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2025 DIGILAW 37 (KAR)

Chetan S/o D. Shankarappa v. P. V. Kalpana

2025-05-02

K.V.ARAVIND, N.V.ANJARIA

body2025
JUDGMENT : K.V. ARAVIND, J. 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. B.N. Mahesh Chandra for learned Advocate Mr. G.S. Naveen for the appellant, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil a/w learned Advocate Smt. N. Sharadha for respondent No.1, learned Advocate Mr. T.L. Kiran Kumar for respondent No.3, learned Government Advocate Mr. K.S. Harish for respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and learned Advocate Mr. H. H. Shivamogga Nagaraj for respondent No.6. 2. Respondent No. 6 in Writ Petition No. 7893 of 2024 has filed this appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 16th July2024. 3. The brief facts are that the election for the post of Treasurer to the Board of Directors of the Bangalore Advocates Co-operative Society Limited was notified through the issuance of a calendar of events. Both the appellant and Respondent No. 1 filed their respective nominations to contest for the position of Treasurer. However, the Returning Officer rejected nomination of Respondent No.1 on the grounds that one of the proposers had nominated more than one candidate. As the appellant was the only candidate, the election for the post of Treasurer was declared unanimous. 4. Respondent No. 1 challenged the endorsement in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment and order, directed Respondent No. 4, the Election Officer-cum-Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Election Authority, to conduct elections for the post of Treasurer between the appellant and Respondent No. 1. This Court, by an order dated 08.08.2024, directed that the result of the election to the post of Treasurer not be declared without the permission of the Court. Accordingly, the election for the post of Treasurer was conducted, but the results were not declared in compliance with the order of this court. Respondent No. 1 has filed an application seeking modification of the interim order dated 08.08.2024, requesting that the results of the election held on 09.08.2024 for the post of Treasurer be declared. The consideration of the I.A. for modification requires a detailed hearing. Therefore, with the consent of the parties, the appeal was heard finally. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. Respondent No. 1 has filed an application seeking modification of the interim order dated 08.08.2024, requesting that the results of the election held on 09.08.2024 for the post of Treasurer be declared. The consideration of the I.A. for modification requires a detailed hearing. Therefore, with the consent of the parties, the appeal was heard finally. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. B. N. Mahesh Chandra, appearing for the appellant, submits that the correctness or otherwise of the rejection of the nomination papers constitutes an election dispute under Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), which provides an alternative efficacious remedy and a complete mechanism to resolve such disputes. 6. Learned Advocate further submits that any dispute arising in connection with the election of the President, Vice-President, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, or Member of the Committee of the Society must be referred to the Registrar by raising an election petition under Section 70 of the Act. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Learned Advocate further submits that, in view of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), a Director of the Society is permitted to propose only one candidate for the office of President, Vice-President, or any other office-bearer of the Society. However, in the present case, one of the Directors, namely G. Manjunath, proposed two candidates. It is submitted that the nomination of Respondent No. 1 is in violation of Rule 14-AG of the Rules. Therefore, the rejection of the nomination by the Returning Officer was justified. Learned advocate relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujarath University vs. N.U. Rajguru and another, 1987 Supp. SCC 512 , to contend that where statute provides for election to an office and if it further provides a machinery or forum for determination of dispute arising out of election jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked unless exception or extraordinary circumstances exists to justify bypassing the alternative remedies. 8. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil, appearing for Respondent No. 1, submits that the issue to be considered by the learned Single Judge was a pure question of law involving the interpretation of Rule 14-AG of the Rules. 8. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil, appearing for Respondent No. 1, submits that the issue to be considered by the learned Single Judge was a pure question of law involving the interpretation of Rule 14-AG of the Rules. It is further submitted that the remedy under Section 70 of the Act is neither effective nor efficacious. The Registrar, in a petition under Section 70 of the Act, can examine disputed facts; however, the interpretation of the scope of Rule 14-AG would be beyond the competence, scope, and ambit of Section 70 of the Act. Therefore, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly entertained the writ petition. 