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2025 DIGILAW 357 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Khodabhai Ishwarbhai Parmar

2025-04-03

S.V.PINTO

body2025
JUDGMENT : (S.V. PINTO, J.) 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant- State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad, (hereinafter referred to as "the learned Trial Court") in Sessions Case No. 120 of 2011 on 25.05.2012, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents for the offence punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) as well as Section 3 of the Prevention of Dowry Act. 1.1] The respondents are hereinafter referred to as “the accused” in the rank and file as they stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2] The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under: 2.1] The accused No. 1 was the husband of deceased Jayaben, the accused No. 2 - the younger brother-in-law and the accused No. 3 - the mother-in-law of deceased Jayaben. Deceased Jayaben was married to the accused No. 1 about 6 months prior to the unfortunate incident and all the accused would physically and mentally torture deceased Jayaben to bring a motorcycle from her parent's house. Jayaben was so fed up of the torture and on 5th of April 2011 at around 20.00 hours, in the outskirts of village Vashna Buzarg, she consumed some poisonous substance and expired during treatment. The complaint was registered by Prahladbhai Kalabhai Solanki, the father of deceased Jayaben before the Kheda Town Police Station, which was registered at Kheda Town Police Station I-C.R. No.47 of 2011 under Sections 498-A, 306 and 114 of the IPC. 2.2] The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the connected witnesses and collected the necessary documents and after completion of investigation the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, and as the said offences against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the learned Sessions Judge, Nadiad as per the provisions of Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the case was registered Sessios Case No. 120 of 2011. 2.3] The accused were duly served with the summons and the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, and it was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of the Code. A charge at Exh. 5 was framed against the accused and the statements of the accused were recorded at Exhs. 6 to 8, wherein, the accused denied all the contents of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken on record. 2.4] The prosecution produced eight oral evidences and twelve documentary evidences to bring home the charge against the accused and after the learned Additional Public Prosecutor filed the closing pursis, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were recorded, wherein, the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution on record. The accused refused to step into the witness box or examine witnesses on their behalf and stated that a false case has been filed against them. After the arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned trial Court by the impugned judgment and order was pleased to acquit all the accused from all the charges leveled against them. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgement and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and during cross-examination, nothing adverse has been elicited in favour of the respondent. The case has been proved beyond reasonable doubts and the prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondent and the judgement and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal and without any basis in the eyes of law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. Vijay Nangesh for learned advocate for the respondents - accused. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, for the appellant State and learned advocate Mr. Vijay Nangesh for learned advocate for the respondents - accused. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case and submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned trial Court has not appreciated the direct and indirect evidence in the case. The prosecution has fully proved the case beyond reasonable doubts but the learned trial Court has relied on minor contradictions and has given undue weightage with regard to the place of incident. That the order passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, improper and perverse and is required to be quashed and set aside and the appeal of the appellant must be allowed. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Vijay Nangesh appearing for the respondents - original accused submits that the judgment and order has been passed after appreciation of all the evidence and the learned Court has appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and hence, the appeal of the appellant-State must be rejected. 7. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court in acquittal appeals in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 : AIR 2006 SC 831 , this Court stated; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (emphasis supplied) From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.. 