ORDER : SURAJ GOVINDARAJ, J. 1. The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs; 1. Issue writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of the 1 st Respondent dated 110.3.2025 passed in Dispute No.3 of 2023-24 as per Annexure-E. 2. Call for the records in related to the election dispute, pending on the file of the 1 st Respondent in Dispute No.3/2023-24. 3. Issue any appropriate order or directions as this Hon’ble Court deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. The Petitioner claims to be one of the candidates who contested in the election of the Managing Committee of Respondent No.3-Society held on 13.3.2024, wherein the Petitioner was declared as elected from the general category for a term of five years, necessary procedure and formalities having being followed. 3. Respondents No.15 to 19 who has also contested in the said election and having lost the election had raised a dispute under section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “KCS Act”), challenging the results of the returning candidates as notified by the Respondent No.2-Returning Officer. 4. The parties were directed to appear before the Respondent No.1-ARCS on 21.01.2024 and file their objections. It is alleged that, on 11.03.2025, the Respondent No.1 passed an order directing the recount of the ballot on 19.03.2025 by issuing certain directions to the Chief Executive Officer, in pursuance thereof a recount having been held, 3 of the persons who had raised the dispute were declared elected, it is challenging the same, the Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the afore said reliefs. 5. The submission of Sri.M.R.Rajagopal., learned Senior counsel is that; 5.1. A recount of the vote cannot be made at the ipse dixie of any of the parties. There have to be valid grounds made out for the same. In the election petition that has been filed, there are no grounds that have been made out for recount except to contend that 13 votes have been improperly rejected while counting the result of the elections, which would not by itself provide grounds for a recount. 5.2. By referring to the impugned order dated11.03.2025, he submits that there is no application of mind. 5.2. By referring to the impugned order dated11.03.2025, he submits that there is no application of mind. The said order has been passed only on the ground that objections to the election petition have not been filed and that the Respondents did not appear in the proceedings nor did they file objections to the application for recounting. 5.3. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in T.A. Ahammed Kabeer v. A.A. Azeez , [ (2003) 5 SCC 650 ] , more particularly para 26, 27 and 28 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference; 26. The task before an Election Judge is ticklish. It is often urged and also held that the success of a winning candidate should not be lightly set aside and the secrecy of the ballot must be zealously guarded. On account of a rigid following of these principles the Election Courts are inclined to lean in favour of the returned candidates and place the onus of proof on the person challenging the result of election, insisting on strict compliance with the rules of pleadings and excluding such evidence from consideration as is in divergence with the pleadings. However, what has so developed as a rule of practice should not be unduly stretched; for the purity of the election process needs to be preserved unpolluted so as to achieve the predominant goal of democracy that only he should represent the constituency who has been chosen by the majority of the electors. This is the purpose and object of the election law. 27. Though the inspection of ballot papers is to be allowed sparingly and the Court may refuse the prayer of the defeated candidate for inspection if, in the garb of seeking inspection, he was indulging in a roving enquiry in order to fish out materials to set aside the election, or the allegations made in support of such prayer were vague or too generalized to deserve any cognizance, nevertheless, the power to direct inspection of ballot papers is there and ought to be exercised if, based on precise allegations of material facts, also substantiated, a case for permitting inspection is made out as is necessary to determine the issue arising for decision in the case and in the interest of justice. As held by the Constitution Bench in Ram Sewak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai [ AIR 1964 SC 1249 : (1964) 6 SCR 238 ] an Election Tribunal has undoubtedly the power to direct discovery and inspection of documents within the narrow limits of Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Inspection of documents under Rule 15 of Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be ordered of documents which are referred to in the pleadings or particulars as disclosed in the affidavit of documents of the other party, and under Rule 18(2) of other documents in the possession or power of the other party. The Returning Officer is not a party to an election petition and an order for production of the ballot papers cannot be made under Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the Election Tribunal is not on that account without authority in respect of the ballot papers. In a proper case where the interests of justice demand it, the Tribunal may call upon the Returning Officer to produce the ballot papers and