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2025 DIGILAW 340 (RAJ)

C. K. Shah v. State

2025-02-13

FARJAND ALI

body2025
ORDER : (FARJAND ALI, J.) 1. By way of filing this instant Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.10.2015 passed by learned Additional Judicial Magistrate No.1, Bikaner, in Criminal Case No. 340/2005 (State vs. C.K. Shah), whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate has ordered the framing of charges against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B of the IPC. 2. Brief facts of the present case is that the petitioner, Dr. C.K.Shah, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the complainant, Shri L.C. Gaur, Secretary of the Indian Health and Paramedical Research Centre (IHPRC), for the establishment of a paramedical training center at Jaipur. Pursuant to the agreement, an advertisement was published inviting student applications, and a sum of Rs.2,02,000/- was remitted to the petitioner. However, grievances arose when students alleged inadequate training facilities, leading to complaints against the petitioner. Consequently, an FIR was registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC. 3. The petitioner, in his defense, contended that training had commenced, but subsequent financial support from the complainant was withheld. Furthermore, a notification issued by the Director, Medical & Health Department, Jaipur, questioned the legitimacy of IHPRC’s advertisements, leading to directions against fresh admissions. The petitioner, upon clarification from AICTE, discovered that IHPRC was not authorized to admit fresh students. As a result, he refunded the caution money to students and ceased operations. Consumer complaints followed, wherein the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum exonerated the petitioner while holding the complainant liable for misleading advertisements. The complainant’s appeals before the State and National Consumer Commissions were dismissed. 4. Additionally, a civil suit for recovery was instituted by IHPRC, which was dismissed, along with the petitioner’s counterclaim, by the civil court. The court recorded findings that the training center operated for two months but found no evidence substantiating further claims. Despite these judicial determinations, the trial court proceeded to frame charges against the petitioner, prompting the present petition. 5. Heard the learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on the record. 6. After hearing the learned counsels for both parties and perusing the material on record, this Court deems it appropriate to consider the legality and propriety of the impugned order dated 27.10.2015 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate No.1, Bikaner. 5. Heard the learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on the record. 6. After hearing the learned counsels for both parties and perusing the material on record, this Court deems it appropriate to consider the legality and propriety of the impugned order dated 27.10.2015 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate No.1, Bikaner. The primary contention of the petitioner is that despite multiple judicial forums, including consumer forums and civil courts, exonerating him and holding the complainant liable, the trial court has proceeded to frame charges without appreciating the findings of those judicial bodies. 7. The framing of charges is a significant stage in criminal proceedings. At this juncture, the court must form a prima facie opinion regarding the existence of sufficient material to presume the accused’s involvement in the alleged offence.While the standard for framing charges is not equivalent to that of conviction, the court must still apply its judicial mind to the material available. 8. In the present case, the trial court, while framing charges against the petitioner, appears to have overlooked crucial aspects of the matter, particularly the findings of other judicial bodies. The consumer forums, after a detailed examination, exonerated the petitioner and held the complainant responsible for misleading advertisements. Additionally, the civil court also dismissed IHPRC’s recovery suit. These findings raise serious concerns about whether the essential ingredients of Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC are made out against the petitioner. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal [ (2000) 1 SCC 722 ] laid down crucial principles regarding the framing of charges. The Court held that while an order discharging an accused must be supported by reasons, an order framing charges does not require detailed reasoning. However, this does not absolve the trial court of its duty to consider whether a prima facie case exists. 10. In the Kanti Bhadra Shah case, the Supreme Court observed: We wish to point out that if the trial court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. 10. In the Kanti Bhadra Shah case, the Supreme Court observed: We wish to point out that if the trial court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of charge itself is prima facie order that the trial judge has formed the opinion, upon consideration of the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. Chapter XIX deals with provisions for trial of warrant cases instituted on police report. Section239 reads thus : "239. When accused shall be discharged. - (1) If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate con-siders the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing." The said Section shows that the Magistrate is obliged to record his reasons if he decides to discharge the accused. The next section (Section240) reads thus : "240, Framing of charge - (1) If, upon such consideration, examina-tion, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried." It is pertinent to note that this section required a Magistrate to record his reasons for discharging the accused but there is no such requirement if he forms the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence which he is competent to try. In such a situation he is only required to frame a charge in writing against the accused. Even in cases instituted otherwise than on police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. In such a situation he is only required to frame a charge in writing against the accused. Even in cases instituted otherwise than on police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. This is clear from Section 245. As per first sub- section of Section 245, if a magistrate, after taking all the evidence considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge the accused. As per sub- section (2) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless. Under both sub-sections he is obliged to record his reasons for doing so. In this context it is pertinent to point out that even in a trial before a court of session, the judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused. (vide Section 227 of the Code). But if he is to frame the charge he may do so without recording his reasons for showing why he framed the charge. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stage in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the Court should avoid expressing one way or other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the Court should avoid expressing one way or other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. In the present case as the Metropolitan Magistrate has chosen to frame the charge, the High Court, when moved by the accused for quash-ment of the charge, could have re-examined the records to consider whether the charge framed was sustainable or not. If the High Court decides to quash the charge it is open to the High Court to record the reasons thereof. The present order of the High Court is one of setting aside the charge without stating any reason. But the direction to the Magistrate to consider the materials once again and then to frame a charge for the same offence (if the Magistrate reaches the opinion that there is ground for presuming the commission of offence) is simply to repeat what the Metropolitan Magistrate had done once at the first instance. To ask him to do the same thing over again is adding an unnecessary extra work on the trial court. Be that as it may, the State has not challenged the order of the High Court. Hence we are not in a position to set aside the impugned order of the High Court. We leave the order as such by making the aforestated observations. We leave it to the Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise his functions under Section 239 or 240 of the Code as he deems fit in the light of the observations made above. In the case above, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed that Section 239-240 of the Cr.P.C. require a Magistrate to record his reasons for discharging the accused but there is no such requirement if he forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which he is competent to try and in such situation, he is only required to frame charge in writing against the accused. 11. The observations of the Supreme Court emphasize that while an elaborate order may not be required for framing charges, there must be an indication that the Magistrate has perused the charge sheet and accompanying documents to form an independent opinion. 12. 11. The observations of the Supreme Court emphasize that while an elaborate order may not be required for framing charges, there must be an indication that the Magistrate has perused the charge sheet and accompanying documents to form an independent opinion. 12. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate has neither discussed the factual background nor indicated why he finds it appropriate to frame charges against the petitioner. The impugned order lacks any reasoning as to how the elements of cheating, forgery, or criminal conspiracy are made out against the petitioner, especially in light of the findings of the consumer forums and civil courts. 13. The Supreme Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah further observed that while a detailed order is not required at the stage of framing charges, the High Court, while reviewing such an order, must assess whether the material on record indeed supports the charges. If it does not, the High Court has the power to quash the charges to prevent an unnecessary trial. 14. This Court also feels that the petitioner should be heard and his submission should be considered by the learned Magistrate before passing an order on the question of framing charge and admittedly, it is not done in this case and to this aspect of the matter, there is a force in the petition. 15. Accordingly, the instant Misc. Petition is disposed of. The order dated 27.10.2015 passed by learned Additional Judicial Magistrate No.1, Bikaner, in Criminal Case No. 340/2005 is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned trial Court with a direction to hear the parties afresh on the question of charge and then pass a reasoned and speaking order. 16. The stay petition stands disposed of.