JUDGMENT : Sachin Shankar Magadum, J. The present Regular First Appeal is filed by the State, assailing the judgment and decree dated 21.09.2016 passed in O.S.No.1654/2009, whereby the Trial Court directed the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.2,14,621/- to the plaintiff along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 2 . For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranks before the Trial Court. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the suit are as follows: The plaintiff is a registered partnership firm which had participated in a tender invited by defendant No.4 on behalf of defendant Nos.1 and 2. Upon acceptance of its bid, the plaintiff was entrusted with the execution of project work. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded that although the work order was issued and site handed over, the defendants committed breach of contract by failing to supply essential construction materials. As a result, the plaintiff was unable to complete the work within the stipulated period ending on 14.03.1991. It was further contended that the plaintiff was additionally instructed to undertake road work from Mysore-Malavalli Main Road up to the project entrance. This additional work, too, was carried out in compliance with the directions of the defendants' office. Despite completion of the entrusted works, the defendants failed to settle the bills, despite several representations. Hence, the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of Rs.9,14,994/-, including a claim for future interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the principal sum of Rs.2,14,621/- from the date of the suit till realization. 4. The defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement. They denied the allegations and asserted that the plaintiff failed to complete the work within the stipulated time, which necessitated issuance of a termination notice. The defendants further contended that in terms of the orders passed in O.S.No.744/1993 and RFA No.499/2002, a sum of Rs.1,12,752/- was paid to the plaintiff towards final settlement, and therefore, no further amount was due or payable. 5. In support of their respective claims, both the plaintiff and defendant No.2 adduced oral and documentary evidence. However, except for the oral testimony of D.W.1, the defendants did not produce any rebuttal documentary evidence to disprove the plaintiff’s claim. 6. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court answered issue Nos.1 to 3 in the affirmative and decreed the suit. However, except for the oral testimony of D.W.1, the defendants did not produce any rebuttal documentary evidence to disprove the plaintiff’s claim. 6. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court answered issue Nos.1 to 3 in the affirmative and decreed the suit. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff had successfully established that there was deviation from the original work order, and the defendants had failed to supply necessary materials, thereby committing breach of contract in violation of clauses 5, 9, 12, 14, and 16 of the agreement. On issue No.2, the Court concluded that the delay in execution was attributable to the defendants, owing to lapses in supplying materials such as steel and cement, and failure to furnish necessary designs for the construction. On issue No.3, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover a sum of Rs.2,14,621/-. Additional Issue No.1 was answered in the negative, with the Court holding that the defendants failed to prove that the contract was assigned in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon. Additional Issue No.2 was also answered in the negative. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the State has preferred the present appeal challenging the money decree passed by the Trial Court. 7. Heard learned counsel appearing for the State and learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff. 8. The following points that would arise for consideration are; 1. Whether the State has made out a case to condone inordinate delay of 2091 days in filing the appeal? 2. Whether the appeal needs to be decided on merits in the light of the observations made while considering inordinate delay on point No.1? Findings on Point No.1: 9. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by its judgment and decree dated 21.09.2016. Pursuant to the said decree, the plaintiff initiated execution proceedings in Ex.P.No.159/2017 seeking enforcement of the money decree. During the pendency of the present appeal, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has placed on record a certified copy of the order sheet maintained in the said execution proceedings. A perusal of the proceedings indicates that the decree-holder has actively pursued execution of the decree. Of particular relevance is the order dated 07.01.2023 in the order sheet, which reflects a significant development in the execution process. A perusal of the proceedings indicates that the decree-holder has actively pursued execution of the decree. Of particular relevance is the order dated 07.01.2023 in the order sheet, which reflects a significant development in the execution process. In order to appreciate the stand taken by state in execution proceedings and the steps taken by the Executing Court, this Court deems it appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the said order sheet dated 07.01.2023, which reads as follows: "ORDER ON MEMO The counsel for DHR filed memo of calculation after payment of decreetal amount by the JDR. The JDR has paid amount of Rs.2,14,621/- and the counsel for JDR produced the details of payment and along with the said memo, filed I.A.No.1 under Section 151 of CPC seeking to recall the attachment warrant of movables issued against the JDR Nos.2 to 5. In the memo of calculation, the DHR stated that the decreetal amount is Rs.3,30,189/- and interest till 15.11.2022 on the said decreetal amount is Rs.75,110/- and now sought for balance amount of Rs.1,90,678/-. The learned counsel for JDRs highly objected to this memo of calculation, stating that they have paid the entire amount and the question of interest does not at all arise and this memo of calculation has to be rejected. Heard both the counsels and perused materials on record. The General rule of execution proceedings is the executing court cannot go