JUDGMENT : R.Nataraj, J. The appellant has challenged the judgment dated 04.07.2018 passed by the VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi, in S.C. No.164/2016 by which he was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376(2)(l) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years for the offence punishable under Section 450 of IPC, and ten years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(l) of IPC. 2. The case of the prosecution was that P.W.1 being the father of the victim, informed the respondent on 31.12.2015 at 8.15 p.m. that, on 31.12.2015 at about 4.00 p.m., when he returned to his house, he saw the accused running out of his house and on entering the house, he found his daughter naked. He thereafter came out of the house and called for help and along with neighbours, he pursued the accused. P.W.4, who came to the house then, covered the victim and on enquiry with her, she disclosed that when she was alone, the accused came into the house and touched her inappropriately, removed her clothes, pinned her down and had forcible sexual intercourse with her. The victim girl disclosed this to her mother also. 3. Based on the information, the respondent registered a case in Crime No.208/2015 for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 447 of IPC. The Investigating Officer drew a spot mahazar, recorded statements of the witnesses to the spot mahazar and drew up the mahazar to evidence recovery of M.Os.1 to 5. The clothes worn by the victim were seized. The accused was arrested the next day and the clothes worn by him were seized. The victim was taken for medical examination by P.W.8 on the next day. P.W.8 collected the vaginal smear, the pubic hair of the victim girl. The statement of the victim girl was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He also recorded the statement of the material witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. An interim report of P.W.8 was procured and the material objects seized were sent for forensic examination. The forensic report disclosed that there were no semen stains on the vaginal swab or on the pubic hair of the victim and on the undergarments worn by the victim and the accused. The forensic report disclosed that there were no semen stains on the vaginal swab or on the pubic hair of the victim and on the undergarments worn by the victim and the accused. Based on these, a charge sheet was laid for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(l) and 447 of IPC. Copy of the charge sheet was furnished to the accused. The accused was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376(2)(l) of IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined C.W.1 as P.W.1 who supported the case of the prosecution. He deposed that the victim was a divorcee. He spoke about the incident as mentioned by him in the complaint at Ex.P.1. He denied that the accused did not have forcible sex with the victim. P.W.2 is the victim who also supported the case of the prosecution. 5. P.W.3 is the Teacher in a school for differently abled children/persons, and he explained the questions put to P.W.2 when her statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He deposed that except him, the victim girl, the Judge and the Typist, there was no one else in the room. 6. P.W.4 is the daughter-in-law of P.W.1 who deposed that she went to the house after the alleged incident. She deposed that when she went to the house, the victim was lying naked and that she disclosed that a stranger had come into the house and had forcible sexual intercourse with her. She supported the prosecution case. However, in her cross-examination, she deposed that P.W.1 wanted to get the victim married again. However, she denied the suggestion that P.W.1 had lodged the complaint to force the accused to marry the victim. 7. P.W.5 is an eye witness who deposed that, at about 4.00 p.m., she saw P.W.1 going into his house and the accused running out of the house of P.W.1. She deposed that P.W.1 pursued the accused and that she and others also chased the accused. In her cross-examination, she deposed that she had a good relationship with P.W.1. She further deposed that, at about 4.00 p.m., when she was sitting with C.W.7 and C.W.8, she saw the accused walking suspiciously near the house of P.W.1. She deposed that P.W.1 pursued the accused and that she and others also chased the accused. In her cross-examination, she deposed that she had a good relationship with P.W.1. She further deposed that, at about 4.00 p.m., when she was sitting with C.W.7 and C.W.8, she saw the accused walking suspiciously near the house of P.W.1. She deposed that she saw the accused attempting to enter the house of P.W.1 for about 5 times, and at about 5.00 p.m., she saw the accused going into the house of P.W.1. She also deposed that she saw the accused running away from the house of P.W.1 and that P.W.1 pursued the accused. 8. P.Ws.6 & 7 are the panch witnesses to Exs.P.6 and P.7 respectively and they supported the case of the prosecution. P.W.8 is the Medical Officer who had specifically deposed that, after the receipt of the report of the FSL at Ex.P.31, and after seeing it, she had given her opinion that the accused did not have forcible sexual intercourse with the victim. She also identified the said report as Ex.P.11. 9. P.W.9 is the psychiatrist who deposed that the victim had an average IQ. P.W.10 the then PSI of Sadalaga Police Station registered the complaint as per Ex.P.1, registered the case in Crime No.208/2015, forwarded it to the JMFC, Chikkodi. He identified the FIR at Ex.P.15 and his signature thereon as Ex.P.15(a). He recorded the statement of C.W.4 and sent the victim for examination along with C.W.19. 