Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 344 (KAR)

N. Vishwanath, Son of Sri. Narappa v. State of Karnataka, By Revenue Department

2025-06-11

E.S.INDIRESH

body2025
ORDER : E.S. Indiresh, J. In this writ petition, the petitioners are assailing the order dated 12.01.2021 in RRT(2)(E)CR.24/2015-16 (Annexure-A) passed by respondent No.2, wherein the grant of land made in favour of one Nanjamma, W/o. Dasaraju and one Kamalamma, W/o. N. Ramanna were cancelled and land in question was resumed to Government. 2. Facts in nutshell for adjudication of this writ petition are that, the land bearing Sy.No. 34 of Kada Agrahara Village, Hoskete Taluk, in all measuring, 12 acres, has been unauthorized occupied by one Smt. Nanjamma W/o. Dasaraju and Smt. Kamalamma, W/o. Ramanna. In view of the permission granted by the Government, 06 acres of land in Sy.No.34 Kada Agrahara village was granted to Smt. Kamalamma on 14.1.19621 and remaining six acres was granted in favour of Nanjamma on 11.06.1962 as per the Grant Certificate produced at Annexures-C and D respectively. Pursuant to the same, original grantees have paid the relevant Kimmat to the land in question as per Annexure-E. It also stated that, the Smt Nanjamma has sold entire extent of six acres of land in favour of one Sri. Mastan and others vide registered Sale Deed dated 19.02.1963 (Annexure-F). Similarly Smt. Kamalamma, has sold entire extent of land to one Sri.Pachasabi as per the registered Sale Deed dated 29.09.1965 (Annexure-G). It is the case of the petitioners that, Sy No. 34 in all measuring 40 acres. Wherein the grandfather of the petitioners- Lakshmaiah, as per registered Sale Deed dated 12.09.1967, has purchased the said land to the extent of 40 acres, including the 12 acres, belonging to Mastan and others and Pachasabi as per the registered Sale Deed dated 12.09.1967 (Annexure-H). In the meanwhile, the grandfather of the petitioners-Lakshmaiah, died on 03.07.1978 and thereafter, a registered Partition Deed dated 31.03.2005 (Annexure-J), was effected between the joint family members of the grandfather of the petitioners and thereafter, khata was changed in respect of the shares of the members of the joint family. In the meanwhile, the grandfather of the petitioners-Lakshmaiah, died on 03.07.1978 and thereafter, a registered Partition Deed dated 31.03.2005 (Annexure-J), was effected between the joint family members of the grandfather of the petitioners and thereafter, khata was changed in respect of the shares of the members of the joint family. The petitioners have also produced the RTC extracts for the period from 2016 to 2022 as per Annexure-K. In the meanwhile, the petitioner No.1 has received notice dated 14.07.2017 issued by respondent No.2 in RRT(2) (E) CR.24/2015-16 proceedings, wherein, the said respondent No.2 summoned the petitioner to appear before respondent No.2 and to produce requisite documents with regard to subject land and pursuant to the same, the petitioner No.1 has filed statement of objections as per Annexure-L. It is also stated in the writ petition that, the respondent No.2 without affording fair opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, has passed the impugned order at Annexure-A, canceling the grant made in favour of original grantees- Smt.Nanjamma and Smt. Kamalamma. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners have presented this writ petition. 3. I have heard Sri. S.S. Ramdas, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri.Pradeep S. Sawkar, for the petitioners and Sri. Manjunath .K, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent-State. 4. Sri. S.S. Ramdas, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of learned counsel, Sri. Pradeep S. Sawkar, for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners herein are the owners of the land in question for more than two decades as the grandfather of the petitioners has purchased the same from original grantees and respondent-authorities without considering the said fact that the grant has been made more than sixty years, has cancelled the grant vide Annexure-A, which requires interference as the quasi-judicial authorities have to exercise the power within a reasonable period and in the present case as the respondent No.2 has exercised its suo- moto jurisdiction by canceling the original grant made in favour of original grantees-Najamma and Kamalamma, which is in violation of principles of natural justice and therefore, sought for interference of this court. 5. 5. It is also contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners by inviting the order sheet maintained by the respondent No.2 at Annexure-M that no fair opportunity was extended to the petitioners and that apart the respondent No.2 has hastily passed impugned at Annexure-A, and thereby necessitating the interference of this Court. 