ORDER : (BIRENDRA KUMAR, J.) 1. Heard the parties on the issue of maintainability of this second appeal. 2. Fact of the case is that the plaintiffs/respondents had brought Civil Suit No. 113/1993 against the appellants for ejectment under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The suit was on two grounds, first, personal necessity of the plaintiffs and second, the default in payment of rent committed by the tenant. The learned trial Judge did not find a case of personal necessity, however, decreed the suit on the ground of default in payment of rent. The decree was challenged in Civil Regular Appeal No. 6/2001 and the appeal was also ultimately dismissed on 30.11.2024. Section 22 of the said Act bars maintainability of a second appeal. The said provision is being reproduced below:- “ Section 22.- Appeal & Revision- (1) From every decree or order passed by a Court under this Act, an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former Court. (2) No second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order; Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the powers of the High Court for Rajasthan in revision. (3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the [Magistrate] may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, appeal there from to [the District Magistrate or] such authority as the [State Government] may from time to time appoint in that behalf. (4) [xxx].” 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that inspite of the bar of second appeal by the special statute, there is judicial pronouncement that second appeal would be maintainable under the general law I.e. Section 100 CPC. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gyan Chand Vs. Kunjbeharilal & Ors. reported in (1977) 3 SCC 317 as well as a judgment of this Court in Ramraj Vs. Naraindas & Anr. (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 149/1989) 4. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gyan Chand Vs. Kunjbeharilal & Ors. reported in (1977) 3 SCC 317 as well as a judgment of this Court in Ramraj Vs. Naraindas & Anr. (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 149/1989) 4. It is worth to notice here that Section 13 of the Act relates to the grounds on which eviction of tenant can be sought for Section 13-A brought by amending the Rajasthan Act 12 of 1965 reserved the right of the tenant to pay the arrears of rent with interest and cost within the outside limit of 2 months and on payment of the same, no decree for eviction on the ground of non payment of rent shall be passed. This is not a case wherein tenant has exercised such right. 5. The case of Gyan Chand (supra) is distinguishable on the facts of this case. Moreover, Hon’ble Supreme Court has not said in Gyan Chand’s case in unequivocal terms that bar of second appeal in Section 22 is a redundant provision. In Gyan Chand’s case, the suit was for a decree of eviction only on the ground of non-payment of rent. There is provision under the Rent Control Act that if a tenant agree to pay arrears of rent within two month’s time allowed, the court would not pass a decree for eviction on the aforesaid ground. While dismissing the tenant’s appeal, Hon’ble Supreme Court stated in Para-3 the question raised to be answered as follows :- “3. The question of law that arises in this appeal is as to whether an application for special leave or an appeal by special leave to this Court is an "appeal" within the meaning of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950. as amended by the Rajasthan Ordinance learned Counsel 26 of 1975 (briefly the Act).” The facts of Gyan Chand’s case was narrated in para-31 to 33, which is being reproduced below :- “31. The defendant/appellant along with his two brothers Padam Chand and Tara Chand had taken on lease a shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 60/- from the plaintiffs/respondents as far back as September 1, 1961. The shop was situated in Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur City (Rajasthan). The defendant/appellant along with his two brothers Padam Chand and Tara Chand had taken on lease a shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 60/- from the plaintiffs/respondents as far back as September 1, 1961. The shop was situated in Tripolia Bazar, Jaipur City (Rajasthan). The plaintiffs served a notice of eviction under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the appellant and his two brothers terminating the tenancy and directing them to vacate the premises. As the tenants did not vacate the premises, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit in the Court of the Munsiff East, Jaipur City, claiming eviction of the appellant, and his two brothers on the ground that they had not paid or tendered rent for a period of six months from Magh Shukla 1. Smt. 2021. In the plaint the plaintiffs also averred that the shop was required by them for their own use and occupation and that the tenants had sublet the shop to Rajasthan Bartan Bhandar without the consent of the plaintiffs. We might mention here that these two grounds taken by the plaintiffs have been held by all the Courts to be completely disproved, and the suit was decreed by the District Judge and the High Court mainly on the ground that the tenants had defaulted in payment of rent for a period of six months and were, therefore, liable to be ejected under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 - hereinafter referred to as the Act'. It appears that after summonses were served on all the three defendants including the appellant, two of the brothers of the appellant, viz., Padam Chand and Tara Chand put in their appearance, but the appellant despite the service did not put in his appearance. In fact the counsel who was appearing for the other two defendants had been instructed to appear for the appellant also, but the Vakalatnama was not signed by the appellant. The appellant appears to have taken advantage of this lacuna in contending that he had not participated in the proceedings of the trial Court. On February 14, 1966 