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2025 DIGILAW 368 (AP)

Koneru Satyanarayana v. Supdt. of Police

2025-02-28

K.SREENIVASA REDDY

body2025
ORDER : This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘the BNSS’) has been filed on behalf of the petitioner herein/accused No.1 to grant anticipatory bail in connection with Crime No.RC2182025A0002 of CBI, AC-III, New Delhi. 2. A case has been registered against the petitioner herein/accused No.1 and other accused for the offences punishable under Section 61 (2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘BNS’) and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘PC Act’) as amended in 2018. 3. Brief facts of the case of prosecution are that, the Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation (KLEF) is a Deemed to be University, accredited by NAAC with A++ grade and it is due to reaccreditation by NAAC for the period 2024-2029. (b) The National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC), an autonomous body, established by the University Grants Commission (UGC) has the mandate to assess and accredit institutions of higher learning, universities and colleges or one or more of their units i.e. Departments, schools, institutions, programmes etc. (c) There was credible information which revealed that NAAC Inspection of KLEF is scheduled from 29.01.2025 to 31.01.2025 and the petitioner herein/accused No.1, accused No.2 being the President and Vice-Chancellor of KLEF, respectively, in connivance of other accused, were alleged to have indulged in corrupt activities of inclusion of Members favourable to KLEF in the NAAC Inspection team and bribing them for favourable report; that accused No.2 with the knowledge of petitioner herein/accused No.1, approached the NAAC officials through accused Nos.5 and 6, to explore ways and means for inclusion of known members in the formation of NAAC Inspection Team and it was further alleged that accused Nos.1 and 2 requested accused No.6 to be one of the Member of NAAC Inspection Committee; that accused No.6 was alleged to have revealed the names of seven members of NAAC Inspection Team to accused No.2 before officially communicated. (d) It is the further allegation that on 18.01.2025 and19.01.2025, accused Nos.1 and 2 were alleged to have delivered a bribe amount of Rs.10.00 lakhs to accused Nos.5 and 6 for arranging favourable NAAC Inspection Team, out of which, Rs.5.00 lakhs to be delivered to accused No.7 and remaining Rs.5.00 lakhs to accused Nos.5 and 6; that on 22.01.2025 accused No.10 was alleged to have disclosed the names of seven member NAAC Inspection Team to accused No.2. (e) That further, on 25.01.2025 accused Nos.3 and 4 were alleged to have met accused No.9 and other accused and negotiated bribe amount for favourable inspection report and it was informed to accused Nos.1 and 2 that accused No.9 was alleged to have demanded Rs.1.80 crores in total for managing the whole inspection team for favourable report, out of which Rs.1.30 crores was for accused No.9, as he would be alleged person preparing the inspection report. (f) That further, on 26.01.2025, accused Nos.3 and 4 visited the residence of accused No.9 to further negotiate the bribe amount and finally fixed the bribe amount at Rs.3.00 lakhs and a laptop to each of the team member and Rs.10.00 lakhs to accused No.9; that on 28.01.2025 accused No.2 was alleged to have informed accused No.1 about the arrival of accused Nos.10 and 12 and accused No.1 was alleged to have instructed accused No.2 to pay a sum of Rs.3.00 lakhs to accused No.12 and Rs.5.00 lakhs to accused No.10; that accused No.2 was alleged to have informed accused Nos.3 and 4 that accused No.9 was alleged to have again demanded a sum of Rs.60.00 lakhs. (g) That it was learnt that the money as agreed, has been delivered to NAAC Inspection Team; that the accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 conveyed accused No.9 to show the score sheet with a favourable grading to KLEF, to deliver the demanded amount to him and KLEF personnel were alleged to have requested all the Members of NAAC Inspection Team to give points of 3.65 and above, so that KLEF would get NAAC A++ grading. 4. 4. It is the contention of the petitioner herein/accused No.1 that none of alleged offences registered by the prosecution carry punishment of more than seven years, but the accused persons were taken into custody on the date of registration of FIR which is violation of guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar, [ (2014) 8 SCC 273 .]. The petitioner herein/ accused No.1 not involved in day-to-day affairs of the society. The petitioner herein/accused No.1 admitted in Andhra Hospital on 01.02.2025, suffering from cardiac ailment and underwent critical medical treatment, where a coronary stent was implanted in the left anterior descending (LAD) artery. Hence, the petitioner herein/accused No.1 prays to grant anticipatory bail. 5. The respondent-CBI filed counter denying the contents of the pre-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner herein/accused No.1. It is contended that some of the accused were arrested and they were got remanded to judicial custody on 02.02.2025. That the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is the key person and principal conspirator in the subject crime and made deliberately evaded the arrest, when the CBI Officials went to his house on 01.02.2025, by taking advantage of his wife and other female members, at the residence and claimed medical emergency. (b) That the allegations leveled against the petitioner herein/accused No.1 are serious in nature, involving