ORDER : (SANJEEV J. THAKER, J.) 1. The present Civil Revision Application is filed under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (for short “the Rent Act”) against the Judgment and Decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.25 of 2024, decided by the Appellate Bench No.1 of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad dated 10.01.2025 confirming the Judgment and Decree passed in HRP No.64 of 2021 passed by the Small Causes Court No.8 at Ahmedabad on 23.02.2024. 2. For the sake of convenience, the petitioners herein shall be referred to as the defendants and the respondents herein shall be referred to as the plaintiffs. 3. The brief facts arising in the present proceedings are that the plaintiff filed HRP Suit No.64 of 2021 on the ground that the plaintiffs are the owners of the property and the suit property was given on rent by the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs to the father of the defendant no.1 i.e. Bansilal B.Verma and he was a tenant in the suit premises. 4. The plaintiff purchased the suit premises in the year 2018 and thereafter filed the suit for eviction. The Trial Court framed issues vide exhibit-16 are as under: “(1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants have not paid rent of the rented premise for a period more than six months and therefore, they become tenants in arrears? (2) Whether the plaintiffs proves that the original defendant acquired suitable accommodation as alleged? (3) Whether the plaintiffs proves that the defendant has made illegal cabin on the terrace and thereby breached terms of tenancy? (4) Whether the plaintiffs proves that defendant has create nuisance and annoyance by making handles for using toilet to the other tenants? (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to obtain relieves as prayed for? (6) What order and decree?” 5. The Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has proved that the original tenant acquired suitable accommodation. (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to obtain relieves as prayed for? (6) What order and decree?” 5. The Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has proved that the original tenant acquired suitable accommodation. The plaintiff in the said suit had examined himself vide exhibit 22 and the defendant no.1 had examined himself vide exhibit 46 and after considering the oral evidence, documentary evidence and giving findings on all the issues, the Trial Court passed a judgment and decree of eviction on the ground that the defendant has acquired alternative suitable accommodation and therefore, and therefore, a decree of eviction under the provision of Section 13(1) (l) of the Rent Act was granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant filed Regular Civil Appeal No.25 of 2024 and after re-appreciating the evidence, the Appellate Court dismissed the said Civil Appeal hence the present Civil Revision Application. 6. The learned advocate for the defendant has mainly argued that the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have not taken into consideration the issue of limitation as the property stated to be the alternative accommodation acquired by the original defendant- tenant was purchased in the year 2008 and the erstwhile owner of the premises i.e. the predecessor in title of the present tenant, were in knowledge that the original tenant has purchased the property and at the time when the plaintiff has also purchased the property in the year 2018, the plaintiff was also aware that the tenant has purchased the property at Shivam Apartment and therefore, the suit of the plaintiff for eviction on the grounds that the defendant had acquired alternative suitable accommodation is hopelessly time barred, as the Trial Court and the Appellate Court could not have passed the Judgment and Decree of eviction against the present defendant. It has also been argued that the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have also not taken into consideration that the said alternative accommodation was not suitable for the entire family of the defendant-tenant to reside. It has also been argued that the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have also not taken into consideration that the said alternative accommodation was not suitable for the entire family of the defendant-tenant to reside. It is the case of the defendant-tenant that original defendant no.1 is the wife of Bansilal Verma who was the original tenant and who expired in the year 2010 and after the death of Bansilal Verma the suit property was in possession of defendant no.1 (wife of original tenant), defendant no.2(son of original tenant), defendant no.3 (son of original tenant), defendant no.4 (son of original tenant) and it is the case of the defendants i.e. legal heirs of Bansilal Verma that defendant no.4 is a special child and the said fact is also admitted in the plaint wherein the plaintiff has admitted that defendant no.4 has some mental issues and therefore defendant no.1 is residing with defendant no.4. 7. It has also been admitted that though defendant no.2 has acquired a suitable accommodation at village Ghuma Ahmedabad, defendant no.1 has to take care of defendant no.4, defendant nos.1 and 4 are staying at an alternative accommodation purchased in the name of original-tenant i.e. Bansilal Verma and the documents of said alternative accommodation of purchase dated 25.04.2008 are also produced vide exhibit 66, but it has been argued that the said property is not suitable to accommodate the entire family, and it has been also argued that defendant no.3 and his entire family reside in the suit property and as the suit property is admeasuring 9 square meters only, and the said property cannot accommodate the entire family of defendant-tenant, defendant no.2 is residing at his own premises at village Ghuma, Ahmedabad and defendant nos.1 and 4 because of the mental condition of defendant no.4 are residing at Shivam Apartment, but the fact remains that defendant no.3 who has become a tenant by virtue of Section 5(11)(c) of the Rent Act is residing in the said premises with his family and therefore it cannot be said that the defendants have acquired alternative suitable accommodation and therefore the possession of the property is to be handed over to the plaintiff. 8. Learned advocate for the defendant has relied on the judgments in case of Shashikant Yeshwant Limaye and Anr. Vs. 8. Learned advocate for the defendant has relied on the judgments in case of Shashikant Yeshwant Limaye and Anr. Vs. Chintaman Vinayak Kolhatkar reported in 2010 ALLMR (Suppl) 869 , in case of Krishnaji V.D.Shankar Abhayankar MANU/MH/0134/1965 , in case of S. Shivraj Reddy (Died) through his Lrs. And Another Vs. S.Raghuraj Reddy and Others, SLP (Civil) No(s).4237 of 2015. 