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2025 DIGILAW 341 (RAJ)

Rini Tripathi v. State of Rajasthan

2025-02-13

FARJAND ALI

body2025
ORDER : (FARJAND ALI, J.) 1. These two Misc. Petitions have been preferred before this Court i.e. one by the wife and other by the husband challenging the order framing charges by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur in Criminal Case No.135/2021 and making alteration to some extent by the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur vide order dated 14.05.2024 passed in Revisions No.56/2023 & 57/2023. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner wife Smt. Rini Tripathi was married to respondent Shivendra Prasad Tiwari on 02.01.2012. ON 17.05.2019, a report No.213/2019 was lodged at the instance of the wife alleging inter alia that she was married to Shivendra Prasad on 02.01.2012. There was demand of hefty dowry by the inlaws. After some time of marriage, she was forced to not remain in contact with her parents and she agreed until 27.05.2018. she was continued to be pressurized to convey her parents for sale of their house and divide the share of 50% sale money to him, to which, she was not agreeable and upon which she was subjected to cruelty on multiple occasions. The FIR speaks about mental and physical cruelty. A specific incident dated 19.05.2019 is mentioned in the FIR, as per which, she was given beatings and whereafter assaulted by a knife, as a consequence of which, she got cuts on her hands. On another incident in which after exchange of hot arguments, the accused-husband hold neck of his wife and pushed her down from the bed. The allegations of the FIR were investigated. The knife used in the incident alleged, was also produced before the police which was seized by the police. A foot-note of the FIR speaks about reflection of injuries on her body for which medical reports were prepared. After investigation, charge-sheet for offence under Sections 498- A, 406 and 323 of the IPC was filed. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence an whereafter, heard the parties on the question of framing of charges. Vide order dated 23.05.2023, the learned Magistrate passed a detailed order whereby the accused- husband was discharged from the offence under Section 406 of the IPC and he was directed to be prosecuted for offfence under Section 498-A, 323 & 324 of the IPC. 2.1. Vide order dated 23.05.2023, the learned Magistrate passed a detailed order whereby the accused- husband was discharged from the offence under Section 406 of the IPC and he was directed to be prosecuted for offfence under Section 498-A, 323 & 324 of the IPC. 2.1. The order framing charges was challenged by way of filing a revision petitions by both the parties before the Court of Sessions. After hearing the parties, both the petitions were disposed of vide order dated 14.05.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge whereby, the charge framed against the accused-husband under Section 498-A IPC was quashed and set aside while order framing charges under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC was affirmed. The learned Court of revision allowed in part the revision petition filed on behalf of wife by setting aside the order of discharging the husband under Section 406 of the IPC. As on now, after passing of both the orders, the accused-husband is to be tried for offence under Sections 323, 324 and 406 of the IPC. 3. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced by both the parties and gone through the niceties of the matter. 4. It is nigh well settled principals of law that at the time of hearing on the question of charge, the meticulous appreciation of evidence is not required rather only it is to see as to whether there is sufficient material available or not to force the accused to face the course of trial. 5. Section 240 of the Cr.P.C. ensures that the accused is properly informed regarding charges leveled against him and at the same time, it protects the right of a fair trial. This stage allows the Court to assess whether there is sufficient material or not to proceed for the trial. It is imperative upon the learned Magistrate to consider, examine the material and hear the parties and then decide if sufficient material is available on record to presume that the accused had committed an offence and for which he should be tried. In the case of Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2000 SC 522 , the law in this regard has very well and aptly been enunciated and expounded and this Court is guided by the proposition made thereunder. In the case of Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2000 SC 522 , the law in this regard has very well and aptly been enunciated and expounded and this Court is guided by the proposition made thereunder. For the ready reference, the relevant part of the judgment is being reproduced hereunder:- We wish to point out that if the trial court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of charge itself is prima facie order that the trial judge has formed the opinion, upon consideration of the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. Chapter XIX deals with provisions for trial of warrant cases instituted on police report. Section-239 reads thus : "239. When accused shall be discharged. - (1) If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate con-siders the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing." The said Section shows that the Magistrate is obliged to record his reasons if he decides to discharge the accused. The next section (Section240) reads thus : "240, Framing of charge - (1) If, upon such consideration, examina-tion, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried." It is pertinent to note that this section required a Magistrate to record his reasons for discharging the accused but there is no such requirement if he forms