6. Per contra, Sri. Manjunath K., learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State invited the attention of the court to the finding recorded by the respondent No.2 at Annexure-A, particularly referring to paragraph 8 of the impugned order and submitted that, the entire grant made in favour of original grantees-Smt. Nanjamma and Smt. Kamalamma were bogus and those grant certificates are created and concocted one and therefore, respondent No.2 has rightly cancelled those grant orders made in favour of original grantees. Accordingly, sought for dismissal of the petition. 7. In the light of the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, on careful examination of the writ papers would indicate that the subject land has been granted in favour of one Smt. Nanjamma and Smt Kamalamma as per the grant certificate dated 14.12.1961 and 11.06.1962 Annexures-C and D. Thereafter, the land granted in favour of original grantees has been sold in favour of one Sri Mastan and others as per registered Sale Deed dated 19.02.1963 and another person namely Sri. Pachasabi as per registered Sale Deed dated 29.09.1965 as per Annexure- F and G respectively. It is also forth coming from the writ papers that, the said purchasers have sold the said property in favour of grand father of the petitioner as per registered Sale Deed dated 12.09.1967. Since then, the revenue records stands in the name of the ancestors of the petitioners. In the backdrop of these aspects, on careful consideration of impugned order at Annexure- A would indicate that the respondent No.2 has initiated suo-moto proceedings under Section 136(3) of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 Act in RRT(2)(E) CR No.24/2015-16 after lapse of 53 years from the date of original grant. In the backdrop of these aspects, on careful consideration of impugned order at Annexure- A would indicate that the respondent No.2 has initiated suo-moto proceedings under Section 136(3) of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 Act in RRT(2)(E) CR No.24/2015-16 after lapse of 53 years from the date of original grant. In this regard, it is relevant the cite the judgment of this Court in the case of M. Ramakrishnappa v. The Deputy Director of Land Records and Another reported in ILR 2007 KAR 769 wherein, it is held that, the quasi judicial authorities has committed a serious error in revoking revisional powers after 17 years and it is also held that quasi-judicial authorities must exercise revisional jurisdiction within a reasonable period, and delay of 17 years was held to be unjustifiable. Therefore, I am of the opinion that, the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 is suffers from delay and laches as the suo-moto proceedings have been initiated after five decades. It is also important to cite the judgment of this Court in the case of Durgappa v. The Deputy Commissioner and Others reported in 2012 SCC online KAR 7112 wherein, this court has interfered with the impugned order passed by the respondent-authorities therein as there is delay of two decades in exercising the suo- moto jurisdiction. Further in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even if it even in cases of fraud, revisional powers must be exercised within a reasonable time, and unreasonable delay would vitiate the proceedings. Paragraphs 30 to 32 of the said judgment emphasize that delay defeats the very purpose of revisional jurisdiction: "30. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [ (1992) 2 SCC 598 : AIR 1993 SC 802 ] wherein the Court explained the legal position as under : (SCC pp.602-03, para 13) “13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case [Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 ] relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed.” 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed.” 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority. 32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. Inasmuch as, the notice was issued as late as on 31-12-2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed." 8. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed." 8. Recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyamo Devi and Others vs. State of UP and Others reported in AIR 2024 SC 2862 has held that the quasi-judicial authorities exercising revisional powers must do so within a reasonable timeframe, and prolonged inaction renders the exercise of such power unsustainable in law and as such, following the declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court referred above, I am of the opinion in the present case that, respondents have exercised the power after five decades which cannot be accepted. Accordingly, the petitioners herein have made out case for interference in this writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed . The order dated 12.01.2021 passed by Respondent No.2-Spl. Deputy Commissioner in RRT(2)(E)CR.24/2015-16 (Annexure-A) is hereby quashed.