JUDGMENT 1. I.A. No.3701/24 has been filed by appellant-Corporation under section 5 of Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay of 5258 days in filing this appeal. 2. The judgment & decree questioned in this appeal was passed by learned First Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Suit No.41-A of 2008 on 17.9.2009 whereby the suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by respondents/plaintiffs was decreed. The instant appeal has been filed on 24.5.2024 i.e. after more than fourteen and half years and seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the application under consideration is filed. 3. For convenience, the parties in this order are referred as plaintiff and defendants as per their respective status in civil suit. 4. The facts in short giving rise to the instant litigation are that the plaintiff- Mohanlal Saraf Memorial Charitable Trust, Murar, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trust’) is a private charitable trust. The object of constitution of Trust is to provide medical facilities to public in general. As per the plaintiff’s case, the suit property situated on part of Survey No.2916 bearing House No.23/188, Mall Road, Murar, was initially owned and possessed by Madhya Bharatiya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Bhopal and the Trust has obtained the same on lease for a period of 99 years vide registered lease deed, dated 14.9.1998. However, vide its resolution, dated 12.10.1999, the defendant Corporation held suit property to be Municipal/Government property. It is alleged by plaintiff that no notice was given to it before taking aforesaid action and it was asked to hand over possession of suit property. The declaration was, therefore, sought to the effect that the Trust is having lease hold rights acquired from Madhya Bhartiya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Bhopal. It also sought decree of confirmation of its possession over suit property and also for a decree of permanent injunction. 5. On summons being issued, the defendant No.1 & 2 (Government officials) and defendant No.3 (appellant Corporation) entered appearance through their respective lawyers. The case was adjourned several times for filing of written statement and reply to application for grant of temporary injunction by defendants. On 2.11.2006, the counsel for defendant Corporation stated that they don’t want to file reply to application for temporary injunction. However, later on, on 12.12.2006, reply to said application was filed, though written statement was not filed. The case was adjourned several times for filing of written statement and reply to application for grant of temporary injunction by defendants. On 2.11.2006, the counsel for defendant Corporation stated that they don’t want to file reply to application for temporary injunction. However, later on, on 12.12.2006, reply to said application was filed, though written statement was not filed. The defendant No.1 & 2 filed their written statement on 17.7.2007. After the plaintiff’s evidence was over, the case was fixed for defendants’ evidence. The defendant No.1 & 2 examined one witness in support of their case. However, no evidence was led by defendant Corporation even though several opportunities were granted for this purpose. Ultimately, on 7.9.2009, the defendant Corporation’s right to lead evidence was closed by the Court. The impugned judgment & decree was passed by learned trial Court on 17.9.2009. 6. It is thus seen that, even though it was continuously represented through its lawyer in the proceedings before learned trial Court, the defendant Corporation has not filed its written statement and/or led any evidence in support of its case. The instant appeal was filed on 24.5.2024 i.e. after the delay of 5258 days. The reason assigned in the application seeking condonation of delay is the traditional one i.e. its counsel did not inform about passing of impugned judgment & decree. It is stated in the application for condonation of delay that the Trust, for the first time, filed the application for mutation of its name on the basis of impugned judgment on 9.10.2023, alongwith a copy of order passed by this Court in W.P. No.13178 of 2023. Thus, as per the averments made in the application, the defendant Corporation acquired knowledge of impugned judgment & decree on 9.10.2023 and, thereafter, after obtaining legal opinion and completing other formalities, the instant appeal is filed on 24.5.2024. 7. The plaintiffs have filed reply to the application and have vehemently opposed the prayer for condonation of delay. It is stated in the reply that the averments made in the application for condonation of delay are factually incorrect inasmuch as the Trust had filed application for mutation of its name alongwith copy of impugned judgment & decree on 12.2.2013, (Annexure R/1). The application was submitted before the Additional Commissioner of the Corporation who made an endorsement on the application itself that action in the matter is desirable and legal opinion be sought. The application was submitted before the Additional Commissioner of the Corporation who made an endorsement on the application itself that action in the matter is desirable and legal opinion be sought. Another application, in the form of reminder, was submitted to Additional Commissioner on 6.3.2013 (Annexure R/2) wherein the respondents, referring to its earlier application, mentioned that it was advised to submit application in Janmitra Centre, however, the person sitting at Janmitra Centre refused to receive the application and asked them to go to T.C. The respondent when went to T.C., the person sitting therein also refused to receive the application. The respondent then served a legal notice to defendant Corporation on 21.10.2013 (Annexure R/3). 