8] The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened. There is no inhibition to re appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after re appre- ciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere in the same. 9] As the appeal pertains to a case under Section 306 of the IPC, it would be appropriate to reproduce the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mahendra Awase vs The State of Madhya Pradhesh Criminal Appeal No. 221/2025 (@ SLP(Cr) No. 11868/2023) passed on 17 th January, 2025 which is as under: 11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:- “306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. Section 107 of the IPC reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” As is clear from the plain language of the Sections to attract the ingredient of Section 306, the accused should have abetted the commission of a suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing who Firstly - instigates any person to do that thing or Secondly - engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing or Thirdly - intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 13. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 438], the appellant remarked to the deceased that 'go and die' and the deceased thereafter, committed suicide. This Court held that:- "3. ...Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite 'mens rea' on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events. …" 14. In Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2010) 8 SCC 628 , this Court held that in order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It was further held that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306. 15. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court held as under:- “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. [Emphasis supplied] 16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 17. M. Mohan vs. State, (2011) 3 SCC 626 followed Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , wherein it was held as under:- 41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629) “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record where-from an inference of the appellant accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.” Thereafter, this Court in Mohan (supra) held:- 45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.” [Emphasis supplied] 10] In light of the above settled principles of law, the evidence on record of the case is appreciated and the prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 1 Dr. Jatin Yogeshbhai Vadhwana at Exhibit 11 and the witness is the Medical Officer, who was working at CHC Matar on 6.4.2011 and he had conducted the post-mortem on the dead body of deceased Jayaben Khodabhai Parmar. The witness has stated that there were no external injuries on the dead body as per column No. 17 and after the post-mortem was conducted, they had given the opinion regarding the provisional cause of death as ingestion of some unknown substance and had reserved the final cause of death for the report of the FSL and after the persual of the FSL report, the final cause of death was poisoning due to “Endosulphan”. The witness has produced the post-mortem note at Exhibit 13 and during the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that there are several reasons for cause of death due to poisoning and the poison would take affect from any time between 1 hour to 6 hours. The witness has produced the post-mortem note at Exhibit 13 and during the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that there are several reasons for cause of death due to poisoning and the poison would take affect from any time between 1 hour to 6 hours. That he could not conclusively opine whether the poison was ingested on her own or by force. 10.1] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 2 Prahladbhai Kadabhai Solanki at Exhibit 15 and the witness is the father of the deceased Jayaben and the complainant, who has fully supported the contents of the complaint. The witness has stated that on 4.4.2011, his daughter Jaya had come to his house and had stayed the night and told him that, they were demanding Rs 25,000/- for a motorcycle. He had made his daughter understand and had also spoken to the accused and had dropped his daughter at her matrimonial home. Once again, she came back after two to three days and told him that the accused were demanding Rs 25,000/- and on the next day, he once again went to her matrimonial home. On 05.04.2011, his son Arvind received a telephone call from the accused No. 2 stating that his daughter was taken to the hospital at Matar and when he went to the Matar hospital, he found that his daughter had expired. He had filed the complaint, which is produced at Exhibit 16. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that his financial condition was not good and he had mortgaged his land before the wedding of his daughter Jaya, who was married at around 25 years of age. At the time of the incident, his daughter Jaya was about 30 years old and the accused No. 1 had a provision store, which was running very well. The financial status of the accused was very good and hence he had got her married to the accused No.1. After some time, his daughter Jaya was living with her husband separately from the accused Nos. 2 and 3 and the accused No.1 and 2 were doing service and also they had agricultural land. The financial status of the accused was very good and hence he had got her married to the accused No.1. After some time, his daughter Jaya was living with her husband separately from the accused Nos. 2 and 3 and the accused No.1 and 2 were doing service and also they had agricultural land. Their financial condition had improved a great deal and after his daughter had expired, he had