large scale of conspiracy, which is supported by substantial evidence; that there is apprehension that if the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is granted pre-arrest bail, he would obstruct the investigation and tamper the evidence, influence the witnesses; that the guidelines declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar case (1 supra) has been followed scrupulously and there was no violation as alleged; that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 being the President of KLEF, holds ultimate authority and responsibility over the institution activities and he played active role in the whole conspiracy of giving undue advantage to the accused public servants in lieu of procuring NAAC A++ grade; that the petitioner’s claim that all the allegations in the FIR are ‘ex facie false and incorrect? is a matter of defense and cannot be considered as grounds of anticipatory bail at this stage; that a comprehensive and impartial assessment be conducted over the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner herein/accused No.1, to ascertain the true extent and nature of health issues raised, as there is every possibility that the same could be procured using his influence and his high domain in Vijayawada. Hence, it is prayed to dismiss the Criminal Petition. 6. The petitioner herein/accused No.1 filed rejoinder to the counter filed by the respondent-CBI, contending that it is not possible to manipulate the selection process, for the reason that, as per the mandate of NAAC, the entire process of accreditation and assessment is robust, transparent, ICT-Driven and automated; that the NAAC in its Press Note, dated 07.03.2023 released five- point procedures followed by it in granting NAAC accreditation; that the process of selecting the Peer Team is complex and elaborate and it is not possible for any individual to involve and manipulate the selection process. Hence, prays for grant of pre-arrest bail. 7. The respondent-CBI filed reply to the rejoinder filed by the petitioner herein/accused No.1 contending that the petitioner herein/accused in coordination with accused No.2, who is Vice Chancellor and other accused, who are public servants of NAAC, arranged bribe/undue advantage to be delivered them and assured its delivery through the other members of KLEF; that the investigation is at initial stage and the evidence so far collected, revealed that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is one of the key conspirators in the subject crime and indulged in corrupt activities of bribing the other accused for obtaining favourable NAAC accreditation. It is further contended that granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner herein/accused No.1, at this stage, would jeopardize the integrity of the investigation and fair progression of legal proceedings and that, some of the witnesses, who are employees of KLEF, are yet to be examined. Therefore, it is prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Petition. 8. Sri S.Dushyanth Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 would contend that all the offences alleged against the petitioner herein/accused No.1 are punishable with less than seven (07) years imprisonment. The petitioner herein/accused No.1 being the President of the Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation (KLEF), is not aware of the day-to-day affairs of the institution. 8. Sri S.Dushyanth Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 would contend that all the offences alleged against the petitioner herein/accused No.1 are punishable with less than seven (07) years imprisonment. The petitioner herein/accused No.1 being the President of the Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation (KLEF), is not aware of the day-to-day affairs of the institution. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 would further contend that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 has got impeccable reputation, having been running the institution for more than 45 years and he is aged about 70 years, suffering from cardiac ailment and a coronary stent was implanted in the left anterior descending (LAD) artery. The petitioner herein/accused No.1 is not an economic offender to anticipate flight risk to deny anticipatory bail. Hence, it is prayed to grant for anticipatory bail to the petitioner herein/accused No.1. 9. Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI would contend that there is substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 along with other accused, conspired bribed the public servants for obtaining NAAC accreditation in favour of KLEF. The investigation also disclosed that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is one of the conspirators, who actively indulged in the corrupt activities of inclusion of Members favourable to KLEF and in bribing them for favourable report and if the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is granted anticipatory bail at this stage, it would jeopardize the integrity of investigation. Hence, it is prayed to dismiss the Criminal Petition. 10. Heard Sri S.Dushyant Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 and Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI. 11. There is no dispute that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is the President of the Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation (KLEF), located in Vaddeswaram, Guntur District and which is deemed to be an University, accredited by NAAC A++ Grade. It is also not in dispute that the said KLEF University is due for reaccreditation by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) for the period 2024-2029. The cause of action in the subject arose at this stage, as alleged by the prosecution that there was reliable source of information that the petitioner herein/ accused No.1 in connivance with other personnel of KLEF and other public servants, indulged in corrupt activities of inclusion of Members favourable to KLEF in the NAAC Inspection Team and alleged to have bribed them for favourable report. 