may permit inspection by the parties before it of the ballot papers which power is clearly implicit in Sections 100(1)(d)(iii), 101, 102 and Rule 93 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. This power to order inspection of the ballot papers which is apart from Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be exercised, subject to the statutory restrictions about the secrecy of the ballot paper prescribed by Sections 94 and 128(1). However, the Constitution Bench has cautioned, by the mere production of the sealed boxes of ballot papers before the Election Tribunal pursuant to its order the ballot papers do not become part of the record and they are not liable to be inspected unless the Tribunal is satisfied that such inspection is in the circumstances of the case necessary in the interests of justice. 28. It is true that a recount is not to be ordered merely for the asking or merely because the Court is inclined to hold a recount. In order to protect the secrecy of ballots the Court would permit a recount only upon a clear case in that regard having been made out. To permit or not to permit a recount is a question involving jurisdiction of the Court. In order to protect the secrecy of ballots the Court would permit a recount only upon a clear case in that regard having been made out. To permit or not to permit a recount is a question involving jurisdiction of the Court. Once a recount has been allowed the Court cannot shut its eyes on the result of recount on the ground that the result of recount as found is at variance with the pleadings. Once the Court has permitted recount within the well-settled parameters of exercising jurisdiction in this regard, it is the result of the recount which has to be given effect to. 5.4. By relying on Ahammed Kabeer 's case, he submits that the success of a winning candidate should not be lightly set aside and recount cannot be ordered merely for the asking or merely because the Court is inclined to hold a recount. 5.5. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in R. Kandasamy v. T.R.K. Sarawathy , [ (2025) 3 SCC 513 ] , more particularly para 42 and 43 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference; 42. The aforesaid two views of this Court, expressed by coordinate Benches, demand deference. However, it is noticed that this Court in Kanthamani [A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed, (2017) 4 SCC 654 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 596] had not been addressed on the effect of non-existence of a jurisdictional fact (the existence whereof would clothe the trial court with jurisdiction to try a suit and consider granting relief) i.e. what would be its effect on the right to relief claimed by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. 43. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros. [Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., (1992) 1 SCC 534 ] , an interesting discussion on “jurisdictional fact” is found in the concurring opinion of Hon'ble R.M.Sahai, J. (as his Lordship then was). It reads :(SCC pp. 551-52, para 19) “19. … What, then, is an error in respect of jurisdictional fact? A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a court, tribunal or an authority. In Black's Legal Dictionary it is explained as a fact which must exist before a court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. In Black's Legal Dictionary it is explained as a fact which must exist before a court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject-matter which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the Court or tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error of jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and bad. [ Wade, Administrative Law.] In Raza Textiles [Raza Textiles Ltd. v. CIT, (1973) 1 SCC 633 : (1973) 87 ITR 539 ] it was held that a court or tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly.” (emphasis supplied) 5.6. By relying on Kandasamy 's case, Sri.M.R.Rajagopal., learned Senior counsel submits that, without a ground being made out for recounting, no recount could have been ordered by Respondent No.1. The non- existence of a ground for recount would result in a non-existence of a jurisdictional fact on which basis the ARCS could not have assumed jurisdiction to direct a recount. 5.7. His submission is that for directing a recount there have to be valid grounds which are available, which are required to be considered, and thereafter a recount ordered. 5.8. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basudev Dutta vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors , [Civil Appeal No.13919 of 2024, dated 5.12.2024] more particularly para 12.2 and 12.6 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference; 12.2. It is settled law that every administrative or quasi-judicial order must contain the reasons. Such reasons go a long way in not only ensuring that the authority has applied his mind to the facts and the law, but also provide the grounds for the aggrieved party to assail the order in the manner known to law. In the absence of any reasons, it also possesses a difficulty for the judicial authorities to test the correctness of the order or in other words, exercise its power of judicial review. In this context, it will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan', wherein after a detailed analysis of various judgments, it was held as follows: "27. In this context, it will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan', wherein after a detailed analysis of various judgments, it was held as follows: "27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram v. State of Kerala [ (1979) 4 SCC 782 : AIR 1979 SC 1918 ] V.R. Krishna lyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes of quasi-judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge held that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made (see SCC p. 788, para 14:AIR p. 1922, para 14). 