JUDGMENT : J.J. Munir, J. Order on Civil Misc. Application No.6 of 2022 1. This is an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code') read with Order VI Rule 16 of the Code, seeking a rejection of the election petition, as one not disclosing a triable cause of action. The application has been made by Mohan, the returned candidate. 2. The election petition has been instituted by Ranvijay Singh, an unsuccessful candidate, who staked his claim for election to the Legislative Assembly from the 334-Hata, Kushinagar Assembly Constituency, that went to hustings, along with others, pursuant to a notification dated 04.02.2022 issued by the Governor of the State in the exercise of his powers under Section 15 (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short 'the Act of 1951'). 3. Shorn of unnecessary detail, suffice it to say that the process of election, that commenced for the Assembly Constituency in question on 04.02.2022, ended on 12.03.2022, with a declaration of the election being complete. The result was announced on 10.03.2022. The petitioner had contested the elections as a candidate of the Samajwadi Party, whereas the returned candidate contested it as a candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The returned candidate secured 1,20,660 votes whereas the petitioner received 61,301 votes. He was defeated by a margin of 59,365 votes. 4. Aggrieved, this election petition was instituted by the petitioner in person on 23.04.2022 along with tender of the requisite security money. The petition was instituted by the petitioner as aforesaid by presenting it to the learned In-charge Registrar General. After nomination by His Lordship the Chief Justice, it came up before me on 30.05.2022, when it was entertained by a detailed order and notice issued to the respondent (returned candidate). On 13.07.2022, the returned candidate put in appearance and moved an application, seeking four weeks' time to file a written statement. It was allowed. On 16.08.2022, the present application under Order VII Rule 11(a) read with Order VI Rule 16 of the Code was made. In due course, it was numbered as Civil Misc. Application No.6 of 2022. Again eschewing unnecessary detail about other proceedings, that were afoot contemporaneously, the hearing of this application was attended by terse, hairsplitting and prolix arguments. 5. Heard Mr. In due course, it was numbered as Civil Misc. Application No.6 of 2022. Again eschewing unnecessary detail about other proceedings, that were afoot contemporaneously, the hearing of this application was attended by terse, hairsplitting and prolix arguments. 5. Heard Mr. Narendra Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel for the returned candidate in support of the application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order VI Rule Rule 16 of the Code and Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Jeetendra Singh, learned Counsel for the election petitioner. 6. The foremost submission that has been urged on behalf of the returned candidate by Mr. N.K. Pandey is that it is the petitioner's case that the returned candidate, while filing his nomination on 07.02.2022, deliberately did not disclose and suppressed material facts regarding the criminal cases pending against him as also the full details of his movable and immovable property. All these particulars, he did not disclose on affidavit filed in Form-26 appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 (for short, 'the Rules of 1961'). This non-disclosure and deliberate suppression, according to the petitioner, constitutes corrupt practice by undue influence as defined under Section 123 of the Act and within the mischief of Section 100 (1)(b). Mr. Pandey submits that the election of a returned candidate can be questioned by a candidate or an elector of the Constituency on the grounds enumerated in Section 100 of the Act, but it is imperative that in order to maintain his election petition, the petitioner must plead all material facts relating to allegations made in the petition. If the election petitioner alleges corrupt practice, then by virtue of Section 83 (1)(b) of the Act, full particulars of the corrupt practice have to be set-forth, including a full statement, as far as possible, of the names of parties, alleged to have committed the corrupt practice, citing the date and place of commission of each such practice. It is argued by Mr. Pandey that upon a reading of the election petition, it is evident that none of the particulars of the corrupt practice or names of parties, who have committed such practice and the date, place and commission of each corrupt practice have been pleaded by the petitioner. No triable case, according to Mr. Pandey, is, therefore, made out under Sections 100 (1)(b), 123(2) and Section 83 of the Act, read together. 7. No triable case, according to Mr. Pandey, is, therefore, made out under Sections 100 (1)(b), 123(2) and Section 83 of the Act, read together. 7. It is further argued that it is not pleaded by the petitioner in the election petition as to which of the electors, who wanted to exercise their franchise, were prevented or unduly influenced by the returned candidate or his agent, or by others with the consent of either. According to the learned Counsel, in the absence of specific, definite and precise pleadings, relating to commission of corrupt practice by undue influence, this petition cannot be maintained on the ground of corrupt practice to question the returned candidate's election, based as it is, on vague and bald assertions. It is submitted by Mr. Pandey that the right to know about the background of a candidate, belonging to a political party or an independent is different from the right to vote belonging to an elector. When the contents of Grounds 8-A and 8-B are read along with the contents of paragraph Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the election petition in the foreshadow of Section 123 (2) read with Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act, there can be little cavil that there is no pleading of commission of corrupt practice by undue influence in the election petition. There is nothing worth trial there about it. The election petition founded on this ground is fit to be rejected. 8. Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Jeetendra Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the election petitioner, on the other hand, submits that Grounds Nos.8A and 8B read together with the averments in Paragraphs Nos.3, 4, 9, 10 and 11 of the election petition and Schedule II to it, would clearly show that material facts and particulars, constituting a good cause of action, are disclosed in the election petition. These raise a triable issue whether the returned candidate has suppressed material facts regarding his criminal antecedents, besides movable and immovable property in their entirety and with full details while filing his affidavit in Form 26. These raise a triable issue whether the returned candidate has suppressed material facts regarding his criminal antecedents, besides movable and immovable property in their entirety and with full details while filing his affidavit in Form 26. It is pointed out that particulars of immovable properties, in their entirety with full details, have not been furnished by the returned candidate, who has filed a false affidavit in Form 26, Paragraph (4) 4, 5 and 6 (page 32 of the election petition), Paragraph (5)(ii)(e) and (g) (page 33 of the election petition), Paragraph (9B) (Page 40 of the election petition), which constitute corrupt practice by undue influence defined under Section 123 (2) of the Act. A detail of the particulars have been pleaded in paragraph Nos.10 and 11 of the election petition, according to Mr. Prasad. Moreover, it is submitted that the returned candidate filed an Application u/s 482 No.19790 of 2008 before this Court, arising out of Crime No.134-B of 2006 (giving rise to Case No.3524 of 2007), under Sections 147, 323, 504, 506, 436 IPC, which is still pending and yet he made a false statement in Paragraph (5) (ii)(g) of the affidavit in Form 26, saying for a response in the said paragraph, 'No'. A disclosure of the entire criminal cases, besides all assets and liabilities are necessary for contesting an election, as held by the Supreme Court in the authorities detailed hereinafter. On this count of the matter, that we are presently considering, Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad has relied upon: (1) People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 ; (2) Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar , (2015) 3 SCC 467 ; (3) Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun Dattatray Sawant , (2014) 14 SCC 162 ; (4) Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy , (2018) 14 SCC 1 and (5) Satish Ukey v. Devendra Gangadharrao Fadnavis , (2019) 9 SCC 1 . 9. It would be apposite to answer each of the points urged by Mr. Pandey in support of the motion under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, setting these forth and answering them one after the other. Further, for a first, we may proceed to deal with the present point, noticed in all its facets as urged by learned Counsel for both sides. Pandey in support of the motion under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, setting these forth and answering them one after the other. Further, for a first, we may proceed to deal with the present point, noticed in all its facets as urged by learned Counsel for both sides. It is trite law that a returned candidate is supposed to disclose, while filing his nomination form, all criminal cases pending against him as also a complete statement of his properties, both movable and immovable in the affidavit in Form 26. The election petitioner has urged that the returned candidate had not deliberately disclosed and suppressed material facts regarding his criminal antecedents with full particulars in Part A, Paragraph (5)(ii) (a), (b) and (c) and made a false declaration in Part A, Paragraph (5)(ii) as 'No' whereas after the submission of a charge-sheet the Court has taken cognizance and framed charges. It is also pleaded that the returned candidate has concealed several sections in the criminal cases that he has mentioned in Form 26 of the nomination form and affidavit, which constitute corrupt practice by undue influence in terms of Section 123 (2) read with Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act. It is said that the returned candidate has special knowledge of the pending cases against him in Court. The returned candidate has been summoned to stand his trial by the Court. It has been pleaded that a deliberate attempt has been made to suppress his criminal antecedents by the returned candidate violating the mandate of Section 33-A of the Act and Paragraph (6A), Note 5 of Form 26 with a view to keep the voters uninformed. It, thus, constitutes undue influence and amounts to corrupt practice under Section 123 (2) read with Section 33 of the Act. It is emphasized that Rule 4-A of the Rules of 1961 obliges a candidate to disclose all of this information in order to enable the electors to freely exercise their right to vote. 10. Likewise, in Ground 8-B with its relative averments in the body of the petition, it is pleaded that non-disclosure of movable and immovable property by the returned candidate, of which details are shown in Part A, Paragraph (7B) (i) and (iv) in its entirety is wanting. 10. Likewise, in Ground 8-B with its relative averments in the body of the petition, it is pleaded that non-disclosure of movable and immovable property by the returned candidate, of which details are shown in Part A, Paragraph (7B) (i) and (iv) in its entirety is wanting. The statement is incomplete and the full details of property, share in the joint family property, has been suppressed by the returned candidate, which again constitutes corrupt practice by undue influence under Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act, inasmuch as the returned candidate has special knowledge of his assets. It is pleaded that deliberate attempt to suppress the property owned by the returned candidate and his source of income, required to be furnished by virtue of Section 33-A of the Act, would constitute an effort to misguide and keep the electorate in the dark. Thus, it would constitute undue influence and a fortiori a corrupt practice. 11. There are two parts of the challenge laid to the returned candidate's election, one in Ground 8A and the other in Ground 8B to the election petition, each supported by averments in the relevant paragraphs (Ground 8A supported by paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18 and 8B supported by paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the election petition). The case pleaded in these grounds is supported by Schedule II to the election petition, which is the affidavit in Form 26 filed by the returned candidate. In Paragraph (6) of the affidavit in Form 26, it is pointed out in paragraph No.10 of the election petition that if the candidate has not been convicted in a criminal case, he would tick mark Paragraph (6)(i) of the affidavit and then write against the alternative Paragraph (6)(ii) 'Not Applicable'. The candidate here has tick marked Paragraph (6)(i) and then written against Paragraph (6)(i) itself 'Not Applicable'. He has further gone on to write in Paragraph (6)(ii) 'Not Applicable'. This incongruity in filling up Paragraph (6) of the affidavit in Form 26 is there and the effect of this error would have to be seen. 12. In paragraph No.5 of the election petition, the objection raised appears to be more substantial. In Paragraph (5)(ii), information relating to pending cases has to be furnished. If there are no pending cases, the candidate must tick-mark Paragraph (5)(i) and then write against Paragraph (5)(ii) 'Not Applicable'. 12. In paragraph No.5 of the election petition, the objection raised appears to be more substantial. In Paragraph (5)(ii), information relating to pending cases has to be furnished. If there are no pending cases, the candidate must tick-mark Paragraph (5)(i) and then write against Paragraph (5)(ii) 'Not Applicable'. Here apparently, the returned candidate has criminal cases registered against him pending at different stages of proceeding. In Paragraph (5)(ii)(a), the candidate has disclosed the total number of cases pending against him as seven. It is pleaded in paragraph No.10 of the election petition that the returned candidate though has declared seven criminal cases pending against him in Paragraph (5)(ii)(a) of the affidavit, but in Paragraph (5)(ii)(e), it is stated that no charges have been framed. It is the election petitioner's case that in all the seven cases, 'cognizance on the charge' has been taken by the Court and the cases are pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kushinagar. 13. It is also the election petitioner's case that in Paragraph (5)(ii)(c), the returned candidate has not disclosed the full description of sections, under which the case at serial No.2 is registered against him. The returned candidate has omitted to mention Sections 149, 336 and 332 IPC in the case detailed at serial No.2 of Paragraph (5)(ii)(c). Likewise, in the case mentioned at serial No.3 of Paragraph (5)(ii)(c), being Crime No.134-B of 2006, Sections 149 IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act have not been disclosed. It is also the election petitioner's case that a bailable warrant issued against the returned candidate by the ACJM, Kushinagar on 10.12.2021 in Case No.39 of 2014, relating to Crime No.567 of 2012, under Sections 353, 342, 506 IPC has not been disclosed. In paragraph No.11 of the election petition, there is a specific plea that five criminal cases, other than those mentioned in Paragraph (5)(ii)(b) of Form 26, have been suppressed by the returned candidate and not disclosed at all. In paragraph No.11 of the election petition, there is a specific plea that five criminal cases, other than those mentioned in Paragraph (5)(ii)(b) of Form 26, have been suppressed by the returned candidate and not disclosed at all. The five cases that have been suppressed from mention in Paragraph (5)(ii) (b) of the affidavit, are set out in Paragraph No.11 of the election petition in tabular form as follows: S. No. Case Crime No./ Year Sections Police Station Date of submission of charge-sheet/ summoning order Court 1 471/2002 143, 283, 341, 268, 504, 506 IPC, 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act Hata, Kotwali Charge-sheet dated 31.01.2003 A.C.J.M., Kasya, Kushinagar 2 134A/2006 147, 149, 504, 506, 427 IPC Hata, Kotwali Charge-sheet No.261 dated 24.12.2006 Summoning Order dated 22.11.2009 Case No.1531 of 2010 A.C.J.M., Kasya, Kushinagar 3 134C/2006 147, 323, 504, 506 IPC Hata, Kotwali Summoning Order dated 19.02.2008 Cognizance date 22.11.2007 Case No. 3523 of 2007 New Case No.971 of 2010 A.C.J.M. Kasya, Kushinagar 4 775C/2008 395, 397, 298 IPC Hata, Kotwali Pending A.C.J.M. Kasya, Kushinagar 5 775B/2008 397, 395 IPC Hata, Kotwali Pending A.C.J.M. Kasya, Kushinagar 14. We have carefully perused the relevant Paragraphs of the affidavit in Form 26 and the pleadings in the election petition. 