the defendant Tara Chand moved an application under Section 13 of the Act praying to the Court that the rent due may be determined and the defendants may be directed to deposit the rent. On February 14, 1966 the defendant Tara Chand moved an application under Section 13 of the Act praying to the Court that the rent due may be determined and the defendants may be directed to deposit the rent. The Court accordingly determined the rent on March 1, 1966 and directed the defendants to deposit a sum of Rs. 398-75 paise on or before April 19, 1966. As the rent was not deposited, the plaintiffs moved an application for striking out the defence of the defendants against eviction for their failure to comply with the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act. The Court accordingly by its order dated December 14, 1966 struck out the defence of the defendants. It may be pertinent to note that although the appellant had not put in his formal appearance he understood the order of the trial Court dated December 14, 1966 striking out the defence and treated the same as having been passed not only , against his brothers Padam Chand and Tara Chand, the two defendants, but also against himself and accordingly he along with his brothers preferred an appeal against that order to the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City on October 30, 1967. This appeal was ultimately dismissed and then the three defendants filed an application for revision before the High Court which was also dismissed by the High Court by its order dated September 19, 1968. Thus it is manifest that the appellant was fully aware of the proceedings that had taken place as also of the order that had been passed against the defendants striking out their defence. When the record was received back by the trial Court, Shri Tata Chand Jain Advocate of the defendants informed the Court on November 26. 1968 that he was holding brief only on behalf of the two defendants Padam Chand and Tara Chand and not on behalf of the appellant Gyan Chand. The Court accordingly passed an order that the suit was to proceed ex parte against the appellant. On November 30, 1968 the appellant filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed against him and this application found favour with the trial Court and was accordingly allowed. The appellant was allowed to file his written statement which he filed on January 27, 1969. On November 30, 1968 the appellant filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed against him and this application found favour with the trial Court and was accordingly allowed. The appellant was allowed to file his written statement which he filed on January 27, 1969. Thereafter the appellant applied to the Court for determining the rent due to the plaintiffs but that application was rejected on the ground that no amount of rent was payable as the entire rent due had already been paid by the other two defendants. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed an application before the trial Court for striking out the defence against Gyan Chand as he had not complied with the order under Section 13(4) of the Act passed by the Court previously. The trial Court, however, did not pass any orders on that application and ultimately dismissed the suit holding that there was no default. 32. It may be stated at the outset that when the appellant applied for setting aside the ex parte order he gave no explanation whatsoever for his non-appearance in the suit, after the summonses were served on him but merely tried to explain his absence on November 26, 1968. We have already pointed out that the appellant knew very well that the defence had been struck out by an order of the Court and had actually joined in the appeal and the revision filed by the other two de-defendants. In spite of that for two years he kept quiet and gave no explanation whatsoever for not appearing before the Court and participating in the proceedings until November 30, 1968. This delay of two years which has been seriously commented upon by the High' Court has not been explained satisfactorily by the appellant. 33. After the suit was dismissed by the trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge who allowed the appeal holding that the defendants were defaulters and accordingly de creed the suit. The grounds of sub letting and personal requirement as alleged by the plaintiffs were, how ever, held not proved. Thereafter there was second appeal to the High Court which affirmed the judgment of the District Judge and maintained the decree passed by the District Judge. The grounds of sub letting and personal requirement as alleged by the plaintiffs were, how ever, held not proved. Thereafter there was second appeal to the High Court which affirmed the judgment of the District Judge and maintained the decree passed by the District Judge. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the conduct of the appellant in not giving any explanation for not participating in the proceeding despite service of the summonses speaks volumes against him. The argument of the appellant that the entire proceedings should be can celled as they had taken place in his absence was rightly rejected by the High Court. In view of the con current findings of fact recorded on this point by the District Judge and the High Court, we are not at all inclined to interfere, in this appeal by special leave, with the merits of the case decided by the Courts below. We are satisfied that the appellant was not diligent at all and has to thank his stars if the decision of the Courts below went against him. In these circumstances, we do not propose to enter into merits of the appeal.” On the aforesaid facts, Hon’ble Supreme Court recorded conclusion in para-9, 24 to 26 as follows : “9. With regard to the first submission it may be pointed out that an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against a judgment or an order cannot be equated with the ordinary remedy of appeal, as of right, under any provisions of law. It is an extraordinary right conferred