JUDGMENT : (P. SREE SUDHA, J.) These appeals are filed against the Judgment and decree in O.S.No.9 of 2003, dated 05.10.2020, passed by the learned X-Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 2. Initially, respondents No.1 to 5, who are the plaintiffs in the suit, have filed a suit for specific performance of an Agreement of Sale, dated 28-02-1998, which is alleged to have been executed by the appellant/defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiffs No.1 to 4 and also to direct appellant/defendant No.1 to acknowledge the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property and for consequential injunction restraining the appellants/defendants from interfering with the alleged peaceful possession of the plaint schedule property. The trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence of both sides, decreed the suit with costs and also directed the defendant No.1 therein to execute the registered sale deed in favour of plaintiffs in respect of the suit schedule property within two months from the date of the Judgment. Challenging the said Judgment defendant No.1 therein preferred C.C.C.A.No.18 of 2021 and defendant No.2 therein preferred C.C.C.A.No.4 of 2021. 3. Parties herein are hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs and defendants as arrayed before the trial Court for the sake of convenience. 4. The plaint schedule property is a house bearing D.No.8-3- 976/92 with plinth area of 1490 square feet, Plot No.92 admeasuring an extent of 350 square yards situated at Shalivahana Nagar, Srinagar Colony, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as "the schedule property"). The averment in the plaint is that defendant No.1 had proposed to sell the plaint schedule property in the month of January, 1998 and, on 19-02-1998, plaintiffs have obtained encumbrance certificate and got it confirmed that the property was not subjected to encumbrances. 5. It was alleged that on 20-02-1998 an oral agreement of sale was concluded between the plaintiffs and defendants for a total sale consideration of Rs.30,00,000/- and Rs.25,00,000/- was paid on the same day, as part sale consideration and a stamped receipt was executed by defendant No.1 to that effect. It was agreed that the final terms and conditions of the contract will be reduced into a written agreement of sale on or before 28-02-1998. It was agreed that the final terms and conditions of the contract will be reduced into a written agreement of sale on or before 28-02-1998. The defendant No.1 promised to deliver the original title deeds, pertaining to the suit schedule property, after getting the clearance from the Income Tax Department under the pretext that the Annual Assessment for the years 1996-1998 was not cleared by the Income Tax Department. 6. It was further alleged that on 28-02-1998 a written agreement of sale was entered into between plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 and defendant No.1 enumerating the terms and conditions and defendant No.1 agreed to receive the balance of sale consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-, after obtaining Income Tax clearance and expressed his willingness to execute the registered sale deed on or before 28-02-1999. As per clause 3 of the agreement of sale, dated 28-02-1998, the defendant No.1 agreed to deliver the vacant and physical possession of the schedule property and the balance sale consideration has to be paid as soon as the vendor obtains the tax clearance and offers his readiness to register the property. 7. It is alleged in the plaint that plaintiffs secured the balance of sale consideration and requested the defendant No.1 to complete the sale transaction by 31-03-1998 as the plaintiff No.5 has to set up his office cum residence and a portion of the property was delivered. Subsequently, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was entered on 03-08-1998, wherein it was alleged that defendant No.1 had stated that he could not get Income Tax clearance and agreed to pay 18% interest on the advance amount. As the time fixed in the agreement was expired, the defendant No.1 addressed a letter on 28-02-1999 enhancing the amount of sale consideration to Rs.49,00,000/- and the said amount was paid by 4 (four) account payee cheques on 20-05-1999 and an endorsement was made on the back of the cheque. It is further alleged that on 28-05-1999 the defendant No.1 requested the plaintiffs to permit him to stay as a tenant and also executed a notarized undertaking on Rs.100/- stamp paper to execute registered sale deed on or before 31-08- 1999. On that day plaintiffs have requested to extend the time for registration up to 30-11-1999 and subsequently, letters were addressed on 07-01-2000 and 06-03-2000, seeking extension of time. On that day plaintiffs have requested to extend the time for registration up to 30-11-1999 and subsequently, letters were addressed on 07-01-2000 and 06-03-2000, seeking extension of time. On 24-03-2000 notice was issued by defendant No.2 cautioning public that defendant No.1 obtained loan of Rs.18,50,000/-from bank on 30-07-1998. On seeing the notice, the