JUDGMENT : (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.) The petitioners have filed the instant petition assailing the selection that was made way back in the year, 2004, as would be evident from the relief claimed in this petition which reads as under:- (i) That the selection and appointment of the ineligible candidates as per the Inquiry Report, who were wrongly and illegally selected to the post of Transport Multi- Purpose Assistants (Conductors) made in the year 2004 by the respondents, may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondents No. 1 & 2 may kindly be directed to give appointment to the petitioners to the post of Transport Multi Purpose Assistant (Conductor) from the due date with all consequential benefits. or In the alternative, the respondents No. 1 & 2 may kindly be directed to give appointment to the petitioners on priority basis against the vacancies of Conductors to be published by the respondents in near future without subjecting the petitioner to face the interview and written examination by granting special relaxation in the age limit, because the petitioners had already qualified the written examination in the year 2003-2004 and thereafter, they were interviewed by the respondent-Corporation, but in order to give the benefit to their near and dear and by adopting the policy of pick & choose, their merit and candidature has been ignored and they were deprived from the appointment. 2. The instant petition has been filed on 26.08.2019, meaning thereby, after an inordinate delay of 15 years. 3. It is more than settled that if a person wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the court at the earliest reasonable possible opportunity. An inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ would indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claim and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of a third party have accrued in the meantime. 4. On the aspect of delay and laches and they reflect on writ proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Mrinmoy Matty vs. Chhanda Koley and others, AIR 2024 SC 2717 , reiterated the legal position thus:- 9. 4. On the aspect of delay and laches and they reflect on writ proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Mrinmoy Matty vs. Chhanda Koley and others, AIR 2024 SC 2717 , reiterated the legal position thus:- 9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [ (1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969 ] ). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 ] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 ] ). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan and another, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in L indsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239 ) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [ (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ] . Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 ] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [ (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 ] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 5. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 5. Having regard to the settled principle of law enunciated here-in-above, when we turn our attention to the facts on hand, it would no longer detain us for too long for coming to the conclusion that the petition is barred by delay and laches, as the petitioners have approached this Court after an inordinate delay of 15 years, that too, without there being any explanation whatsoever for such delay. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners would argue that since the petitioners were unaware of certain proceedings that had been initiated by the Vigilance Department against respondent No. 2 and upon learning of the same, they had promptly filed this petition, which only came to their notice in the year, 2019, therefore, there is no delay whatsoever. 7. However, we are not impressed by such arguments, firstly for the reasons that if at all the petitioners felt that there was malpractice or irregularity in the selection process, they ought not have waited for other people or authority to take action against such illegality, but ought to have moved the Court / Tribunal themselves, knowing fully well that someone else was not going to fight their battle, given the fact that in those proceedings, the authority or court could at best have held the selection process to be vitiated, but what the petitioners are seeking is their appointments, which relief could not have been granted in those proceedings. 8. That apart, the petitioners are otherwise guilty of suppressio veri and suppressio falsi, as they have on afÏdavit categorically stated in para 23 as under:- “23. That the petitioners have not filed any other petition on the same and similar grounds in any other Court of law including the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.” 9. This averment is false to the very knowledge of the petitioners because alongwith the petition they themselves annexed a copy of the complaint filed by them against the ofÏcial-respondents under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. wherein verbatim allegations have been set out against the ofÏcial respondents. 10. This averment is false to the very knowledge of the petitioners because alongwith the petition they themselves annexed a copy of the complaint filed by them against the ofÏcial-respondents under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. wherein verbatim allegations have been set out against the ofÏcial respondents. 10. Interestingly, this complaint is dated 24.01.2017 and cognizance thereof stands taken by the Court on 03.02.2017. This goes to indicate that: (i) the averment that the petitioners had not filed the same or similar petition is false; (ii) the arguments that the petitioners had acquired knowledge about the so called irregularity in the year, 2019 and thereafter promptly filed the petition is also a blatant lie. 11. It is more than settled that one must approach the Court with clean hand, clean mind, clean heart and a clean objective. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay and laches, without examining the merits of the case. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.