ORDER : (B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J.) This civil revision petition is filed aggrieved by the order dated 05.03.2025 passed by the I Additional District Judge, Khammam, in CMA.No.4 of 2024. 2. The revision petitioners are the plaintiffs and the respondent is the defendant in O.S.No.1019 of 2021 on the file of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-Mobile court, Khammam. The parties are referred to as arrayed in the suit. 3. O.S.No.1019 of 2021 was filed by the plaintiffs seeking perpetual injunction against the defendant in respect of dry land admeasuring Ac.0.21 guntas in Sy.No.127/A/4, Arempula Village, Khammam Rural Mandal, Khammam District (hereinafter referred to as ‘suit property’). Plaintiffs pleaded that the defendant became the owner of the suit property having succeeded to the same from her father. Plaintiff No.2 purchased the suit property from the defendant under sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 for sale consideration of Rs.21,000/, which was scribed on stamp paper worth Rs.5/- and the plaintiff No.2 was handed over possession of the same. The name of the plaintiff No.2 has been recorded as possessor continuously in the revenue records. 4. It is stated that the plaintiff No.2 instituted a suit for specific performance in O.S.No.306 of 1990 seeking registration of the unregistered sale deed. However, due to ill health, he could not consult his counsel and could not attend the Court. As such, the suit was dismissed for default. Later, the plaintiff No.2 applied before the Tahsildar, Khammam (Rural), for regularization of the sada sale deed and issuance of pattadar pass books and title deeds under the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short ‘ROR Act’). As there was no response from the Tahsildar for a long time, the plaintiff No.2 preferred ROR Appeal No.A3/9470/2016 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Khammam. The RDO issued notices to both the parties and conducted enquiry. The appeal was disposed of in favour of the plaintiff No.2. Thereafter, the Tahsildar regularized the sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 under the provisions of the ROR Act and the plaintiff No.2 was issued pattadar passbook and title deed bearing No.T 26060080007 with Khata No.16. The name of the plaintiff No.2 has been recorded as pattadar and possessor of the land in the revenue record. 5. Thereafter, the Tahsildar regularized the sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 under the provisions of the ROR Act and the plaintiff No.2 was issued pattadar passbook and title deed bearing No.T 26060080007 with Khata No.16. The name of the plaintiff No.2 has been recorded as pattadar and possessor of the land in the revenue record. 5. It is submitted that the plaintiff No.2 gifted the suit property to his wife, plaintiff No.1, by registered Gift Deed bearing document No.8154/2018 dated 01.10.2018 and delivered possession of the suit property to the plaintiff No.1. The plaintiff No.1 applied for mutation before the Tahsildar by virtue of registered gift deed. The mutation proceedings are pending with the Tahsildar and the land is being continued in the name of the plaintiff No.2 in the revenue record. 6. It is stated that, while the matter stood thus, the defendant tried to grab the suit property. He came to the suit property along with his henchmen on 11.09.2021 along with JCB machine and scolded the plaintiffs in filthy language and high-handedly destroyed the fencing, pillar and boundary stones. 7. Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed IA.No.1 of 2021 seeking temporary injunction and ex parte ad interim injunction was granted by the trial Court by order dated 27.09.2021. The defendant filed CMA.No.4 of 2024 challenging the order dated 27.09.2021 passed in IA.No.1 of 2021 in O.S.No.1019 of 2021 and subsequent flouting of mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for 1077 days as against the principles of natural justice. The appellate Court by the impugned order dated 05.03.2025 allowed the CMA and set aside the ex parte injunction order granted IA.No.1 of 2021 dated 27.09.2021. 8. In CMA.No.4 of 2024, it was contended by the defendant that the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff No.2 in O.S.No.306 of 1990 was dismissed. Thus, the application of the plaintiff No.2 for regularization of the sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 is nothing but fraud played by him on the Tahsildar. In ROR Appeal No.A3/9470/2016 before the RDO, the defendant was not made a party. In fact, the Tahsildar, Khammam (Rural) and the Village Revenue Officer, were made as respondents No.1 and 2 in the appeal. The appeal was filed behind the back of the defendant. The ROR appeal is not for regularization of an unregistered agreement of sale (sada sale deed). In fact, the Tahsildar, Khammam (Rural) and the Village Revenue Officer, were made as respondents No.1 and 2 in the appeal. The appeal was filed behind the back of the defendant. The ROR appeal is not for regularization of an unregistered agreement of sale (sada sale deed). The appeal was filed for deleting the name of the plaintiff No.2 from the Web Land Pahani (Mee Seva Pahani). The order of the RDO dated 28.11.2016 directed the Tahsildar to make entry of the name of the appellant – Bandi Venkateswarlu, S/o. Late Ramaiah in Mee seva digital record (i.e. Web Pahani) duly conducting field inspection and without giving any scope for further delay. 