12. 12. Sri S.Dushyant Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 by placing reliance on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar case (1 st supra) contends that the respondent-CBI Officials violated the guidelines issued therein, for the reason that, all the alleged offences does not carry punishment of more than seven years, but the respondent-CBI Officials apprehended some of the accused in the subject crime and also trying to apprehend the petitioner herein/accused No.1. 13. Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent-CBI would contend that the police personnel visited the hospital multiple times seeking the petitioner’s arrest, which is indicative of the ongoing investigation and seriousness of the charges leveled against him, therefore, the reliance of the petitioner herein/accused on the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar case (1 st supra) is not relevant, as the said guidelines pertains to cases where arrests are made arbitrarily or excessively, particularly when the punishment for the offences is of a lesser severity, but, in the subject crime, the petitioner herein/accused No.1 implicated in serious corruption related offences, which involve not only substantial criminal conduct but also high risk of interference with the investigation. 14. In Arnesh Kumar case (1 st supra), the petitioner therein knocked the door of the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of Special Leave Petition apprehending his arrest in a case registered against him under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, when his attempt to secure anticipatory bail was failed before the High Court of Patna. The Hon’ble Apex Court while adjudicating the aforesaid case, made clear that in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under Section 41 (1) CrPC, the Police Officer is required to issue notice under Section 41-A CrPC, directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time and if such an accused complies with the terms of notice he shall not be arrested, unless for reasons to be recorded, the Police Officer is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary, however, at that stage also, the condition precedent for arrest as envisaged under Section 41 CrPC has to be complied and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate. The Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph No.12 added that the directions in the aforesaid Judgment shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine. 15. In the petition on hand, as per the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-CBI, the Investigating Officer arrested accused Nos.2, 3, 4, 8 to 14 on 01.02.2025 and got remanded them to judicial custody. A perusal of entire record, it is silent as to whether the respondent-CBI issued notice to the petitioner herein/ accused No.1 under Section 41-A CrPC Notice, as emphasized in Arnesh Kumar case (1 st supra), if so, whether the petitioner herein/accused No.1 complied with the terms of the notice and further, if at all the petitioner herein/accused No.1 complied and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in the respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the Police Officer is of the opinion that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 ought to be arrested. Indisputably, it is the contention of learned Special Public Prosecutor that on 01.02.2025, the CBI Officials went to the house of the petitioner herein/accused No.1 for his apprehension. Therefore, prima facie it appears that the CBI Officials did not follow the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar case (1 st supra). 16. Learned Special Public Prosecutor for respondent-CBI would contend that the offences committed by the petitioner herein/ accused No.1 are of far-reaching consequences, which clearly suggests that the offence falls in the separate category requiring differential treatment effecting the society at large, therefore this case does not fall under the category of exceptional circumstances. He placed reliance on the proposition of law laid down in Srikant Upadhyay and others vs. State of Bihar and another, [2024 SCC OnLine SC 282.], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph Nos.9, 10 and 25, held as under: “9. He placed reliance on the proposition of law laid down in Srikant Upadhyay and others vs. State of Bihar and another, [2024 SCC OnLine SC 282.], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph Nos.9, 10 and 25, held as under: “9. It is thus obvious from the catena of decisions dealing with bail even while clarifying that arrest should be the last option and it should be restricted to cases where arrest is imperative in the facts and circumstances of a case, the consistent view is that the grant of anticipatory bail shall be restricted to exceptional circumstances. In other words, the position is that the power of grant anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is an exceptional power and should be exercised only in exceptional cases and not as a matter of course. Its object is to ensure that a person should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant. (See the decision of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. V. J.J.Mannan, [ (2010) 1 SCC 679 .] 