28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [ (1979) 2 SCC 368 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 197] this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor [ (1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5: AIR 1974 SC 87 ], held that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra), SCC p. 854, para 28, to the extent that: "28.... Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions." (See AIR p. 377, para 18.) 29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. [ (1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16: AIR 1980 SC 1 ] while giving the majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC p. 658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p. 97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows "Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex." 30. The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that: (H.H. Shri Swamiji case ( (1979) 4 SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16: AIR 1980 SC1], SCC p. 658, para 29) "29.... reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself." (See AIR p. 11, para 29.) 33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corpn. reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself." (See AIR p. 11, para 29.) 33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. [ (1990) 3 SCC 280 ] a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set-up judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the State has to justify its action in various fields of public law. All these necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review both by superior administrative heads and for judicial process and opined that such reasons should be communicated unless there are specific justifications for not doing so (see SCC pp. 284-85, para 10). …. 46. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee ( (1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669: 1991 SCC (L&S) 242: (1991) 16 ATC 445: AIR 1990 SC 1984 ] in SCC p. 602, para 11: AIR para 11 T p.1988 of the judgment. This Court held that the in the United States the courtts have always insisted on the recording of reasos by administrative authorites in exercise of their powers. It was further held that suhc recoding of reasons is requried as the “the courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are adviced of the considerations underlying the action under review”. In S.N.Mukherjee [ (1990)4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 69: 1991 SCC (L & S) 242: (191) 16 ATC 445: AIR 1990 SC 1984 ] this Court relied on the decision sof the US Court in Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corpn. [87 L Ed 626: 318 US 80 (1942)] and Dunlop v. BAchowski [44 L Ed 2d 377: 421 US560 (1974)] in support of its opinion dicussed above. justice. Before the services of an employee are terminated, resulting in forfur of his right to be considered for employment, opportunity of explanation afforded to the employee concerned. [87 L Ed 626: 318 US 80 (1942)] and Dunlop v. BAchowski [44 L Ed 2d 377: 421 US560 (1974)] in support of its opinion dicussed above. justice. Before the services of an employee are terminated, resulting in forfur of his right to be considered for employment, opportunity of explanation afforded to the employee concerned. The appellant was not afforded any opportunity of explanation before the issue of the impugned order, concepensly the order is rendered null and void being inconsistent with the principles of natural justice..." 12.5. This Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, in an unequivocal terms observed as follows: 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber- stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987)100 Harvard Law Review 731-37]). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision- making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.” 12.6 . (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.” 12.6 . It is manifestly clear from the above judgments that reasons are heartbeat of every order and every notice must specify the grounds on which the administrative or quasi-judicial authority intends to proceed; if any document is relied upon to form the basis of enquiry, such document must be furnished to the employee; it is only then a meaningful reply can be furnished; and the failure to furnish the documents referred and relied in the notice would vitiate the entire proceedings as being arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice; and before taking any adverse decision, the aggrieved person must be given an opportunity of personal hearing. In the light of the same, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of termination passed against the appellant is arbitrary. illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice and it cannot be sustained. 