9. Learned Senior Advocate further submits that sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Rules restricts a Director from proposing or seconding more than one candidate for the office of President, Vice-President, or any other office-bearers of the Society. It is submitted that the restriction under sub-rule (5) applies only to proposing or seconding more than one candidate for the same post, and cannot be extended to proposing or seconding candidates for different posts. In the present case, one of the proposers, namely G. Manjunath, has proposed two candidates, one for the post of President and the other for the post of Treasurer. The Returning Officer incorrectly applied sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG and rejected the nomination of Respondent No. 1. As the endorsement contravened the plain reading of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG, it was issued without jurisdiction. Hence, it is submitted that the writ petition was rightly entertained and the endorsement was set aside. Learned Senior Advocate relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Godrej Sara Lee Limited vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and others, 2023 SCC Online SC 95, to contend that when pure question of law is involved, it should be decided by the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available. 10. Sri K.S. Harish, learned Government advocate appearing for respondent Nos.4 and 5 by relying on the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Umesh Ambi vs. Angadi Shekara Basappa, (1998) 4 SCC 529 , submitted that once an election is over, the aggrieved candidate will have to pursue his remedy in accordance with the provisions of law. Hence, intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution is not permissible. 11. Hence, intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution is not permissible. 11. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties, the Court is required to consider two aspects: Firstly, the maintainability of the writ petition; and secondly, the interpretation of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Rules. Maintainability. 12. The writ appeal challenges the order of the learned Single Judge primarily on the ground of the maintainability of the writ petition in view of Section 70 of the Act. The appellant contends that the endorsement rejecting the nomination pertains to a dispute arising in connection with the election of the Treasurer, which constitutes an election dispute that should be addressed under Section 70 of the Act. 13. Similar contentions were raised before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge held that the remedy available under Section 70 of the Act is not efficacious. It was further held that, considering the nature of the controversy, which requires the interpretation of law, the remedy under Section 70 of the Act cannot be regarded as an efficacious remedy. The learned Single Judge referred to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Others , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 801 and Radhakrishnan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334, where it was held that an alternative remedy does not, by itself, divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further held that while a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternative remedy is available by law, the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a matter of policy, convenience, and discretion. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy necessitates the exercise of its jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with. 14. As held in Godrej Sara Lee Limited (surpa), when petition raises pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the High Court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed off and unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse. 14. As held in Godrej Sara Lee Limited (surpa), when petition raises pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the High Court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed off and unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse. If the Court finds that the issue raised is pristinely legal requiring determination by the High Court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy, writ can be entertained. Where the controversy is purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available. 15. The learned Single Judge further held that, having regard to the interpretation of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Rules, the controversy as to whether the interpretation given by the Returning Officer to sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG is valid or not constitutes a pure question of law, which requires adjudication by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. The learned Single Judge, while entertaining the writ petition, further held that the interpretation placed on sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Rules by the Returning Officer is impractical to apply, and relegating the parties to the remedy under Section 70 of the Act would render the grievance or dispute infructuous. 17. There is no dispute with the settled position of law, that there is no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, even when an alternative remedy is provided by statute and is if, efficacious. The exercise of declining writ jurisdiction is a matter of self-restraint to ensure that the remedies provided under the statute are exhausted. While relegating the parties to an alternative remedy, the court while declining to exercise the jurisdiction needs to consider as to the remedy is efficacious or not. The nature of dispute brought before the court in a petition under Article 226 is regarding interpreting of Rule 14AG of the Rules, without there being any dispute on facts. 18. While relegating the parties to an alternative remedy, the court while declining to exercise the jurisdiction needs to consider as to the remedy is efficacious or not. The nature of dispute brought before the court in a petition under Article 226 is regarding interpreting of Rule 14AG of the Rules, without there being any dispute on facts. 