10. When a Court grants anticipatory bail what it actually does is only to make an order that in the event of arrest, the arrestee shall be released on bail, subject to the terms and conditions. Taking note of the fact the said power is to be exercised in exceptional circumstances and that it may cause some hindrance to the normal flow of investigation method when called upon to exercise the power under Section 438 Cr.P.C., courts must keep reminded of the position that law aides only the abiding and certainly not its resistant. By saying so, we mean that a person, having subjected to investigation on a serious offence and upon making out a case, is included in a charge sheet or even after filing of a refer report, later, in accordance with law, the Court issues a summons to a person, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. It only means that though he will still be at liberty, rather, in his right, to take recourse to the legal remedies available only in accordance with law, but not in its defiance. We will dilate this discussion with reference to the factual matrix of this case. It only means that though he will still be at liberty, rather, in his right, to take recourse to the legal remedies available only in accordance with law, but not in its defiance. We will dilate this discussion with reference to the factual matrix of this case. However, we think that before dealing with the same, a small deviation to have a glance at the scope and application of the provisions under Section 82, Cr.P.C will not be inappropriate. 25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. But then, person(s) continuously, defying orders and keep absconding is not entitled to such grant.” 17. Learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI also placed reliance on the proposition of law laid down in P.Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement, [(2019) 9 Supreme Court Cases 24.], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78 and 83 held as under: “69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but several other purposes. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but several other purposes. Power under Section 438 CrPC is an extraordinary power and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of the pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of an offence and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy. 71. Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. However, the power conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not unfettered and is qualified by the later part of the Article i.e. “… except according to a procedure prescribed by law”. In State of M.P. v. Ram Krishna Balothia, [ (1995) 3 SCC 221 .], the Supreme Court held that the right of anticipatory bail is not a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and held as under: (SCC p.226, para 7) “7. … We find it difficult to accept the contention that Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral part of Article 21. In the first place, there was no provision similar to Section 438 in the old Criminal Procedure Code. The Law Commission in its 41 st Report recommended introduction of a provision for grant of anticipatory bail. It observed: "We agree that this would be a useful advantage. Though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such power should be exercised.? In the light of this recommendation, Section 438 was incorporated, for the first time, in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It observed: "We agree that this would be a useful advantage. Though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such power should be exercised.? In the light of this recommendation, Section 438 was incorporated, for the first time, in the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. Looking to the cautious recommendation of the Law Commission, the power to grant anticipatory bail is conferred only on a Court of Session or the High Court. Also, anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of right. It is essentially a statutory right conferred long after the coming into force of the Constitution It cannot be considered as an essential ingredient of Article 21 of the Constitution. And its non-application to a certain special category of offences cannot be considered as violative of Article 21.” (emphasis supplied) 72. We are conscious of the fact that the legislative intent behind the introduction of Section 438 CrPC is to safeguard the individual's personal liberty and to protect him from the possibility of being humiliated and from being subjected to unnecessary police custody. However, the court must also keep in view that a criminal offence is not just an offence against an individual, rather the larger societal interest is at stake. Therefore, a delicate balance is required to be established between the two rights-safeguarding the personal liberty of an individual and the societal interest. It cannot be said that refusal to grant anticipatory bail would amount to denial of the rights conferred upon the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 73. The learned Solicitor General has submitted that depending upon the facts of each case, it is for the investigating agency to confront the accused with the material, only when the accused is in custody. It was submitted that the statutory right under Section 19 of PMLA has an in-built safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power of arrest by the investigating officer. Submitting that custodial interrogation is a recognized mode of interrogation which is not only permissible but has been held to be more effective, the learned Solicitor General placed reliance upon State v. Anil Sharma, [1997 SCC (Cri) 1039.]; Sudhir v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2016) 1 SCC 146 .]; and Directorate of Enforcement v. Hassan Ali Khan, [(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 612.] 74. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of the investigation intended to secure several purposes. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provided information leading to discovery of material facts and relevant information. Grant of anticipatory bail may hamper the investigation. Pre-arrest bail is to strike a balance between the individual?s right to personal freedom and the right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused as the material so far collected and to collect more information which may lead to recovery of relevant information. In Anil Sharma case (4 th supra), the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p.189, para 6) “6. We find force in the submission of CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation- oriented than questioning a suspect who is well- ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effect interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders.” 75. Observing that the arrest is a part of the investigation intended to secure several purposes, in Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B., [2005 SCC (Cri) 933.], it was held as under: (SCC p.313, para 19) “19. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of investigation intended to secure several purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the investigation to proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons connected with the victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance, to maintain law and order in the locality. For these or other reasons, arrest may become an inevitable part of the process of investigation. The legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in an application under Section 438 of the Code. The role of the investigator is well defined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the Court in the process of investigation is limited. The court ordinarily will not interfere with the investigation of a crime or with the arrest of the accused in a cognizable offence. An interim order restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an application under Section 438 of the Code will amount to interference in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under Section 438 of the Code.” 76. In Siddaram Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2011) 1 SCC 694 .] and other judgments and observing that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances, in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, [(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 468.], the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p.386, para 19) “19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional cases where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K.Ganesh Babu v. P.T.Manokaran, [ (2007) 4 SCC 434 .], State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain, [ (2008) 1 SCC 213 .] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal, [ (2008) 13 SCC 305 .] .)” Economic Offences 78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain, [ (2008) 1 SCC 213 .] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal, [ (2008) 13 SCC 305 .] .)” Economic Offences 78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, [1998 SCC (Cri) 510.], it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail. 83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting the useful information and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 18. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor goes to show that Section 438 CrPC is to be invoked only in exceptional cases where the case alleged is frivolous or groundless and particularly in economic offences would definitely hamper the effective investigation. But, in the case on hand, the offence alleged against the petitioner herein/ accused No.1 is punishable under Section 61(2) of BNS and Sections 7 to 12 of the PC Act and it cannot be termed as an economic offence. Furthermore, the case in P.Chidambaram (supra) relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, is at the stage of Criminal Appeal, challenged by the accused therein, aggrieved by the order of the High Court of refusing to grant anticipatory bail to the accused therein, who was alleged to have committed the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, and it requires systematic and analysed investigation which would be of great advantage, as the said offence involves many stages of placement, layering i.e. funds moved to other institutions to conceal origin and interrogation i.e. funds used to acquire various assets. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dismissing the said Criminal Appeal, and in the concluding paragraph No.85 observed that it is for the appellant to work out his remedy in accordance with law. As and when the application for regular bail is filed, the same shall be considered by the learned trial court on its own merits and in accordance with law without being influenced by any of the observations made in this judgment and the impugned order of the High Court. Therefore, as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, every case has to be considered on its own merits and in accordance with law. Apparently, the case on hand, is at the stage of investigation, and the merits of the case can only be adjudicated after full-fledged trial conducted by the trial court concerned. 19. Learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI would contend that there is reliable source of information that the petitioner herein/accused No.1 indulged in corrupt activities of inclusion of members favourable to KLEF in the NAAC Inspection Tream and bribed them for favourable report and such source is of conversation between the petitioner herein/accused No.1 and other accused in the subject crime and prima facie the accusation is proved as against the petitioner herein/accused No.1 and such conversation is enough to refuse the anticipatory bail to the petitioner herein/accused No.1. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 would contend that the respondent-CBI Officials basing on a mere assertion that there is reliable source of information, trying to apprehend the petitioner herein/accused No.1 for custodial interrogation and such mere assertion on the part of the respondent-CBI Officials for getting custodial interrogation, would not be sufficient to oppose the plea of anticipatory bail. He placed strong reliance on a decision rendered in Ashok Kumar vs. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, [2024 SCC OnLine SC 274.] , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph No.12 held as under: “12. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation.” 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/accused No.1 also relied upon a decision made in R.M.Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra, [(1973) 1 Supreme Court Cases 471.], wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph Nos.20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27 and 30, held as under: “21. This Court in N. Sri Rama Reddy, Shri etc. v. V.V. Giri [ (1970) 2 SCC 340 : (1971) 1 SCR 399 ] Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1968 SC 147 : (1967) 3 SCR 720 : (1968) 1 SCJ 511] , and S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1964 SC 72 : (1964) 4 SCR 733 ] accepted conversation or dialogue recorded on a tape recording machine as admissible evidence. In Nagree case the conversation was between Nagree and Sheikh Nagree was accused of offering bribe to Sheikh. 22. In Presidential Election case, questions were put to a witness Jagat Narain that he had tried to dissuade the petitioner from filing an election petition. The witness denied those suggestions. The election petitioner had recorded on tape the conversation that had taken place between the witness and the petitioner. Objection was taken to admissibility of tape recorded conversation. The Court admitted the tape recorded conversation. In Presidential Election case, the denial of the witness was being controverted, challenged and confronted with his earlier statement. Under Section 146 of the Evidence Act questions might be put to the witness to test the veracity of the witness. Again under Section 153 of the Evidence Act a witness might be contradicted when he denied any question tending to impeach his impartiality. This is because the previous statement is furnished by the tape recorded conversation. Under Section 146 of the Evidence Act questions might be put to the witness to test the veracity of the witness. Again under Section 153 of the Evidence Act a witness might be contradicted when he denied any question tending to impeach his impartiality. This is because the previous statement is furnished by the tape recorded conversation. The tape itself becomes the primary and direct evidence of what has been said and recorded. 23. Tape recorded conversation is admissible provided first the conversation is relevant to the matters in issue; secondly, there is identification of the voice; and, thirdly, the accuracy of the tape recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasing the tape record. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under Section 7 of the Evidence Act. The conversation between Dr Motwani and the appellant in the present case is relevant to the matter in issue. There is no dispute about the identification of the voices. There is no controversy about any portion of the conversation being erased or mutilated. The appellant was given full opportunity to test the genuineness of the tape recorded conversation. The tape recorded conversation is admissible in evidence. 24. It was said by counsel for the appellant that the tape recorded conversation was obtained by illegal means. The illegality was said to be contravention of Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act. There is no violation of Section 25 of the Telagraph Act in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There is warrant for proposition that even if evidence is illegally obtained it is admissible. Over a century ago it was said in an English case where a constable searched the appellant illegally and found a quantity of offending article in his pocket that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice if it were held, because evidence was obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against a party charged with an offence. See Jones v. Owen [(1870) 34 JP 759]. See Jones v. Owen [(1870) 34 JP 759]. The Judicial Committee in Kuruma, Son of Kanju v. R. [1955 AC 197] dealt with the conviction of an accused of being in unlawful possession of ammunition which had been discovered in consequence of a search of his person by a police officer below the rank of those who were permitted to make such searches. The Judicial Committee held that the evidence was rightly admitted. The reason given was that if evidence was admissible it matters not how it was obtained. There is of course always a word of caution. It is that the Judge has a discretion to disallow evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused. That caution is the golden rule in criminal jurisprudence. 