9. The defendant further contended in the CMA that the plaintiff No.1 has not filed single piece of evidence to show that she is in possession of the suit property. The Tahsildar vide Memo RTI/B/365/2021 dated 07.05.2022 informed that no mutation was performed in respect of the suit land and unequivocally denied having issued pattadar pass books and title deeds to the plaintiffs. 10. The Tahsildar vide Memo RTI/B/365/2021 dated 07.05.2022 informed that no mutation was performed in respect of the suit land and unequivocally denied having issued pattadar pass books and title deeds to the plaintiffs. 10. The appellate Court recorded the findings that in the order of RDO dated 28.11.2016 (Ex.P1), admittedly, the defendant is not a party and no notice was served on her and the order of the RDO is not based on merits against the defendant; as per Ex.P5, the information secured by her under RTI vide letter No.RTI/B/365/2021 dated 07.05.2022 and on verification of records as per Dharani Land status report and village pahanies for the year 2021-2022, the land was not digitally signed towards the pattadar Bandi Venkateswarlu; Ex.R5 categorically shows that no mutation took place in favour of the plaintiff No.2 and the revenue entries were simply changed based on Ex.P1 wherein the defendant was not a party and that the revenue records relied upon by the plaintiff No.2 to show his prima facie possession is not in accordance with law; as per Section 5A of the ROR Act, the Tahsildar has to follow the procedure for regularization of certain alienation or transfer of land and in accordance with Rule 22(1) of the ROR Rules; the plaintiffs have not filed any valid documents in respect of their case and the alleged unregistered document is not even impounded before the Collector and no such document is filed in the suit and finally, by relying on the principle of law laid down that entries in the revenue records do not confer any title as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Prahalada Pradhan v. Sonu Kumar [ (2019) 10 SCC 259 ] and that abruptly in the year 1989-90 the name of the plaintiff No.2 – Venkateswarlu was brought on record without reference of any proceeding, held that possession of the plaintiff No.1 is not proved and without having any settled possession, the plaintiff No.2 cannot transfer title to the plaintiff No.1 and the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 are not having prima facie case of being in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and CMA was allowed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners – plaintiffs contended that the impugned order is erroneous and contrary to the record and the facts of the case. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners – plaintiffs contended that the impugned order is erroneous and contrary to the record and the facts of the case. Ex parte injunction order was granted on 27.09.2021 and extended from time to time and IA.No.1 of 2021 was not disposed of on merits. The documents produced by the plaintiffs under Exs.P1 to P35 were marked in IA.No.1 of 2021 in O.S.No.1019 of 2021 before the trial Court whereas Exs.R1 to R8, which were produced by the defendant on her behalf in IA.No.3 of 2025 and IA.No.829 of 2025 have not been marked yet and the enquiry is pending. In a suit for perpetual injunction, the relevant factor necessary for the trial Court/appellate Court was to see whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property. The entries made in favour of the plaintiffs have not been set aside by the appellate authority and as per Ex.P1, the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property. The appellate Court decided the appeal as if it is an authority under the ROR Act. It is the revenue authorities, who have to adjudicate the dispute regarding entries in the revenue records under the relevant statute and not the civil Court. 12. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that the appeal was filed challenging the ex parte injunction order. Assuming there was delay on the part of the plaintiffs or the trial Court in disposing of the injunction application in IA.No.1 of 2021 in O.S.No.1019 of 2021, the appellate Court should have directed the trial Court to pass final orders in the injunction application within a time frame. Instead the appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction by passing orders on merits. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that directions be issued to the trial Court to pass orders in IA.No.1 of 2021 on merits. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent – defendant submitted that the plaintiffs do not have any case to prove prima facie title or possession over the suit property. Having obtained ex parte injunction, the plaintiffs had been dragging the enquiry in IA.No.1 of 2021. As the injunction application was not disposed of within reasonable time and there was violation of the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC, CMA was filed. The plaintiffs argued the matter on merits and did not take any objection regarding maintainability of CMA. 14. As the injunction application was not disposed of within reasonable time and there was violation of the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC, CMA was filed. The plaintiffs argued the matter on merits and did not take any objection regarding maintainability of CMA. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent – defendant further submitted that as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan , [ (2000) 7 SCC 695 ] , the CMA is maintainable under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC as against an ex parte injunction order. The appellate Court has recorded detailed findings by holding the plaintiffs have no prima facie possession over the property and that the entries in the revenue records do not confer any title. Fraud played by the plaintiffs is evident from the face of the record. Thus, the civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 15. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondent. 16. It is a usual practice to file counter in the injunction application and seek for vacating the ex parte injunction order. When an ex parte injunction order is granted by dispensing with notice under proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC, direction is issued by the trial Court or appellate Court, as the case may be, to comply with the conditions prescribed under Order XXXIX Rule 3(a) and (b) CPC for serving notice to the respondent – defendant along with the copy of the plaint, injunction application and documents. Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2 and 3A read as under: ORDER XXXIX TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS Temporary injunctions 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted. Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2 and 3A read as under: ORDER XXXIX TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS Temporary injunctions 1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted. — Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach. —(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. … 3. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. … 3. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party. —The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: [Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant— (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with— (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant, relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent. 3A. Court to dispose of application for injunction within thirty days. —Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. 17. In A. VENKATASUBBIAH NAIDU ’s case (1 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: “What would be the position if a court which passed the order granting interim ex parte injunction did not record reasons thereof or did not require the applicant to perform the duties enumerated in clauses (a) & (b) of Rule 3 of Order 39. In our view such an Order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. In our view such an Order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. But if a party, in whose favour an order was passed ex parte, fails to comply with the duties which he has to perform as required by the proviso quoted above, he must take the risk. Non-compliance with such requisites on his part cannot be allowed to go without any consequence and to enable him to have only the advantage of it. The consequence of the party (who secured the order) for not complying with the duties he is required to perform is that he cannot be allowed to take advantage of such order if the order is not obeyed by the other party. A disobedient beneficiary of an order cannot be heard to complain against any disobedience alleged against another party. Learned Single Judge stated that the trial court ought not to have granted ex parte injunction beyond thirty days to be in force. The said observation is based on the language contained in Order 39 Rule 3-A of the Code which reads thus: Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite-party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability. The Rule does not say that the period of the injunction order should be restricted by the Court to thirty days at the first instance, but the Court should pass final order on it within thirty days from the day on which the injunction was granted. Hence, the order does not ipso facto become illegal merely because it was not restricted to a period of thirty days or less. Nonetheless, we have to consider the consequence, if any, on account of the Court failing to pass the final orders within thirty days as enjoined by Rule3-A. The aforesaid Rule casts a three- pronged protection to the party against whom the ex parte injunction order was passed. First is the legal obligation that the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application of injunction within the period of thirty days. First is the legal obligation that the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application of injunction within the period of thirty days. Second is, the legal obligation that if for any valid reasons the Court could not finally dispose of the application within the aforesaid time the Court has to record the reasons thereof in writing. What would happen if a Court does not do either of the courses? We have to bear in mind that in such a case the Court would have by-passed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided for the safety of the person against whom the order was passed without affording him an opportunity to have a say in the matter. First is that the Court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. It is only by way of a very exceptional contingency that the Court is empowered to by-pass the said protective measure. Second is the statutory obligation cast on the Court to pass final orders on the application within the period of thirty days. Here also it is only in very exceptional cases that the Court can by-pass such a rule in which cases the legislature mandates on the court to have adequate reasons for such bypassing and to record those reasons in writing. If that hump is also bypassed by the Court it is difficult to hold that the party affected by the order should necessarily be the sole sufferer. It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1,2,2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. In such appeal, if preferred, the appellate court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate court in complying with the provisions of Rule 3A. In appropriate cases the appellate court, apart from granting or vacating or modifying the order of such injunction, may suggest suitable action against the erring judicial officer, including recommendation to take steps for making adverse entry in his ACRs. Failure to decide the application or vacate the ex-parte temporary injunction shall, for the purposes of the appeal, be deemed to be the final order passed on the application for temporary injunction, on the date of expiry of thirty days mentioned in the Rule.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Insofar as the maintainability of CMA as against an ex parte injunction orders passed by the trial Court is concerned, there is no plausible explanation given by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs for not disposing of the injunction application in IA.No.1 of 2021 in O.S.No.1019 of 2021 within thirty (30) days, as required under Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC. The plaintiffs have not produced docket proceedings of the trial court either before the appellate Court or before this Court. It is also not the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the trial Court has recorded reasons for not disposing of the IA within thirty days and for extending injunction order. Thus, there is clear violation of the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC. 19. It is also not the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the trial Court has recorded reasons for not disposing of the IA within thirty days and for extending injunction order. Thus, there is clear violation of the mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC. 19. In the light of the law laid down in A. VENKATASUBBIAH NAIDU ’s case (1 supra), this Court does not have any hesitation to hold that CMA filed under Order XLIII Rule 1 is maintainable and the respondent – defendant cannot be left without any remedy, if there is a delay on the part of the plaintiffs or lapse on the part of the trial Court in disposing of the injunction application within thirty (30) days or reasonable time. 20. Now coming to the merits, it is borne out from the record that the suit in O.S.No.306 of 1990, filed for specific performance by the plaintiff No.2, was dismissed for default and thereafter, a claim is made in O.S.No.1019 of 2021 that the sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 was regularized and pattadar passbooks have been issued. First of all, when the plaintiff No.2 himself claimed that the defendant has not performed his part of the contract and a suit filed for specific performance seeking registration of the sale deed was dismissed for non prosecution, the question of the plaintiff No.2 again seeking regularization of alleged sada sale deed before the revenue authorities does not arise. The judgment and decision of the civil Court is binding on the revenue Court. Moreover, regularization proceedings are not filed before the trial Court or the appellate Court along with the suit or subsequent thereto. 21. The order of the RDO dated 28.11.2016 (Ex.P1) is not a regularization proceeding. Under Ex.P1, the RDO directed the Tahsildar to enter the name of the appellant – plaintiff No.2 in the revenue record by conducting field inspection. Moreover, the defendant is not a party to the said proceedings. Thus, Ex.P1 is not binding on the defendant. It was merely averred by the plaintiffs that the Tahsildar has regularized the sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 and pattadar passbooks were issued to the plaintiff No.2 and later, the plaintiff No.2 executed a gift deed dated 01.10.2018 in favour of the plaintiff No.1. Thus, Ex.P1 is not binding on the defendant. It was merely averred by the plaintiffs that the Tahsildar has regularized the sada sale deed dated 28.04.1986 and pattadar passbooks were issued to the plaintiff No.2 and later, the plaintiff No.2 executed a gift deed dated 01.10.2018 in favour of the plaintiff No.1. The information obtained by the defendant under the Right to Information Act, 2005, under Ex.P5, clarifies that there is no mutation issued in favour of the plaintiff No.2. In the absence of regularization proceedings or mutation proceedings, the issuance of pattadar passbooks in favour of the plaintiff No.2 does not arise. Without there being regularization proceedings or mutation proceedings, it is not known how the name of the plaintiff No.2 has been entered in Exs.P4 to 31 pahanies and Exs.P32 to P35 revenue records. The appellate Court rightly recorded that the entries in the revenue records do not confer any title and that entries in the pahanies showing the name of the plaintiff No.2 as pattadar and possessor are not supported by any valid proceedings. Thus, the order under revision does not suffer any error of law or jurisdiction and warrants no interference. 22. In view of the above discussion, there are no merits in the civil revision petition and it is accordingly dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.