18. In that view of the matter and also in the light of the judgments referred to supra, the dispute being pure question of law, it cannot be said that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be entertained and is not maintainable. Analysis. 19. The dispute arose concerning the interpretation of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Rules. The relevant provision is extracted and is read as follows: "1. xxxxxx 2. xxxxxx 3. xxxxxx 4. xxxxxx 5. No Director shall propose or second under sub-rule (4) more than one candidate for the office of the President or Vice President or any other office-bearer of the Society: Provided that if any director has proposed or seconded more than one candidate for the office of the President or vice President or any other Office-bearer of the Society, the nomination which is received first shall be considered for scrutiny." 20. The appellant contends that no Director shall propose or second more than one candidate for any office, whether it be the President, Vice-President, or any other office-bearer of the Society. On the other hand, Respondent No. 1 contends that the restriction on a Director to propose or second candidates is office-specific. In other words, Section 5 does not impose a restriction on a Director proposing or seconding more than one candidate if the candidates are contesting for different posts. 21. A plain reading of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG explicitly states that the restriction applies only to proposing or seconding more than one candidate for each post or office. If a Director has proposed or seconded a candidate for the office of the President, they cannot propose or second another candidate contesting for the office of President. However, this restriction does not apply to proposing or seconding another candidate for a different office, such as the Vice-President, Treasurer etc. If a Director has proposed or seconded a candidate for the office of the President, they cannot propose or second another candidate contesting for the office of President. However, this restriction does not apply to proposing or seconding another candidate for a different office, such as the Vice-President, Treasurer etc. This interpretation is made explicitly clear by the proviso, which states that in a case where more than one candidate for an office is proposed or seconded by any Director, the nomination that was received first shall be considered for scrutiny. This makes it clear that the first nomination would be valid, and any subsequent nominations would not be valid. 22. If the appellant's contention were to be accepted, the language of sub-rule (5) would likely have imposed a blanket restriction on proposing or seconding more than one candidate, irrespective of the office or post. However, such language is not present in sub-rule (5). 23. It is a settled position of law that a statute must be read in its plain and natural context, without adding or omitting any words. It is also a well-established principle that, while interpreting a statutory provision, the Court cannot rewrite the statute by adding or omitting words. 24. The contention of Respondent No. 1 is that if the mandate of sub-rule (5) were intended to restrict a Director from proposing or seconding more than one candidate irrespective of the post, the language would not have specified 'President or Vice-President or any other office-bearers of the Society.' This submission carries some force. 25. The learned Single Judge, while referring to the judgment in Eera through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2017) 15 SCC 133 , held that when two constructions are reasonably possible, preference should be given to the one that furthers the beneficent purpose of the Act, without unduly expanding the scope of the provision. It was further held that, while interpreting a provision, due regard should be given to each and every word employed in the provision. 26. It was further held that, while interpreting a provision, due regard should be given to each and every word employed in the provision. 26. Applying this principle, the learned Single Judge held that the use of the word 'office' preceding the posts of office-bearers can only mean that a Director of the Board, who is otherwise eligible to propose or second a candidature, is permitted to propose or second no more than one candidate for each 'office.' If the intention of the legislature was otherwise, the legislature could have simply provided that no Director shall propose or second more than one candidate, without the need to include the word 'office' or the names of the offices in the provision. 27. The learned Single Judge further held that the use of 'or' between the posts indicates that the Directors can propose or second the candidature of a candidate for each of the posts. With these observations, the learned Single Judge concluded that a Director is, therefore, permitted to propose or second the candidature of a candidate for each of the posts, and the restriction cannot apply to only one post. 28. If the case at hand is examined in light of the above observations, Mr. G. Manjunath proposed two candidates, one for the post of President and another for the post of Treasurer. Since the proposals are for two different posts, the same cannot be said to be in contravention of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14-AG of the Rules. 29. In light of the above, the order of the learned Single Judge is well-reasoned. No ground has been made out for interference. The appeal is without merit and is accordingly dismissed. 30. This Court, by interim order dated 08.08.2024, directed that the results of the election to the post of Treasurer shall not be declared without permission of the Court. 31. In view of the dismissal of the writ appeal, the Election Authorities are directed to announce the results of the election to the post of Treasurer within one week from the date of service of copy of this order.