plaintiff No.5 met the bank officials and informed them that plaintiffs have entered into agreement of sale with defendant No.1. On that, the Bank Manager has intimated them that they will proceed according to the procedure. Thereafter, on 03-04-2000, plaintiffs got issued a registered notice directing the defendant no.1 to execute the registered sale deed and in the meantime the bank has filed ARC.No.21/2000 for recovery of loan amount. Thereafter, plaintiffs were constrained to issue legal notice, dated 02-05-2000 calling upon defendant No.1 to execute the registered sale deed and it is alleged that defendant No.1 addressed a letter dated 10-03-2001, undertaking to clear the loan amount and convey the suit schedule property in their favour. On the basis of the above averments, the suit was filed by the plaintiffs. 8. Defendant No.1 had filed the written statement in the suit denying the allegations made in the plaint and specifically pleaded that he did not enter into an Agreement of Sale with an intention to sell the suit schedule property and it was specifically pleaded that the defendant No.1 has obtained loan and the anti-date agreement was prepared by plaintiff No.5 as if the property was intended to be sold. At Para No.13 of the written statement filed by the defendant No.1, he specifically pleaded that he used to borrow amounts as and when there was necessity and as and when there was pressure from creditors and plaintiff No.5 used to advance and take signatures on stamp papers and white papers and as there was a threat, he used to obey the dictates of plaintiffs and used to sign on the documents which were kept ready by Plaintiff No.5. It was also pleaded that the alleged document dated 20-02-1998, which is said to be notarized, is false as he never visited the notary. 9. It was also pleaded that the alleged document dated 20-02-1998, which is said to be notarized, is false as he never visited the notary. 9. At Para No.15 of the written statement filed by the defendant No.1, it was specifically pleaded that plaintiff No.2 signed as attestor to the document i.e., General Power of Attorney (GPA), dated 06-01-2000, which was executed by him in favour of K.Mallikarjun Rao, who is the brother-in-law of Plaintiff No.5, and this clearly shows that the alleged agreement of sale in favor of the plaintiffs is a false document and except the money transactions, at no point of time, defendant No.1 has got the intention to sell the property and it was only to secure loan. No prudent and genuine buyer of a property will sign as a witness to the alleged sale document of the same property executed in favor of another person. In fact, if the genuine buyer comes to know that there is another transaction for the same property, he will immediately challenge the same in the court of law to protect his interest. The defendant No.1 also gave the list of cases filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant and others which were pending. 10. Plaintiffs have filed the rejoinder to the written statement filed by defendant No.1 and in Para No.15 it was pleaded that plaintiff No.2 has not signed any such document, i.e., G.P.A dated 06-01-2000, executed by defendant No.1 in favor of K. Mallikarjun Rao, which is incorrect. 11. Defendant No.2 has also filed the written statement stating that there is no nexus between obtaining the Income Tax clearance and the original document and also pleaded that the property was already mortgaged in favor of the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC.,), Housing Finance, and the original documents and the original title deed was with them and the equitable mortgage was already created in favor of the LIC., Housing Finance, and the loan taken by defendant no.1 was cleared by defendant no.2 and the LIC., authorities handed over the documents to defendant no.2 and there was a subrogation in favor of defendant No.2 which stepped into the shoes of the LIC. 12. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial court has framed five issues: i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance? 12. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial court has framed five issues: i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance? ii) Whether the plea setup by defendant No.1 that the transactions took place between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 is against money transaction? iii) Whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule property. iv) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for injunction, as prayed for? v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for alternate relief, as prayed for? vi) To what relief? 13. In support of the case, plaintiff No.5 examined himself as P.W.1 and also got examined four other witnesses as P.Ws.2 to 5 and got marked Exs.A1 to A145. On behalf of the defendants, defendants No.1 and 2 were examined as D.Ws.1 and 2 marked Exs.B1 to B39. 14. It is pertinent to note that at no stage plaintiff nos.1 to 4 appeared in the court and got examined themselves. 