a discussion with all his relatives about the steps to be taken and thereafter they had all gone to the police station. His wife Babyben was ill for some time and his son Arvind was married 2 to 3 years after the marriage of Jaya. His daughter Jaya used to come often to her parental home as her mother was not well and the doctor had advised her not to do any work. After some time, the wife of his son Arvind bhai had gone off to her paternal home and in his presence, the accused No. 1 has never ill-treated his daughter Jaya. His wife never told him that his daughter had told her that the accused were demanding an amount of Rs.25,000/- and he did not inform any of his elders that the accused were demanding an amount of Rs.25,000/-. One day prior to the incident, his daughter Jaya was at his house and the accused No. 1 had telephoned at around 10:00 pm and she had gone to her matrimonial home on the next day. When the telephone call from the accused No. 1 came, his wife did not allow his daughter to go to her matrimonial home. After marriage, his daughter did not have any child and a number of relatives would come to inquire about the health of his wife and they would ask his daughter about her child. His wife and daughters had kept a number of vows for his daughter Jaya to have a child and three months prior to the incident, a son was born to the younger brother-in-law of his daughter Jaya. Thereafter she was upset mentally and she was very upset mentally. 10.2] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 3 Ilaben Bharatbhai Parmar at Exhibit 17 and the witness is the sister of the deceased Jayaben, who has supported the case of the prosecution. Thereafter she was upset mentally and she was very upset mentally. 10.2] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 3 Ilaben Bharatbhai Parmar at Exhibit 17 and the witness is the sister of the deceased Jayaben, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination, the witness has stated that the accused No. 1 and her sister Jaya would reside separately away from the accused Nos. 2 and 3. Her mother Babyben was unwell for a long time and on a number of occasions, her sister Jayaben would come to her paternal home in the morning and go back in the evening. As she had children, she could not spend more time in her paternal home looking after her mother and she and Jayaben reside in the same village. When she went on the date of the incident to the house of Jayaben, the rickshaw was waiting and they had immediately taken Jayaben in the rickshaw to the hospital and the accused Nos. 1 and 2 had also come to the hospital and they had tried to save her sister Jayaben. That her sister did not have any children and she was mentally upset about the same. 10.3] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 4 Arvindbhai Prahladbhai Solanki at Exhibit 18 and the witness is the brother of the deceased Jayaben, who has supported the case of the prosecution. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, he has stated that his sister was never ill-treated by the accused No. 1 in his presence and after discussion with the relatives, his father had decided to file the complaint. His sister was very upset because she did not have a child and one day prior to the incident, his brother-in-law had phoned and called his sister home, but his mother did not allow her to go. 10.4] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 5 Ganeshbhai Chunibhai Baraiya at Exhibit 19 and the witness is the owner of CNG rickshaw number GJ-7-VV-1022. The witness has stated that on 5.4.2011, the accused No. 1 and his sister-in-law Ilaben came and they brought Jayaben and asked him to take them to hospital. He had taken them to Matar Hospital and the accused Nos. 1 and 2 and Ilaben were with her. The witness has stated that on 5.4.2011, the accused No. 1 and his sister-in-law Ilaben came and they brought Jayaben and asked him to take them to hospital. He had taken them to Matar Hospital and the accused Nos. 1 and 2 and Ilaben were with her. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that when he took the rickshaw and went to the house of the accused No. 1, there were a number of persons from the street, who had gathered there and immediately she was taken to hospital. That on the way to the hospital, Jayaben could not speak anything. 10.5] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 6 Bhikhabhai Atmarambhai Solanki at Exhibit 23 and the witness is the neighbor of the complainant, who has stated that on 5.4.2011, when he was at his home, he was informed that Jayaben has consumed poison and he went to along with the complainant to the hospital and they were informed that while Jayaben was being brought to the hospital, she had expired enroute to the hospital. During the cross-examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that he is a leader of his community and if a person is in the community wedding, the gifts are given by the community and no dowry is given or taken for a wedding for a community wedding. 10.6] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 7 Vinubhai Keshavbhai Solanki at Exhibit 24 and the witness is the nephew of the complainant, who has stated that Jayaben was married to the accused No. 1 around five years prior to the incident and one day prior to the incident, Jayaben had come to her parental house and thereafter she was sent back to her matrimonial home. On 05.04.2011, Jayaben consumed some poison and he was informed and he along with his uncle and others had gone to the Matar hospital where Ilaben, the sister of Jayaben and her husband Bharatbhai were present. They were not informed about the reason for the quarrel and Jayaben expired enroute to the hospital. 