMENT : (A.S. SUPEHIA, J.) 1. With the consent of the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties, the Letters Patent Appeal is taken up for final hearing today. ADMIT. Learned advocate Mr.K.B. Pujara, waives service of admission on behalf of the respondent. 2. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.12.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition, while setting aside the order of termination, has directed the appellants to reinstate the petitioner forthwith as if no order of termination was ever passed. Liberty is also reserved by the learned Single Judge in favour of the appellants to initiate appropriate inquiry proceedings in case they desire. BRIEF FACTS: 3. The brief facts, which are established from the record, are that the State authority issued an advertisement dated 20.01.2021 through the Gujarat Subordinate Services Selection Board for filling up 18 posts of Havaldar Instructor, Class- III in Home Guards Organization, which falls under the State Home Department. The respondent accordingly applied for the said post and after undergoing the selection process, he was placed at Serial No.1 in the merit list. Accordingly, an appointment order dated 05.11.2023 was issued by the Office of the Director General Civil Defence, Commandant General, Home Guards and he was appointed as a Havaldar Instructor, Class-III on a fixed pay of Rs.26,000/- for a period of five years on contractual period with a relaxation inter alia stating that though he is having the LMV license, he would not be driving the Government vehicle for two years since he does not possess two years driving experience. 4. Before the respondent could hold the charge, his appointment order was cancelled by the order dated 08.11.2023 passed by the Office of the Director General Civil Defence and Commandant General Home Guards on the ground that he does not possess the requisite driving experience of two years. 5. Being aggrieved by such action, the respondent filed the captioned writ petition seeking quashing and setting aside of the impugned order of cancellation of his appointment. 5. Being aggrieved by such action, the respondent filed the captioned writ petition seeking quashing and setting aside of the impugned order of cancellation of his appointment. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition by holding that “Whether the termination order can be said to be stigmatic or not, is not a question raised in the writ petition and the question is that once right is created in favour of an employee and though he is a probationer, whether such order can be recalled by cancelling the order on the ground that he does not possess the qualification once a conscious decision was taken to relax the experience and that also unilaterally ….”. It is held that the authority is supposed to hold either summary inquiry or full fledged inquiry before terminating the service of the petitioner. Ultimately, the learned Single Judge, by treating the cancellation of appointment as termination of service and also his contractual appointment for a period of five years on fixed pay as probation, has set aside the order of termination and directed the appellants to reinstate the petitioner in service reserving liberty in favour of the appellants to hold appropriate inquiry proceedings. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-STATE: 6. Learned Government Pleader Mr. Virk, at the outset, has submitted that when the State authority realized that the order is de hors the provision of law and Rules and also condition of the advertisement, a conscious decision was taken by the authority to cancel the appointment of the respondent. He has referred to the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Classification and Recruitment (General)) Rules, 1967 and has submitted that there is no condition of providing any relaxation, except the age relaxation, and once there is a condition incorporated in the advertisement with regard to the possession of experience by a candidate of two years of driving after possessing the valid driving license, no relaxation was required to be granted in case of the present respondent. While referring to the Recruitment Rules of the Havaldar Instructor, Class III, Home Guards Organization, Recruitment Rules, 2008, more particularly, Clause (e) of Rule 3, it is submitted that the candidate has to possess a valid LMV driving license and should have two years experience as on the date of appointment, which the respondent was not holding. While referring to the Recruitment Rules of the Havaldar Instructor, Class III, Home Guards Organization, Recruitment Rules, 2008, more particularly, Clause (e) of Rule 3, it is submitted that the candidate has to possess a valid LMV driving license and should have two years experience as on the date of appointment, which the respondent was not holding. Further, it is submitted that a candidate, who does not fulfill the requisite qualification as directed in the advertisement and the Rules, and he is appointed, the authority can cancel his appointment by discharging him from service without affording any opportunity of hearing, as it would be an exercise in futility. 7. Learned Government Pleader has also referred to the check-list, which has been filled-in by the respondent for producing the documents as required. He has referred that in his check-list, the respondent has specifically, in column no.9, wherein, it is specified that where the candidate is having LMV (Pakka) License, he has endorsed it positively. He has also referred to the photocopy of the license, which is produced at page 67, which has been issued on 07.07.2020 and the validity is till 31.05.2039, however, it is submitted that same date of issue for LMV is shown as 17.04.2023. though he is having the LMV license, whereas the cut-off date for holding the requisite elibility for getting appointment is 01.02.2021 as per the advertisement. 