JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. C. Lalfakzuala, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Z. Hnamte, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the C.P.C., is directed against the order dated 30.07.2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. III, Aizwal, in CMA No. 185/2024 arising out of RFA No. 05/2024 and order dated 30.07.2024, passed in RFA No. 05/2024. 3. It is to be noted here that vide order dated 30.07.2024, the learned Additional District Judge No. III, Aizwal has rejected the petition filed by the appellant for condonation of delay of 1320 day in filing the connected RFA No. 05/2024. Background facts:- 4. The background facts leading to filing of this present appeal are briefly stated as under:- “The husband of the appellant herein, namely, Late Ramdingliana was the owner of a plot of land measuring 0.06 bigha, 81.85 square meters and LSC No. 282 of 1981 was issued to him. The husband of the appellant, suffered demise on 19.08.2009 and being the legal heir, the appellant kept the original copy of the LSC No. 282 of 1981 in her safe custody. But, at the time of Covid-19, while she was admitted in hospital, she kept the same in the safe custody of her daughter. Then, while she was undergoing treatment, without her knowledge, her daughter obtained a loan of Rs. 3,00,000/- from one person, namely, Shri Thangrotluanga of Thuampuii in the year 2019 and for which, she secretly mortgaged the original copy of LSC No. 282 of 1981. Thereafter, to redeem the said money her daughter took another loan of Rs. 10,00,000/- from the present respondent, by further mortgaging the said LSC and thereafter, being unable to redeem the said loan to the respondent herein, her daughter in connivance with the respondent herein decided to obtain the Heirship Certificate in his favour in respect of the landed property covered by LSC No. 282 of 1981. Thereafter, the respondent herein filed one application, under Section 30(3) of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 before the learned trial court for issuing one Heirship Certificate in respect of a landed property, covered by LSC No. 282 of 1981, situated at Chanmari West, measuring 0.06 bigha 81.85 square meters, left by Late Ramdingliana. Thereafter, the respondent herein filed one application, under Section 30(3) of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 before the learned trial court for issuing one Heirship Certificate in respect of a landed property, covered by LSC No. 282 of 1981, situated at Chanmari West, measuring 0.06 bigha 81.85 square meters, left by Late Ramdingliana. Thereafter, the learned trial court, vide order dated 24.07.2020, had issued the Heirship Certificate to the respondent considering the documents placed on the record including Death Certificate of Late Ramdingllana; photo copy of LSC; photo copy of Voters ID; No Objection Letter from Ms. Lalengliani, wife of Late Ramdingliana and Ms. Lungtiawil, daughter of Late Ramdingliana; and acknowledgement letter issued by Secretary Local Council Chanmari West, Aizawl. Thereafter, on 04.01.2024, the respondent herein approached the appellant and informed her that the landed property covered by LSC No. 282 of 1981 belongs to him. Then, she inquired about the matter and came to know that the respondent has obtained the heirship certificate and got the land mutated in his name. Thereafter, the petitioner had decided to challenge the aforesaid order, by filing one regular first appeal. However, there was delay of 1320 days in filing the same. It is the pleaded case of the appellant herein that in fact there was delay of 514 days only after exclusion of the period, from 15.03.2020 to 30.05.2022, due to exemption granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Muto Case No. 03 of 2020. Thereafter, one appeal was preferred along with one condonation petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonain the delay in preferring the connected appeal before the learned Additional District Judge No. III, Aizawl and after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, the learned first appellate court had dismissed the petition for condoning the delay in preferring the connected appeal, vide order dated 30.07.2024, in CMA No. 185/2024 arising out of RFA No. 05/2024.” 5. Thereafter, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred this second appeal which was admitted by this court on the following substantial questions of law:- “ (i) Whether the learned Additional District Judge No. III, Aizwal could have rejected the condonation application on a mere perusal of document produced by the respondent in the absence of legal proof under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872? And (ii) Whether the order dated 30.07.2024, passed in CMA No. 185/2024 and RFA No. 05/2024 is perverse and arbitrary?” Submissions:- 6. Mr. Lalfakzuala, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order, so passed by the learned first appellate court, dismissing the condonation petition, is perverse as the learned first appellate court has not considered the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the grounds so assigned by the applicant in the petition. Referring to decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (Through Director) vs. State of Haryana and Another, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 656 , Mr. Lalfakzuala further submits that transfer of immoveable can be effected by a deed of conveyance (Sale Deed) and unless such deed is executed and registered and duly stamped no right, title and interest in an immoveable property can be transferred. But, in the case in hand there is no such sale deed to show transfer of the land to the respondent. Mr. Lalfakzuala also submits that as the impugned order was passed without consideration of the aforementioned facts, the same is arbitrary and liable to be interfered with by this court and therefore, it is contended to set it aside. 6.1. Mr. Lalfakzuala has referred following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) Sabarmati Gas Limited vs. Shah Alloys Limited, reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 9 and (ii) N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Hnamte, learned counsel for the respondent submits that while refusing to condone the delay in filing the regular first appeal, the learned first appellate court has considered the original document, i.e. Intiamna dated 14.07.2023. Mr. Hnamte further submits that on perusal of the said document, the learned first appellate court found that the appellant and her daughter promised to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- as rent to the present respondent on or before 22.07.2023, which clearly shows that the appellant has full knowledge about the transfer of ownership towards the respondent and therefore, the submission of appellant that she knows about transfer of ownership towards the respondent only on 04.01.2024 is baseless. Therefore, Mr. Hnamte has contended to dismiss this petition. Disucssion:- 8. 