under the Constitution, within the discretion of this Court, and such an application for special leave does not come within the contemplation of appeal pending before the Court under Section 13A(a). It is true that the word “proceeding” which appears in Section 13A(a) and (b) means suit, appeal or application for revision according to the explanation appended to Section 13A. Therefore, in order to attract Section 13A (a), a suit, appeal or application for revision must be pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance No. 26 of 1975”. “24. Section 22(1) refers to every decree or order passed by a court under this Act. The decree or order passed under this Act must, therefore, have reference to those passed under Sections 6, 7, 11, 19A and 19C. “24. Section 22(1) refers to every decree or order passed by a court under this Act. The decree or order passed under this Act must, therefore, have reference to those passed under Sections 6, 7, 11, 19A and 19C. Sub-section (2) provides that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order. Such decrees or orders are, therefore, again referable to those passed under the above mentioned sections under the Act. While a second appeal is barred in case of those' decrees and orders under the Act the High Court's power of revision is not barred. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides for appeals from an order of a Magistrate to the District Magistrate or such authority as may be appointed by the Government. As noticed earlier certain orders are passed by the Magistrate under Section 12(3), Section 17 and Section 19. Section 22(3) makes provision of appeal against such orders passed under Section 12(3), Section 17 and Section 19. 25. It is, therefore, clear that the Act provides for the institution of actions in two different forums and also makes provision for appeals and revisions against orders and decrees passed under the Act. There is no provision in the Act for institution of suits for eviction which will, therefore, lie, in the ordinary courts of competent jurisdiction. Appeals, also revisions, where competent, will lie against decrees in eviction suits in the usual hierarchy of courts. 26. It is manifest from a perusal of the scheme of the Act that appeals or applications for revision under Section 13A(c) relate only to decrees in suits for eviction based on the ground of non- payment of rent. Such appeals or applications for revision under Section 22 of the Act. As shown above, decrees or orders passed by the court under the Act against which appeals and revisions are provided in Section 22 do not take in decrees or orders passed in a suit for eviction. Usual rights of appeal and revision will be available in the latter class of suits. To hold otherwise will be to deny a right of second appeal to a litigant, be he a landlord or tenant, against a decree in an eviction suit which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. Usual rights of appeal and revision will be available in the latter class of suits. To hold otherwise will be to deny a right of second appeal to a litigant, be he a landlord or tenant, against a decree in an eviction suit which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. Second appeal is only barred in case of decrees or orders passed under the Act to which a copious reference has been made hereinabove with reference to the various provisions of the Act”. 6. Evidently the impugned judgment in the case on hand was passed under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 when the suit was filed on two grounds i.e. personal necessity and default in payment of rent. The suit was decreed only on the ground of default in payment of rent and the appeal was dismissed by the first appellate court. In the circumstance under Section 22 of the Act only revision would be maintainable before this Court, because it is not the case of the appellant that the tenant-appellant had applied for payment of arrears of rent, as such, the court should have ordered for payment of arrears of rent and the suit should have not been decreed on this ground alone. Therefore, in my view the second appeal under general law was not permissible in the facts and circumstance of the present case. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant appellant next relied on the judgment of this Court in Ramraj Vs. Naraindas & Anr., reported in 1989 1 RLW (Raj.) 314. Ramraj’s case was a civil revision. The Court simply stated that when the judgment and decree was passed under general law, remedy of second appeal was there. In the present case, the impugned judgments and decree were passed under special statute. 8. In view of specific statutory provision under Section 22 of the Act, as referred above, the judgment rendered in Choudhary Filling Service Vs. Ram Prasad reported in 1997 1 RLW (Raj.) 109, as referred by learned counsel for the appellant, is not binding on this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on the judgment of Suraj Narain Vs. Khawas Bala Bux reported in (1955) RLW 379. Ram Prasad reported in 1997 1 RLW (Raj.) 109, as referred by learned counsel for the appellant, is not binding on this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on the judgment of Suraj Narain Vs. Khawas Bala Bux reported in (1955) RLW 379. In Suraj Narain’s case, the Court was of the view that the appellant failed to show that the suit was under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. In fact, the suit was filed under ordinary law hence provision of Section 22 of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act wound not apply. 10. In the present case, impugned judgments and decrees were passed under Special Act aforesaid, hence provisions of Section 22 would apply. Since there is a specific bar of second appeal under the statute, the present second appeal is not maintainable. However, since civil revision is maintainable against appellate court’s order, let this second appeal be registered as a civil revision and for statistical purpose the second appeal be treated as disposed off.