15. Both the parties have lead their evidence and taking the evidence on record, the following additional points that arise, also, came up for consideration: “i) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for specific performance is in consonance with form 47 of Schedule-A of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the CPC")? ii) Whether the suit for specific performance filed is within the period of limitation?” 16. Whether defendant No.1 had entered into agreement of sale of the schedule property or it was an anti-dated agreement as pleaded by the appellant? a) It is relevant to mention here that plaintiff No.5 in the suit examined himself as P.W.1 and a Special Power of Attorney i.e., Ex.A88 was executed in his favor on 09-02-2001 by the other plaintiffs. As per the pleadings and documents filed by the plaintiffs, it is their specific case that defendant No.1 had received the amount in cash and executed a receipt and the same was marked as Ex.A108. A perusal of Ex.A108, clearly shows that the persons from whom the defendant No.1 herein is alleged to have taken the amount are plaintiffs No.1 to 4 and the name of the plaintiff No.5 i.e., P.W.1 was not mentioned. A perusal of Ex.A108, clearly shows that the persons from whom the defendant No.1 herein is alleged to have taken the amount are plaintiffs No.1 to 4 and the name of the plaintiff No.5 i.e., P.W.1 was not mentioned. When it comes to the typed receipt, which is marked as Ex.A130, the names of plaintiffs No.1 to 4 are mentioned and in the said receipt the total consideration was mentioned as Rs.30,00,000/- and that an agreement of sale in writing would be entered on or before 28-02-1998. Under Ex.A127, the agreement of sale was filed and in the said agreement of sale, the name of plaintiff No.5 was shown. In the body of the agreement of sale, it was mentioned that the vendor has sought for extension of time up to 28-02-1999 by way of an endorsement on the receipt dated 20-02-1998 and the vendor had agreed to execute the sale deed and register the same after receipt of full consideration. b) The specific plea of the defendant No.1 is that he had not executed Ex.A 127 and there was no intention on the part of the defendant No.1 to sell the property and that Ex.A127 is a created document and the amount was not received, as stated under Ex.A127. It is submitted that none of the plaintiffs i.e., plaintiffs No.1 to 4, have entered into the witness box and only plaintiff No.5 had entered into the witness box and he was also a Special Power of Attorney holder of plaintiffs No.1 to 4 by virtue of the power of attorney dated 09-02-2001, under Ex.A88. Though a specific plea was taken in the written statement, none of the plaintiffs No.1 to 4 have entered into the witness box to prove that the sale consideration of Rs.25,00,000/- was paid. Further, there is no evidence to show that the defendant No.1 had received an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- as on the date of issuance of the receipt, under Ex.A130. The witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, i.e., P.Ws.2 and 3 are not the witnesses with regard to receipt of Rs.25,00,000/-, as on the date of issuance of receipt. Further, there is no evidence to show that the defendant No.1 had received an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- as on the date of issuance of the receipt, under Ex.A130. The witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, i.e., P.Ws.2 and 3 are not the witnesses with regard to receipt of Rs.25,00,000/-, as on the date of issuance of receipt. Both the witnesses have specifically stated that on the date of agreement of sale, there was no passing of consideration, even the evidence of P.W.3 was very clear that he was informed by P.W.1 regarding the agreement of sale dated 28-02-1998 and also about receipt dated 20-02-1998. The trial court has failed to take into consideration that the plea of the defendant No.1 that there was no intention to sell nor he had executed the documents as pleaded by the plaintiffs. The specific plea of the defendant No.1 was that he was in financial stress and that plaintiff No.5 was helping him in money transactions and was taking the signatures of defendant no.1 and also the letters as he desired and ought to have disbelieved the plea of the plaintiffs. In the absence of any evidence, adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs, with regard to Ex.A130 by plaintiffs No. 1 to 4, that the alleged Ex.A127 was executed by defendant No.1 and it was with an intention to sell the property, it cannot be said that it is proved and, therefore, Ex.A127 is not genuine one. c) To show that Ex.A127 was not executed, as alleged by the plaintiffs in the suit, the defendant No.1 had specifically pleaded in the written statement that; "Further, if really this defendant No.1 ought to have executed the agreement of sale as alleged by plaintiff No.5, why the plaintiff No.2 signed the documents i.e., GPA dated 06.01.2000, got executed by defendant no.1 (wrongly typed as plaintiff no.5) in favor of K.Mallikarjun Rao. The plaintiff No.5 used to involve this defendant No.1 in one or the other transactions and sometimes used