2,50,000/- as rent to the present respondent on or before 22.07.2023, which clearly shows that the appellant has full knowledge about the transfer of ownership towards the respondent and therefore, the submission of appellant that she knows about transfer of ownership towards the respondent only on 04.01.2024 is baseless. Therefore, Mr. Hnamte has contended to dismiss this petition. Disucssion:- 8. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also perused the impugned order dated 30.07.2024, passed in CMA No. 185/2024 arising out of RFA No. 05/2024 and also perused the case laws referred by the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. Before directing a discussion, into the points raised by the learned counsel for both the parties, it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of condonation of delay, presently holding the field, so to deal with the issue with greater precision. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji , reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 , has observed as under:- “ The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step- motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even- handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.” 11. Again in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 , Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and made the following observations:- “ It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 12. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 12. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. , reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to earlier authorities, broadly culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under:- “ (1) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (2) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. (3) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (4) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (5) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (6) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (7) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (8) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (9) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (10) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (11) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (12) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (13) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 13. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. They are :- “ (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 14. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Executive Engineer jalgaon Medium Project and Another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448 , while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 29. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Executive Engineer jalgaon Medium Project and Another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448 , while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. 31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 15. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing with an application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is being shown. The term ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose and regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. The paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation of delay, the presumption is not available but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time, it must be reasonable also. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time, it must be reasonable also. In case of inordinate delay, strict approach is required to be taken while in case of delay of short duration, a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case the explanation, being offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The entire gamuts of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public body or an entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. 16. Thus, having informed ourselves, about the proposition of law, presently holding the field in respect of condonation of delay, now an endeavour will be made to examine how far the applicant has been able to explain the delay of 514 days in preferring the connected appeal and whether the same are sufficient or not. 17. In the instant case, a cursory perusal of the impugned order dated 30.07.2024, indicates that the learned first appellate court had not taken into consideration the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and also not considered the grounds assigned by the present appellant as to whether the same are sufficient or not in the condonation petition being filed in filing in the regular first appeal. 18. It appears that the appellant came to know about the Heirship Certificate and about the fate of the LSC No. 282 of 1981, only on 04.01.2024, when the respondent herein came to her house and told her that the landed property covered by LSC No.282 of 1981, belongs to him. 18. It appears that the appellant came to know about the Heirship Certificate and about the fate of the LSC No. 282 of 1981, only on 04.01.2024, when the respondent herein came to her house and told her that the landed property covered by LSC No.282 of 1981, belongs to him. Further, it appears that though in the application it stated that there was delay of 1320 days, yet in fact the actual number of days of delay was 514 days, after excluding the limitation period from 15.03.2020 to 30.05.2022, due to exemption granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Muto Case No.03 of 2020. The learned counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed this out during argument and there appears to be substance in the same. Besides, the learned counsel for the respondent has not disputed the said fact. 19. It is to be noted here that the appellant herein, in her petition for condonation for delay, had taken following grounds:- (i) she did not know about the process of obtaining the Heirship Certificate, in Heirship Certificate Case No. 693/2020, filed by the opposite party who is a third party and soon after she came to know