8. He has also submitted that after the appointment of the respondent was cancelled, seven other persons, including the present respondent – original petitioner, filed a representation on 21.11.2023 seeking relaxation in the Rules and they also demanded that they should be treated similar to the respondent. 9. It is submitted that since the appointment of the respondent is void-ab-initio and nullity and de hors the Recruitment Rules and the clauses of advertisement, no further departmental inquiry or preliminary inquiry is required, as directed by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that the sole discretion is of the State Government to grant relaxation in recruitment process and the appointing authority cannot on its own incorporate such relaxation, that too at the stage of issuing appointment order. It is submitted that the sole discretion is of the State Government to grant relaxation in recruitment process and the appointing authority cannot on its own incorporate such relaxation, that too at the stage of issuing appointment order. Learned Government Pleader has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ankita Thakur and ors vs. H.P. Staff Selection Commission and Ors., 2023 SCC Online SC 1472 and it is urged that the present appeal may be allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge may be quashed and set aside. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT-EMPLOYEE : 10. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Mr.Pujara appearing for the respondent has urged that the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with as the same is precisely passed. While referring to the findings of the learned Single Judge, more particularly in paragraph no.8, it is submitted by learned advocate Mr. Pujara that the respondents authorities are either required to hold full-fledged inquiry or at least summary inquiry before terminating service of the petitioner. It is further urged by learned advocate Mr.Pujara that a bare minimum notice or hearing is also required. In support of his submission, learned advocate Mr. Pujara has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 2025(0) INSC 126 . 11. Learned advocate Mr.Pujara has also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakala Trivedi vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 3 S.C.C. 129 and has submitted that since the respondent was provisionally selected, a certain degree of reasonable expectation of the selection also comes into existence and hence, the appointing authority was within its rights to relax the condition of experience. It is submitted that the respondent was never appointed to do the job of a driver, whereas he has appointed on the post of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III and then such a minor lapse cannot result into his termination of services. It is submitted that the respondent was never appointed to do the job of a driver, whereas he has appointed on the post of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III and then such a minor lapse cannot result into his termination of services. Learned advocate Mr.Pujara has submitted that the appellants authority, which issued the appointment order upon verification of license of the respondent and upon realizing that the respondent is not possessing the requisite qualification, in its wisdom, has relaxed the condition and allowed the respondent to undertake the training and accordingly while he was undertaking the training, the impugned order was passed. Learned advocate Mr.Pujara has further pointed out the averments made in the writ petition, more particularly, paragraph no. 7.8 and has submitted that the appellants authority can still reinstate him in service and continue him by keeping the criterion of possessing the experience of driving LMV vehicle in abeyance. It is submitted that by now two years have passed and hence, the appellants may be directed to reinstate the respondent on service by relaxing his condition. Thus, it is urged that the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is validly passed, hence the same may not be interfered with as it is still open for the appellants to initiate appropriate proceedings after reinstating the respondent in the service. OPINION AND CONCLUSION: 12. The facts, as mentioned herein above, are not in dispute. After undergoing the selection process initiated vide advertisement dated 20.01.2021 for filling up 18 posts for Havaldar Instructor, Class-III, the respondent was appointed vide order dated 05.11.2023 on the said post on fixed monthly wages of Rs.26,000/- for a contractual period of 5 years with a condition that he would not be driving any Government vehicle for a period of two years, as he does not possess the requisite experience of two years after holding a LMV license. 13. At this stage, we may refer to the Recruitment Rules of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III. The State Government, vide Notification dated 07.10.2008, published the Rules of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III, Home Guards Organization, Recruitment Rules, 2008. Rule 3(e) of the said Rules reads thus: “3. 13. At this stage, we may refer to the Recruitment Rules of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III. The State Government, vide Notification dated 07.10.2008, published the Rules of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III, Home Guards Organization, Recruitment Rules, 2008. Rule 3(e) of the said Rules reads thus: “3. To be eligible for appointment by direct selection to the post mentioned in rule 2, a candidate shall : a. xxx b.xxx c.xxx d.xxx e. Possess valid light motor vehicle driving license and have about two years experience of driving as on the date of appointment.” 14. Thus, as per the Recruitment Rules of 2008, more particularly, clause (e) of Rule 3 for the appointment by direct selection to the post of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III, the candidate has to possess the valid LMV driving license and must have two years of experience on the date of appointment. We may also refer to the Clause 4(1) of the advertisement, which also incorporates same condition. Unquestionably, the respondent herein does not possess the requisite qualification as required by the statutory Recruitment Rules and as per the clause of the advertisement, however he was offered the appointment by relaxing such condition. When the authority realized that a mistake has been committed, within four days before the respondent could hold the charge of Havaldar Instructor, Class-III, an order dated 08.11.2023 has been passed by the Commandant General Home Guards, State of Gujarat cancelling his appointment on the ground that he is not possessing the requisite qualification as mandated by the Recruitment Rules and the advertisement. 15. Learned Single Judge has set aside the aforesaid order by holding that the respondents were at least required to hold a regular departmental inquiry or minimum preliminary inquiry before cancelling the appointment of the petitioner and if the action of the appellant authorities is sustained, then no probationer would find his job to be safe as he will always find that the same authority, without any reason by citing a Rule or something, would cancel his appointment. The learned Single Judge is also impressed with the fact that a conscious decision was taken by the appellants authority in appointing the respondent by relaxing the criteria and hence, it was not open for them to “terminate” his services for want of the requisite qualification. 16. We do not agree with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge for the following reasons. 17. 16. We do not agree with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge for the following reasons. 17. It is an admitted position that the respondent has been appointed de hors the Recruitment Rules and also the requirement of the advertisement. The cut-off date provided in Clause 5(7) of the advertisement dated 21.01.2021 for fulfilling the requisite eligibility and suitability is 01.03.2021. The respondent procured his LMV License on 17.04.2023 beyond the cut-off date. As per the Recruitment Rules and the advertisement, he should possess 2 years’ experience on the date of his appointment. In the present case, the date of appointment order of the respondent is 05.11.2023. Despite such acknowledged facts, the respondent was offered the appointment by relaxing the statutory requirement. Realizing the mistake, his appointment order was cancelled after two days on 08.11.2023 by the appointing authority. It is also an admitted position that when his appointment was cancelled, the respondent was sent to training, and he was not holding the charge of Havaldar Instructor, Class III. A bare perusal of the impugned order cancelling the appointment of the respondent would reveal that there is no stigma attached to the cancellation of the appointment and the appointment of the respondent is cancelled on the premise of an undisputed fact that he was not holding the requisite eligibility of two years experience as mandated by the Recruitment Rules and as per the provision of the advertisement. Thus, the learned Single Judge has faltered in directing the appellants to hold either full-fledged departmental inquiry or preliminary inquiry before “terminating of the service” of the respondent. There is no need for holding either a full-fledged departmental inquiry or a minimum inquiry before cancelling the appointment order, when it is an admitted fact that the appointment order has been issued de hors the Recruitment Rules and the candidate has not yet taken charge on the post on which he is appointed. 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Dr.J. Shashidhara Prasad vs. Governor of Karnataka and Anr., (1999) 1 S.C.C. 422 where the appointment order of the candidate was cancelled before he was given the charge on the ground of suppressing of the criminal case. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as under: “9. 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Dr.J. Shashidhara Prasad vs. Governor of Karnataka and Anr., (1999) 1 S.C.C. 422 where the appointment order of the candidate was cancelled before he was given the charge on the ground of suppressing of the criminal case. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as under: “9. This ruling does not help the appellant in the present case as it is seen that the order of cancellation came long after the date specified in the order of appointment for the appellants to join their respective posts. In the present case the order of cancellation was passed the very next day, long before the date on which the appellant was to take charge as Vice Chancellor. 10.xxxxx 11. Mr. S Vijay Shankar, learned Advocate General of Karnataka appearing for respondent No.1 has placed reliance on the judgment in State of U.P. & Anr. v. Girish Bihari & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 362 . In that case the respondent was an IPS officer and was due to retire on superannuation on 31.3.96. An order was issued by the Governor on 20.3.1996 granting an extension of service for six months from 31.3.96. But on 23.3.1996, the order of extension was cancelled. The question was, whether the respondent therein was entitled to have an opportunity of hearing before the order of cancellation was made. The Court answered the question in negative. The Court answered the question in negative. The Court also referred to the judgment in Shrawan Kumar's case (supra) and observed thus: "A Division Bench of this Court comprising Kuldip Singh and K. Ramaswamy, JJ. observed that the candidates should have been given an opportunity of hearing before their appointments were cancelled. The court accordingly directed the Solicitor General to ask the Secretary (Education), Government of Bihar to grant an opportunity of hearing to the candidates and to give a finding as to whether they were validly appointed as Assistant Teacher. The Court also ordered that if anyone had actually worked as a Teacher, he or she would be entitled to the salary for that period. The Court also ordered that if anyone had actually worked as a Teacher, he or she would be entitled to the salary for that period. It is interesting to note that this Court while directing that a hearing be given to those appointed as Assistant Teachers did not grant any relief in terms of actual appointment in pursuance to the appointment letters, Nor did the Court order for any pecuniary benefits being given to those appellants pursuant to the appointment letters. Salary, etc. were ordered to be paid only in case any one of those candidates had actually joined and worked." 