5.9. By relying on Vasudev Dutta 's case, he submits that every administrative or constitutional order must contain reasons. It is those reasons which are required to be ascertained and verified to ascertain if the order passed is correct or not. If no reasons are provided, the authority appreciating the order in an appeal or otherwise would not be able to do so, and it is in that background that he submits that where reasons are not provided, the unreasoned order will have to be set aside. 5.10. In the present case, the ARCS has not given any reason for holding a recount. On the above basis, he submits that the above petition is required to be allowed. 6. Sri.Jayakumar S. Patil., learned Senior counsel appearing for Respondents No.15 to 19 would submit that; 6.1. Firstly, the Petitioner has an alternative efficacy remedy, in terms of Section 105 of the KCS Act, inasmuch as the order which has been passed is akin to an award passed by an arbitrator under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 71 and as such an appeal is provided to a tribunal and as such the present petition is not maintainable. 6.2. 6.2. Secondly, he submits that the Petitioner is not an aggrieved party inasmuch as the Petitioner is not affected by the recount the election of the Petitioner still stands. It is three of the Respondents namely Sri.Kumaraswamy, Smt.Maramma and Sri. Veluswamy, who have been now declared to be elected on account of the recount of the votes. 6.3. The aggrieved parties being three others, they have not approached this Court. Hence the question of granting any relief to the Petitioner on academic grounds, and appreciation of the contentions taken by the Petitioner would not arise. On this ground, he submits that the above petition is required to be dismissed. 7. Heard Sri.M. R.Rajagopal, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, Sri.Jaykumar S.Patil, learned senior counsel for Respondents No.15 to 19 and Sri.Yogesh D. Naik, learned AGA for Respondents No.1 and 2.Perused papers. 8. The points that would arise for determination are; 1. Whether in an election petition and or proceedings arising therefrom, a person whose election is not disturbed can be said to be an aggrieved party, entitling such person to challenge any order passed in the proceedings? 2. Whether even if there is any infraction of the applicable procedure, can a person other than an agreived party but who is a contestant in the election challenge such an order? 3. Whether the present petition is not maintainable on account of an alternative efficacious remedy being available under Section 105 of the KCS Act? 4. What order? 9. I answer the above points as under: 10. Answer to point No.1: Whether in an election petition and or proceedings arising therefrom, a person whose election is not disturbed can be said to be an aggrieved party, entitling such person to challenge any order passed in the proceedings? 10.1. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner's election is not disturbed. The Petitioner continues to be a successful candidate and has been declared elected as a director. On account of the recount three of the successful candidates have now failed in the election however, those persons are not before this Court. 10.2. 10.1. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner's election is not disturbed. The Petitioner continues to be a successful candidate and has been declared elected as a director. On account of the recount three of the successful candidates have now failed in the election however, those persons are not before this Court. 10.2. The submission of Sri.M.R.Rajagopal., learned senior counsel is that if there is an infraction of any particular procedure in an election any of the candidate in the election could challenge the same irrespective of whether they are affected by it or not and as such he contends that the Petitioner has a locus to file and maintain the above petition. 10.3. I am unable to agree with the said submission of Sri.M.R.Rajagopal., learned senior counsel, merely because one of the candidates were to bring to notice of this Court certain infraction and thereby bring about a challenge to the election of any other candidate in as much as if a challenge were required to be made, the same could be made only by way of election petition. 10.4. In the present case, though it is contended by Sri. M.R.Rajagopal., learned senior counsel that no grounds have been made out in the election dispute. Respondent No.1, being of the opinion that 13 votes had not been counted, had directed a recount, which caused three of the Respondents to become successful. The fact that there is a change in the result on account of a recount where many of the votes which were held to be invalid have now been held valid would indicate that there was sufficient ground raised by the respondents. 10.5. However, the three of the candidates who have now lost the elections have neither challenged that order, have neither appeared before the ARCS, nor challenged the said order, nor are they before this Court. 10.6. Thus, the aggrieved party would be those three candidates who have lost the election now, who do not apparently have any grievance as regards their losing the elections. The Petitioner is one other candidate who has not suffered on account of the voting individually, however contends that there is an infraction of the procedure. 10.7. 