to demand to be as surety to third parties whom this defendant No.1 is not at all know or acquainted and further used to threaten that unless this defendant No.1 acts according to his dictates he will see that 3rd parties file the suits against this defendant No.1 and also used to threaten that he will make this defendant to run one Court to another;" d) After the written statement is filed by defendant No.1, a rejoinder is filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and they have not disputed with regard to the attestation of the document by the plaintiff No.2. The document which is attested by the plaintiff No.2 is marked as Ex.B1 and the witness on behalf of the plaintiffs was specifically cross-examined with regard to the recitals and the same is evident in the cross-examination of P.W.1 on 31-08-2016 and 01-09-2016. P.W.1 had admitted that there is a subsisting registered agreement of sale with respect to suit schedule property in favor of K.Mallikarjun Rao. If really there is an agreement of sale in favor of the plaintiffs, as alleged in the plaint, plaintiff No.2 would not have attested Ex. B1 registered agreement of sale-cum-G.P.A., in favor of K.Mallikarjun Rao on 06-01-1999. When a specific plea was taken in the written statement and the witness on behalf of the plaintiffs was cross-examined on this aspect and the plaintiff No.2 has not entered into the witness box, an adverse inference, for plaintiff No.2 in not entering into the witness box can be drawn and, therefore, it can safely be held that the agreement of sale under Ex.A127 is a created document and hence the suit for specific performance itself is not maintainable. Plaintiff No.5 is the power of attorney holder and the GPA was executed on 06-01-2000 and plaintiff No.5 as GPA holder cannot speak of events which have taken place prior to the execution of the power of attorney. Hence there is no evidence on record to show that defendant No.2 has received the sale consideration of Rs.25,00,000/- and executed the receipt. Hence there is no evidence on record to show that defendant No.2 has received the sale consideration of Rs.25,00,000/- and executed the receipt. e) It is the settled principle of law that if the attorney holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved. But, in the present case, Ex.A130 was alleged to have been executed by defendant no.1 in favour of plaintiffs No.1 to 4 on 20-02-1998 and Ex. B1 is dated 06-01-1999. Therefore, the attorney-holder/P.W.1 cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principals for the acts done by the principals or transactions or dealings of the principals, of which principals alone have personal knowledge. f) In the agreement of sale, which is alleged to have been executed by defendant No.1, it is seen that the total sale consideration that is mentioned in the agreement of sale was a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- and it is alleged that even prior to the date of agreement of sale an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- was paid and the balance sale consideration was only Rs.5,00,000/-. In the receipt, it is mentioned that the sale deed would be executed as soon as the defendant No.1 gets clearance from the departments. The receipt which was marked as Ex.A130 refers to is prior to the oral agreement of sale and that the parties are going to enter into an agreement of sale on or before 28-02-1998. In the agreement of sale, the period for performance of the terms of the agreement is fixed as 28-02-1999. When the major portion of sale consideration is alleged to have been paid by the plaintiffs, prior to the date of agreement of sale, there was no necessity to fix the period for execution of the sale deed i.e., one year from the date of agreement of sale. This clearly shows that the alleged transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 is only a money transaction and the defendant No.1 has not executed the alleged agreement of sale with an intention to sell the property. 17. This clearly shows that the alleged transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 is only a money transaction and the defendant No.1 has not executed the alleged agreement of sale with an intention to sell the property. 17. LEGAL NOTICE: a) Even if there is an agreement of sale as alleged by the plaintiffs, plaintiffs No.1 to 4 have not issued any notice demanding the defendant No.1 to execute the registered sale deed in terms of the agreement of sale. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have marked Exs.A119 and A120. A reading of Ex.A119, clearly shows that only notices were given by B.R.S.Chowdary, in his individual capacity, and not on behalf of the other plaintiffs. It is mentioned in the notice that the same was issued under the instructions of his client Mr.B.R.S.Chowdary. In the notice dated 30-08-2000, under Ex.A119, it is mentioned that defendant No.1 had received the token advance of substantial amount in cash on 28-02-1998. b) Another notice, which is dated 02-05-2000, marked as Ex.A120 also shows that the said notice is issued only on behalf of Mr.BRS Chowdary, and surprisingly in both the notices the amount of cash alleged to have been paid as advance on 28-02- 1998, is not mentioned and it is only stated that only a token advance of substantial amount has been received. Thus, by any stretch of imagination, an amount of Rs.25,00,000/-, out of Rs.30,00,000/-, can be said to be a token advance. Plaintiffs No.1 to 4, in whose favor the agreement of sale is alleged to have been executed, have not demanded the defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed and even the notices issued by plaintiff No.5/PW-1 is only in his individual capacity and not on behalf of the other plaintiffs. The very fact that notices have not been issued by plaintiffs No.1 to 4 goes to show that the very alleged agreement of sale is not genuine. 18. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for specific performance is in consonance with form 47 of Schedule-A of the C.P.C? a) In the absence of issuance of notice, demanding the defendant No.1 to perform his part of the contract, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and the same is not in consonance with Forms 47 and 48 of Schedule -A to the CPC., and the suit has to be dismissed. a) In the absence of issuance of notice, demanding the defendant No.1 to perform his part of the contract, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and the same is not in consonance with Forms 47 and 48 of Schedule -A to the CPC., and the suit has to be dismissed. b) In the case of M.Rangaiah Vs. T.V. Satyanarayana Rao and another, 2009 (5) ALD 663 and in Baddam Prathp Reddy Vs. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy and Another , [ 2008 (5) ALT 192 ] , while analyzing the provisions under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Order 6 Rule 3 of the CPC, Appendix A, Forms 47 and 48, of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is categorically held that the suit is liable to be dismissed if a registered notice is not issued by the vendee to the vendor, making prior demand, before filing the suit for execution of registered sale deed stating further that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in compliance with forms Nos.47 and 48. In this context it is expedient to extract the relevant observations of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Baddam Prathp Reddy (supra 2 ). “Reading Form Nos. 47 and 48 CPC together and Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, it has to be held that ordinarily the requirement of law is issuance of a registered notice by the plaintiff demanding the accepting of (balance) sale consideration and execution of sale deed by the vendor (first defendant). Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act lays down that the plaintiff has to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. A contract for sale of immovable property has to be performed by the buyer in accordance with Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Transfer of Property Act, for brevity). Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, contains the rights and liabilities of buyer and seller. Section 55(1) (d) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that seller is bound to execute proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders the amount due in respect of the price at a proper time and place. Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, contains the rights and liabilities of buyer and seller. Section 55(1) (d) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that seller is bound to execute proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders the amount due in respect of the price at a proper time and place. Section 55(5) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act is to the effect that buyer is bound to pay at the time and place of completing the sale, the purchase money to the seller and then request for a property conveyance deed. The execution of conveyance deed, as a duty of the seller and as a right of buyer, has a commonality with reference to time and place of completing transaction. There cannot be better evidence of showing compliance with these provisions than the buyer sending a registered notice to the seller demanding execution of a conveyance deed. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the law laid down by the Supreme Court.” c) Though, the Specific Relief Act provides for the remedy for specific performance under Chapter-II thereof, Section 20 of the said Act make it amply clear that the relief of the specific performance of obligation under an agreement of sale is discretionary in nature. Having said that it proceeds to stipulate the guidelines to be kept in view, while exercising the discretion so vested in the court, apart from that, the law requires certain conditions to be comply with by the plaintiff in a suit of this nature, before he claims the relief of specific performance. d) Though, the Code of Civil Procedure is mostly procedural in nature, it has some attributes of substantive law. These aspects are mostly in built in the procedure itself. The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the