Suneera Ovungal, W/o Jabir C. P v. State Of Kerala
2025-02-21
JOBIN SEBASTIAN, P.B.SURESH KUMAR
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. The petitioner is the wife of Jabir C.P., ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P2 order of detention dated 16.10.2024 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for brevity). After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the said order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 19.12.2024, and the petitioner’s husband has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention. 2. The records reveal that a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram, the 3rd respondent, on 08.05.2024 seeking initiation of proceedings against the petitioner’s husband under Section 3(1) PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether two cases in which the petitioner’s husband was involved have been considered by the detaining authority for passing the impugned order of detention and the details of the said cases are given below:- Sl. No. Crime No. Police Station Crime Date Offences involved under Sections Present status of case 1 226/2023 Kondotty 01.03.2023 U/s. 22(b) & 25 of NDPS Act Charge sheeted 2 20/2024 Excise Range Office, Manjeri 06.04.2024 U/s. 20(b)(ii) C & 29 of NDPS Act Charge sheeted 3. The allegation in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is that on 06.04.2024 at 11.30 p.m., the accused and his accomplices were found in possession 1.058 kgs. hashish oil in a Toyota Qualis vehicle bearing registration No.KL-10-AP-0695 for the purpose of sale in violation of the provisions of NDPS Act. In the said case, the detenu was arrayed as the 1st accused. 4. We heard Sri. P. Mohammed Sabah, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner started his argument by pointing out that the impugned order of detention was passed while the petitioner was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. It is further submitted that, even now, the petitioner’s husband is in judicial custody.
K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner started his argument by pointing out that the impugned order of detention was passed while the petitioner was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. It is further submitted that, even now, the petitioner’s husband is in judicial custody. According to the counsel when an order of detention is passed while the accused is in custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the competent authority, who passed the impugned order should explain what reliable materials were placed before him, that he came to a conclusion that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity. It is relying upon the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another [ 1991 (1) SCC 128 ] the learned counsel took such a contention. According to him, in view of the said decision in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 6. Per contra, Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader submitted that even in cases wherein the person is in judicial custody, a detention order can be validly passed if the satisfaction of the authority is properly adverted to in the order. According to the counsel, it was after being fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the present order of detention was passed. Moreover, the learned Government Pleader would submit that in the impugned order itself, it is mentioned that though the Special Court for Trial of NDPS cases, Manjeri had dismissed the bail application filed by the detenu, still there is a chance that the detenu will approach higher courts for getting bail. According to the learned Government Pleader, it was in anticipation that the detenu would approach higher courts for bail, the proceedings under the PITNDPS Act were initiated which culminated in the passing of the impugned order. 7.
According to the learned Government Pleader, it was in anticipation that the detenu would approach higher courts for bail, the proceedings under the PITNDPS Act were initiated which culminated in the passing of the impugned order. 7. While considering the rival contentions, the first and foremost aspect that cannot be overlooked is that in the case at hand, the proceedings for taking action under the PITNDPS Act were initiated and the final order of detention under the said Act was passed while the petitioner was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. Evidently, the detenu is still under judicial custody in connection with the last case registered against him. In the last case, the detenu was caught red-handed with a commercial quantity of Hashish oil on 06.04.2024 at 11.30 p.m. His arrest was recorded in the said case on the next day. The records further reveal that from 07.04.2024 onwards he is in judicial custody. Though he approached the Special Court for trial of NDPS cases with a bail application, the same was dismissed. As already stated, it was while he was in judicial custody the present detention order was passed. 8. Undisputedly, a detention order can validly be passed even when the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. There is no law that precludes the competent authority from passing a detention order against a person who is in judicial custody. However, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, when a detention order was passed against a person who is in judicial custody, the authority who passed the said order should be cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody while passing such an order. In the case at hand, the fact that the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to in the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the authority that passed the order was unaware of the custody of the detenu in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and the counsel for the petitioner also does not have such a contention. 9.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the authority that passed the order was unaware of the custody of the detenu in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and the counsel for the petitioner also does not have such a contention. 9. While coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in cases where the detenu is in judicial custody, detention order can validly be passed only on the satisfaction of the triple test laid down by the Supreme Court in Kamarunissa (supra), it is to be noted that in the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as noted below: “Even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this regard such an order would be valid.” Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [ 1994 (2) SCC 337 ] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [ 2003 (8) SCC 342 ]. 10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while coming to records in the present case, in the impugned order it is specifically mentioned that the earlier bail application filed by the detenu seeking bail in the last case registered against him was dismissed by the Special Court for Trial of NDPS cases, Manjeri. It is further mentioned that there is a chance that the respondent may approach the higher courts for bail. The said vague statement in the impugned order does not disclose that, on the basis of what materials, the competent authority who passed the order, entered a satisfaction that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail.
It is further mentioned that there is a chance that the respondent may approach the higher courts for bail. The said vague statement in the impugned order does not disclose that, on the basis of what materials, the competent authority who passed the order, entered a satisfaction that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail. Notably, in the impugned order nowhere it is stated that the competent authority has reason to believe that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail. On the other hand, what is mentioned in the order is that, there is a chance that the detenu may approach higher courts for getting bail. Though the detaining authority was aware that the detenu was in judicial custody, there is no mention of the awareness of the authority on the basis of reliable material that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail. At this juncture it is significant to note that the contraband seized, in connection with the last case registered against the detenu under the NDPS Act, is commercial quantity. Therefore, the rigor contained under Section 37 of the NDPS Act to grant bail is squarely applicable in that case. Moreover, the records reveal that the bail application filed by the detenu in the abovesaid last case was dismissed on 27.04.2024. There is nothing to show that after the dismissal of the said petition, the detenu approached any higher courts or the same court again with a petition seeking bail so far till the detention order was passed on 16.10.2024. Therefore, a bare statement in the impugned order that there is a chance that the respondent may approach higher courts for getting bail is not sufficient to establish that the competent authority has reason to believe that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the case last registered against him. If there were cogent materials to arrive at a conclusion that the detenu might be released on bail then the same should have been clearly indicated in the order. In the absence of the same we have no hesitation in holding that the objective as well as the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the competent authority to pass the impugned order of detention is vitiated. 11.
In the absence of the same we have no hesitation in holding that the objective as well as the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the competent authority to pass the impugned order of detention is vitiated. 11. In the result, this Writ Petition is allowed and Ext.P1 order of detention is set aside. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Jabir C.P., forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. The Registry is directed to communicate the order to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram forthwith.