the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence which he is competent to try. In such a situation he is only required to frame a charge in writing against the accused. Even in cases instituted otherwise than on police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. This is clear from Section 245. As per first sub-section of Section 245, if a magistrate, after taking all the evidence considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge the accused. As per sub- section (2) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless. Under both sub-sections he is obliged to record his reasons for doing so. In this context it is pertinent to point out that even in a trial before a court of session, the judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused. (vide Section 227 of the Code). But if he is to frame the charge he may do so without recording his reasons for showing why he framed the charge. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stage in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the Court should avoid expressing one way or other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. In the present case as the Metropolitan Magistrate has chosen to frame the charge, the High Court, when moved by the accused for quash-ment of the charge, could have re-examined the records to consider whether the charge framed was sustainable or not. If the High Court decides to quash the charge it is open to the High Court to record the reasons thereof. The present order of the High Court is one of setting aside the charge without stating any reason. But the direction to the Magistrate to consider the materials once again and then to frame a charge for the same offence (if the Magistrate reaches the opinion that there is ground for presuming the commission of offence) is simply to repeat what the Metropolitan Magistrate had done once at the first instance. To ask him to do the same thing over again is adding an unnecessary extra work on the trial court. Be that as it may, the State has not challenged the order of the High Court. Hence we are not in a position to set aside the impugned order of the High Court. We leave the order as such by making the aforestated observations. We leave it to the Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise his functions under Section 239 or 240 of the Code as he deems Fa in the light of the observations made above. Hence we are not in a position to set aside the impugned order of the High Court. We leave the order as such by making the aforestated observations. We leave it to the Metropolitan Magistrate to exercise his functions under Section 239 or 240 of the Code as he deems Fa in the light of the observations made above. In the case above, Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed that Section 239-240 of the Cr.P.C. require a Magistrate to record his reasons for discharging the accused but there is no such requirement if he forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which he is competent to try and in such situation, he is only required to frame charge in writing against the accused. 6. Here in the case at hand, there are allegations of harassment and maltreatment to a wife in matrimony and thus prima facie sufficient material is there to frame charges under Section 498-A of the IPC and in my opinion, the learned Sessions Judge has committed an error of law in discharging the accused-husband from offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate had given sufficient reasons for framing charges against the respondent under Section 498-A of the IPC and, therefore, there was no reason for the learned Sessions Judge to make interference in it. 7. The offence under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC are very much evident in light of the material available on record thus to this extent, both the orders impugned passed by the Court of first instance and the Court of revision are hereby affirmed. 8. The learned trial Court had not framed charges under Section 406 of the IPC which was set aside by the learned Court of revision. After scanning the allegations levelled in the FIR and her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., it is revealing that sufficient material is there to frame charges against the petitioner for offence under Section 406 of the IPC which deals with the punishment of criminal breach of trust. To invoke the offence above, there has to be some evidence in clear terms regarding entrustment of the property. Criminal breach of trust makes out when someone dishonestly misuses the property or convert it for his own purpose which was entrusted to him. To invoke the offence above, there has to be some evidence in clear terms regarding entrustment of the property. Criminal breach of trust makes out when someone dishonestly misuses the property or convert it for his own purpose which was entrusted to him. There is no whisper either in the FIR or in her statement that any property was entrusted to the husband which was denied by him when demanded by the wife. In the contrast, the FIR speaks about wedding of the parties against the wishes of bride’s parents thus, the allegations of dowry or entrustment of property is not verifying from the material. 9. In view of the discussion made herein above, this Court disposed of the instant Misc. Petitions with a direction to the learned trial Court to frame charges afresh against the husband- respondent for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 324 of the IPC. The respondent-husband is discharged from offence under Section 406 of the IPC. The order dated 14.05.2021 passed by the learned Court of Sessions whereby the learned Judge has reversed the order passed by the learned Magistrate in respect of Section 406 of the IPC whereby the respondent-husband was discharged from the said offence, is set aside to this extent. 10. The stay petitions stand disposed of.