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2025 DIGILAW 363 (PAT)

Meena Devi @ Anju Devi v. State of Bihar

2025-04-03

SANDEEP KUMAR

body2025
Sandeep Kumar, J. – Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned APP appearing for the State; Sri Abhay Kumar. 2. This criminal appeal is filed against the judgment dated 17.12.2020 passed by 11th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in Sessions Trial No. 733 of 2019 arising out of G.R. Case No. 513/2019 in connection with Nath Nagar P.S. Case No. 75 of 2019, by which the appellants have been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter ‘IPC’ for brevity) and the order of sentencing dated 18.12.2020 whereby the appellant nos. 1 and 2 have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for seven years and the appellant no. 3 has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years under sections 304B read with 34 of I.P.C. 3. The case of the prosecution is that, the fardbayen of the informant Jhumki Devi was recorded on 22.01.2019, wherein the informant has stated that on 20.01.2019 at 04:00 PM, the accused persons namely Vishunu Mandal, Chamak Lal Mandal, the wife of Chamak Lal Mandal (the informant not being aware of the name) and Anirudh Mandal forcibly entered into the house of the informant and the accused Vishnu Mandal married her daughter. The informant states that after the marriage, the daughter was kept with honour and dignity for three months, however it is alleged that thereafter, the son-in-law Vishnu Mandal, and Anirudh Mandal started torturing her daughter. It was further alleged by the informant that the accused persons demanded Rs. 1,50,000/- and one colour T.V. from her daughter and threatened that if the demands are not fulfilled then the daughter of the informant would not be allowed to remain in the house. The informant alleged that the accused persons even threatened to kill the daughter. The informant has further stated that her daughter informed about her ordeal however since the informant could not fulfill the demands of the accused persons therefore as a consequence all the accused persons burnt her daughter on 20.01.2019. It is lastly stated that when the informant came to know about the incident, the informant got the victim-daughter admitted to the Mayaganj Hospital and in course of the treatment, the daughter passed away. 4. It is lastly stated that when the informant came to know about the incident, the informant got the victim-daughter admitted to the Mayaganj Hospital and in course of the treatment, the daughter passed away. 4. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant- Jhumki Devi, the F.I.R. vide Nath Nagar P.S. Case No. 75/2019 was registered on 06.02.2019 under Section 304 B, read with 34 of I.P.C. against all the aforementioned accused persons. The investigating officer after investigation, submitted the charge-sheet bearing no. 121/2019 dated 30.10.2019 against the accused persons under Section 304 (B) and section 34 of the I.P.C. in the court of learned C.J.M., Bhagalpur, where cognizance was accordingly taken and after the supply of the police papers to the accused persons, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions at Bhagalpur by the A.C.J.M., Bhagalpur. 5. During the course of the trial the prosecution has examined altogether 06 witnesses which are as follows: – (I) P.W. 1- Puran Mandal (father of deceased); (ii) P. W.2- Rajesh Kumar @ Raja Ram Mandal (elder brother of deceased); (iii) P. W.3- Poonam Kumari (independent witness); (iv) P. W. 4- Jhumki Devi (Informant and mother of deceased); (v) P.W.5- Balram Yadav (Investigation Officer (I.O.) of the case); (vi) P.W.6- Dr. Atual Kumar Malik (conducted post Mortem and prepared P.M. report). 6. The prosecution has also adduced the following documentary evidence during the course of the trial: – (i) Ext. 1-is the signature of witness on inquest report; (ii) Ext. 2-is writing (FARD BEYAN) of informant; (iii) Ext. 3- is writing and signature of A.S.I., Ajay Sharma upon fardbeyan; (iv) Ext. 4- is writing and signature of S.H.O., Nath Nagar Thana upon Fardbeyan.(v) Ext. 5 is writing and signature of Thana Munshi and S.H.O. upon fardbeyan; (v) Ext. 5- is writing and signature of Thana Munshi and S.H.O. upon fardbeyan; (vi) Ext. 6 is writing and signature of A.S.I. Badri Upadhay on carbon copy of inquest report; (vii) Ext. 7 is writing and signature of Doctor on post-mortem report; 7. No oral or documentary evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defence. 8. 5- is writing and signature of Thana Munshi and S.H.O. upon fardbeyan; (vi) Ext. 6 is writing and signature of A.S.I. Badri Upadhay on carbon copy of inquest report; (vii) Ext. 7 is writing and signature of Doctor on post-mortem report; 7. No oral or documentary evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defence. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that out of six witness examined on behalf of the prosecution, P.W.-2, Rajesh Kumar @ Raja Mandal (elder brother of deceased) and P.W.-4, Jhumki Devi (Informant) mother of the deceased have not supported the prosecution story and have been declared hostile on the prayer of the prosecution since they have stated that they do not know how the deceased died in her sasural and further their statements have never been recorded by the police. The learned counsel has further submitted that these two witnesses have also denied to have given any such statement before the police supporting the prosecution case or the allegation levelled against the accused persons. The learned counsel has vehemently emphasized that these two witnesses have also stated that they have no complaint against the accused persons. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has next submitted that from the discussion of the prosecution witnesses it appears that there is no witness who has supported the prosecution story. It is further pointed out that the P.W.-4 and P.W.