8. It was further stated in the reply that when no action was taken, the respondent Trust filed a writ petition (W.P. No.8190 of 2013) before this Court which was disposed of vide order, dated 29.11.2013, (Annexure R/4) directing the defendant Corporation to take a decision on the application filed by Trust. The copy of order passed by this Court was placed before Commissioner of Corporation vide Trust’s application, dated 27.12.2013, (Annexure R/5). The Deputy Commissioner vide letter, dated 27.12.2013, (Annexure R/6) asked the Trust to submit application/property tax receipt in Janmitra Centre No.9 so that application for mutation can be processed. 9. It is further stated that the Trust thereafter again submitted an application, dated 22.2.2023, (Annexure R/7) to Commissioner and requested for mutation of its name on the basis of judgment passed by trial Court. When nothing was done, it again approached this Court by filing W.P. No.13878/23 which came to be disposed of by this Court vide order, dated 1.7.2023, (Annexure R/8) directing the Corporation to take a decision on the Trust application. The order passed by this Court was placed before Commissioner vide application, dated 10.7.2023, (Annexure R/9). When nothing was done, a contempt petition (Conc. No.5565 of 2023) was filed of which copy was served to counsel for Corporation on 3.10.2023. The vakalatnama of Corporation’s lawyer was filed in contempt petition on 16.10.2023. As per application, it is on 9.10.2023, the defendant Corporation acquired knowledge of impugned judgment and decree and got filed the present appeal on 24.5.2024. 10. It is thus seen that from 9.10.2023 also when, admittedly the knowledge of impugned judgment & decree was acquired by Corporation, the appeal is not filed within prescribed period of limitation. As per application, it is on 9.10.2023, the defendant Corporation acquired knowledge of impugned judgment and decree and got filed the present appeal on 24.5.2024. 10. It is thus seen that from 9.10.2023 also when, admittedly the knowledge of impugned judgment & decree was acquired by Corporation, the appeal is not filed within prescribed period of limitation. The defendant has tried to justify this delay after 9.10.2023 by stating that it sought for legal opinion on 16.10.2023; file was sent for legal opinion to Corporation on 25.10.2023; on 5.3.2024, Computer Operator informed that only one contempt petition is pending relating to suit property; panel lawyer gave legal opinion (no date is mentioned); then again it is stated that file was sent to panel lawyer on 21.3.2024 for legal opinion; the application for obtaining certified copy of judgment & decree was made on 20.3.2024 and the same was supplied to it on 2.4.2024. It is stated that on 22.3.2024, legal opinion was given by panel lawyer to file first appeal; on 5.4.2024, the lawyer was instructed to file appeal and, thereafter instant appeal is filed on 24.5.2024. Even though reference to various correspondences is made in the application, copy of such correspondences is not filed. Thus, there is no justification for not filing the appeal immediately after the Corporation acquired knowledge about passing of judgment & decree on 9.10.2023. 11. The delay in filing appeal after 9.10.2023 may not have been fatal to defendant Corporation. However, the delay prior to 9.10.2023 is huge and inordinate which calls for valid and cogent explanation from the defendant Corporation. For the period from 17.9.2009 till 9.10.2023, the defendant has put entire blame upon its lawyer who handled the case for it before the trial Court. It is stated that the lawyer did not inform the Corporation about passing of impugned order. This explanation is not acceptable in view of recent pronouncement of apex Court in the case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. v. Ved Prakash reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3380 wherein the apex Court in para 10 held as under : “10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. v. Ved Prakash reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3380 wherein the apex Court in para 10 held as under : “10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the Court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.” 12. The apex Court while holding so, relied upon verdict of earlier judgment in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., reported in (1993)2 SCC 185 , wherein the apex Court held in para 8 as under : “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the Court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is not such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the Court is located. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the Court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head-office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit for final hewing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the Court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they 'chose to non-cooperate with the Court. Having adopted such a stand towards the Court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” 13. Similar view was taken by apex Court in the case of Nitin Mahadeo Jawale & Ors. v. Bhaskar Mahadeo Mutke reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3468 wherein, in para 6 to 8 apex Court held as under : “6. We have noticed over a period of time the growing tendency on the part of the litigants in throwing the entire blame on the head of the advocate. Not only this, we have come across cases where the concerned advocate has filed an affidavit in favour of his client (s) saying that he was unable to attend the proceedings due to some personal reasons difficulties thereby facilitating the litigant to get the delay condoned. 7. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. 8. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.” 14. 8. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.” 14. Similar view has been taken by apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. v. Mohan Lal reported in AIR 2024 SC 2404 . 15. In view of the aforesaid pronouncements, the Corporation cannot be allowed to shirk from its own responsibility by putting entire blame on its lawyer. It is not a case where the appellant is rustic villager. It is a Corporation manned by literate officials. The counsel for the respondent is right in submitting that the defendant Corporation has its legal department and OIC is appointed for each case. Therefore, it cannot be believed that for long 14 years, OIC did not enquire about status of the case from its lawyer. 16. From the documents filed by plaintiff alongwith its reply to the application, it is evident that it has placed the judgment & decree before the Corporation in the year 2013 and, therefore, the defendant Corporation cannot be allowed to say that the knowledge about the impugned judgment & decree is gathered only in October’ 2023 as has been alleged in application. Moreso, the applications were submitted by plaintiff before the Commissioner/Additional Commissioner/Dy. Commissioner of defendant Corporation who are supposed to be the responsible officers. In the year 2013 itself, the Additional Commissioner has made an endorsement on the application that action is desired and legal opinion be sought in the matter. Therefore, the ground that the lawyer did not inform about the impugned judgment & decree and that it came to know about the same in October’ 2023, is factually incorrect and is not acceptable. 17. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant Corporation relied upon judgments rendered by apex Court in the case of Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr. reported in (1981)2 SCC 788 wherein the matter was decided by High Court in absence of counsel and when the client came to know about the same, application for recall of the order was filed. In that context, the apex Court held that the party should not suffer for the act of its counsel. v. Munshilal & Anr. reported in (1981)2 SCC 788 wherein the matter was decided by High Court in absence of counsel and when the client came to know about the same, application for recall of the order was filed. In that context, the apex Court held that the party should not suffer for the act of its counsel. The apex Court in the case of Salil Dutta (supra), has already clarified this judgment and held that the reason so assigned is not universally accepted. Similar was the situation in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998)7 SCC 123 wherein the application for setting aside ex-parte decree was allowed after delay of 883 days holding that the counsel did not inform about the same. However, in the present case, the factum of passing of impugned judgment & decree came to the knowledge of defendant in 2013 itself and yet no action was taken. Therefore, the aforesaid judgments of apex Court do not help the defendant. The delay in the said cases was also not much as it is in the instant case. 18. Another judgment cited by defendant’s counsel is passed by this Court in the case of Mani Bai v. Avinash Jamidar & Ors. reported in 2005(4) MPLJ 232 , wherein the appeal was filed without an application for condonation of delay which was held to be a curable defect. The judgment is thus different on facts. 19. Yet another judgment cited by defendant’s counsel is rendered in the case of State of Karnataka v.Y. Moideen Kunhi (Dead) by Lrs & Ors. reported in (2009)13 SCC 192 wherein SLP was filed after the delay of 6500 days from original order passed in writ petition while there was delay of 300 days from the date of order passed in review petition. The judgment was rendered in peculiar facts of the case wherein more than 4000 acres of Government land, out of which 3500 acres was forest land, was involved and the delay was condoned in order to protect the public justice. However, in the case at hand there is no such public justice involved. The Corporation has not even filed written statement in suit and has also led no evidence in support of its cause. The State Government which had contested the suit has not filed any appeal. Thus, this judgment also does not help the defendant. However, in the case at hand there is no such public justice involved. The Corporation has not even filed written statement in suit and has also led no evidence in support of its cause. The State Government which had contested the suit has not filed any appeal. Thus, this judgment also does not help the defendant. 