12. The Court held that till the order of extension of service could become operative no right under the order had vested in the incumbent and it was therefore, not necessary to grant him hearing before the extension order was cancelled. The Court also pointed out that the respondent therein may or may not have accepted the offer and till the order came into force, no vested right could have arisen. Consequently, the Court held that no opportunity was required to be given to the incumbent before cancelling the said order. The principles laid down in the aforesaid two cases will certainly apply in the present case and in our opinion, there was no necessity for giving an opportunity to the appellant before the chancellor passed the order dated 21.8.97 rescinding the earlier order dated 20.8.97. 17. The next decision referred to is the judgment in C L Kapoor vs. Jagmohan & Ors. (1981)1 SCR 746 . Reliance was placed on the following passage in the judgment: "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non- observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. The non- observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." The aforesaid passage itself shows that the Court will refuse to issue a writ which will be futile even after there had been failure to observe the principles of natural justice. On the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that the chancellor has appointed the second respondent as Vice chancellor after cancelling the appointment of the appellant. It is also not disputed that the criminal case was pending against the appellant on the date on which the order of cancellation of the appellant was made.” The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case, wherein the appointment was cancelled on the next day, and the candidate was yet to take charge has held that there was no need of even granting any opportunity of hearing. It is held that Court can refuse to issue a writ which will be futile even after there had been failure to observe the principles of natural justice. 19. Subsequently, in the case of Union of India vs. Raghuwar Pal Singh, (2018) 15 S.C.C. 463 , after survey of various judgements, the Supreme Court has reiterated thus: “ 20 In the case of State of Manipur (supra), the appointment letters were cancelled on the ground that the same were issued without the knowledge of the department of the State. The Court after adverting to the reported decisions concluded that the candidates were not entitled to hold the posts and in a case of such nature, principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, particularly when the same would result in futility. It may be useful to advert to paragraph 22 of the reported decision, which reads thus: "22. The respondents, therefore, in our opinion, were not entitled to hold the posts. It may be useful to advert to paragraph 22 of the reported decision, which reads thus: "22. The respondents, therefore, in our opinion, were not entitled to hold the posts. In a case of this nature, where the facts are admitted, the principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, particularly when the same would result in futility. It is true that where appointments had been made by a competent authority or at least some steps have been taken in that behalf, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, in view of the decision of this Court in Murugayya Udayar." (emphasis supplied) 21 In paragraph 30 of the reported decision, the Court adverted to the exposition in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors., 1999(3) R.C.R (Civil) 652 : (1999) 6 SCC 237 which evolved the `useless formality' theory. It is apposite to reproduce paragraphs 30 to 32 of the reported judgment, which read thus: "30. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India this Court developed the "useless formality" theory stating: (SCC PP.246-47, para 22) "22. ... More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the `useless formality' theory in R.v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton by giving six reasons. (See also his article `Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary' 1991 PL, p.64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the 'useless formality theory' has been made much earlier in `Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the Court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. De Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a `real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their `discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., 1996(3) R.C.R (Civil) 565 : (1996) 5 SCC 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived." (emphasis in original) 31. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan it was held: (SCC p. 505, para5) "5. ... ... It is clear that if after the termination of services of the said Dr. K.C. Rakesh, the orders of appointment are issued, such orders are not valid. If such appointment orders are a nullity, the question of observance of principles of natural justice would not arise." 32. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6 SCC 311 it was stated : (SCC p.323, para 45) "Principles of natural justice, however, cannot be stretched too far. If such appointment orders are a nullity, the question of observance of principles of natural justice would not arise." 32. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6 SCC 311 it was stated : (SCC p.323, para 45) "Principles of natural justice, however, cannot be stretched too far. Their application may be subject to the provisions of a statute or statutory rule." (emphasis supplied) In the present case, the appointment letter was admittedly issued without the approval of the competent authority.” Thus, the Apex Court has reiterated that even in cases, where the candidates were appointed and were holding the posts, and their appointments were found to be illegal and is wake of admitted facts, the principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, particularly when the same would be an exercise in futility. In the present case, in view of the admitted facts, that the respondent is not holding the experience as required under the statutory rules, the issuing of show cause notice and hearing him would be an exercise in futility, and hence, the learned Single Judge ought not to have issued a writ which would be futile. 20. Learned advocate Mr. Pujara, in support his submissions to this issue, has placed reliance on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the issue of considering the validity of appointment of school teacher, who had undertaken a selection process and while examining the principle of bias which affected such selection process impacting the entire selection of teachers, the Apex Court, after survey of various judgments, has concluded thus: “V. CONCLUSION 68. The principle of audi alteram partem is the cornerstone of justice, ensuring that no person is condemned unheard. This principle transforms justice from a mere technical formality into a humane pursuit. It safeguards against arbitrary decision-making, and is needed more so in cases of unequal power dynamics55. 69. An allegation of bias, can only be proved if facts are established after giving an opportunity of hearing. This process requires a fair and transparent procedure in which the concerned parties are given an adequate opportunity to present their case. Such an opportunity allows the accused party or the affected individuals to respond to the allegations, provide evidence, and clarify any misgivings regarding the decision-making process. This process requires a fair and transparent procedure in which the concerned parties are given an adequate opportunity to present their case. Such an opportunity allows the accused party or the affected individuals to respond to the allegations, provide evidence, and clarify any misgivings regarding the decision-making process. Therefore, for an allegation of bias to be proved, it is imperative that the procedural safeguards of a fair hearing are observed allowing for establishment of the relevant facts.” 21. There cannot be a cavil on the proposition of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, however the said observations and directions cannot apply in the facts of the present case, as in the present case there is no issue of bias and the cancellation of appointment of the respondent is also not stigmatic. Before the respondent was assigned the charge of the post, the appointment has been cancelled immediately within the span of four days. The learned Single Judge has thus fell in error by setting aside the cancellation of the appointment of the respondent by recording that either a full-fleged departmental inquiry or preliminary inquiry was required to be needed since the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the nature and cancellation of the appointment order. The learned Single Judge was required to consider that the appointing authority, which issued the appointment order, has failed to observe the Recruitment Rules, and there is no power of relaxation conferred either in the Rules or in the advertisement. We do not find that such power is extended on the appointing authority by any Rules which can provide relaxation, de hors the Recruitment Rules and the clauses of the advertisement. Thus, the initial action of giving the relaxation of experience in case of the respondent was illegal and de hors the Recruitment Rules and hence, the subsequent action of canceling the appointment of the respondent cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary or perverse. 22. The reliance placed by learned advocate Mr. Pujara on the judgment in the case of Chandrakala Trivedi (supra will not rescue the respondent as the same would not apply to the facts of the case as the same pertains to equivalence of educational qualification. The Apex Court in the said decision has clarified that the view expressed therein is taken looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Apex Court in the said decision has clarified that the view expressed therein is taken looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. The request of learned advocate Mr.Pujara to reconsider and validate the appointment of the respondent at this stage, since he will be completing two years in April,2025 also does not merit acceptance, as the initial defect/illegality in the appointment cannot be cured subsequently on acquiring the requisite eligibility. Such an approach will be an anathema to the recruitment and the Recruitment Rules. A candidate, who is not fulfilling the requisite qualification/eligibility at the initial stage of selection, cannot be allowed to be continued in appointment by giving relaxation as the same will be detrimental to the interest of other candidates who had not participated in the recruitment process since they did not satisfy the eligibility. 23. Hence, the present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order dated 17.12.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and set aside. 24. In view of allowing the appeal, connected Civil Application also stands allowed. 25. At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Pujara has requested to stay the present judgment and order. However, in light of the aforesaid observations, we are not inclined to accede to his request.