10.6. Thus, the aggrieved party would be those three candidates who have lost the election now, who do not apparently have any grievance as regards their losing the elections. The Petitioner is one other candidate who has not suffered on account of the voting individually, however contends that there is an infraction of the procedure. 10.7. Whether there is an infraction of the procedure or not, I’am of the sonsidered opinion that unless, the person coming before this Court is able to establish that there is any harm or injury, caused to such person or right of that person being affected a petition cannot be maintained. If the person approaching this courrt is not affected, the only manner in which such a petition will be maintainable is as a Public Interest Litigation, which obviously the present petition is not, there being a categorical statement made in para 7 of the petition that it is not a Public Interest Litigation. 10.8. Thus, the Petitioner is not before this Court espousing the cause of any other person which is in public interest, but it is categorically stated to be espousing his own interest on the ground that there is an infraction of law from and out of which he has not suffered any harm or injury. 10.9. Thus, I answer point No.1 by holding that an election petition and or proceedings arising therefrom, a person whose election is not disturbed can not be said to be an aggrieved party, entitling such person to challenge any order passed in the said proceedings by way of a writ petition, the Writ Petition in such corcumstances cannot be maintained. 11. Answer to point No.2: Whether even if there is any infraction of the applicable procedure, can a person other than an agreived party but who is a contestant in the election challenge such an order? 11.1. This aspect is dealt with to some extent in answer to point No.1. The contestant at an election can have a right or grievance insofar as his election is concerned and cannot have a grievance as regards any other person's election so long as the same does not have an impact on the election of such candidate. 11.2. In the present case, the Petitioner is a successful candidate, whose election has been unaffected by the recount of the votes. 11.2. In the present case, the Petitioner is a successful candidate, whose election has been unaffected by the recount of the votes. Thus, merely being a candidate, in my considered opinion would not entitle the Petitioner to challenge the results of the election. 11.3. The decision in Ahammed Kabeer s case speaks of the success of a winning candidate not being lightly set aside. In the present case, the result of the Petitioner has not been set aside. Insofar as ordering a recount is concerned, it is only the persons who have lost on account of the said recount who could have a grievance and not the Petitioner. Whose election is not affected adversely. 11.4. Thus I answer point No.2 by holding that even if there is any infraction of the applicable procedure, a person other than an aggrieved party but who is a contestant in the election can not challenge such violation, the same being academic, no relief can be granted to such a contestant. 12. Answer to Point No.3: Whether the present petition is not maintainable on account of an alternative efficacious remedy being available under Section 105 of the KCS Act? 12.1. Section 105 of the KCS Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference; 105. Appeals to the Tribunal. - Any person aggrieved by,- (a)any decision of the Registrar made under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 71; or (b)any decision of the person invested by the State Government with powers in that behalf under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 71;or (c)any award of an Arbitrator under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 71; or (d)any determination of a Liquidator under clauses (f) of subsection (2) of section 74; or (e)any order made under section 103 with a view to preventing any delay or obstruction in [the execution of any order, decision or award that may be made under sections 69 and 71] [Substituted by Act 25 of 1998 w.e.f.15.08.1998.]; or (f)[ any order passed under section 69;] [Inserted by Act 19 of 1976 w.e.f. 20.01.1976.]may, within sixty days from the date of the decision, award or order, as the case may be, appeal to the Tribunal. 12.2. 12.2. A perusal of Clause (C) of sub-section (1) of Section 105 indicates that any person aggrieved by any award of an arbitrator under Clause (C) of sub-section (1) of Section 71 may within 60 days from date of decision, award or order appeal to the Tribunal. 12.3. The present order passed by the ARCS, though an interim order directing the recounting, which later on resulting in three of the Respondents being declared successful, which is a final order, is an award in terms of Section 70 of the KCS Act. Therefore, any person aggrieved can only challenge the same by filing an appeal to the tribunal under Section 105. Such an alternative and efficacious remedy being provided under the statute, the writ petition is not a remedy which can be availed of. 12.4. Hence, I answer point No.3 by holding the present petition not maintainable on account of an alternative efficacious remedy being available under Section 105 of the KCS Act. 13. Answer to point No.4: What order? In view of my findings on points No.1, 2, 3, no grounds being made of, the petition stands dismissed .