Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 347 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Sheela Thakur

2025-03-11

G.S. SANDHAWALIA, RANJAN SHARMA

body2025
Judgment : (G.S. Sandhawalia, CJ.) The present Letters Patent Appeal seeks consideration of order dated 16.10.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 2420 of 2020, whereby the recovery notices dated 03.06.2020 & 27.05.2020 (Annexure P-1 & P-2, respectively) were set aside, vide which recovery to the tune of Rs. 2,42,300/- was sought to be done by the office of respondent No. 3-appellant No. 3 herein, on the basis of an objection raised by the Office of Senior Accounts Officer, (Annexure P-1) from the writ petitioner, who is widow of a Class-IV employee, who died in harness. 2. The basic principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others, (2015) 4 SCC 334 (2) were relied upon to grant the relief before the learned Single Judge, wherein recovery to the tune of Rs. 2,42,300/- was made, after almost a year after the death of the original employee-Prem Singh Thakur, who died in the year 2019. 3. The present appeal is barred by 406 days. Reluctantly, CMP(M) No.1796 of 2024 has been filed for condoning the delay in filing the present LPA, wherein the delay has been calculated as 313 days. 4. A perusal of the application would go no to show the manner in which the State has processed the matter, and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has not been made out to condone the delay for the reasons recorded hereafter. 5. Learned Advocate General has vehemently argued that the judgments passed by the Supreme Courts in State of Manipur and others Vs. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 and Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs and others Vs. Union of India & another, (2023) 10 SCC 531 be taken into consideration. 6. A perusal of the application would go on to show that after the judgment was passed on 16.10.2023, a copy of the same was supplied to appellant No. 3 on 08.11.2023. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the office of appellant No. 2 for obtaining necessary advice of Government/Law Department vide letter No. 16372-73, dated 21.12.2023, which was received in the office of appellant No. 2 on 28.12.2023. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the office of appellant No. 2 for obtaining necessary advice of Government/Law Department vide letter No. 16372-73, dated 21.12.2023, which was received in the office of appellant No. 2 on 28.12.2023. On having received the incomplete record of the case, a request was made to the Superintending Engineer, HP PWD to supply the complete record on 29.12.2023, which was done on 11.01.2024 by the Superintending Engineer. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Government on 21.01.2024, which was examined only on 07.03.2024 and the decision to file LPA was taken vide letter dated 14.03.2024. Thereafter, the draft appeal was prepared which was received in the office of appellant No. 2 on 26.03.2024. Thereafter the grounds of LPA were prepared and further processed to the office of the learned Advocate General on 02.04.2024. While filing the LPA, the office of the learned Advocate General found that the certified copy of the judgment was not available on the official website of the High Court. Thereafter, on 18.09.2024 certified copy of the judgment was applied for almost after one year of the decision, which was only supplied on 23.09.2024. 7. A claim was made that the learned Advocate General had intimated that the petition was still pending as per the official website of the High Court, but nothing has been shown as to what action was taken from 03.04.2024 to 18.09.2024, which is a period of more than five months and which has been apparently consumed in applying for the certified copy of the judgment. Eventually, the LPA was filed on 30.09.2023. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that keeping in view the controversy in issue, it was not a matter of any policy decision which has been decided against the State. 8. The observations in Sheo Raj Singh’s case (supra) are to be taken into consideration that the merits of the claim were to be considered when deciding such application for condonation of delay. In the said case, delay had been condoned by the High Court of a private litigant as such challenging the appeal filed by the State for enhancement of the compensation payable to the land owners, before the Apex Court. In such circumstances, the Apex Court upheld the order of the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In the said case, delay had been condoned by the High Court of a private litigant as such challenging the appeal filed by the State for enhancement of the compensation payable to the land owners, before the Apex Court. In such circumstances, the Apex Court upheld the order of the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The relevant observations regarding inordinate and unexplained delay in filing the appeal were kept in mind, while upholding the said order. The relevant portion of the said order reads as under:- “35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice. 35.2 The expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail. 35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay. 35.4 Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court. 35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness. 36. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which it is not.” 9. Similarly, in Koting Lamkang case , (supra) , the Apex Court noticed that the delay in filing Regular First Appeal was not 312 days, since the appeal had been filed before the District Judge at the first instance and if that period was considered, then there was delay of only 44 days in filing the RFA. Similarly, in Koting Lamkang case , (supra) , the Apex Court noticed that the delay in filing Regular First Appeal was not 312 days, since the appeal had been filed before the District Judge at the first instance and if that period was considered, then there was delay of only 44 days in filing the RFA. It was also noticed that if the main appeal was not heard, it would affect the public interest as it was a strategically sensitive case involving security and therefore, the State should be non-suited on the ground of delay. In such circumstances, the appeal was allowed subject to payment of costs of Rs. 50,000/- by the appellant. 10. As noticed above, the petitioner/respondent No. 1 is a widow of a Class-IV employee, who has to pay 25% of retiral dues vide the recovery notice, after the death of her husband. In such circumstances, the said judgment is also not applicable to the present case. 11. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , can be culled out to the extent that totally unfettered free play cannot be allowed and the conduct, behaviour and attitude should be the relevant factors to be taken into consideration, though, the State may be given some acceptable latitude. 12. The manner in which the certified copy of the judgment was applied for almost after a period of one year is thus the major factor as such for not allowing the application for condonation of delay, keeping in view the controversy involved. 13. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.