25. This Court in Magraj Patodia v. R.K. Birla [ AIR 1971 SC 1295 ] dealt with the admissibility in evidence of two files containing numerous documents produced on behalf of the election petitioner. Those files contained correspondence relating to the election of Respondent 1. The correspondence was between Respondent 1 the elected candidate and various other persons. The witness who produced the file said that Respondent 1 handed over the file to him for safe custody. The candidate had apprehended raid at his residence in connection with the evasion of taxes or duties. The version of the witness as to how he came to know about the file was not believed by this Court. This Court said that a document which was procured by improper or even by illegal means could not bar its admissibility provided its relevance and genuineness were proved. 27. The admissibility of evidence procured in consequence of illegal searches and other unlawful acts was applied in a recent English decision in R. v. Maqsud Ali [(1965) 2 All ER 464] In that case two persons suspected of murder went voluntarily with the police officers to a room in which, unknown to them, there was a microphone connected with a tape-recorder in another room. They were left alone in the room. They proceeded to have a conversation in which incriminating remarks were made. The conversation was recorded on the tape. The court of criminal appeal held that the trial Judge had correctly admitted the tape-recording of the incriminating conversation in evidence. They were left alone in the room. They proceeded to have a conversation in which incriminating remarks were made. The conversation was recorded on the tape. The court of criminal appeal held that the trial Judge had correctly admitted the tape-recording of the incriminating conversation in evidence. It was said “that the method of the informer and of the eavesdropper is commonly used in the detection of crime. The only difference here was that a mechanical device was the eavesdropper”. The courts often say that detention by deception is a form of police procedure to be directed and used sparingly and with circumspection. 30. It was said that the admissibility of the tape recorded evidence offended Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. The submission was that the manner of acquiring the tape-recorded conversation was not procedure established by law and the appellant was incriminated. The appellant's conversation was voluntary. There was no compulsion. The attaching of the tape- recording instrument was unknown to the appellant. That fact does not render the evidence of conversation inadmissible. The appellant's conversation was not extracted under duress or compulsion. If the conversation was recorded on the tape it was a mechanical contrivance to play the role of an eavesdropper. In R. v. Leatham [(1961) 8 Cox CC 498] it was said “it matters not how you get it if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence”. As long as it is not tainted by an inadmissible confession of guilt evidence even if it is illegally obtained is admissible.” 22. In the case on hand, the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is the President of KLEF from the past 40 years. A perusal of material on record goes to show that entire material has been seized by the CBI, therefore, question of custodial interrogation to elicit more information, would not arise. Furthermore, the petitioner herein/accused No.1 is aged about 70 years, he got fixed abode and there is absolutely no flight risk. The material filed on record goes to show that the petitioner herein/ accused No.1 was having history of coronary artery disease and transient ischemic attack and the petitioner herein/accused No.1 was admitted in the Andhra Hospitals Private Limited, Vijayawada and he now accelerated hypertension and chest pain and considering the severity, he requires continuous follow up to monitor his recovery and overall health. Above all, at the cost of repetition, all the offences alleged against the petitioner herein/accused No.1 are punishable with less than seven (07) years imprisonment. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner herein/accused No.1, however, on certain conditions. 23. Accordingly, in the event of the arrest of petitioner herein/accused No.1 in the above crime he shall be released on bail on his executing personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the arresting police officials, subject to the following conditions: (i) The petitioner herein/accused No.1 shall appear before the Investigating Officer and shall cooperate with the investigation, as and when required; (ii) The petitioner herein/accused No.1 shall not influence any witness, tamper the evidence and shall not interfere into the investigation; (iii) The petitioner shall surrender his Passport to the Investigating Officer and he shall not leave the Country without obtaining prior permission from the Court concerned; (iv) The petitioner herein/accused No.1 shall attend before the Investigating Officer, CBI, Hyderabad once in a month i.e. on 3 rd Saturday of every month between 10.00 a.m. and 2.00 p.m; 24. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. As a sequel thereto, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Criminal Petition, shall stand closed.