-1 have said that their daughter never complained to them that she was being tortured by her husband and her father-inlaw. The mother of the deceased has also said that she has no complaint against the accused persons. There is no proof of cruelty with the deceased soon before her death and on the other hand F.I.R. has been registered after seventeen days of the fardbeyan of informant (P.W.4). The two witnesses P.W. 2 and P.W. 4, i.e., the brother and the mother of deceased were declared hostile upon the prayer of prosecution. The P.W. 3 also did not state anything which could support the allegation against the appellants. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has filed a supplementary affidavit bringing on record the husband’s name of appellant no. 01 and father’s name of appellant nos. 02 and 03. 11. The P.W. 3 also did not state anything which could support the allegation against the appellants. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has filed a supplementary affidavit bringing on record the husband’s name of appellant no. 01 and father’s name of appellant nos. 02 and 03. 11. The learned APP for the State has opposed the prayer of the appellants and has submitted that it is a case of dowry death and from the materials available on record, the conviction of the appellants cannot be interfered with. 12. I have heard the rival submissions of the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 13. From the fardbayan of the informant it surfaces that the date of occurrence was 20.01.2019 at 04:00 PM whereas the date of FIR is 06.02.2019. The informant Jhumki Devi (P.W- 4, Mother of the deceased) and P.W. 2, Rajesh Kumar @ Raja Ram Mandal - P.W-2 (the elder brother of the deceased) have been declared hostile in the trial. P.W-1 is the father of the deceased who has supported the allegations in his examination-in-chief but in his cross-examination, he has said that his daughter was taken to the hospital for medical treatment by her in-laws and there was no demand of dowry or torture meted to her daughter before the incident. The I.O. of the case has also in his deposition said that he had not found any stench of kerosene oil at the place of occurrence where the deceased is alleged to have been killed. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses it appears that the deceased had a love marriage with the appellant no. 03. 14. P.W-3 is one Poonam Kumar, a hearsay witness who has said that the deceased was taken to the hospital by the appellants and her cremation was done by the appellants. 15. P.W-6 is the doctor in whose deposition it has come that the deceased died because of burn injuries caused by gas. 16. In the present case, the prosecution has not been able to establish harassment or inflection of cruelty by the appellants in connection with demand of dowry from the deceased soon before her death. 15. P.W-6 is the doctor in whose deposition it has come that the deceased died because of burn injuries caused by gas. 16. In the present case, the prosecution has not been able to establish harassment or inflection of cruelty by the appellants in connection with demand of dowry from the deceased soon before her death. There is no evidence on record to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or in-laws who are appellants herein, therefore, the presumption under Section 313 B of the Evidence Act has not been established. 17. Section 304(B) of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows: – “304B. Dowry death. – (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. – For the purpose of this subsection, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 18. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows: – “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. – When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. – For the purpose of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)].” 19. Explanation. – For the purpose of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)].” 19. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304(B) are that the death of the deceased wife must happen within seven years of marriage and the death must be caused by any burns or any bodily injury or the death must be caused otherwise than under the normal circumstances and it should be established that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death by her husband or any relative of the husband in connection with demand of dowry. 20. If the above ingredients are present then only Section 304(B) treats the death of the deceased as dowry death and in such circumstances, the husband and his relatives will be treated to have caused her death and under Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act, 1872, there is a presumption of dowry death and when the dowry death is there under Section 304(B) of the I.P.C., the presumption is rebuttable and it is open for the husband and his relatives to show that the ingredients of Section 304(B) are absent. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shoor Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2595 while considering the appeal of the accused persons in a dowry death case has held as follows: – 12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable under Section 304-B IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied: (i) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) soon before such death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with any demand for dowry. The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide enough to encompass a suicidal death. 13. When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’. The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide enough to encompass a suicidal death. 13. When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’. What is important is that the presumption under Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry, which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to prove the essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’ the burden is on the prosecution. 14. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage. However, the issue between the parties is about her being subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative, soon before her death, in connection with any demand for dowry. 15. The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 do not indicate that any demand for dowry was made by the accused-appellants either before or at the time of marriage of the deceased with their son. Further, there is no evidence that the accused appellants directly demanded a motorcycle or cash from any of the above witnesses. In fact, evidence is to the effect that the deceased had informed PW-1 and PW-2 on 4.1.2007 and 11.1.2007 about the demand for a motorcycle and cash. Further, from the deposition of PW-1 and PW-2, it appears that the aforesaid demand was not in connection with marriage but as a mark of celebration on birth of a male child. (Emphasis supplied) 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of dowry death in the case of Chabi Karmakar & Ors vs. State of West Bengal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2433 has held as follows: – 6. After going through the evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-4 and P-16 (who are the brother, father, mother and cousin of the deceased respectively), it becomes clear that the deceased faced cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband (appellant no. After going through the evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-4 and P-16 (who are the brother, father, mother and cousin of the deceased respectively), it becomes clear that the deceased faced cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband (appellant no. 2) which compelled her to commit suicide. However, these witnesses did not state that such cruelty and harassment was in connection with the demand for dowry. With respect to the demand for dowry, they have just made some general statements which are not sufficient to convict the appellants under section 304B of IPC. 7. Trial Court raised a presumption under section 113B of Evidence Act to convict the appellants under section 304B of IPC. The High Court did not go into the question of whether the trial court was right in relying upon section 113B of the Evidence Act. In Charan Singh alias Charanjit Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 454, where there were allegations against the husband that he was subjecting the deceased therein on the demand of a motorcycle and some land, this Court in relation to Section 113B of Evidence Act and section 304B of IPC, had noted that: “21…………………It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act…… 22. XXXXXXX 23. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the prerequisites to raise presumption under Section 304B and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not being fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A of IPC.” Similarly, in the case at hand, it has not been proved by the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with the demand of dowry and hence we are of the opinion that this is not a case of dowry death under Section 304B of the Penal Code, 1860. PW-1 and PW-3 had only stated that deceased used to tell them about her torture. PW-1 and PW-3 had only stated that deceased used to tell them about her torture. PW-4 (mother of the deceased) did not speak about any demand of dowry after marriage. Moreover, this witness had said that appellant no. 2 used to assault her deceased daughter as the deceased had objections to the illicit relation of appellant no. 2 with another woman. PW-16, who is the cousin of the deceased, had deposed in court almost a year after the testimony of PW-1, 3 & 4 and his deposition regarding the physical assault of the deceased in connection with the demand of dowry is also not believable. Considering the aforesaid, in our view, the trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not established. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State of West Bengal would rely on two judgments of this Court, seeking appellants’ conviction under Section 304B of IPC, both of which were decided by Three Judges’ Bench of this Court : Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra (2022) 5 SCC 401 . The facts in Rajinder Singh (supra) were entirely different. In that case, the deceased had died due to consumption of poison and there were specific allegations against in-laws in the form of evidence from the deceased's father, who had given credible evidence that the in-laws were demanding money for the construction of the house. There was also evidence of giving a she-buffalo to pacify the in-laws. Father of the deceased therein further deposed how the Sarpanch and Ex-Sarpanch of their village went to the matrimonial home of the deceased for reconciliation where the father of deceased had promised to give money after harvest of crops. Jogendra (supra) was decided by taking into account the peculiar facts of that case where the evidence of PW-1 therein contained specific allegations of constant demand for dowry. It was stated that deceased was asked to raise Rs. 50,000 for the construction of house. He further stated that there was even an attempt by the ‘people of society’ to settle the matrimonial discord between the parties. In paragraph 9 of Rajinder Singh (supra), this Court had discussed the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC as follows: “9. It was stated that deceased was asked to raise Rs. 50,000 for the construction of house. He further stated that there was even an attempt by the ‘people of society’ to settle the matrimonial discord between the parties. In paragraph 9 of Rajinder Singh (supra), this Court had discussed the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC as follows: “9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry.” The evidence placed before us, in the case at hand, is not sufficient to prove the fourth ingredient i.e. cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, as laid down by the abovementioned case. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumar vs. State of Haryana; (2024) 2 SCC 573 [: 2024 (2) BLJ 240 (SC)] has held as follows: – 21. This Court in Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab [Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 417] , observed that whenever a person instigates or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission, the doing of a thing, a person can be said to have abetted in doing that thing. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. 22. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. 