10. P.W.11 is the Women Police Constable who took the victim to Belagavi Government Hospital for examination. P.W.12 is the Constable who handed over M.Os.1 to 9 to the FSL for examination. P.W.13 was the Magistrate who recorded the statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. P.W.14 is the Investigating Officer who, after conducting the investigation, submitted a charge sheet. P.W.15 is the Medical Officer at Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Belagavi, who submitted the report and identified the report as Ex.P.31. 11. Based on the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court held that the prosecution had proved the commission of offence by the accused. It held that the Medical Officer-P.W.8 had opined that the victim girl was used to sexual intercourse and that the report of P.W.8 was based on the FSL report-Ex.P.31. 11. Based on the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court held that the prosecution had proved the commission of offence by the accused. It held that the Medical Officer-P.W.8 had opined that the victim girl was used to sexual intercourse and that the report of P.W.8 was based on the FSL report-Ex.P.31. It held that mere absence of injury on the private part of the victim would not by itself establish that there was no forcible sexual intercourse as the victim was a married woman who was used to sexual intercourse. The Trial Court, therefore, held that the evidence of P.W.2 inspired the confidence and her testimony was corroborated by other evidence which was sufficient to connect the accused with the crime. It perused the evidence of P.W.15 and held that there were blood stains on the clothes worn by the victim and the undergarments worn by her. Therefore, the Trial Court held that the said report as well as the medical opinion of P.W.8 were sufficient to prove that the accused had committed rape on the victim girl. Consequently, it convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376(2)(l) of IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of two years and ten years respectively. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the accused has filed this appeal. 12. The learned counsel for the accused contended that as per Ex.P.31, there were no spermatozoa on the clothes of the victim or on the clothes worn by the accused or on the pubic hair of the victim or on the vaginal swab collected from the victim on the next day. He contends that the victim girl did not claim that she had washed herself before she was examined by P.W.8. He, therefore, contends that there is no evidence of any forcible intercourse by the accused. He, thus, contends that the only circumstance in the case is that P.W.1 had seen the accused running out of the house of P.W.1 and the victim girl was lying naked in the house. He contends that the victim girl was mentally not sound and though she claimed that the accused had forcible sexual intercourse with her, the same is not corroborated by medical evidence. Therefore, he contends that the impugned judgment of conviction is without any basis. 13. He contends that the victim girl was mentally not sound and though she claimed that the accused had forcible sexual intercourse with her, the same is not corroborated by medical evidence. Therefore, he contends that the impugned judgment of conviction is without any basis. 13. He referred to the judgment of the Trial Court and submitted that the Trial Court mainly referred to the FSL report where it was stated that there were blood stains on the top worn by the victim and her underwear. He contends that P.W.15 deposed that the stains could be due to menstruation of the victim girl, and that nothing is mentioned of it in the report. He, therefore, contends that the Trial Court has jumped to the conclusion that there was evidence to establish that the accused committed the offence of forcible sexual intercourse on the victim. He also contends that, when the victim was not mentally sound and when there were no eye witnesses to the incident, it is not safe to rely upon the statement of the victim girl recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. as well her claim that she was raped by the accused. He contends that the Trial Court jumped to the conclusion that Indian women will not concoct untruthful story and face ignominy of being a rape victim. He contends that the victim was married and was used to sexual intercourse. He, therefore, contends that the Trial Court could not have lightly considered the report of P.W.8 and P.W.15. He thus contends that the Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence on record, but is blinded by its own prejudices. 14. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that P.W.2, the victim, has supported the case of the prosecution and that she categorically stated that when she was alone, the accused barged into the house and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. He contends that the victim girl was used to sexual intercourse and it was not difficult for her to explain what forcible sexual intercourse means. He, therefore, contends that the evidence of P.W.2 cannot be lightly brushed aside, but must be considered from the evidence of P.W.1 as well as the evidence of P.W.5 who had seen the accused running away from the house of P.W.1. He, therefore, contends that the evidence of P.W.2 cannot be lightly brushed aside, but must be considered from the evidence of P.W.1 as well as the evidence of P.W.5 who had seen the accused running away from the house of P.W.1. He, therefore, contends that this evidence is sufficient to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. He also contends that the victim was not mentally sound meaning thereby that she could not have consented to have a sexual intercourse with the accused. He contends that the accused was not known to the family of the victim and that he forced himself into the house when the victim was alone and had intercourse