beyond the decree. Here in this case on 19.11.2022, the learned counsel for JDR submitted that she will settle the matter within 2 weeks after discussion with concerned authority. The JDRs herein are Government officials. The JDRs paid Rs.2,14,621/- rupees on the basis of said settlement and DHR accepted the same by filing memo of calculation. On hearing both the parties, this Court is of the opinion that as a huge part of amount has already been paid and the part of interest is remaining as per the said memo of calculation, it is better to settle the matter between the parties without dragging the matter. Hence, proceed to refer the matter to LOK ADALATH. THEREFORE, Execution Petition is hereby referred to Lok Adalath. Both the parties and their counsels are directed to be present before the Lok Adalath. Call on 11.02.2023." (Emphasis supplied by me) 10. Hence, proceed to refer the matter to LOK ADALATH. THEREFORE, Execution Petition is hereby referred to Lok Adalath. Both the parties and their counsels are directed to be present before the Lok Adalath. Call on 11.02.2023." (Emphasis supplied by me) 10. A perusal of the execution proceedings in Ex.P.No.159/2017 reveals that on 07.01.2023, the State, through its Government Advocate, unequivocally admitted the liability towards the decreetal amount and made a categorical submission before the Executing Court that the plaintiff’s claim would be settled within two weeks. In furtherance of this undertaking, the State proceeded to deposit the decreetal amount of Rs.2,14,621/- before the Executing Court. The matter was thereafter adjourned to enable both parties to arrive at an amicable resolution specifically with respect to the interest component of the decree. In view of this, the Executing Court referred the matter to the Lok Adalat to facilitate a possible settlement. However, as no settlement was reached before the Lok Adalat, the matter was referred back to the regular court on 25.03.2023 for further proceedings. 11. This sequence of events clearly establishes that the State not only admitted the liability but also took concrete steps towards satisfying the money decree passed by the Trial Court. In light of these developments, the conduct of the State in subsequently filing the present appeal after an inordinate delay of 2091 days is not only inexplicable but also grossly unfair. Once the State had voluntarily deposited the decreetal amount and participated in the execution proceedings without demur, it cannot be permitted to turn around and assail the very decree it has accepted and acted upon. 12. It is trite law that a party who has accepted the decree and acted upon it cannot, as an afterthought, seek to challenge it belatedly, particularly when the reasons assigned for condonation of delay are neither bonafide nor convincing. The belated filing of this appeal appears to be a calculated and strategic attempt to resist payment of the interest component alone, after having satisfied the principal amount of the decree. This approach reflects an unjust and inequitable stance, especially on the part of the State, which is expected to act as a model litigant. 13. The explanation offered in the affidavit filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not satisfy the well-settled parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for condonation of inordinate delay. This approach reflects an unjust and inequitable stance, especially on the part of the State, which is expected to act as a model litigant. 13. The explanation offered in the affidavit filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not satisfy the well-settled parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for condonation of inordinate delay. The law mandates that the applicant must demonstrate ‘sufficient cause’ which is reasonable, bonafide, and free from negligence. Mere administrative inefficiency, indifference, or oversight cannot be treated as sufficient cause for condonation of an extraordinary delay, particularly when the appellant is a State agency represented by a well-established legal machinery. 14. In the present case, the delay is not only colossal but also devoid of any plausible justification. The events in the execution proceedings leave no manner of doubt that the State had accepted the decree, and the only outstanding dispute pertained to interest. If the State was genuinely aggrieved by the judgment and decree, it was open for it to challenge the same on merits within the prescribed period. Having failed to do so, and having participated in execution and settlement proceedings, the State is now estopped from questioning the decree itself. 15. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The reasons assigned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit in support of the delay condonation application are vague, perfunctory, and devoid of any material particulars. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed solely on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay. Point No.1 is, therefore, answered in the negative Finding on Point No.2: 16. In view of the finding recorded on Point No.1, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appeal does not warrant adjudication on merits. Though this Court, as the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is empowered to reassess both factual and legal aspects, such exercise is unwarranted in the present case. The State, having unequivocally admitted the claim and satisfied the decree in execution, is estopped from reopening the dispute at this belated stage. There are no complex questions of fact or law requiring reconsideration, especially when the very foundation of the appeal is rendered unsustainable due to the delay. 17. The State, having unequivocally admitted the claim and satisfied the decree in execution, is estopped from reopening the dispute at this belated stage. There are no complex questions of fact or law requiring reconsideration, especially when the very foundation of the appeal is rendered unsustainable due to the delay. 17. Accordingly, this Court declines to exercise its appellate jurisdiction to reassess the matter on merits and holds that no indulgence is warranted. Point No.2 is accordingly answered in the negative 18. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following; ORDER The appeal is devoid of merits and accordingly, stands dismissed