22. This Court in Kashibai vs. State of Karnataka [Kashibai vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 15 SCC 751 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 575] , observed that to bring the case within the purview of “abetment” under Section 107 IPC, there has to be an evidence with regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid on the part of the accused and for the purpose proving the charge under Section 306 IPC, also there has to be an evidence with regard to the positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid to drive a person to commit suicide. 23. Had there been any clinching evidence of incessant harassment on account of which the wife was left with no other option but to put an end to her life, it could have been said that the accused intended the consequences of his act, namely, suicide. A person intends a consequence when he : (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind (a “subjective” test). 24. For intention in English law, Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 provides the frame in which the mens rea is assessed. It states: “A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence, (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reasons only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.” Under Section 8(b), therefore, the jury is allowed a wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute intent or foresight on the basis of all the evidence. 25. It is now well settled that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. 25. It is now well settled that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. 24. In the present case, there is no reliable evidence to show that there was demand of dowry and torture for the same just before the death of the deceased. The prosecution has not been able to prove that the death of the deceased is a dowry death under Section 304(B) in view of the fact that the prosecution has not been able to prove the demand for dowry and no torture has been proved by the prosecution. Moreover, there is a delay in lodging the FIR of 17 days. 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilawar Singh vs. State of Delhi reported in (2007) 12 SCC 641 has held that unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is fatal to the prosecution: – “9. In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the court is to look for plausible explanation for the delay in lodging the report. Delay sometimes affords opportunity to the complainant to make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or even make fabrications. Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version of the case to be presented before the court at the earliest instance. That is why if there is delay in either coming before the police or before the court, the courts always view the allegations with suspicion and look for satisfactory explanation. If no such satisfaction is formed, the delay is treated as fatal to the prosecution case.” 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case P. Rajgopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2019) 5 SCC 403 , has held as follows: – “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of concoction of evidence by the prosecution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case P. Rajgopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2019) 5 SCC 403 , has held as follows: – “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is dutybound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely.” 27. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Ramdev Singh reported in (2004) 1 SCC 241 has held as follows: – “Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the same would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the same cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution version....” In the present case also, there is a long delay in lodging the complaint i.e., the delay of about nine months and it appears that from the conduct of the victim/informant and from her deposition, it appears that the victim had eloped with the appellant and thereafter, she has returned home. The complaint was filed after nine months as an afterthought by the P.W. 6 and from the reading of the evidence of the victim, it appears that it is a case of elopement and consensual sex and for such an occurrence, the appellant cannot be convicted. 28. The complaint was filed after nine months as an afterthought by the P.W. 6 and from the reading of the evidence of the victim, it appears that it is a case of elopement and consensual sex and for such an occurrence, the appellant cannot be convicted. 28. In view of the above, I am of the view that since the informant who is the mother herself as well as the brother of the deceased have been declared hostile and the father of the deceased victim has also not supported the case of the prosecution during the cross-examination becomes a fatal obstacle for the prosecution. Moreover, from the cross-examination of the father of the victim it appears that the victim was not meted any torture immediately before the incident. There is also an unexplained delay in lodging the present F.I.R which casts doubts on the prosecution story. The inconsistencies have also been left unexplained and therefore the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore the conviction of the accused persons can not be sustained. 29. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction dated 17.12.2020 passed by the 11th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in Sessions Trial No. 733 of 2019 arising out of Nath Nagar P.S. Case No. 75 of 2019 (G.R. No. 513/2019) is hereby set aside. 30. The appellants are acquitted of all charges. 31. The present appeal stands allowed. 32. Since the appellant no.01 Meena Devi @ Anju Devi and Appellant No. 02 Chamak Lal Mandal are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds. 33. Since the appellant No. 03 namely Vishnu Mandal is in jail, he is directed to be released forthwith from jail, if not detained or wanted in any other case. 34. Let a copy of this judgment be dispatched to the Superintendent of concerned Jail forthwith for compliance. 35. Let the L.C.R. be returned to the concerned Court below. 36. Interlocutory Application/s, if any, also stand disposed off accordingly.