ORDER : (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND, J.) 1. While deciding Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.14726/2024 titled as Army Public School Versus Arvind Bhandari, the Hon’ble Apex Court has issued directions to this Court vide order dated 16.04.2024 to decide the instant writ petition expeditiously. 2. In pursuance of the aforesaid order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this writ petition is taken up for final disposal with the consent of the counsel for the parties and the same is decided by this order. 3. The instant writ petition has been preferred against the impugned order dated 06.10.2022 passed by the Rajasthan Non- Governmental Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in Appeal No.9/2016 by which the appeal filed by the respondent under Section 19 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1989”) has been allowed and his termination order dated 11.05.2016 has been quashed and set aside. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed of the Tribunal, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on account of misconduct of the respondent, an enquiry was conducted against him under the provisions contained under earlier Army Welfare Education Society Rules & Regulations (hereinafter referred to as “AWES Rules”) after affording him due opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel submits that the respondent has cross-examined the witnesses and after taking into account the defence put by him, a decision was taken to dismiss him from service. Learned counsel submits that the Tribunal has allowed the appeal submitted by the petitioner on a technical count that the provisions contained under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1993”) were not complied with. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order was passed by the petitioner on 11.05.2016 and at the relevant time, two different judgments, passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of TMA Pai Foundation & Ors. Versus State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in 2002 (8) SCC 481 and passed by the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society Versus Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal Jaipur & Ors. reported in 2010 SCC ONLINE Raj. Versus State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in 2002 (8) SCC 481 and passed by the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society Versus Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal Jaipur & Ors. reported in 2010 SCC ONLINE Raj. 2382 were in existence, and the ratio as propounded in the above two cases was that while passing the order of termination, compliance of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 were not required. Learned counsel submits that the judgment in the case of Raj Kumar Versus Director of Education & Ors. reported in 2016 (6) SCC 541 was delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 13.04.2016 whereby it was held that prior approval of Director of Education is necessary for termination of services of an employee. The said judgment was passed 28 days before passing of the present impugned order. Learned counsel submits that when the impugned order was passed, the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) was not in the knowledge of the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that after passing of the judgment in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court took a different view in the case of Kailash Singh Versus Managing Committee, Mayo College reported in 2018 (18) SCC 216 . Learned counsel submits that in the case of Kailash Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that before passing the order of termination, the compliance of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 is not required. Learned counsel submits that, under these circumstances, the petitioner has not committed any error in passing the order impugned. Learned counsel submits that there is no clarity on the issue involved in this writ petition as to whether compliance of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 is required or not. Learned counsel submits that the judgment in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra) has been passed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the strength of 11 Judges while the judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) has been passed by a Bench with the strength of two Judges of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Learned counsel submits that the judgment in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra) has been passed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the strength of 11 Judges while the judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) has been passed by a Bench with the strength of two Judges of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Learned counsel submits that the judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) cannot be treated as absolute looking towards the different & conflicting views taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Learned counsel submits that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna versus State of Maharashtra & Another reported in 2014 (16) SCC 623 has held that when High Court faces two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, then it must apply the earliest view as the succeeding one would fall in the category of per incuriam. Learned counsel submits that the above analogy has been drawn by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna (supra) and it has been further affirmed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Pranay Sethi & Ors. reported in 2017 (16) SCC 680 . Learned counsel submits that, under these circumstances, the judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and Gajanand Sharma Versus Adarsh Siksha Parisad Samiti reported in AIR 2023 SC 539 are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted. 6. Learned counsel submits that while passing the order impugned, the Tribunal has committed an error in issuing directions to the petitioner for reinstatement of the respondent. Learned counsel submits that looking to the misconduct of the respondent, the order of reinstatement should not have been passed. He argued that the Tribunal has further committed an error in issuing directions to the petitioner to grant back-wages to the respondent. Learned counsel submits that the respondent is a Mathematics Teacher and he remained in gainful employment at Sanskrit School at Ajmer. Learned counsel submits that the information, in this regard, was available on the website of the Sanskrit School which clearly indicates that the respondent was teaching there as a Post Graduate Mathematics Teacher. Learned counsel submits that the respondent is a Mathematics Teacher and he remained in gainful