JUDGMENT : Sachin Shankar Magadum, J. This appeal is by the plaintiffs assailing the judgment and decree dated 25103/2011, passed by the LXXIV Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, in O.S.No.25103/2011. 2. For the sake of brevity, the ranks of the parties are referred to as per their ranks before the trial court. 3. The plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the property bearing BBMP Corporation No.8. They claim to have acquired the Schedule A property under a registered sale deed dated 31.07.2004, executed by one Narain Dass Bodaram and others, represented by defendant No.1, Sri R. Shekar. The plaintiffs specifically assert that defendant No.1 had negotiated the sale transaction, having derived interest in a larger extent of land originally owned by the vendor, measuring approximately 1,03,455 square feet. In respect of Schedule A property, the plaintiffs contend that they have developed two apartment complexes one measuring 11,435 square feet and another measuring 44,020 square feet under the name and style of “GEM REGENCY,” which correspond to item Nos. 1 and 2 of the Schedule B property described in the sale deed. The plaintiffs, who are professional civil engineers by occupation and actively engaged in the field of designing, construction, and sale of residential apartments, have constructed two blocks of apartments equipped with modern facilities and amenities for the benefit of the residents. 4. The present suit is instituted seeking a declaration that the Schedule B property, described as a private road abutting and lying to the southern side of the Schedule A property, constitutes common property jointly owned and enjoyed by both the plaintiffs and the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have also sought a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their right of access through the Schedule B property, demarcated as ABCDE in the sketch annexed to the plaint. The plaintiffs assert that the said road has always been treated and used as a common access route, and that both parties have equal rights to its use. They further contend that Schedule B property is to be treated as a common area, and as such, the defendants cannot claim exclusive ownership or restrict access. Alleging that the defendants have sought to interfere with and deny the plaintiffs’ right to use the said private road, the plaintiffs claim to have been constrained to approach the Court seeking the aforesaid declaratory and injunctive reliefs. 5. Alleging that the defendants have sought to interfere with and deny the plaintiffs’ right to use the said private road, the plaintiffs claim to have been constrained to approach the Court seeking the aforesaid declaratory and injunctive reliefs. 5. Upon service of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed their written statement, wherein they have categorically denied the entire averments made in the plaint. The defendants, while strongly refuting the plaintiffs' claims, contend that they are the exclusive owners of the Schedule B property, which they describe as a private road specifically meant to provide access to the apartment complex developed by them, prior in time to the sale of Schedule A property in favour of the plaintiffs. They deny that Schedule B property is a common area intended for joint use by both parties. 6. The defendants further dispute the plaintiffs’ assertion that there was a mutual understanding to construct a common security room and install a gate at the entrance of the said private road, referred to as point AE in the rough sketch annexed to the plaint. It is specifically pleaded that Schedule B property, being a private road, is located to the western side of the plaintiffs’ Schedule A property and is meant exclusively for the benefit and use of the defendants’ apartment owners. On these grounds, the defendants have sought dismissal of the suit in its entirety. 7. In the light of rival claims, the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that, "B" schedule property - road situated on the Northern side of "A" schedule property is common property to both plaintiff and defendants? 2. Whether the plaintiffs prove interference? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction? 4. What order or decree? 8. In order to substantiate their claim over the Schedule ‘B’ property, the plaintiffs examined plaintiff No.1 as P.W.1 and relied upon eight documents, which have been duly marked as Exhibits P.1 to P.8. 9. The defendants, in support of their defence and to assert exclusive rights over the Schedule ‘B’ property, examined one witness as D.W.1. However, they did not adduce any rebuttal documentary evidence. 10. The trial court, upon consideration of the pleadings, oral evidence, and particularly the recitals contained in the sale deed, has partly decreed the suit. 9. The defendants, in support of their defence and to assert exclusive rights over the Schedule ‘B’ property, examined one witness as D.W.1. However, they did not adduce any rebuttal documentary evidence. 10. The trial court, upon consideration of the pleadings, oral evidence, and particularly the recitals contained in the sale deed, has partly decreed the suit. It granted a limited injunction in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that they are entitled to access the Schedule ‘B’ property only to the extent demarcated as points ABE in the sketch marked as Exhibit P.2, which forms part of the plaint. 11. Aggrieved by the partial decree and limitation imposed on their access rights, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal before this Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. This Court has heard at length the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for both the plaintiffs and the defendants. The Court has also meticulously examined the pleadings as well as the oral and documentary evidence placed on record by the plaintiffs. Particular attention has been given to the sketch annexed to the plaint and marked as Exhibit P.2. 13. In light of the contentions advanced and the evidence on record, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal: "i.Whether the finding of the trial court that the Schedule ‘B’ property is a private road, and therefore not a common area intended for joint use by the plaintiffs and defendants, is perverse and warrants interference by this Court? ii.Whether the trial court’s conclusion that only the defendants are entitled to use the Schedule ‘B’ property, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, suffers from legal or factual perversity requiring appellate intervention?" 14. Finding on Point No.i and ii Though the plaintiffs have produced several documents along with a sketch marked as Ex.P2 in support of their claim that Schedule ‘B’ property constitutes a common area jointly used by both parties, a meticulous examination of the registered sale deeds marked at Exs.P1 and P7 leads to a contrary conclusion. It is evident from the recitals in these documents that the defendants, while selling the Schedule ‘A’ property to the plaintiffs in the year 2006, did not confer or reserve any right in favour of the plaintiffs over the Schedule ‘B’ property, which is a private road. 15. It is evident from the recitals in these documents that the defendants, while selling the Schedule ‘A’ property to the plaintiffs in the year 2006, did not confer or reserve any right in favour of the plaintiffs over the Schedule ‘B’ property, which is a private road. 15. Ex.P2, the sketch furnished by the plaintiffs themselves, when closely scrutinized, reveals the actual layout and topographical arrangement of the properties in question. It is clear that the defendants, having already developed a residential apartment complex on the western portion of the property, retained the southern strip of land for access purposes and subsequently sold the eastern portion now referred to as Schedule ‘A’ property to the plaintiffs. The sketch indicates that the defendants prudently retained the Schedule ‘B’ road on the southern side to ensure uninterrupted access from their apartment complex to the public road. The plaintiffs, as per the same sketch, are shown to have independent access at point ‘A’, thereby making it evident that their ingress and egress needs were sufficiently addressed under the original sale arrangement. 16. The plaintiffs’ assertion that the private road, depicted in both the general sketch and Ex.P2, constitutes a common area accessible to both parties cannot be accepted. The road in question running from point CD to point BE and ultimately leading to point AE was clearly retained to serve as an internal access road solely for the benefit of the flat owners of the apartment complex constructed by the defendants on the western side of Schedule ‘A’ property. The plaintiffs’ attempt to assert a right over this access road, under the guise of it being a common area, is a strained interpretation unsupported by the registered sale deed or any other contemporaneous documentation. The road in question, having a width of 30 feet and a total length of 74.5 feet, is clearly demarcated as lying entirely within the portion retained by the defendants and is intended to serve the specific purpose of providing ingress and egress to the flat owners of the defendants' project. 17. Upon a close reading of the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs and marked as Ex.P1, this Court finds no reference whatsoever to any easementary or co- ownership rights conferred upon the plaintiffs over the private road forming Schedule ‘B’ property. 17. Upon a close reading of the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs and marked as Ex.P1, this Court finds no reference whatsoever to any easementary or co- ownership rights conferred upon the plaintiffs over the private road forming Schedule ‘B’ property. Despite this, the plaintiffs have attempted to project that their right of access extends beyond point BE, which is clearly demarcated as part of the defendants’ retained property. This Court finds no legal or factual basis for such a claim. The private road is evidently meant to serve only the defendants’ apartment owners and cannot be construed as a common facility or appurtenant right acquired by the plaintiffs under the registered sale deed. 18. During the course of trial, the plaintiffs attempted to improve their case by asserting that there was an oral understanding or agreement between them and the defendants whereby both parties had agreed to treat a portion near point BE as a common area to be used for constructing a common security cabin. However, this assertion is not supported by any pleadings in the plaint nor backed by any cogent documentary evidence. In the absence of such foundational material, the alleged understanding cannot be acted upon. It is a settled principle of law that parties cannot be permitted to travel beyond their pleadings or establish substantive rights through oral assertions lacking documentary corroboration. Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the plaintiffs’ attempt to enlarge the scope of their rights by relying on unsubstantiated claims. 19. It is also pertinent to note that, despite the plaintiffs' failure to establish a legal or contractual right over the entire private road, the trial court, in a gesture of equitable consideration, has granted limited access to the plaintiffs through the portion demarcated as ABE in Ex.P2. This portion, although forming part of the defendants' retained property, has been made accessible to the plaintiffs purely on equitable considerations to facilitate smoother access to their apartment complex. The defendants, notably, have not challenged this limited injunction granted by the trial court. In view of this, and taking into consideration the discretionary relief already extended to the plaintiffs despite the absence of any legal entitlement under the sale deed, this Court is not inclined to grant any further relief in the present appeal. 20. The defendants, notably, have not challenged this limited injunction granted by the trial court. In view of this, and taking into consideration the discretionary relief already extended to the plaintiffs despite the absence of any legal entitlement under the sale deed, this Court is not inclined to grant any further relief in the present appeal. 20. For the reasons stated above, the finding of the trial court that the Schedule ‘B’ property is a private road exclusively retained by the defendants and not a common area is neither perverse nor legally unsustainable. Accordingly, Point No.i and ii are answered in the Negative In the result, the appeal is found to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.