JUDGMENT : VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated 12-7-2018 in A.S.No.14 of 2017 on the file of the V Additional District Judge, Rayachoty, YSR Kadapa District, partly allowing the Judgment and decree, dated 03-11-2015, in O.S.No.79 of 2012 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty. 2. The appellant herein is the 4 th defendant, the 1 st respondent is plaintiff and respondents 2 to 4 are defendants 1 to 3 in O.S.No.79 of 2012, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty. 3. The plaintiff, who is the mother of defendants 1 to 3, initiated action in O.S.No.79 of 2012, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, with a prayer for partition of the suit schedule properties into four equal shares and to allot one such share to her and also for declaration of registered sale deed dated 10-6-2008 executed by the defendants 1 to 3 in favour of the 4 th defendant as invalid in law and not binding on the plaintiff. 4. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, preliminarily decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful 4 th defendant in the above said suit filed A.S.No.14 of 2017, on the file of the V Additional District Judge, Rayachoty. The learned V Additional District Judge, Rayachoty, partly allowed the appeal by setting aside declaration of sale deed under Ex.A-4, dated 10-6-2008, to the extent of 1/4 th share of the plaintiff. Aggrieved thereby, the 4 th defendant approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.79 of 2012, is as follows: It is pleaded that the plaintiff’s husband, by name Mannuru Jayaramaiah, was lawful owner of the suit schedule properties, having purchased the same through a registered sale deed dated 24-11-1969 from its lawful owners Shaik Abdul Latif and Gundluru Fekroobi. The said Jayaramaiah constructed two houses in the schedule property and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same until his death. He died intestate about 20 years back, leaving behind him the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 as his legal heirs. The said Jayaramaiah constructed two houses in the schedule property and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same until his death. He died intestate about 20 years back, leaving behind him the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 as his legal heirs. After his death, the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 have been in joint possession and enjoyment of the schedule property without partition. While so, the plaintiff went to Kuwait for her livelihood. Taking advantage of her absence at Rayachoty, the defendants 1 to 3 have created a sham and nominal registered sale deed dated 10-6-2008 in favour of the 4 th defendant with respect to the suit schedule property. After the plaintiff returned from Kuwait, she came to know about alienation of the property by defendants 1 to 3 in favour of the 4 th defendant. The plaintiff is entitled for 1/4 th share in the suit schedule property and she demanded the defendants 1 to 3 for partition and separate possession of her 1/4 th share in the schedule property, but the defendants postponed the same. The plaintiff issued legal notice dated 06-12-2011 to the defendants for partition and separate possession of the plaint schedule property. The defendants 1 to 3 have received the said legal notice and did not choose to give any reply. The 4 th defendant issued reply notice on 15-12-2011 with untenable grounds and therefore, the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 7. The defendants 1 to 3 filed a written statement before the trial Court. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: They admitted their relationship with the plaintiff and also admitted that the plaint schedule property is self-acquired property of their father and their father died intestate. It is contended that the defendants 1 to 3 have sold their share of property in house bearing Door No.46/53 i.e. their 3/4 th right in item No.1 of the schedule property, but the 4 th defendant obtained sale deed from them by mentioning the total extent in item No.1 of the schedule property. Since the defendants were badly in need of money, they were forced to sign on the sale deed. Since the defendants were badly in need of money, they were forced to sign on the sale deed. The 4 th defendant promised to deposit Rs.1,00,000/- in the joint account of 1 st defendant and one Madan, who is the 4 th defendant’s son and executed an agreement to that effect, but she never deposited Rs.1,00,000/- as agreed, thus the 4 th defendant cheated them. It is further contended that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4 th share each in item Nos.1 and 2 of the schedule property and she is also entitled for declaration of sale deed dated 10-6-2008 executed in favour of the 4 th respondent in respect of item No.1 of the schedule property as invalid and not binding on her. 8. The 4th defendant filed a separate written statement contending that she purchased the house bearing Door No.46/53 from defendants 1 to 3, with the knowledge of the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 10-6-2008. The plaintiff knew the said fact very well and later she planned to get wrongful gain in collusion with her children and got issued notice. She purchased only half share in the total property, purchased by the original owner with house and is in possession and enjoyment of the same by paying house tax and electrical charges for the same. The defendants 1 to 3, who got 1/3 rd right in the total extent purchased by their father, have sold only 1/2 share and still they are having the rest of the property, which is mentioned as item No.2 of the suit property, therefore, the suit for partition is not tenable. It is further contended that the plaintiff can claim her 1/4 th share in the property of her husband. The defendants 1 to 3 are sailing with the plaintiff and supporting the version of the plaintiff for wrongful gain without taking steps for cancellation of alleged sale deed executed by them in favour of the 4 th defendant, as such the plaintiff alone cannot claim for declaration of said sale deed as invalid. 9. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate possession of 1/4 th share in the suit schedule property, as prayed for? 9. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate possession of 1/4 th share in the suit schedule property, as prayed for? (2) Whether the sale deed dated 10-6-2008 executed by defendants 1 to 3 in favour of 4 th defendant is not valid and binding on the plaintiff? (3) Whether the Court fee paid by the plaintiff under Section 34(2) of A.P.C.F. and S.V. Act is not correct, as set out in the written statement of 4 th defendant? (4) Whether the 4 th defendant is bona fide purchaser of the schedule property, as set out in the written statement of 4 th defendant? And (5) To what relief? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.B-1 was marked. 11. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, preliminarily decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful 4 th defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.14 of 2017, on the file of the V Additional District Judge, Rayachoty, wherein, the following points came up for consideration: 1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate possession of 1/4 th share in the suit schedule item Nos.1 and 2 i.e. two houses bearing Door Nos.46/53 and 46/54 in Survey No.690/2 of Bose Nagar, Rayachoty Town, as prayed for or not? 2) Whether the sale deed dated 10-6-2008 executed by defendants 1 to 3 in favour of 4 th defendant under Ex.A-4 is a sham and nominal document? 3) Whether the appellant/4 th defendant is bona fide purchaser of the schedule property in respect of house bearing Door No.46/53 situated in Survey No.690/2 of Bose Nagar of Rayachoty Town i.e. item No.1 from the defendants 1 to 3 under Ex.A-4 or not? 4) Whether the findings of the learned Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Rayachoty in its judgment, dated 03-11-2014 are sustainable, tenable under law or not? 4) Whether the findings of the learned Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Rayachoty in its judgment, dated 03-11-2014 are sustainable, tenable under law or not? 5) Whether in view of the specific contentions raised by both the parties, the judgment of the trial Court is liable to be set aside, altered or modified? 6) Whether the sale deed under Ex.A-4 is not only binding on the defendants 1 to 3, but also on the plaintiff or not? and 7) To what relief? 12. The learned V Additional District Judge, Rayachoty i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, and partly allowed the appeal filed by the 4 th defendant by modifying the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Felt aggrieved of the same, the 4 th defendant in O.S.No.79 of 2012 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 13. Heard Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri G. Vivekanand, learned counsel for the appellant/4 th defendant and Sri P. Subash, learned counsel appearing for the 1 st respondent/plaintiff. 14. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant would contend that both the Courts below failed to observe that the entire sale consideration was paid by the appellant/4 th defendant in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, which was purchased under a registered sale deed dated 10-6-2008 from defendants 1 to 3. He would further contend that the first appellate Judge erred in holding that the appellant is not a bona fide purchaser to the extent of 1/4 th share of the plaintiff. He would further contend that the first appellate Judge erred in holding that equities cannot be worked out by allotting more property in item No.2 of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff. 15. The learned counsel for respondent would contend that on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first appellate Judge gave a finding that the appellant is not a bona fide purchaser to the extent of 1/4 th share of the plaintiff and there is no need to interfere with the finding arrived by the first appellate Judge. 16. The learned counsel for respondent would contend that on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned first appellate Judge gave a finding that the appellant is not a bona fide purchaser to the extent of 1/4 th share of the plaintiff and there is no need to interfere with the finding arrived by the first appellate Judge. 16. Law is well settled that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure , the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. 17. In the case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh , [ AIR 1993 SC 398 ], the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.” 