15. So far as the error in Paragraph (5)(ii)(c) is concerned, the case that in the crime mentioned at serial Nos.2 and 3 of Paragraph (5)(ii)(c), some of the sections charged have been left out, is a matter, which requires to be determined. It has to be determined for a fact if indeed the sections not mentioned are there and if these have been omitted, the effect of the omission, vis-a-vis the ground of corrupt practice under the law, judged. Likewise, the case that five cases, in addition to the seven mentioned in Paragraph 5(ii)(c) of the affidavit are registered against the petitioner that have been deliberately suppressed, is a matter, which has to be tried. In his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, there is no case that the five cases, not mentioned in Form 26, were never registered against the returned candidate and that the plea is frivolous to its face. 16. In his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, there is no case that the five cases, not mentioned in Form 26, were never registered against the returned candidate and that the plea is frivolous to its face. 16. In any case, the settled law is that the election petition is to be tried on the basis of averments in the petition without looking into the returned candidate's defence, unless the plea is frivolous, vexatious and without any basis to it. That certainly is not the returned candidate's case. About the discrepancy of five cases, said to be not mentioned in Paragraph (5)(ii)(c) of the affidavit in Form 26, all that is said in the application in paragraphs Nos.16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 is that upon information secured from Police Station Hata on 01.01.2022, seven cases alone were shown pending against the petitioner. It is also said that no case is pending against the petitioner away from Police Station Hata, District Kushinagar. There is no outright denial of the fact that the five cases mentioned in paragraph 11 of the election petition, all relating to P.S. Hata, Kotwali, are not pending against the returned candidate, or that these have indeed been mentioned in Paragraph (5)(ii)(c) of the affidavit in Form 26. Thus, it has to be determined for a fact during trial if these five cases, that are said to be not mentioned in Paragraph (5)(ii)(c) of the affidavit, are registered against the returned candidate. If the answer is yes, it has to be determined if the non-disclosure is deliberate and an act of suppression. If it is an act of suppression indeed, the issue to be examined is if the non-disclosure of these cases would amount to corrupt practice by undue influence under Section 123 (2) read with Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act. This part of the matter has, therefore, to be determined at the trial. 17. This would bring us to the other part of the objection, which is about non-disclosure of property by the returned candidate and if there is any truth to the allegation, worth trial. 18. Ground 8B raised in the election petition says that the returned candidate deliberately did not disclose and suppressed material facts regarding the movable and immovable property that he owns. 18. Ground 8B raised in the election petition says that the returned candidate deliberately did not disclose and suppressed material facts regarding the movable and immovable property that he owns. The account shown in Part A, Paragraph (7)-B (i), (iv) of the affidavit in Form 26 is incomplete and the full details of property, share in the joint family property, have been suppressed by the returned candidate, which constitutes corrupt practice by undue influence within the meaning of Section 100 (a)(b) of the Act. This is more so, where the returned candidate, as here, has special knowledge of the assets. A deliberate attempt has been made to suppress property and the source of income required to be furnished by dint of Section 33-A of the Act. A non-disclosure would misguide the electors about the suitability of the returned candidate, keeping them in the dark. It is, thus, undue influence. It is urged that the suppression, as aforesaid, amounts to corrupt practice under Section 123 (2), bringing the act within the mischief of Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act. The ground is supported by pleadings in paragraph Nos.15 and 16 read with Schedule 3, which is an integral part of the election petition. 19. The learned Counsel, appearing for the returned candidate, submits that upon a perusal of paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 18 of the election petition, it is apparent that an attempt to make out a case about details of assets, liabilities and the sources of income for the financial year 2019-20, being deliberately suppressed by the returned candidate, has been made. It is urged that suppression with regard to particulars of agricultural land owned is misconceived as the election petitioner does not have any knowledge of family settlement about the said land. The submission in this regard, therefore, is that any inaccuracy in the details of agricultural land owned by the returned candidate is not attributable to any deliberate act of suppression on his part. It is also urged that neither the returned candidate nor his wife are owners of any huge building or land, located in an urban area or agglomeration nor do they have a hefty bank balance. The averments in this regard in paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 18 of the election petition are all misconceived in the submission of the learned Counsel for the returned candidate. The averments in this regard in paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 18 of the election petition are all misconceived in the submission of the learned Counsel for the returned candidate. These have been made for the purpose of instituting the election petition and harassing the returned candidate. There is no case, according to the learned Counsel for the returned candidate, made out under Section 123 (2) read with Section 100 (1)(b) of the Act. It is submitted emphatically that the election petitioner has not pleaded all material facts relating to the allegations in Ground 8B and required to constitute a triable cause of action. 20. The learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, on the other hand, asserts with reference to the averments in paragraph Nos.15, 16 and 17 of the election petition that a clear case of deliberate suppression of assets by the returned candidate and his wife is clearly and forthrightly disclosed. The attempt is to misguide the electors in making an informed choice about the candidate they desire to elect. The learned Senior Counsel has taken the Court through the various discrepancies in Form 26 about the statement of movable and immovable property made by the returned candidate in order to show that a triable case on this count is made out. 21. So far as the present point is concerned, we have already noticed the contents of Ground 8B and what the election petitioner has pleaded in paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 18 of the election petition hereinbefore. In Paragraph (7)-B (i) of Form 26, the returned candidate is recorded as bhumidhar in possession of agricultural land, comprising Plot Nos.636, 562, 560, 490, 696, 1-ka, 380, 379, 31-kha, 187, 582, 489. A perusal of Paragraph No.7B (i) relating to agricultural land requires two details to be furnished about the agricultural property of the candidate himself, to wit, the location and survey plot number. Here, it may be noticed that the returned candidate has mentioned 12 survey plot numbers, standing in his name, but not disclosed the location thereof. In the same Paragraph, further down, the details of property owned by the spouse are required to be disclosed. This has been disclosed as Plot Nos.619, 821, 832, 574M, 599M, 539, 589M, 575M, 590M, 592M, 843 Hata, 821, 853, 840, 140M, 577, 578, 140, 841, 843, Bhagnath, 1182, Tharuadih. In the same Paragraph, further down, the details of property owned by the spouse are required to be disclosed. This has been disclosed as Plot Nos.619, 821, 832, 574M, 599M, 539, 589M, 575M, 590M, 592M, 843 Hata, 821, 853, 840, 140M, 577, 578, 140, 841, 843, Bhagnath, 1182, Tharuadih. Apparently, for his spouse, the returned candidate has disclosed the survey plot numbers with their location. The total area of agricultural land, standing to the returned candidate’s account, shown in Paragraph (7)-B (i) is 4.30 acres and that in his wife’s account, 1.64 acres. 22. In paragraph No.15 of the election petition, it is pleaded that the returned candidate is the recorded bhumidhar of Khata No.00222 Gata No.689(kha) admeasuring 0.243 hectare, Tehsil Hata, Kushinagar. He is also the bhumidhar of Gata No. 1(ka) admeasuring 2.294 hectares comprised in Khata No.00055, Gata No.31(kha) admeasuring 1.765 hectares Khata No.00319 and Gata No.9(ka) admeasuring 0.49 hectare Khata No.00396, all situate in Tharuadih, Kushinagar. It is then pleaded that the returned candidate is the bhumidhar of Khasra No.560, Khata No.00445 admeasuring 0.2870 hectare. The averment in paragraph No.15 further on says that the returned candidate deliberately did not disclose and suppressed material facts regarding his bhumidhari rights jointly held in Village Rampur Sohrouna, Pargana Silhat, Tehsil Hata, District Kushinagar. The returned candidate is also alleged to own a 1/4th share of Khata No. 00041 Khasra No. 380(M) admeasuring 0.2430 hectare, situate in Village Balua Rampul Sripal, Pargana Silhat, Tehsil Hata, District Kushinagar and Khasra No. 560 Khata No.00445 admeasuring 0.2870 hectare, Khasra No. 649(M) Khata 00450 admeasuring 0.4270 hectare, situate in Village Sohraouna. The returned candidate is also the bhumidhar of a 1/3rd share in Khata No. 00103 Khasra No. 650 admeasuring 0.2180 hectare, Khasra No. 559 admeasuring 0.1860 hectare, Khasra No. 763(kha)(M) admeasuring 0.0230 hectare, Khasra No. 558 admeasuring 0.1340 hectare and Khasra No.709(M) admeasuring 0.0290 hectare. Also, the returned candidate is said to be the bhumidhar, holding a share in Khata No.00798 Khasra No. 763(ka) admeasuring 0.0360 hectare, Khasra No.730 (kha) admeasuring 0.2610 hectare, Khasra No.779(M) admeasuring 0.0280 hectare, Khata No. 00461 Khasra No. 696 admeasuring 0.2510, all situate at Village Rampur, Sohrouna, Pargana Silhat, Tehsil Hata, District Kushinagar. It is then pleaded that likewise the full detail of property in the name of his wife has been suppressed. It is then pleaded that likewise the full detail of property in the name of his wife has been suppressed. It is said that the returned candidate’s wife is bhumidhar of Gata No. 631, situate at Hata Nagar Palika, Tehsil Hata Khaas, Kushinagar. 23. In Paragraph (7)-B (iv) of the affidavit in Form 26 filed by the returned candidate, he has disclosed for his residential buildings a property by the description 'Mahadev Jharkhandi, Gorakhpur', Gata No. 114. The total measurement of the plot, on which the building is erected, is detailed as 1526 square feet. The built up area is indicated to be 1000 square feet. In the Paragraph relating to the date of purchase, in case of self- acquired property, it is written 'Year 2018'. The sale consideration paid for the property is Rs.21 lacs and its current value Rs.25 lacs. In paragraph No.15 of the election petition, it is averred that the returned candidate has purchased a residential building at 'Mahadev Jharkhandi, Gorakhpur', bearing Gata No.114 and at Hata, Kushinagar, Plot Nos.562 and 564. The valuation of the aforesaid property is shown as Rs.21 lacs whereas the same Gata number has also been shown to be purchased in the name of his wife and the sale consideration being Rs.21 lacs. It is said that the valuation and description of the aforesaid property appears to be false and contradictory to each other. 24. The next facet about the incorrect disclosure of movable property is founded on the details furnished by the returned candidate in Paragraph (7)-A (ii) of Form 26, relating to deposit in bank accounts, deposit with financial institutions, non- banking financial companies etc. The allegation is about the incorrect disclosure of deposits in the bank account of the returned candidate's wife. A perusal of Paragraph (7)-A (ii) of Form 26 would show that in the returned candidate's wife's bank account maintained with the Bank of India, the total deposit shown is a sum of Rs.2,42,170.70. A perusal of Part B, Paragraph (11) 7. shows that for the financial year 2019-20, the total income of the returned candidate's wife shown is Rs.12,46,178/-. The allegation in paragraph No.16 of the election petition says that comparing the total deposits shown in the returned candidate's wife's account in Paragraph (7)-A (ii) and the total income shown in Part-B, Paragraph (11) 7. shows that for the financial year 2019-20, the total income of the returned candidate's wife shown is Rs.12,46,178/-. The allegation in paragraph No.16 of the election petition says that comparing the total deposits shown in the returned candidate's wife's account in Paragraph (7)-A (ii) and the total income shown in Part-B, Paragraph (11) 7. for the financial year 2019-20, the declaration made by the returned candidate is apparently misguiding. It is pleaded that a person, whose source of income is interest earned in the savings bank account and the total deposit in the savings bank account by interest is a sum of Rs.2,42,120.78, an annual income of Rs.12,46,178/- shows an unknown source and the purchase of property in last five years not made from legal source. According to the petitioner, these discrepancies violate the principle of transparency embodied in Section 33-A of the Act, which require disclosure of assets and liabilities by a candidate. The case is that this suppression and concealment with a false declaration of income and deposits in bank constitutes undue influence in terms of Section 123 (2) of the Act, which attracts Section 100 (1)(b). 25. The election petition pleads a case of material discrepancy between the movable and immovable property disclosed by the returned candidate for himself and his wife in Form 26 and what he and his wife actually own in order to show a case of deliberate suppression of his financial status and affairs. In Schedule 3, some khatauni relating to immovable property owned by the returned candidate have been annexed. The details given about immovable property owned by the returned candidate and that disclosed in Form 26, Paragraph (7)-A (ii) do show prima facie discrepancies in the number of plots disclosed and those alleged by the petitioner to be owned by the returned candidate. There is some material also annexed to the election petition to show the returned candidate's holdings. The case that the returned candidate has put forward in his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is that he does not know about family settlements made relating to immovable property that appears to be quite extensive. This again is a matter to be inquired into during trial of the election petition. The case that the returned candidate has put forward in his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is that he does not know about family settlements made relating to immovable property that appears to be quite extensive. This again is a matter to be inquired into during trial of the election petition. There is also a discrepancy pleaded between the returned candidate's wife, total deposit in her savings bank account from which she earns her income and the annual income shown in her return form of the financial year 2019-20. The returned candidate might have an explanation to offer on behalf of his wife, but the discrepancy is there. This leads to the necessity of determining facts, if indeed the returned candidate has suppressed his wife's income and cash deposit in banks, the details of which he has not truthfully set forth. The requirement of a full and complete disclosure by a candidate of his own and his wife's financial status, the details of their movable and immovable property has the avowed purpose of permitting the electors to make an informed choice about the candidate, whom they wish to elect. Therefore, any suppression about these information or non-disclosure of some material information may constitute corrupt practice by undue influence envisaged under Section 123 (2) of the Act read with Section 100 (1)(b). 26. The question, if non-disclosure of assets and sources of income would amount to undue influence, a corrupt practice under Section 123 of the Act, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Lok Prahari through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla v. Union of India and others , (2018) 4 SCC 699 . In Lok Prahari (supra), it was held: “ 79. We shall now deal with Prayer 2 [Prayer 2 — “declare that non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of self, spouse and dependants by a candidate would amount to undue influence and thereby, corruption and as such election of such a candidate can be declared null and void under Section 100 (1)(b) of the 1951 RP Act in terms of the judgment reported in AIR 2015 SC 1921 .”] which seeks a declaration that non- disclosure of assets and sources of income would amount to “undue influence” — a corrupt practice under Section 123 (2) of the 1951 RP Act. In this behalf, heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner on a judgment of this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar , (2015) 3 SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359 : AIR 2015 SC 1921 . It was a case arising under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. A notification was issued by the State Election Commission stipulating that every candidate at an election to any panchayat is required to disclose information, inter alia, whether the candidate was accused in any pending criminal case of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more and in which charges have been framed or cognizance has been taken by a court of law. In an election petition, it was alleged that there were certain criminal cases pending falling in the abovementioned categories but the said information was not disclosed by the returned candidate at the time of filing his nomination. One of the questions before this Court was whether such non-disclosure amounted to “undue influence” — a corrupt practice under the Panchayats Act. It may be mentioned that the Panchayats Act simply adopted the definition of a corrupt practice as contained in Section 123 of the 1951 RP Act. 80. On an elaborate consideration of various aspects of the matter, this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar , (2015) 3 SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359 : AIR 2015 SC 1921 held as follows: (SCC p. 522, Para 91) “91. … While filing the nomination form, if the requisite information, as has been highlighted by us, relating to criminal antecedents, is not given, indubitably, there is an attempt to suppress, effort to misguide and keep the people in dark. This attempt undeniably and undisputedly is undue influence and, therefore, amounts to corrupt practice. …” 81. For the very same logic as adopted by this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar , (2015) 3 SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359 : AIR 2015 SC 1921 , we are also of the opinion that the non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of the candidates and their associates would constitute a corrupt practice falling under heading “undue influence” as defined under Section 123 (2) of the 1951 RP Act. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2. 27. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2. 27. Following Lok Prahari , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in S. Rukmini Madegowda v. Karnataka State Election Commission and others , (2022) 18 SCC 1 held: “ 61. Mr Patil rightly argued that Section 123 (2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 699 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 139 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 590 : (2018) 2 SCC (L&S) 125 where this Court held that non-disclosure would amount to “undue influence” as defined in the Representation of People Act, 1951. The non-disclosure of assets would therefore, also amount to “undue influence” and consequently to “corrupt practices” under the KMC Act. Mr Patil argued that the Notifications dated 14-7-2003 and in particular 19-6-2018 issued by the State Election Commission made it mandatory for the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assets of their spouses.” 28. So far as the effect of non-disclosure of criminal cases or suppression of some is concerned, that too would amount to corrupt practice within the meaning of Section of Section 123 (2) of the Act read with Section 100 (1)(b). Reference in this connection may be made to Krishnamoorthy (supra). It would be apposite to refer to the following remarks of the Supreme Court in Krishnamoorthy “79. Both the paragraphs when properly understood relate to the stage of scrutiny of the nomination paper. In this context, a question may arise if a candidate fills up all the particulars relating to his criminal antecedents and the nomination is not liable for rejection in law, what would be the impact. At the stage of scrutiny, needless to say, even if objections are raised, that possibly cannot be verified by the Returning Officer. Therefore, we do not intend to say that if objections are raised, the nomination paper would be liable for rejection. However, we may hasten to clarify that it is not the issue involved in the present case. The controversy which has emanated in this case is whether non-furnishing of the information while filing an affidavit pertaining to criminal cases, especially cases involving heinous or serious crimes or relating to corruption or moral turpitude would tantamount to corrupt practice, regard being had to the concept of undue influence. The controversy which has emanated in this case is whether non-furnishing of the information while filing an affidavit pertaining to criminal cases, especially cases involving heinous or serious crimes or relating to corruption or moral turpitude would tantamount to corrupt practice, regard being had to the concept of undue influence. We have already referred to the authorities in Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms , (2002) 5 SCC 294 and People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India , (2013) 10 SCC 1 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 587 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 769 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 648. Emphasis on all these cases has been given with regard to essential concept of democracy, criminalisation of politics and preservation of a healthy and growing democracy. The right of a voter to know has been accentuated. As a part of that right of a voter, not to vote in favour of any candidate has been emphasised by striking down Rules 41(2), 41(3) and 49-O of the Rules. In Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms , (2002) 5 SCC 294 , it has been held thus : (SCC pp. 309-10, para 22) “22. For health of democracy and fair election, whether the disclosure of assets by a candidate, his/her qualification and particulars regarding involvement in criminal cases are necessary for informing voters, maybe illiterate, so that they can decide intelligently, whom to vote for. In our opinion, the decision of even an illiterate voter, if properly educated and informed about the contesting candidate, would be based on his own relevant criteria of selecting a candidate. In democracy, periodical elections are conducted for having efficient governance for the country and for the benefit of citizens—voters. In a democratic form of Government, voters are of utmost importance. They have the right to elect or re- elect on the basis of the antecedents and past performance of the candidate. The voter has the choice of deciding whether holding of educational qualification or holding of property is relevant for electing or re-electing a person to be his representative. Voter has to decide whether he should cast vote in favour of a candidate who is involved in a criminal case. For maintaining purity of elections and a healthy democracy, voters are required to be educated and well informed about the contesting candidates. Voter has to decide whether he should cast vote in favour of a candidate who is involved in a criminal case. For maintaining purity of elections and a healthy democracy, voters are required to be educated and well informed about the contesting candidates. Such information would include assets held by the candidate, his qualifications including educational qualification and antecedents of his life including whether he was involved in a criminal case and if the case is decided—its result, if pending—whether charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the court. There is no necessity of suppressing the relevant facts from the voters.” (Emphasis supplied) 82. Having stated about the need for vibrant and healthy democracy, we think it appropriate to refer to the distinction between disqualification to contest an election and the concept or conception of corrupt practice inhered in the words “undue influence”. Section 8 of the 1951 Act stipulates that conviction under certain offences would disqualify a person for being a Member either of the House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State. We repeat at the cost of repetition unless a person is disqualified under law to contest the election, he cannot be disqualified to contest. But the question is when an election petition is filed before an Election Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be, questioning the election on the ground of practising corrupt practice by the elected candidate on the foundation that he has not fully disclosed the criminal cases pending against him, as required under the Act and the Rules and the affidavit that has been filed before the Returning Officer is false and reflects total suppression, whether such a ground would be sustainable on the foundation of undue influence. We may give an example at this stage. We may give an example at this stage. A candidate filing his nomination paper while giving information swears an affidavit and produces before the Returning Officer stating that he has been involved in a case under Section 354 IPC and does not say anything else though cognizance has been taken or charges have been framed for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or offences pertaining to rape, murder, dacoity, smuggling, land grabbing, local enactments like the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970, embezzlement, attempt to murder or any other offence which may come within the compartment of serious or heinous offences or corruption or moral turpitude. It is apt to note here that when an FIR is filed a person filing a nomination paper may not be aware of lodgement of the FIR but when cognizance is taken or charge is framed, he is definitely aware of the said situation. It is within his special knowledge. If the offences are not disclosed in entirety, the electorate remain in total darkness about such information. It can be stated with certitude that this can definitely be called antecedents for the limited purpose, that is, disclosure of information to be chosen as a representative to an elected body. 91. The purpose of referring to the instructions of the Election Commission is that the affidavit sworn by the candidate has to be put in public domain so that the electorate can know. If they know the half truth, as submits Mr Salve, it is more dangerous, for the electorate is denied of the information which is within the special knowledge of the candidate. When something within special knowledge is not disclosed, it tantamounts to fraud, as has been held in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 . While filing the nomination form, if the requisite information, as has been highlighted by us, relating to criminal antecedents, is not given, indubitably, there is an attempt to suppress, effort to misguide and keep the people in dark. This attempt undeniably and undisputedly is undue influence and, therefore, amounts to corrupt practice. It is necessary to clarify here that if a candidate gives all the particulars and despite that he secures the votes that will be an informed, advised and free exercise of right by the electorate. This attempt undeniably and undisputedly is undue influence and, therefore, amounts to corrupt practice. It is necessary to clarify here that if a candidate gives all the particulars and despite that he secures the votes that will be an informed, advised and free exercise of right by the electorate. That is why there is a distinction between a disqualification and the corrupt practice. In an election petition, the election petitioner is required to assert about the cases in which the successful candidate is involved as per the rules and how there has been non-disclosure in the affidavit. Once that is established, it would amount to corrupt practice. We repeat at the cost of repetition, it has to be determined in an election petition by the Election Tribunal. 94. In view of the above, we would like to sum up our conclusions: 94.1. Disclosure of criminal antecedents of a candidate, especially, pertaining to heinous or serious offence or offences relating to corruption or moral turpitude at the time of filing of nomination paper as mandated by law is a categorical imperative. 94.2. When there is non-disclosure of the offences pertaining to the areas mentioned in the preceding clause, it creates an impediment in the free exercise of electoral right. 94.3. Concealment or suppression of this nature deprives the voters to make an informed and advised choice as a consequence of which it would come within the compartment of direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere with the free exercise of the right to vote by the electorate, on the part of the candidate. 94.4. As the candidate has the special knowledge of the pending cases where cognizance has been taken or charges have been framed and there is a non-disclosure on his part, it would amount to undue influence and, therefore, the election is to be declared null and void by the Election Tribunal under Section 100 (1)(b) of the 1951 Act. 94.5. The question whether it materially affects the election or not will not arise in a case of this nature.” 29. 94.5. The question whether it materially affects the election or not will not arise in a case of this nature.” 29. Now, the question is if in a case, like the present one, where there are averments specifically made, backed by some material, to show that the returned candidate suppressed certain information relating to the pending cases against him or about his financial assets or that of his spouse, should the petition be thrown out under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. We have already said in the context of some discrepancy in the criminal cases disclosed in Form 26 and those said to be not disclosed there, that the petition cannot be summarily rejected or nipped in the bud. The same principle applies on facts as regards the alleged non-disclosure of assets by the returned candidate for himself and his wife in Form 26. That too also cannot be summarily determined and the inquiry about it terminated by exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 30. At this stage, it is not for us to analyze the material produced by parties in the sense of being evidence. That is something to be determined at the trial. Also, anything said here about the parties’ case in no manner reflects on the merits thereof. All that we wish to say at this stage is that the election petition based on Grounds 8A and 8B, given the material on record, deserves to be tried; not summarily determined. In this regard, reference may be made to the remarks of the Supreme Court in Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju (supra), which read: “ 51. To put it differently, the approach of the High Court in considering the two applications is, in our opinion, manifestly erroneous, if not perverse. For, it has ventured into the arena of analysis of the matter on merit. That is a prohibited area at this stage. Since the conclusion reached by the High Court that the pleadings in Paras 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition are frivolous and vexatious is untenable, it would necessarily follow that the election petition, as filed, will have to be examined as a whole without subtracting any portion therefrom. If so read, it is not possible to take a view that the same does not disclose any cause of action at all. If so read, it is not possible to take a view that the same does not disclose any cause of action at all. On this finding, the application preferred by Respondent 1 for rejection of election petition in limine under Order 7 Rule 11, cannot be countenanced and must also fail.” 31. The next ground raised in the election petition, and which the returned candidate wants this Court to summarily determine under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, is Ground 8C. It says that the Returning Officer has improperly accepted the returned candidate's nomination in violation of the provisions of Section 33 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1961, and further failed to adhere to the provisions of Section 36 of the Act, leading to the election being one fit to be declared null and void. It is said for this ground that the returned candidate has not filled up the nomination form in terms of the mandate of the Election Commission. He has left blank Paragraph of date in Form 26 as well as several (Parts) of Paragraph 4. In support of this ground, it is averred in paragraph No.20 of the election petition that the Returning Officer, while scrutinizing the returned candidate's nomination form, failed to check Part A, Paragraph (6A) of Form 26. Instead, mechanically and without scrutinizing the form, he put the returned candidate's name in the list of candidates. It is pleaded that the returned candidate, at the foot of the declaration, did not write the date of declaration and yet his nomination paper was improperly accepted. 32. It is averred that several Paragraphs in Form 26 were left blank, which are mandatory to fill up. The defects in filing the nomination paper are substantial in nature, inasmuch as the returned candidate did not correctly declare in Part A, Paragraph (6) (i) and (6) (ii). The returned candidate filled up Paragraph (6) (i) as not applicable and thus was bound to disclose the details of cases, where he was convicted. Instead, he made a declaration in Paragraph (6) (ii) to the effect that it was not applicable. The returned candidate failed to fulfill the requirements of disclosing cases where he was convicted. The Returning Officer, without scrutinizing the nomination paper, accepted it. Instead, he made a declaration in Paragraph (6) (ii) to the effect that it was not applicable. The returned candidate failed to fulfill the requirements of disclosing cases where he was convicted. The Returning Officer, without scrutinizing the nomination paper, accepted it. It is pleaded in paragraph No.21 that Part A, Paragraph (6A) of Form 26 has not been verified by the returned candidate. The defect as to verification in nomination form was of a substantial character. Since the defect in verification was not cured until the last date of nomination, it could not be accepted, as improperly done by the Returning Officer. The result of the election petitioner is, therefore, materially affected. 33. The learned Counsel for the returned candidate has contested this fact about any paragraphs in Form 26 being left blank or the nomination form being defective and yet accepted as valid. Some of these would overlap with the other grounds. But, here all that is to be seen is if there is any case of some Paragraphs in Form 26 being left blank by the returned candidate. There appears to be some inaccuracy in filling up Paragraphs (6) (i) and (6) (ii) of Part A, because against Paragraph (6) (i) if the returned candidate's position was that he was not convicted of any criminal offence, he would have to just tick mark the declaration in Paragraph (6) (i) and then write against Paragraph (6) (ii) 'Not Applicable'. Instead, the returned candidate has written against Paragraph (6) (i) 'Lagu Nahi Hota (Not Applicable)' and in the entire table comprising Paragraph (6) (ii) 'Lagu Nahi (Not Applicable)'. It cannot be said at this juncture if this ground is not at all available to the election petitioner to question the returned candidate's election. The matter would have to be determined after a close scrutiny of the various paragraphs that have been marked 'Not Applicable' or they have been improperly filled up. There cannot be any comment with finality at this stage of the proceeding while deciding a motion under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 34. It is next urged that the affidavit of corrupt practice at page 61 of the election petition is not one drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act. There cannot be any comment with finality at this stage of the proceeding while deciding a motion under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 34. It is next urged that the affidavit of corrupt practice at page 61 of the election petition is not one drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act. It is, therefore, the returned candidate's case that the election petition is liable to be rejected for non-filing of a valid affidavit of corrupt practice. It is submitted during the course of hearing by the learned Counsel appearing for the returned candidate that the affidavit of corrupt practice in Form 25 is not in conformity with Rule 94A of the Rules 1961 or Form 25, inasmuch as the name of the corrupt practice alleged has not been specified, which is imperative. A reading of the verification Clause A of the affidavit shows that paragraph Nos.9 to 18 of the election petition have been mentioned as 'corrupt practice of suppression of criminal antecedents', 'non-disclosure of movable and immovable property' and 'false declaration in Form 26'. What the learned Counsel for the returned candidate would submit is that the requirement in the verification clause (a) of the affidavit of corrupt practice or clause (b) for that matter, which have not been separately made here, ought name the corrupt practice, such as 'undue influence', 'bribery', 'appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste etc.' What we find is that even if there is a defect in the affidavit of corrupt practice, the defect in the said affidavit is not fatal to the maintainability of the election petition. The requirement of filing an affidavit of corrupt practice is spelt out by the proviso to Section 83 (1) of the Act. The question, if a defect in compliance with Section 83 (1) of the Act would entail dismissal of election under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh and others , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1058 . The question, if a defect in compliance with Section 83 (1) of the Act would entail dismissal of election under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh and others , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1058 . In Thangjam Arunkumar (supra), the relevant facts would show that an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code as well as Section 86 of the Act was made on behalf of the returned candidate, seeking dismissal of the election petition on the following grounds, that may best be recapitulated in the words of their Lordships: “ 3. …..... (i) non-disclosure of cause of action/ triable issue vis-à-vis the alleged corrupt practice committed by the Appellant; (ii) the absence of a concise statement of facts as mandated under Section 83 of the Act and (iii) for not serving a true self attested copy of the election petition on the returned candidate as provided under Section 81 of the Act. Apart from the above, and more importantly, the Appellant also sought dismissal of the election petition on the ground that the Form-25 affidavit as prescribed under Section 83 of the Act r/w Rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 ha s not been filed along-with the election petition. It was alleged that such an affidavit is mandatory, as the election petition raises allegations of corrupt practice.” (Emphasis by Court) 35. The following issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar , which again in the words of their Lordships, reads: “ 8. The only issue for consideration is whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed by allowing the Order 7 Rule 11 application for non-compliance of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act.” 36. After referring to the provisions of Sections 83 and 86 of the Act and Order VI Rule 15 of the Code, it was held: “ 11. The first decision on this issue is by a Constitution Bench in T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose, (1999) 4 SCC 274 . In the said case, the returned candidate was defending an election petition filed against him on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements under Section 81(3) of the Act. The first decision on this issue is by a Constitution Bench in T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose, (1999) 4 SCC 274 . In the said case, the returned candidate was defending an election petition filed against him on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements under Section 81(3) of the Act. This Court, after going through the difference in the legislative intent of Sections 81 and 83 of the Act, observed that non-compliance with the requirements of the former provides for an automatic dismissal of an election petition under Section 86 of the Act, and non-compliance with the latter is a curable defect and would not merit dismissal at the threshold. In this light, this Court observed that: “ 38. … to our mind, the legislative intent appears to be quite clear, since it divides violations into two classes — those violations which would entail dismissal of the election petition under Section 86(1) of the Act like non-compliance with Section 81(3) and those violations which attract Section 83 (1) of the Act, i.e., non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 . It is only the violation of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance as expounded in Murarka Radhey Shyam, (1964) 3 SCR 573 and Ch. Subbarao, (1964) 6 SCR 213 cases. The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act, on the other hand, can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure.” 12. In Siddeshwar (supra), the matter came up before a three-judge bench of this Court by way of a reference. When the matter was placed before a two-judge bench, it was contended, relying upon P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan13, that an election petitioner has to file the Form-25 affidavit in support of the corrupt practice allegation, in addition to the usual verifying affidavit which forms an integral part of the election petition. On the other hand, the two- judge bench was also appraised of judgments to the contrary which held that not filing of the affidavit is a curable defect. In order to give quietus to the issue, the matter was referred to a bench of three judges. After relying on various precedents, the three Judge Bench in Siddeshwar observed as under: “ 1. In order to give quietus to the issue, the matter was referred to a bench of three judges. After relying on various precedents, the three Judge Bench in Siddeshwar observed as under: “ 1. The principal question of law raised for our consideration is whether, to maintain an election petition, it is imperative for an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE , 1908 in support of the averments made in the election petition in addition to an affidavit (in a case where resort to corrupt practices have been alleged against the returned candidate) as required by the proviso to Section 83 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In our opinion, there is no such mandate in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and a reading of P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan, (2012) 5 SCC 511 , which suggests to the contrary, does not lay down correct law to this limited extent. 2. Another question that has arisen is that if an affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned candidate is not in the statutory Form 25 prescribed by the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, whether the election petition is liable to be summarily dismissed. In our opinion, as long as there is substantial compliance with the statutory form, there is no reason to summarily dismiss an election petition on this ground. However, an opportunity must be given to the election petitioner to cure the defect. Further, merely because the affidavit may be defective, it cannot be said that the petition filed is not an election petition as understood by the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 22. A plain reading of Rule 15 suggests that a verification of the plaint is necessary. In addition to the verification, the person verifying the plaint is “also” required to file an affidavit in support of the pleadings. Does this mean, as suggested by the learned counsel for Siddeshwar that Prasanna Kumar was obliged to file two affidavits—one in support of the allegations of corrupt practices and the other in support of the pleadings? 