employment at Sanskrit School at Ajmer. Learned counsel submits that the information, in this regard, was available on the website of the Sanskrit School which clearly indicates that the respondent was teaching there as a Post Graduate Mathematics Teacher. Learned counsel submits that when an effort was made by the petitioner to get the details of his employment in the said school, instead of providing the relevant information, the name of the petitioner was deleted from the website of the school. Learned counsel submits that it is settled proposition of law that a person is not entitled to get the wages for the period in which he has not worked. Learned counsel submits that the principle of ‘No work No pay’ is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, hence under these circumstances, the order passed by the Tribunal with regard to payment of back-wages is liable to be quashed and set-aside. Lastly, counsel for the petitioner argued that validity of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 is under challenge before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan Versus State of Rajasthan (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.16407/2024) but the said petition is still pending for adjudication by this Court. 7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd. Versus P.C. Chaturvedi & Others reported in 2005 (8) SCC 211 , Mulin Sharma Versus State of Assam reported in 2016 (14) SCC 208 , Metropolitan Transport Corporation Versus V. Venkatesan reported in 2009 (9) SCC 601 and Novartis India Limited Versus State of West Bengal & Others reported in 2009 (3) SCC 124 . Learned counsel submits that in view of the submissions made hereinabove, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal be quashed and set-aside. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that no charge sheet or memorandum of charges was served upon the respondent and only on the basis of Preliminary Enquiry, the order of termination was passed. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that no charge sheet or memorandum of charges was served upon the respondent and only on the basis of Preliminary Enquiry, the order of termination was passed. Learned counsel submits that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the respondent prior to passing of the order of termination, hence the impugned order of termination has resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the law with regard to applicability of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments and now nothing is required to be decided by this Court again. Learned counsel submits that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Parishad Samiti & Anr. Versus Gajanand Sharma & Ors. while deciding D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1077/2005 vide order dated 06.05.2022 has taken a view, contrary to the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the catena of judgments. Learned counsel submits that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Parishad Samiti (supra) has been overruled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gajanand Sharma (supra). Learned counsel submits that, under these circumstances, the Tribunal has not committed any error in passing the order impugned. Hence, under these circumstances, the interference of this Court is not warranted and the writ petition is liable to rejected. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Learned counsel submits that as per Rule 31 of the AWES Rules in case of conflict between the provisions of the State Education Act and AWES Rules and regulations, the provisions of State Education Act will prevail. Learned counsel submits that neither before the Tribunal nor before this Court, the petitioner has averred that the respondent remained in gainful employment elsewhere. Learned counsel submits that hard copy of the additional affidavit was not supplied by the petitioner and only soft copy was sent. Learned counsel submits that neither before the Tribunal nor before this Court, the petitioner has averred that the respondent remained in gainful employment elsewhere. Learned counsel submits that hard copy of the additional affidavit was not supplied by the petitioner and only soft copy was sent. Learned counsel submits that no cogent evidence with regard to gainful employment of the respondent has been produced on record. Learned counsel submits that along-with additional affidavit, a copy of the screenshot has been annexed, which does not indicate the period of alleged employment in the said Sanksrit School. Learned counsel submits that the photo copy or typed copy of the screenshot is not legally admissible in the eye of law as per Section 64(b) of the Evidence Act, 1872, hence under these circumstances, no reliance can be placed on such screenshot or additional affidavit submitted by the petitioner. 11. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalya Versus Asha Shrivastava & Ors. reported in 2020 (14) SCC 449 12. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on the record. 13. Perusal of the impugned order dated 06.10.2022 indicates that the respondent had approached the Tribunal against the order dated 11.05.2016 by which his services were terminated by the petitioner-institution. 14. The Tribunal quashed the termination order dated 11.05.2016 holding that the same was passed without making compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993 and a direction has been issued to the petitioner to reinstate him back in service with all consequential benefits. 15. Before proceeding further to decide the issue “whether the provisions under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39(2) (h)(iii) of the Rules of 1993 were followed by the petitioner- Institution or not”, it would be gainful to quote the provisions hereunder, which read as follows:- “ Section 18 of the Act of 1989. 