20. The defendant’s counsel also relied upon apex Court judgment in the case of Ram Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. Har Prasad & anr. reported in (2010)1 SCC 391 wherein application for restoration of writ petition was allowed on the ground that the petitioner’s counsel was appointed as Additional Advocate General and, therefore, could not appear when the case was called. The delay in filing the application was only about six months. This case is also different on facts. 21. In yet another case of Pyarelal v. State of M.P. & Ors. passed in C.R. No.146/06, cited by defendant’s counsel, this Court condoned the delay where State officials were held to have no knowledge about passing of decree and the appeal was filed as soon as they acquired knowledge about the same. Thus, this case is also different inasmuch as the defendant Corporation was having knowledge about passing of impugned judgment & decree in 2013 itself, but no action was taken. 22. The defendant’s counsel also placed reliance on apex Court judgment in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Lrs & ors. v. Union of India & anr. reported in (2023)10 SCC 531 , wherein the delay of 479 was there in filing appeal against the order passed by Reference Court under Land Acquisition Act. Holding the explanation sufficient, the apex Court declined to interfere with the order passed by High Court. In the same case, the apex Court observed that exercise of discretion to condone the delay must necessarily depend upon sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. 23. He also cited apex Court judgment in the case of Mool Chandra v. Union of India reported in (2025)1 SCC 625 wherein there was delay of 425 days in approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal. 23. He also cited apex Court judgment in the case of Mool Chandra v. Union of India reported in (2025)1 SCC 625 wherein there was delay of 425 days in approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal. This was also a case where the party concerned was found to have no knowledge about withdrawal of his application before Tribunal and on coming to know about the same, party filed another original application before Tribunal. The Court, having found sufficient cause, condoned the delay. 24. The defendant’s counsel also relied upon order passed by this Court in case of Anand Mohan v. Smt. Malti & ors. passed in W.P. No.40731/24, wherein also delay of about 19 years in challenging the order of mutation was condoned recording a finding that the concerned party was unaware about the mutation order. 25. Yet another apex Court judgment of Inder Singh v. State of M.P. reported in 2025(3) JLJ 36 = 2025 SCC Online SC 600, relied upon by defendant’s counsel was a case whereby the order of this Court, condoning the delay of 1537 in filing second appeal, was challenged before apex Court. It was found that out of 1537 days, most of the time was spent in pursuing review application before first appellate Court. Considering the fact that the defendant before the Court is State and not a private litigant and further the factum of involvement of public interest, the High Court decision to condone the delay was upheld by the apex Court. The Court found sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 26. Thus, in all the aforesaid cases relied upon by defendant’s counsel, the Court found the sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The common ratio laid down in all these cases is that it is not the length of delay that is required to be considered but it is the cause for delay which needs to be considered. If the cause for delay fall within four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of length of delay, same deserves to condoned”. Thus, no hard and fast formula is laid down and each case is required to be considered on facts of its own case while deciding the application for condonation of delay. 27. The learned counsel for respondents placed reliance upon apex Court judgment in the case of Postmaster General & ors. v. Living Media India Limited & anr. Thus, no hard and fast formula is laid down and each case is required to be considered on facts of its own case while deciding the application for condonation of delay. 27. The learned counsel for respondents placed reliance upon apex Court judgment in the case of Postmaster General & ors. v. Living Media India Limited & anr. reported in (2012)3 SCC 563 , Amalendu Kumar Bera & ors. v. State of W.B. reported in 2013(3) MPLJ 1 (SC), State of M.P. & ors. v. Bherulal reported in 2020(4) JLJ 315 = (2020)10 SCC 654 , Nitin Mahadeo Jawale & ors. v. Bhaskar Mahadeo Mutke reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3468, State of U.P. & anr. v. Mohan Lal reported in AIR 2024 SC 2404 , H.11 F.A.946/2024 Guruswamy & ors. v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs. reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 54 and the judgments of this Court in the case of State of M.P. & anr. v. Abdul Gani S/o Kasam Kunjda (since deceased) through L.H. Jebunisha wd/o Abdul Gani & ors. reported in 2014(3) MPLJ 265 , State of M.P. v. Ranjana Yogi reported in 2014(4) MPLJ 1 , State of M.P. v. Shrimant Tukojirao Panwar reported in 2015(3) MPLJ 705 , State of M.P. v. Himmat Singh & Ors. passed in S.A. No.1576/20 and State of M.P. & anr. v. Gudabai & ors. passed in S.A. No.378/22. The proposition of law laid down in all these cases is common, therefore, all the cases are not required to be referred in detail. However, some of the cases may be referred on principle of law. 28. In the case of Bherulal (supra), the apex Court, while dealing with a prayer for condoning delay of 663 days, held in para 2 & 6 as under : “2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counseling to Government and Government authorities have fallen on deaf ears i.e., the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the Government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the Legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for Government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. We have raised the issue that if the Government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the Legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for Government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the Statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the Statues prescribed. 