about the Heirship Certificate, she took steps to avail the same without any delay; (ii) after the demise of her husband-Late Ramdingliana on 19.08.2009, she being the wife and legal heir, kept the original copy of LSC No. 282 of 1981 in her safe custody, but due to Covid-19 she was detrimentally affected in the year 2020 and on 19.06.2020, she was admitted at Ebenezer Medical Centre, Aizwal for emergency surgery; (iii) due to such ailments she had entrusted her daughter, Smt. Lungtiawii to take care of the original copy of the LSC No. 282 of 1981 for paying revenue, taxes and she did not thought that her daughter could have the intention to dispose of the same; (iv) thereafter, on 04.01.2024, the opposite party surprisingly came to her house and told her that the landed property covered under LSC No. 282 of 1981 is now owned by him and he transferred the title and ownership of the same in his name and thereafter, she immediately asked her daughter how the LSC was in his hands and then her daughter told her that as she was in dire need of money for some urgent reasons, she had earlier borrowed Rs. 3,00,000/- from one person namely, Shri Thangrotluanga of Thuampuii in the year 2019 and for which, she secretly mortgaged the original copy of LSC No. 282 of 1981 without her knowledge; (v) thereafter, to redeem the said money her daughter took another loan of Rs. 10,00,000/- from the present opposite party, by further mortgaging the said LSC; (vi) thereafter, being unable to repay the said loan to the opposite party, her daughter connived with the opposite party in obtaining the Heirship Certificate for him in respect of the said landed property by forging her signature in the NOC and also took an acknowledgement letter from the concerned Village Council’s Secretary of their locality and accordingly, the opposite party had obtained the Heirship Certificate in respect of land covered by LSC No. 282 of 1981; (vii) then, as suggested by her present engaged counsel one RTI query was made to the office of the Revenue Department as regard the LSC No. 282 of 1981 and from the RTI response letter dated 10.01.2024, it was revealed that the opposite party had already mutated and registered the said landed property in his name way back in the year 2020, after obtaining Heirship Certificate Case No. 693/2020; and (viii) thereafter, she obtained a copy of the said Heirship Certificate and her engaged counsel had spent two weeks time to study the case and to prepare the draft of the appeal. 20. Admittedly the learned first appellate court had not directed any discussion as to whether these grounds are sufficient or not to condone the delay of 514 days in the impugned order. It had solely relied upon the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent and also relied upon the Intiamna, and thereafter, arrived at the finding that the appellant herein had the knowledge of transfer of ownership of the land towards the respondent herein and they also paid rent to him and that there is no ground for condonation of delay. 21. While the present appellant had taken a categorical stand that her signature over the Intiamna was forged, then the learned first appellate court ought not to have relied upon the said Intiamna to arrive at the aforementioned conclusion that there is no ground for condonation of delay. 21. While the present appellant had taken a categorical stand that her signature over the Intiamna was forged, then the learned first appellate court ought not to have relied upon the said Intiamna to arrive at the aforementioned conclusion that there is no ground for condonation of delay. The learned first appellate court ought to have asked for legal proof of Intiamna and also it could have send the disputed signature of the appellant in the Intiamna and her admitted signature to the handwriting expert. But, having not done so, the learned first appellate court, relied upon the version of the respondent that the Intiamna was executed by the appellant herein and thereafter, paid rent to the respondent and then, thereafter, dismissed the condonation petition. 22. It is worth mentioning in this context that in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (Supra) , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a transfer of immovable property, by way of sale, can only be effected by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance duly stamped and registered as required by law, no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred. This being the legal position, without there being a deed of conveyance, duly stamped and registered, the landed property covered by LSC No. 282 of 1981 could not have been transferred to the respondent. But, this aspect also eschewed consideration of the learned first appellate court. Findings:- 23. I have carefully considered the grounds, so assigned by the appellant for condonation of delay of 514 days, in the light of the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties and also in the light of the proposition of law discussed herein above, and considering the entire gamut of facts, I am satisfied to hold that there exist sufficient grounds for condonation of the aforementioned delay. There is no deliberate delay or negligence on the part of the appellant and the delay appears to be bona-fide one. She has an arguable case, which has to be decided on merit in the appeal. 24. Under the given facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 30.07.2024, so passed by the learned first appellate court, in CMA No. 185/2024, arising out of RFA No. 05/2024, appears to be arbitrary and perverse. She has an arguable case, which has to be decided on merit in the appeal. 24. Under the given facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 30.07.2024, so passed by the learned first appellate court, in CMA No. 185/2024, arising out of RFA No. 05/2024, appears to be arbitrary and perverse. This court is satisfied to hold that herein this case, both the substantial question of law, so framed at the time of admission of this second appeal, are involves and accordingly, the same stands answered in terms of above discussion and findings. 25. In the result, this second appeal stands allowed. The impugned order dated 30.07.2024, passed in CMA No. 185/2024 arising out of RFA No. 05/2024, stands set aside and quashed. 26. Consequently, the RFA No. 05/2024, stands restored to the file of the learned first appellate court. The learned first appellate court shall proceed to hear the RFA No. 05/2024 and disposed of the same in accordance with law, as soon as practicable. The parties have to bear their own costs.