15. Before proceeding further to decide the issue “whether the provisions under Section 18(iii) of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39(2) (h)(iii) of the Rules of 1993 were followed by the petitioner- Institution or not”, it would be gainful to quote the provisions hereunder, which read as follows:- “ Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees – Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised institution shall be removed, dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been given by the management a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the action proposed to be taken: Provided that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has been obtained: (i) xxxxxxxxxxxx (ii) xxxxxxxxxxxx (iii) Where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee can not be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, the services of such employee are terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and the consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing.” “ Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993. Removal or Dismissal from Service (1)xxxxxxxxxxxx (2) An employee, other than the employee referred to in sub-rule (1), may be removed or dismissed from service on the grounds of insubordination, inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct or any other grounds which makes the employee unsuitable for further retention in service. Removal or Dismissal from Service (1)xxxxxxxxxxxx (2) An employee, other than the employee referred to in sub-rule (1), may be removed or dismissed from service on the grounds of insubordination, inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct or any other grounds which makes the employee unsuitable for further retention in service. But the following procedure shall be adopted for the removal or dismissal of an employee:- (a) to (g)xxxxxxxxx (h) On receipt of the approval as mentioned in sub-clause (g) above, the managing committee may issue appropriate order of removal or dismissal as the case may be and forward a copy of such order to the employee concerned and also to the Director of Education or the officer authorised by him in this behalf: Provided that the provisions of this rule shall not apply:- (I) xxxxxxxxxxxx (ii) xxxxxxxxxxxx (iii) Where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that, the services of an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, the service of such employee are terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and the consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing..” 16. Perusal of Section 18 (iii) of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39(2) (h)(iii) of the Rules of 1993 clearly indicates that before removal of an employee, the managing committee is supposed to give six months notice or salary in lieu thereof to the employee and the consent of the Director of Education is required to be obtained in writing. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid provision of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39of the Rules of 1993 were not applicable at the relevant time and the prior consent of the Director of Secondary Education was not required. Counsel submitted that the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of TMA Pai Foundation (supra) has made it clear that in any recognized private institution which is not receiving any aid from the State, the State cannot interfere with the managerial function of such institution. Counsel submitted that the same view was taken by the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra). 18. Counsel submitted that the same view was taken by the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra). 18. Counsel submitted that subsequently the above view was changed by the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) vide judgment dated 13.04.2016 while the impugned termination order of the respondent was passed by the petitioner-institution on 11.05.2016, i.e., few days later in ignorance of the judgment of Raj Kumar (supra). 19. This Court finds no substance in the above argument of the counsel for the petitioner because it is settled proposition of law that “ignorance of any law is not an excuse in the eyes of law”. Each and every individual is supposed to know the law and he/ she cannot take the excuse that he/ she was not aware about the particular law. 20. The maxim 'ignorantia juris non-excusat,' or 'ignorance of the law is no excuse,' implies that the Court presumes that every party is aware of the law and hence, cannot claim ignorance of the law, as a defence to escape from the liability. This Latin maxim and its wide legal spillovers belong to the common law system. 21. In the case of Just Rights For Children Alliance Vs. S. Harish reported in 2024 INSC 716 , it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that: “210. Thus, both the aforesaid decisions in Chandi Kumar Das Karmarkar (supra) Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills (supra) are not applicable. We say so, because this Court in the aforesaid decisions has only gone so far as to say that a plea of ignorance of law can be used as a valid defence for either showing that the purported act was done or not done (as the case may be) due to a consequent bona-fide belief as to the existence of such a right or claim. In other words, a plea of ignorance of law can be a valid defence if it consequently gives rise to a legitimate and bona-fide mistake of fact as to the existence (or non-existence) of a particular right or claim. 211. In other words, a plea of ignorance of law can be a valid defence if it consequently gives rise to a legitimate and bona-fide mistake of fact as to the existence (or non-existence) of a particular right or claim. 211. This may be better understood through a four- prong test wherein for a valid defence, there must exist (1) an ignorance or unawareness of any law and (2) such ignorance or unawareness must give rise to a corresponding reasonable and legitimate right or claim (3) the existence of such right or claim must be believed bonafide and (4) the purported act sought to be punished must take place on the strength of such right or claim. It is only when all the four of the above conditions are fulfilled, that the person would be entitled to take a plea of ignorance of law as a defence from incurring any liability.” 22. The principle of 'Ignorantia juris non-excusat,' is fully applicable in the present case, which means 'ignorance of the law is not an excuse'. This principle places responsibility on individuals to know and follow the law, regardless of whether they were aware of the law or not. A person cannot avoid liability by claiming that he did not know the law. This maxim implies that the Court presumes that every party is aware of the law and hence cannot claim ignorance of law as a defence to escape from the liability as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) came into existence on 13.04.2016, before the impugned order dated 11.05.2016 passed by the petitioner. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after the judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken a different view in the case of Kailash Singh (supra). It appears that the above judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) was not bought into the notice of the Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the order in the case of Kailash Singh (supra), by the respective counsel, who argued the matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court. 24. It appears that the above judgment passed in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) was not bought into the notice of the Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the order in the case of Kailash Singh (supra), by the respective counsel, who argued the matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court. 24. On the contrary, the counsel for the respondent has relied upon the later judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalya (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that prior consent of the Director of Education is necessary in the case of termination of an employee working in any non-government aided educational institution. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no clarity and exact view of the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the applicability of Section 18 of the Act and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993, and that is why, the different views have been taken on different occasions. Counsel submitted that under such circumstances, as per the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna (supra), it is often encountered in High Court that when two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar then the earlier view will apply and the succeeding view would fall in the category of per incuriam. 26. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Parishad Samiti & Anr. Vs. Gajanand Sharma & Ors. while deciding D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1077/2005 on 06.05.2022 has held as under:- “Hence, in view of the Constitutional Bench of 11 Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) and Larger Bench of three Judges of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra), it is clear that the first proviso to section 18 of the Act of 1989 would not apply in the disciplinary action taken by the Unaided Private Educational Institutions and prior consent/ approval of the Director, Education is not required before passing the order of removal/dismissal. The two Judges judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court relied by the counsel for the respondent in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is not applicable under the facts of this case. The two Judges judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court relied by the counsel for the respondent in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is not applicable under the facts of this case. Because in the cse of Raj Kumar (supra), the judgment of 11 Judges Constitutional Bench in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) was not brought into the notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohara Community and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in para 12 as under:- “12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :- (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co- equal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of co- equal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh & Ors. and Hansoli Devi.” In the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafana Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2014) 16 SCC 623 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in para 19 as under:- “19. It cannot be over-emphasised that the discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of Courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the Court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a Co-equal or Larger Bench; or if the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta. It is often encountered in High Courts that two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. It must immediately be clarified that the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta. It is often encountered in High Courts that two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. We think that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others Vs. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger & Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 301 has held in para 116, 117, 118, 119 as under:- “116. As rightly held by brother Lalit J., the issue involved in these appeals is answered by two decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court, namely, State of Punjab vs. Joginder Singh and Zabar Singh Vs State of Haryana. 117. In my view also, the issue, which is subject-matter of these appeals, has to be decided keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in the aforementioned two decisions of the Constitution Bench. 118. I may, at this stage, refer to a decision in N.Meera Rani vs. State of T.N. In this case, it was argued that the question involved in the appeal is governed by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan. It is pertinent to mention that the same question was also decided by this Court but it was decided subsequent to the decision of the Constitution Bench in many other cases. The later decisions on the same question were, however, rendered by the Benches comprised of lesser number of the Judges. 119. J.S. Verma, J. (as His lordship then was), speaking for Three Judge Bench, held that the question involved in the appeal before them has to be, therefore, decided in the light of law laid down by the Constitution Bench because firstly, it is a decision rendered by the Constitution Bench; Secondly, it is prior in point of time; and thirdly, the law laid down in later decisions has to be read in the light of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench. This is what His Lordship said in para 13 (Meera Rani case SCC p.429): “13. We may now refer to the decisions on the basis of which this point is to be decided. This is what His Lordship said in para 13 (Meera Rani case SCC p.429): “13. We may now refer to the decisions on the basis of which this point is to be decided. The starting point is the decision of a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan. All subsequent decisions which are cited have to be read in the light of this Constitution Bench decision since they are decisions by Benches comprising of lesser number of Judges. It is obvious that none of these subsequent decisions could have intended taking a view contrary to that of the Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw case.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand, reported in 2008 (10) SCC 1 has held in para 90 as under:- “90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass root will not be able to decide as to which of the judgment lay down the correct law and which one should be followed. Hence, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we see no reason to take a different view as the controversy involved in this appeal has already been put to rest by the Constitutional Bench of 11 Judges of the Hon’ble Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) and the three Judges Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra), that prior approval of the Director of Education is not necessary before taking disciplinary action against the employee of the Unaided Recognized Educational Institution. The provisions contained under proviso (iii) of section 18 of the Act of 1989 are not attracted in this case. Hence, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge on this point is not sustainable. In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment dated 16.09.2005 passed by the Single Judge as well as the impugned judgment dated 16.08.2003 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside and the impugned termination order dated 06.08.1998 is upheld.” 27. The above judgment dated 06.05.2022 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Adarsh Shiksha Parishad Samiti (supra) was assailed by the respondent Gajanand Sharma before the Apex Court by filing Civil Appeal No.100-101/2023 (SLP (C) NO.12645-12646 of 2022) Gajanand Sharma Versus Adarsh Shiksha Parishad Samiti & Others ( reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 54 ) and the same was allowed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 19.01.2023 and the above judgment dated 06.05.2022 was quashed and set-aside with the following observation in para 14 to 24 and the same are reproduced as under:- “14. At the outset, it is required to be noted that and it is an admitted position that parties are governed by the Rajasthan Non-Governmental Educational Institutions Act, 1989 . Section 18 provides that no employee of a recognized institution shall be removed, dismissed, or reduced in rank unless he has been given by the management a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the action proposed to be taken and that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorized by him in this behalf has been obtained. The learned Tribunal set aside the order of termination on non-compliance of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 inasmuch as before terminating the services of the appellant - employee prior approval of the Director of Education was not obtained. The same came to be confirmed by the learned Single Judge, however, by the impugned judgment and order taking a contrary view, the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed the appeal and has restored the order of termination. 15. The same came to be confirmed by the learned Single Judge, however, by the impugned judgment and order taking a contrary view, the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed the appeal and has restored the order of termination. 15. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that before the High Court the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) taking a contrary view and taking the view that before terminating the services of an employee of a recognized institution prior approval of the Director of Education is required was pressed into service. However, though impermissible the Division Bench of the High Court has not followed the said binding decision by observing that in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), this Court had not considered the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Apart from the fact that the same is wholly impermissible for the High Court even the said observations are factually incorrect. If the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is seen in more than 8-9 paragraphs, this Court had referred to and as such dealt with the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Even the decision in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) was explained and considered by this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra). Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court is factually incorrect in observing that while deciding the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court had not considered the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Before commenting upon the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have thoroughly read and/or considered the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra). Even after making the incorrect observations that in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court had not considered the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) the Division Bench of the High Court has considered few decisions of judicial discipline which were not applicable at all. Judicial discipline also requires that the judgment/decision of this Court should be considered and read thoroughly. Judicial discipline also requires that the judgment/decision of this Court should be considered and read thoroughly. As observed hereinabove, the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) was binding upon the High Court. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has seriously erred in not following the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra). 16. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is concerned, this Court was considering pari materia provisions under the DSE Act. This Court was considering Section 8 of the DSE Act, which reads as under:— “8.(2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director.” 17. Similar is the provision so far as Section 18 of the Act, 1989 is concerned which reads as under:— “18. Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees.- Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised institution shall be removed, dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been given by the management a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the action proposed to be taken; Provided that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has been obtained.” 18. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra) while dealing with the pari materia provision under the DSE Act and after considering the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), it is specifically observed and held by this Court that in case of a recognized institution, before terminating the services of an employee, prior approval of the Director of Education is required. Therefore, a contrary view taken by the Larger Bench of the High Court relied upon by the Division Bench of the High Court is not a good law. It is required to be noted that the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) has been considered by this Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) and also by the Delhi High Court in the case of Mangal Sain Jain (supra). It is required to be noted that the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) has been considered by this Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) and also by the Delhi High Court in the case of Mangal Sain Jain (supra). In the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) this Court considered the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and object and purpose of Section 8 of DSE Act in paragraphs 13 and 14 as under:— “13. In Raj Kumar v. Director of Education [Raj Kumar v. Director of Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 111] this Court held that Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 is a procedural safeguard in favour of employee to ensure that order of termination or dismissal is not passed without prior approval of Director of Education to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable termination/dismissal of employee of even recognised private school. Moreover, this Court also considered the Objects and Reasons of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and came to the conclusion that the termination of service of the driver of a private school without obtaining prior approval of Director of Education was bad in law. This Court observed : (SCC p. 560, para 45) “45. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent school. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is a procedural safeguard in favour of an employee to ensure that order of termination or dismissal is not passed without the prior approval of the Director of Education. This is to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable termination or dismissal of an employee of a recognised private school.” 14. This Court has laid down in Raj Kumar v. Director of Education [Raj Kumar v. Director of Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 111] that the intent of the legislature while enacting the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (in short “the DSE Act”) was to provide security of tenure to the employees of the school and to regulate the terms and conditions of their employment. While the functioning of both aided and unaided educational institutions must be free from unnecessary governmental interference, the same needs to the reconciled with the conditions of employment of the employees of these institutions and provision of adequate precautions to safeguard their interests. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is one such precautionary safeguard which needs to be followed to ensure that employees of educational institutions do not suffer unfair treatment at the hands of the management.” 19. Even on fair reading of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, we are of the opinion that in case of termination of an employee of a recognized institution prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has to be obtained. In Section 18, there is no distinction between the termination, removal, or reduction in rank after the disciplinary proceedings/enquiry or even without disciplinary proceedings/enquiry. As per the settled position of law the provisions of the statute are to be read as they are. Nothing to be added and or taken away. The words used are “no employee of a recognized institution shall be removed without holding any enquiry and it further provides that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education has been obtained.” The first part of Section 18 is to be read along with first proviso. Under the circumstances, taking a contrary view that in case of dismissal/removal of an employee of a recognized institution which is after holding the departmental enquiry the prior approval of the Director of Education is not required is unsustainable and to that extent the judgment of the Larger Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra) is not a good law. 20. Therefore, on true interpretation of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, it is specifically observed and held that even in case of termination/removal of an employee of a recognized institution after holding departmental enquiry/proceedings prior approval of the Director of Education has to be obtained as per first proviso to Section 18 of the Act, 1989. 21. 20. Therefore, on true interpretation of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, it is specifically observed and held that even in case of termination/removal of an employee of a recognized institution after holding departmental enquiry/proceedings prior approval of the Director of Education has to be obtained as per first proviso to Section 18 of the Act, 1989. 21. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court restoring the order of termination which as such was without obtaining the prior approval of the Director of Education deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The order of learned Tribunal setting aside the order of termination confirmed by the learned Single Judge is hereby restored. Consequently, the appellant shall have to be reinstated in service and considering the fact that the respondent(s) is/are un-aided institution and the order of termination was passed as far as back in the year 1998, we direct that the appellant shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages, however, he shall be entitled to all other benefits notionally including the seniority etc., if any. 22. Civil appeal No. 100/2023 arising out of the impugned judgment and order passed in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1077/2005 is hereby allowed according to the aforesaid extent. 23. Now so far as Civil Appeal No. 101/2023 arising out of the impugned judgment and order passed in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 826/2011 is concerned, the Division Bench of the High Court has not at all dealt with the said appeal on merits while upholding the order of termination. Therefore, we set aside the order passed by the High Court in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 826/2011 and remand the matter to the High Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with law and on its own merits. 24. Both the appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent and in terms of the above. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.” 28. The judgment passed by the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra) was held to be not a good law by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case of Gajanand Sharma (supra). 29. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.” 28. The judgment passed by the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Central Academy Society (supra) was held to be not a good law by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case of Gajanand Sharma (supra). 29. Hence, after the decision of Gajanand Sharma (supra) the position of law is clear that an order of termination/ removal of any employee of a recognized institution can be passed only after holding departmental enquiry/ proceedings and with prior permission of Director of Education as per the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and no contrary view has been taken in this regard. The recent view is against the petitioner. 30. The Hon’ble Apex Court has taken into consideration each and every judgment passed by it on the issue of applicability of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, in the case of termination of service of an employee working in a recognized institution. 