with her forcibly. He also contends that P.W.1 saw the victim naked in the house and the accused running away out of the house. He, therefore, contends that the offence is committed by the accused and hence, the Trial Court was justified in convicting the accused. In so far as the evidence of P.W.15 as well as report of the FSL at Ex.P.31 is concerned, he contends that absence of spermatozoa on the clothes worn by the victim by itself does not mean that the offence was not committed. He contends that the victim girl was undressed and therefore, it can be quite possible that there were no semen stains on the clothes of the victim girl. He contends that since the victim girl was used to sex, she must have felt it appropriate to wash herself before going to the police to lodge a complaint. Thus, he submits that the report at Ex.P.31 is not sufficient in the face of unclenching oral evidence adduced by P.W.2. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is just and proper and there is no need to interfere with the same. 15. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused as well as the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor. 16. The accused was charge sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376(2)(l) of IPC. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused had raped the victim girl. ‘Rape’ is defined under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code as follows: “ 375. 16. The accused was charge sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376(2)(l) of IPC. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused had raped the victim girl. ‘Rape’ is defined under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code as follows: “ 375. Rape .—A man is said to commit “rape” if he— (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:— First.—Against her will. Secondly.— Without her consent. Thirdly.— With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly.— With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly.— With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly.— With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly.— When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. Sixthly.— With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly.— When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. Explanation 2.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1.—A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. 17. In the instant case, the victim girl (P.W.2) was not mentally sound as per the assessment made by P.W.9. He deposed that the victim girl was of average intelligence. P.W.1 deposed that P.W.2 was married but due to her mental condition she was divorced. P.W.4 also deposed that P.W.2 was mentally retarded and that she was restricted to the house. Therefore, there is evidence to show that the victim girl was mentally not sound. The accused was not known to the family of the victim. P.W.1 saw the accused running out of his house at about 4.00 p.m. and when he entered the house, he saw the victim lying naked. The statement of P.W.2 was recorded before the Magistrate wherein she stated that the accused had forcible sexual intercourse with her. None of the prosecution witnesses deposed that, after the crime, the victim took a wash before they went to the police station to lodge a complaint. The vaginal swab collected from the victim girl (M.O.9) did not disclose the presence of spermatozoa. There were also no signs of spermatozoa on the clothes worn by the victim girl or the clothes worn by the accused. Even if it is assumed that the victim girl was used to have sex, unless there was evidence to establish that the accused had forcible sex with the victim girl, it was not safe to rely upon the evidence of P.W.2 to hold that the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Section 376(2)(l) of IPC. Even if it is assumed that the victim girl was used to have sex, unless there was evidence to establish that the accused had forcible sex with the victim girl, it was not safe to rely upon the evidence of P.W.2 to hold that the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Section 376(2)(l) of IPC. The evidence of P.W.5, who was an eye witness and who saw the accused going into the house of P.W.1, would not be sufficient to hold the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(l) of IPC. There were clearly no signs of protest or resistance by the victim. The spot mahazar also does not show any signs of protest. There were no injuries on the accused. 18. The learned Trial Judge, even after noticing the FSL report at Ex.P.31, merely referred to the blood stains on M.O.2 and M.O.5 and held that the accused had committed an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(l) of IPC. The Trial Judge was completely oblivious of the report of FSL as well as the opinion furnished by P.W.8 who categorically stated that there were no signs of sexual intercourse by the accused with P.W.2. Under the circumstances, the judgment and order of the Trial Court holding the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 376(2)(l) of IPC is not justified and therefore, deserves to be interfered with. As far as the offence under Section 450 of IPC is concerned, though P.W.1 deposed that the accused ran out of the house and P.W.5 saw the accused running out of the house, there is nothing to show that the accused had trespassed into the house for committing an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. 19. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, passed in S.C. No.164/2016 by the VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi, is hereby set aside. The appellant/accused is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(l) and 450 of IPC, and he is set free. Bail bonds furnished by the accused, if any, stands discharged.