23. A reading of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act makes it clear that what is required of an election petitioner is only that the verification should be carried out in the manner prescribed in CPC. 23. A reading of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act makes it clear that what is required of an election petitioner is only that the verification should be carried out in the manner prescribed in CPC. That Order 6 Rule 15 requires an affidavit “also” to be filed does not mean that the verification of a plaint is incomplete if an affidavit is not filed. The affidavit, in this context, is a stand-alone document. 25. It seems to us that a plain and simple reading of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act clearly indicates that the requirement of an additional affidavit is not to be found therein. While the requirement of “also” filing an affidavit in support of the pleadings filed under CPC may be mandatory in terms of Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC, the affidavit is not a part of the verification of the pleadings—both are quite different. While the Act does require a verification of the pleadings, the plain language of Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act does not require an affidavit in support of the pleadings in an election petition. We are being asked to read a requirement that does not exist in Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act. 37. A perusal of the affidavit furnished by Prasanna Kumar ex facie indicates that it was not in absolute compliance with the format affidavit. However, we endorse the view of the High Court that on a perusal of the affidavit, undoubtedly there was substantial compliance with the prescribed format. It is correct that the verification was also defective, but the defect is curable and cannot be held fatal to the maintainability of the election petition. 38. Recently, in Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 the issue of a failure to file an affidavit in accordance with the prescribed format came up for consideration. This is what this Court had to say: “28. … The format of the affidavit is at any rate not a matter of substance. What is important and at the heart of the requirement is whether the election petitioner has made averments which are testified by him on oath, no matter in a form other than the one that is stipulated in the Rules. … The format of the affidavit is at any rate not a matter of substance. What is important and at the heart of the requirement is whether the election petitioner has made averments which are testified by him on oath, no matter in a form other than the one that is stipulated in the Rules. The absence of an affidavit or an affidavit in a form other than the one stipulated by the Rules does not by itself cause any prejudice to the successful candidate so long as the deficiency is cured by the election petitioner by filing a proper affidavit when directed to do so.” We have no reason to take a different view. The contention urged by Siddeshwar is rejected.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. More recently, in A. Manju v. Prajwal Revanna (supra), this Court dealt with the same question as to whether an election petition containing an allegation of corrupt practice but not supported by an affidavit in Form 25, is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. This Court had observed: “ 26. However, we are not persuaded to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the non-submission of Form 25 would lead to the dismissal of the election petition. We say so because, in our view, the observations made in Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 which have received the imprimatur of the three-Judge Bench in G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 , appear not to have been appreciated in the correct perspective. In fact, G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 , has been cited by the learned Judge to dismiss the petition. If we look at the election petition, the prayer clause is followed by a verification. There is also a verifying affidavit in support of the election petition. Thus, factually it would not be appropriate to say that there is no affidavit in support of the petition, albeit not in Form 25. This was a curable defect and the learned Judge trying the election petition ought to have granted an opportunity to the appellant to file an affidavit in support of the petition in Form 25 in addition to the already existing affidavit filed with the election petition. This was a curable defect and the learned Judge trying the election petition ought to have granted an opportunity to the appellant to file an affidavit in support of the petition in Form 25 in addition to the already existing affidavit filed with the election petition. In fact, a consideration of both the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned Judge i.e. Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 as well as G.M. Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar, (2013) 4 SCC 776 , ought to have resulted in a conclusion that the correct ratio in view of these facts was to permit the appellant to cure this defect by filing an affidavit in the prescribed form.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. The position of law that emerges for the above referred cases is clear. The requirement to file an affidavit under the proviso to Section 83 (1)(c) is not mandatory. It is sufficient if there is substantial compliance. As the defect is curable, an opportunity may be granted to file the necessary affidavit. 15. In the instant case, the election petition contained on affidavit and also a verification. In this very affidavit, the election petitioner has sworn on oath that the paragraphs where he has raised allegations of corrupt practice are true to the best of his knowledge. Though there is no separate and an independent affidavit with respect to the allegations of corrupt practice, there is substantial compliance of the requirements under Section 83 (1)(c) of the Act.” 37. Now, Thangjam Arunkumar was a case, where there was no affidavit of corrupt practice filed, but there was verification of the relevant paragraphs of the election petition on affidavit filed in support thereof. The allegations of corrupt practice in the election petition were sworn on oath as true to the best of the election petitioner's knowledge. It was regarded as substantial compliance. Here, a separate affidavit of corrupt practice is there, though there might be a minor infraction in not mentioning the name of the corrupt practice as required in Form 25 or separately verifying the swearing clauses of the affidavit, marked as (a), (b) and (c) in the form. In the election petition, paragraphs marked as (a), (b) and (c) are prescribed for verifying particular paragraphs of the election petition, that are sworn as true on the basis of personal knowledge, information etc. In the election petition, paragraphs marked as (a), (b) and (c) are prescribed for verifying particular paragraphs of the election petition, that are sworn as true on the basis of personal knowledge, information etc. No doubt, that kind of separate swearing clauses, marked as (a), (b), (c) etc., are not there in the affidavit of corrupt practice, enclosed with the election petition. Still, it is a case of substantial compliance, where the swearing clause in the affidavit of corrupt practice specifies paragraphs, sworn as true to the petitioner's knowledge, based on information received by him from supporters, election agents and other persons and on perusal of records. The defect in the affidavit of corrupt practice may be there, but it cannot be regarded as fatal. Apart from it, the election petition carries a separate affidavit in support of it at pages 53-55 of the paper-book, distinct and different from the affidavit of corrupt practice. Here, the paragraphs of the election petition are separately sworn on the basis of personal knowledge, information received by the petitioner from his supporters, election agents and other persons, those based on perusal of records, and still others, sworn on the basis of legal advice. 38. In this state of swearing of the affidavit in support of the election petition and the affidavit of corrupt practice, it cannot be said that for the petitioner's failure in not filing an affidavit sworn strictly in accordance with Section 83 (1) read with Rule 94 in Form 25, the election petition ought be summarily rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 39. In the totality of circumstances, this Court is of opinion that the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is fit to be rejected and the election petition must proceed to trial. 40. Let the office be intimated. 41. There shall be an order accordingly.