31. The principle of 'stare decisis' is as old as the establishment of the courts. It is derived from legal maxim 'stare decisis et non quieta movere': It is best to adhere to decisions and not to disturb questions, which have been put at rest. When a point of law has been settled, it forms a precedent which is not to be ordinarily departed afterwards. When the same point comes for consideration again in litigation, the scales of justice must be kept even and steady. 32. In the hierarchy of courts the opinion of judges on the questions of law decided by the superior courts are binding on the lower courts. The Constitution of India declares in Article 141 that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding in all courts within the territory of India. The High Courts do not have liberty under this rule of discipline, to take a different view or to rely upon supposedly conflicting decisions, where the Supreme Court has laid down clear law on the subject. The High Courts are not to contradict the law declared by the Supreme Court. 33. A precedent to be binding must be express and founded on reasons. The 'ratio decidendi' and not 'obiter dicta' has the binding force. 'Ratio decidendi' means the reasons or the grounds of a decision. The High Courts are not to contradict the law declared by the Supreme Court. 33. A precedent to be binding must be express and founded on reasons. The 'ratio decidendi' and not 'obiter dicta' has the binding force. 'Ratio decidendi' means the reasons or the grounds of a decision. Reason is the soul of law. Ratio est radius divine luminous; reason is a ray of the divine light. Ratio injure aequitas integra; reason in law is total equity. 34. The 'obiter dicta' is the incidental question which may arise indirectly connected with the main questions for consideration.The observations on such questions are not binding as precedent. 35. Only that much which has been decided, and is the ratio decidendi is binding. The judgments are not to be read like statutes. The courts relying upon a binding precedent should be careful to find out the ratio of the decisions. Such ratio must be on the matter in law and not the decisions on facts. The judgment must be read as a whole. The observations in the judgment must be considered in the light of the questions which were before the court. What is binding is the principle underlying a decision. A decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide. 36. In case of conflict between the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is the latest pronouncement which is binding upon the subordinate Court. It is settled proposition of law that the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court are the ‘law of the land’ and there is no question of anyone violating the principles laid down. Article 141 of the Constitution of India provides that law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court shall be binding on all the courts including this Court. Hence, it is clear that the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Gajananad Sharma (supra) is the latest pronouncement and the same is the last view till now, hence, it is binding upon this Court. 37. The Rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and the ‘Doctrine of Precedents’ has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. 37. The Rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and the ‘Doctrine of Precedents’ has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. Following the rule of judicial discipline and doctrine of precedents it can safely be held that the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gajanand Sharma (supra), is fully applicable in the instant case. 38. This Court finds no substance in the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner that the validity and vires of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 is under challenge before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan (supra) hence, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is liable to be quashed and set aside. Mere filing of petition and mere making a challenge to the validity of any provision does not make the said provision repugnant unless and until the said provision is declared ultra-vires. 39. Here, it is clear from the authoritative pronouncement of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above series of cases, that in case of termination of an employee of a recognized institution, prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorised by him, has to be obtained. As per the settled position of law, the provisions of the statute are to be read as they are. Nothing is required to be added or taken away. Here in the instant case, it is clear that consent of the Director of Education or the person authorised on his behalf, was not taken at the time of passing of the termination/order of removal. Hence, the Tribunal has not committed any error in quashing the termination order of the respondent. This Court finds no substance in the arguments of the petitioner that looking to the misconduct of the respondent, his order of reinstatement should not have been passed by the Tribunal. Once it was found that the termination order of the respondent was passed without taking prior consent of the Director of Education, the same is/was liable to be quashed. The petitioner could have passed the same after following the mandate contained under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993. Once it was found that the termination order of the respondent was passed without taking prior consent of the Director of Education, the same is/was liable to be quashed. The petitioner could have passed the same after following the mandate contained under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993. Even now, they can do so, after following the said provisions by passing fresh order and after affording the opportunity of hearing to the respondent if his misconduct is found to be proved. 40. This Court finds no force in the argument of the petitioner that the respondent is not entitled for back-wages because no such directions have been issued by the Tribunal, while passing the impugned order and only a direction has been issued to grant the respondent all consequential benefits. It is clarified that the respondent would be entitled for notional benefits w.e.f. the date of his termination and he would be entitled for actual monetary benefits w.e.f. the date of joining the services. 41. The petitioner is directed to reinstate the respondent forthwith without any further delay. Needless to observe that the petitioner would be free to pass fresh order against the respondent (if they so desire) after following the due process of law and after following the provisions and procedures contained under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and Rule 39 of the Rules of 1993. 42. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition as well as the stay application and all applications (pending, if any) stand disposed of.