18. In the case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, [AIR 1999 SC 471], the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 19. The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff is none other than the wife of one Mannuru Jayaramaiah, having purchased the vacant site of plaint schedule properties under a registered sale deed dated 24-11-1969 from its lawful owners and subsequent to the said purchase, the said Jayaramaiah constructed two houses in the suit schedule property i.e. item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit schedule houses and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same till his death along with his family members. Therefore, it is not in dispute that the suit schedule property is an undivided property of the plaintiff’s husband, by name late Jayaramaiah and he died intestate. All the legal heirs of the said Jayaramaiah viz., wife and children i.e. the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 are having equal shares in item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property. It is not the specific case of the appellant that the plaintiff is not having any share in item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit schedule property. 20. The appellant/purchaser would contend that there are two houses in the suit schedule property, which are in item Nos.1 and 2 and item No.1 of the suit schedule property is purchased by the appellant from out of the share of defendants 1 to 3. Admittedly, there is no mention in Ex.A-1 sale deed that defendants 1 to 3 alienated item No.1 of the suit schedule house from out of their share. There is no specific pleading in the written statement of 4 th defendant that she purchased item No.1 of the suit schedule property from out of the share of defendants 1 to 3. D.W.1 i.e. the 1 st defendant admitted in his evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4 th share each in item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit schedule property. 21. As stated supra, one of the contentions raised by the appellant is that there are two houses in the suit schedule property, which are item Nos.1 and 2 and item No.1 of the suit property is purchased by the appellant from out of the share of defendants 1 to 3. There is no whisper in the sale deed of appellant that her vendors sold 3/4 th share in the house bearing Door No.46/53 i.e. item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Another statement made by the 4 th defendant i.e. D.W.2 in her evidence is that she purchased the house in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property from defendants 1 to 3 with the knowledge of the plaintiff under registered sale deed dated 10-6-2008. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show that with the knowledge of the plaintiff, the appellant purchased item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show that with the knowledge of the plaintiff, the appellant purchased item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Another statement made by the 4 th defendant in her evidence is that from the date of purchase, she is in possession and enjoyment over item No.1 of the suit schedule property and the defendants 1 to 3 have got 1/3 rd right each in the suit schedule property purchased by their father and they sold only half share. But, there is no whisper in the sale deed of 4 th defendant that the defendants 1 to 3 i.e. her vendors sold their half share in the total suit schedule property. Another contention taken by the appellant is that since she is in possession of item No.1 of the schedule property, the plaintiff can claim her share in item No.2 of the suit schedule property. Admittedly, the said contention taken by the appellant is untenable. The law is very clear that each co-sharer is having right in the undivided property until the said undivided property is partitioned with metes and bounds. Item Nos.1 and 2 of the schedule property is an undivided schedule property and the same is in joint possession of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3, by the date of alleged sale deed of appellant. 22. The material on record clearly goes to show that there is no mention in the sale deed Ex.A-1 that item No.1 of the plaint schedule property came to the share of defendants 1 to 3. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that she purchased item No.1 of the plaint schedule property from out of the share of defendants 1 to 3. It is not the case of either of the parties that item No.1 of the schedule property came to the share of defendants 1 to 3 from out of total item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property. As seen from the plaint schedule property, item No.1 of plaint schedule property is house bearing Door No.46/53 and item No.2 of plaint schedule property is house bearing Door No.46/54. Both item Nos.1 and 2 of plaint schedule properties are separate houses. As seen from the plaint schedule property, item No.1 of plaint schedule property is house bearing Door No.46/53 and item No.2 of plaint schedule property is house bearing Door No.46/54. Both item Nos.1 and 2 of plaint schedule properties are separate houses. As per the statement of appellant/D.W.2, she purchased item No.1 of the plaint schedule house from defendants 1 to 3 with the knowledge of the plaintiff under a registered sale deed, the same is specifically denied by the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3. But, the appellant failed to prove that she purchased item No.1 of the schedule property with the knowledge of the plaintiff. 23. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant would contend that while allotting 1/4 th share of the plaintiff herein in a final decree proceeding, equities can be worked out by allotting share only in her favour in item No.2 of the plaint schedule property. He would further contend that equities can be worked out by allotting more property in item No.2 of the schedule property to the plaintiff. It is not in dispute that originally one Jayaramaiah purchased the plaint schedule property vacant site under a registered sale deed and later he constructed two separate houses in the total suit schedule property vacant site and later he died intestate and that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3, who are legal heirs of Jayaramaiah, are having equal undivided rights in the plaint schedule property until the suit schedule property is divided by metes and bounds. It is not the case of none of the parties that the plaint schedule property is divided among the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3. Therefore, the plaintiff is having 1/4 th undivided share in item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit schedule property respectively. The purchaser/appellant without verifying the real facts, in the absence of the plaintiff in India, she purchased item No.1 of the suit schedule house in total from her vendors defendants 1 to 3. At best, defendants 1 to 3 can alienate their 3/4 th undivided share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to the appellant and they cannot alienate 1/4 th undivided share of the plaintiff in item No.1 of the suit schedule property. Admittedly, the plaintiff is having 1/4 th undivided share in item No.1 of the schedule property. At best, defendants 1 to 3 can alienate their 3/4 th undivided share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to the appellant and they cannot alienate 1/4 th undivided share of the plaintiff in item No.1 of the suit schedule property. Admittedly, the plaintiff is having 1/4 th undivided share in item No.1 of the schedule property. No sale deed was obtained by the appellant from the plaintiff in respect of 1/4 th share of the plaintiff. 24. As per the own statement of the appellant in her evidence, she purchased item No.1 of the plaint schedule property from defendants 1 to 3 with the knowledge of the plaintiff under a registered sale deed, but the appellant failed to prove that she purchased item No.1 of the suit schedule house with the knowledge of the plaintiff. It is not the case of all the coparceners i.e., the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 that with the knowledge of the plaintiff, the appellant purchased item No.1 of the suit schedule property. Therefore, undoubtedly, the sale deed under Ex.A-1 is invalid to the extent of 1/4 th undivided share of the plaintiff in item No.1 of the suit schedule property. The first appellate Court came to the right conclusion that the sale deed under Ex.A-1 is invalid in respect of 1/4 th undivided share of the plaintiff in item No.1 of the plaint schedule house. 25. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant that the judgment of first appellate Court can be modified as equities can be worked out by allotting more property in item No.2 of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff instead of holding that the sale deed to the extent of 1/4 th share of the plaintiff is invalid. It is undisputed by both sides that item Nos.1 and 2 of plaint schedule property are two separate houses. Moreover, a preliminary decree has only been passed and final decree is not yet passed. Admittedly, the plaintiff is having 1/4 th share in item No.1 of plaint schedule house, therefore, there is no substance in the contention taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that equities can be worked out by allotting more property in item No.2 of the plaint schedule property. Admittedly, the plaintiff is having 1/4 th share in item No.1 of plaint schedule house, therefore, there is no substance in the contention taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that equities can be worked out by allotting more property in item No.2 of the plaint schedule property. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the sale deed under Ex.A-1 is invalid to the extent of 1/4 th undivided share of the plaintiff in item No.1 of the plaint schedule house. The learned trial Judge passed a preliminary decree of partition and final decree is not yet passed and final decree proceedings are pending against the preliminary decree, the appellant, who is a party to the suit, filed an appeal against the preliminary decree of partition since final decree is not yet passed, the appellant can agitate her request in a final decree proceeding pending before the trial Court. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Judge. 26. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the sale deed under Ex.A-1 is invalid to the extent of undivided 1/4 th share of the plaintiff in item No.1 of the plaint schedule house. Since the appellant, who is a party to the suit, filed an appeal against the preliminary decree of partition passed since final decree is not yet passed, the appellant can agitate her request, insofar as the equities are concerned, in final decree proceedings pending before the trial Court. 27. With the above observations, the second appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. Each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal.