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2025 DIGILAW 351 (AP)

Y. Srikanth v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2025-02-24

V.SUJATHA

body2025
ORDER : V.SUJATHA, J. This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is filed by the petitioner/accused seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.19 of 2019 on the file of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palamaner, registered for the offences under Sections 420 and 379 I.P.C. 2. The case of the defacto complainant is that he has been operating Narayana School buses on lease basis in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Bangalore. Originally, the accused entered into an agreement with Narayana Educational Society for the said purpose and in pursuance of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 18.07.2013, allowed the defacto complainant as business partner of the accused with 50% of share in transport and maintenance of 59 school/college buses to Narayana Educational Society vide Transportation and maintenance agreement, dated 17.06.2013. While so, after completion of five years, disputes arose in between the defacto complainant and the accused regarding the share in business and after mediations held by the mediators, the defacto complainant got 25 buses as his share and the accused got 32 buses as his share. 3. While the matter being so, the main allegation is that on 10.07.2018 at 11.30 a.m., the accused with deceitful intention committed theft of eight buses bearing registration numbers 1)AP03TA8958, 2) AP29U7879, 3) AP02TA8928, 4) AP297880, 5) AP29V7892, 6) AP29V7893, 7) KA34A9670, and 8) AP29V7979, which were kept by the defacto complainant at the groundnut and rice mill of one T.N. Prathap @ Babu, and taken them away due to disputes in the transportation business. Upon filing of the complaint by the defacto complainant, a case in Crime No.91 of 2018 under Sections 420 and 379 I.P.C. was registered. During the course of investigation, the stolen buses were seized by the police and produced before the concerned Magistrate. After completion of investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 379 I.P.C., which came to be registered as C.C.No.19 of 2019. Seeking to quash the proceedings against him in the said C.C., the petitioner/accused filed the present criminal petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there was a tri-party agreement entered into between the petitioner, Secretary of Narayana Educational Institution as well as Financer of the said buses. Seeking to quash the proceedings against him in the said C.C., the petitioner/accused filed the present criminal petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there was a tri-party agreement entered into between the petitioner, Secretary of Narayana Educational Institution as well as Financer of the said buses. As per the said agreement, the petitioner has cleared all formalities by running the buses and subsequently, the Narayana Educational Society has also issued "No Objection Certificate? on 03.07.2018 transferring all the 58 vehicles, which were allotted to the petitioner in the year 2013, in the name of the petitioner. By virtue of such transfer, the petitioner has become the owner of the buses and has been in possession of the said buses. As such, the question of committing theft of his own vehicles by the petitioner does not arise. It is further contended that except the alleged MOU, which was a fabricated document, there is no other material to show that the vehicles have been allotted to the defacto complainant and taking note of the same, the trial Court has dismissed the application filed by the defacto complainant for grant of interim custody of the vehicles and allowed the application of the accused, granting interim custody of the vehicles seized, which was further confirmed in revision. It is also further contended that upon an application submitted by the petitioner under RTI Act requesting to furnish information with regard to the stamp details of the Document No.BN298303 i.e. the MOU dated alleged to have been entered into between the petitioner and the defacto complainant, Public Relations Officer, Joint Registrar-I, Kakinada, has furnished information vide letter dated 07.12.2020, stating that the stamp document with Sl.No.BN298303 was issued to stamp vendor GSR Murthy, who sold the same to Chakravarthula Krishna Sesha Rao, S/o Nagababu and the date of the said transaction is 19.11.2014. When the said document itself was purchased in the year 2014, the question of executing the MOU in the year 2013 does not arise. Hence, it is prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioner. 5. When the said document itself was purchased in the year 2014, the question of executing the MOU in the year 2013 does not arise. Hence, it is prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioner. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent-defacto complainant contends that the allegations made in the complaint are sufficient to attract the offences under Sections 420 and 379 I.P.C. He further submits that whether the MOU is genuine document or not and whether the buses were transferred in favour of the petitioner are all questions of fact, which have to be decided after full-fledged trial, and therefore, seeks to dismiss the present petition. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor concurs with the said submission made by the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent-defacto complainant. 7. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows: “Whether the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No.19 of 2019 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palamaner, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 8. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 9. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: In “ R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 ”, the Apex Court laid down the following principles: (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 10. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interferenceby the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar, [ AIR 1990 SC 494 ] ” 11. In “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] ” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 12. The offences alleged against the petitioner/accused in the present C.C. are under Section 420 and 379 I.P.C. Section 420 I.P.C. reads as under: “Cheating and di shonestly inducing delivery of property. Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” Section 379 I.P.C. reads as under: “ Punishment for theft. Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 13. Now, it is to be examined whether the aforesaid offences would attract in the present case, on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet and prima facie material, if any, available on record. 14. The allegation levelled against the petitioner is that he has committed theft of eight buses belonging to Narayana Educational Society, which were in possession of the defacto complainant in pursuance of MOU dated 18.07.2013 entered into between him and the accused. 14. The allegation levelled against the petitioner is that he has committed theft of eight buses belonging to Narayana Educational Society, which were in possession of the defacto complainant in pursuance of MOU dated 18.07.2013 entered into between him and the accused. A perusal of the record shows that originally, the accused and Narayana Educational Society have entered into an agreement dated 17.06.2013 as per which the accused agreed to operate the buses of the said Educational Society to facilitate transportation to its students, on hire-cum-purchase basis. Though it is the case of the defacto complainant that subsequent to the said agreement dated 17.06.2013, he and the accused have entered into an MOU dated 18.07.2013 and shared the buses amongst themselves, the accused denies execution of the said MOU and contends that it is a fabricated document. In support of his contention, the accused filed letter dated 07.12.2020 issued by Public Information Officer/Joint Sub-Registrar, Kakinada, stating that as per the records, the stamp document bearing No.BN298303 on which the alleged MOU dated 18.07.2013 was drafted, was issued to one GSR Murthy, stamp vendor, and it was purchased on 19.11.2014. Thus, it creates a doubt as to how the MOU was executed in the year 2013, when the stamp document was purchased in the year 2014. 15. Further, a perusal of the additional material papers would show that the Secretary of Narayana Educational Society has filed a third-party affidavit before the trial Court, stating that the said Educational Society has entered into an agreement with the accused on 17.06.2013 to operate the buses for transportation of students of the Society on hire-cum-purchase basis and as per the agreement, the accused cleared all formalities by running the buses and therefore, in terms of the agreement, the Educational Society has issued "No Objection Certificate? on 03.07.2018 for transferring all the buses for registration in the name of the accused. Thus, by the date of incident i.e., 10.07.2018, NOC has already been issued by Narayana Educational Society in favour of the petitioner for registration of the buses in his name. 16. Thus, viewed from any angle, the allegations of cheating or theft are not attributable and the offences under Section 420 and 379 I.P.C. do not attract in the present case. 16. Thus, viewed from any angle, the allegations of cheating or theft are not attributable and the offences under Section 420 and 379 I.P.C. do not attract in the present case. As such, continuing the proceedings against the petitioners would amount to abuse of process of law and the proceedings are, therefore, liable to be quashed. 17. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner/accused in C.C.No.19 of 2019 on the file of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palamaner, are hereby quashed. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.