9. Therefore, it is the argument of learned advocate for the defendants that the Trial Court and the Appellate Court could not have granted a decree of eviction against the defendants under the provisions of Section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act. 10. Per contra, learned advocate for the plaintiffs has mainly argued that if the provisions of Section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act are looked into, the same is continuous wrong and therefore it cannot be said that the suit that has been filed by the plaintiff for possession of the property is hit under the provisions of the Limitation Act. Moreover, it has also been argued that on the plain reading of Section 13(1)(l) of the Rent Act, it can be clearly seen that the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant-tenant has acquired alternative accommodation after coming into operation of the Rent Act and in the present case, the plaintiff has proved the said fact that the defendant has acquired a suitable accommodation which is produced vide exhibit 66, and it is also an admitted position that defendant no.2 has acquired a suitable accommodation at village Ghuma, Ahmedabad and therefore the present Civil Revision Application is required to be rejected. 11. Moreover, it has also been argued that there are concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court and therefore the present Civil Revision Application cannot be entertained and is required to be dismissed. 12. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and on perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, the fact remains that all throughout, during the pendency of the said suit, the defendants have not taken contention that the alternative accommodation at village Ghuma, Ahmedabad and the property which has been purchased by the original tenant i.e. at Shivam Apartment, Nava Vadaj is not suitable for the entire family to be accommodated. 13. The judgment on which learned advocate for the defendant relies on i.e. Shashikant Yeshwant Limaye and Anr. Vs. 13. The judgment on which learned advocate for the defendant relies on i.e. Shashikant Yeshwant Limaye and Anr. Vs. Chintaman Vinayak Kolhatkar reported in 2010 ALL MR (Suppl) 869, will be of no assistance to the defendant as in the said suit, the Court was referring to the issue of limitation but the fact remains that to seek eviction from the tenant on the ground of Section 13(1)(L) the plaintiff landlord has to first prove that after coming into force of the Rent Act, the defendant has either built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. Therefore, provisions of Section 13(1)(L) will apply if the defendant has acquired suitable residence after coming into force of the Rent Act. The said Act came into force on 13.02.1948. Therefore, if there is any acquisition that has been made subsequent to the said date i.e. 13.02.1948, it can clearly be said that the defendant has acquired suitable residence. The words used in Section 13(1)(L) of the Rent Act are not to be read restrictively to the title but it must be interpreted in wider sense that the tenant has roof over his head. 14. Therefore, plaintiff has proved the fact that the defendants have acquired accommodation and, therefore, non-suitability of the property was to be proved by the tenant himself. Therefore, once it is established on record that the defendant has acquired vacant possession of suitable possession he is bound to vacate the possession. 15. The law is very clear that once the tenant acquired property, landlord is entitled for eviction on the ground that the defendant has suitable alternative accommodation. 16. The revisional jurisdiction can only be exercised with the limited purpose with a view to satisfy itself that the decision under challenge before it is according to law and High Court cannot substitute its own findings on a question of fact for the findings recorded by the courts below on reappraisal of evidence. 17. In my opinion, the evidence is sufficient to establish that he has acquired suitable residential accommodation. 18.Therefore, on the basis of overall material on record, on the basis of conclusion that has been referred to by the Courts below, the Court is of the opinion that there is no material irregularity nor any perversity reflecting which would permit this Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction. 18.Therefore, on the basis of overall material on record, on the basis of conclusion that has been referred to by the Courts below, the Court is of the opinion that there is no material irregularity nor any perversity reflecting which would permit this Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction. The entire reasoning of both the Courts at the findings are based upon clear analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for either side and also in consonance with documentary material and according to this Court it cannot be said that there is any perversity in the said order. Moreover, while deciding the Revision Application by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under this Act is confined to find out that findings of fact recorded by the courts below is according to law and does not suffer from any abuse of law. The findings recorded by the courts below if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, would result in gross miscarriage of justice, the same is open for correction because it is not treated as finding according to Law and in that event the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Bombay Rent Act, is entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. 19. The High Court can not interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the first Appellate Court. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under this Act is confined to find out that finding recorded by the courts below is according to Law and does not suffer from any error of Law and only if the finding of facts recorded by the courts below, is perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or that such finding is based on no evidence, or misreading of the evidence, or is grossly erroneous that, if allow to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice and the same is open to correction as the same is not treated as findings according to Law and in the present case, the finding of facts recorded by the trial Court and the appellate Court is neither perverse nor arrived at without consideration of the material evidence. In the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can not exercise its powers as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding of facts. Revisional jurisdiction is not and can not be equated with the powers of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. 20. The findings recorded by both the courts below are based on critical appreciation of the evidence led by the parties on record and does not suffer any error or material irregularities. Both the courts have rightly come to the conclusion that the tenant has acquired suitable alternative accommodation and, therefore, there was no error committed by the courts below which requires any correction at the hands of the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 21. Under the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. In view of the aforesaid facts and proposition of law and in view of the concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below, since no case is made out to call for any interference in the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court upholding the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the present Revision Application requires to be dismissed and it is dismissed accordingly. Further Order After pronouncement of judgement, learned advocate for the appellant has sought for stay of the order for a period of 30 days so as to enable him to challenge the present order before the Apex Court. Request is granted accordingly.