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.” 29. From the facts of the present case also it appears that the instant appeal has been filed only to complete the formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default. It only wants a certificate from this Court that the Corporation did everything from its side. 30. There is a slight departure from the normal rule that length of delay is not material. In the case of H. Guruswamy (supra), the apex Court was considering prayer for condonation of delay of 2200 days in filing application under Order 9 rule 13 CPC. The apex Court held in para 16 & 17 as under : “16. 30. There is a slight departure from the normal rule that length of delay is not material. In the case of H. Guruswamy (supra), the apex Court was considering prayer for condonation of delay of 2200 days in filing application under Order 9 rule 13 CPC. The apex Court held in para 16 & 17 as under : “16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No Court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.” 31. Thus, from the judgments relied upon by counsel for respondents, it is gathered that, even when the appellant before the Court is State Government, the delay was not condoned holding that the law of limitation does not differentiate between private litigant and the Government. Further, when the delay is inordinate, it is definitely a relevant aspect to be considered. Thus, from the judgments relied upon by counsel for respondents, it is gathered that, even when the appellant before the Court is State Government, the delay was not condoned holding that the law of limitation does not differentiate between private litigant and the Government. Further, when the delay is inordinate, it is definitely a relevant aspect to be considered. A lenient approach may be adopted where the delay is less and reasonable, however, when delay is inordinate, the explanation for the same needs to be sufficient for its condonation. 32. The learned counsel for defendant submitted that this Court should adopt lenient approach while considering his prayer for condonation of delay on the ground that valuable land belonging to Municipal Corporation is involved. In order to prima facie see this claim of defendant Corporation, this Court has gone through the records of civil suit and has found that the defendant Corporation has failed to bring on record any material to even prima facie justify its claim over the suit property. Further, the document marked as Ex. P/4 to P/6 shows that the premises was earlier let out by Madhya Bhartiya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha to State Government to run a Government School. Even the State Government has failed to bring any record to show that the land in question is a Government land. It has not even challenged the judgment & decree passed by learned trial Court. Thus, the defendant Corporation has even prima facie failed to establish its claim over suit property and to show that any public interest is involved in the matter. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no ground is made out for condoning the huge and unexplained delay of 5258 days in filing the instant appeal. The explanation offered by defendant Corporation is held to be incorrect and unacceptable. The I.A. No.3701/24 is, therefore, rejected. Consequently, the instant first appeal is also dismissed as barred by limitation. 34. This is a case where the appellant Corporation has been highly negligent in prosecuting the instant case. As per the submission of its counsel, the suit property is a valuable property of Corporation. If that be so, it needs to be enquired into as to : i. why the written statement alongwith relevant documents, was not filed before the trial Court in support of its case? ii. why the Corporation failed to lead evidence in the suit? As per the submission of its counsel, the suit property is a valuable property of Corporation. If that be so, it needs to be enquired into as to : i. why the written statement alongwith relevant documents, was not filed before the trial Court in support of its case? ii. why the Corporation failed to lead evidence in the suit? iii. Further, when the impugned judgment and decree was brought to the knowledge of Additional Commissioner on 12.2.20213 (Annexure R/1) and the Additional Commissioner made an endorsement on the application itself that the action is desired in the matter and legal opinion be obtained, why no steps were immediately taken for filing of instant appeal? 35. Let a copy of this order be sent by Registry of this Court to Principal Secretary, Urban Administration & Development Department, Bhopal, for his information and necessary action in the matter.