10.7] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 8 Sahdevsinh Bahadursinh Vaghela at Exhibit 25 and the witness is the Investigating Officer, who has narrated in detail the entire procedure that was undertaken by him during investigation. They were not informed about the reason for the quarrel and Jayaben expired enroute to the hospital. 10.7] The prosecution has examined Prosecution Witness No. 8 Sahdevsinh Bahadursinh Vaghela at Exhibit 25 and the witness is the Investigating Officer, who has narrated in detail the entire procedure that was undertaken by him during investigation. During the cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused, the witness has stated that he had recorded the statements of Ramabai Somabai and Kabhaibhai Somabai but they have not been cited as witnesses in the charge-sheet. In the statements of Ramabai Somabai Parmar and Kabhaibhai Somabai Parmar, it had emerged that the deceased was residing separately with her husband and there was no mental or physical torture from the accused. Jayaben had gone to the field and consumed poison and thereafter Kanubhai Chandubhai and Bharatbhai Chandubhai had brought her home. In the statements of Kanubhai Chandubhai and Bharatbhai Chandubhai, there was no evidence that Jayaben would speak and he had not recorded the statements of the neighbours of the matrimonial house of Jayaben. 11] On minute appreciation of the entire evidence of the prosecution, the evidence that has come on record is that Jayaben was married with the accused No. 1 in the community wedding and as per the evidence of Prosecution Witness No. 6 Bikhabai Atmaram Solanki, who is a leader of their community, no dowry is given or taken in a community wedding and the persons of the community give the gifts to the couple. The incident has occurred on 05.04.2011 and on 04.04.2011, deceased Jayaben was at her parental home and the accused No. 1 had called her back home as his tiffin had to be prepared in the morning but she did not return on that day. Her mother babyben was ill and Jayaben would often come to help her mother as the doctor had advised her mother not to do any work. Moreover, even though she was married for about five years, deceased Jayaben did not have any children and in the evidence of Prosecution Witness No. 2 Prahlad Kadabhai Solanki, the father of the deceased, Prosecution Witness No. 3, Ilaben Bharatbhai Parmar, the sister of the deceased and Prosecution Witness No. 4, Arvindbhai Prahladbhai Solanki, the brother of the deceased, it has come on record that deceased Jayaben was mentally upset as she did not have children. Moreover, it has also emerged on record that a boy child was born at the house of her younger brother-in-law and she was upset about the same. In the evidence of Prosecution Witness No. 8, Sahdevsinh Bahadursinh Vaghela, the Investigating Officer, it has come on record that Jayaben had consumed poison in a field and Kanubhai Chandubhai and Bharatbhai Chandubhai had brought her to her matrimonial house but both of the witnesses have not been examined before the learned Trial court. The complainant Prosecution Witness No. 2 Prahladbhai Kadabhai Solanki has categorically stated that no demand of dowry was made to him and the deceased had told his wife Babyben that the accused were demanding for Rs.25,000/- to bring a motorcycle and his wife had told him the same, but it is pertinent to note that Babyben, the mother of the deceased had not been examined before the learned Trial court. Moreover, in the evidence of Prosecution Witness No. 2 Prahladbhai Solanki, it has also come on record that the accused were well off and their financial status was good and hence he had got Jayaben married to the accused No. 1. Moreover, one year after the marriage, Jayaben had started living separately with the accused No. 1 and the accused Nos. 2 and 3 were not residing with the deceased. That Babyben, the mother of the deceased, was ill and she would often come to her parental home in the morning and go back in the evening and Prosecution Witness No. 3, Ilaben Bharatbhai Parman was residing in the same village, but she had children and she could not come to help her mother. The complainant Prosecution Witness No. 2 Prahladbhai Solanki has also stated that he had never told anyone about the demand made by the accused at any point of time and in the entire evidence of the prosecution, there is nothing on record to prove that the accused had aided, abetted, instigated or goaded the deceased to commit suicide and there is no evidence that immediately prior to the incident, any of the accused had a quarrel or any contact with the deceased, so that she could have no option but to commit suicide. 12] In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of Mahendra Awase (supra), the learned trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in extending benefit of doubt and acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against him. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of extending benefit of doubt and acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 13] The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad in Sessions Case No. 120 of 2011 on 25.05.2012, ,is hereby confirmed. 14] Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.