forms to be used by the parties as well as courts, with reference to relevant provisions of law, under Appendices "A" to "H", each, donated to subjects like pleadings, process, discovery, inspection and admission, decrees, execution, appeals etc.., Forms 47 and 48 of the Appendix-A relate to suits for specific performance. The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the forms to be used by the parties as well as courts, with reference to relevant provisions of law, under Appendices "A" to "H", each, donated to subjects like pleadings, process, discovery, inspection and admission, decrees, execution, appeals etc.., Forms 47 and 48 of the Appendix-A relate to suits for specific performance. In both the forms, two requirements are prescribed as essential; the first is that the plaintiff must have demanded or requested the defendant to perform the contract in accordance with the agreement, and the second is that the plaintiff must state that he is ready to willing to perform his part of contract. The relevant clauses read as follows: “Form No.47: … 2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on his part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had noticed. Form No.48: … 3. On the day of......19/20, the plaintiff tendered …. Rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument. 4. The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer. 5. The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase-money of the said property to the defendant.” e) In the present case, it is necessary for plaintiffs No.1 to 4 to fulfill conditions of Form No.47 of the C.P.C., and requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. Plaintiffs No.1 to 4 shall make a demand and request defendant No.1 to perform the contract in accordance with the agreement. 19. LIMITATION: Whether the suit for specific performance filed is within the period of limitation? a) Article 54 of the schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the period of limitation for specific performance of contract is three years and the time from which the period begun to run is the date fixed for performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. b) In view of the circumstances of the case, it would be appropriate to refer the legal position on the question whether time is essence of the contract and can it be construed in strict terms. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.S. Vidyanadam Vs. b) In view of the circumstances of the case, it would be appropriate to refer the legal position on the question whether time is essence of the contract and can it be construed in strict terms. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.S. Vidyanadam Vs. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1 held as follows: "It has been consistently held by the Courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding in the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time- limit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the Court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by Constitution Bench of this Court in chand rani vs. Kamal rani , [ (1993) 1 SCC 519 ] , it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident?) (1) from the express terms of the contract: (2) from the nature of the property: and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example the object of making the contract". Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident?) (1) from the express terms of the contract: (2) from the nature of the property: and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example the object of making the contract". c) The aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been extracted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Shaik Mahaboob Sahab v. K. Nageswara Rao , [2008(1) Law Summary 24] and has categorically held that the time being the essence of the contract has close proximity with the point of time on which relief is prayed for and thus, in turn, would have a direct bearing upon the manner in which discretion of the court is to be exercised. Thus, a perusal of the above said decision would indicate that though fixing of period, within which contract is to be performed, does not make stipulation as to time is essence of the contract, but the intention of the parties in that regard has to be gathered from the evidence by express stipulations or by circumstances attending there to. d) In the case of Parakunnan Veetil Joseph's son Mathew v. Nedubara Kuruvila's son , [ AIR 1987 SC 2328 ] , which is referred by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Dammalapati Subba Rao Vs. Bobbili Peda Nanchara Prasad, , [2009 (3) APLJ 301 (HC)] the Hon'ble Apex Court laid down certain parameters while granting a decree for Specific Performance, which are extracted as under: "Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion to Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter in the judicial verdict. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter in the judicial verdict. The Court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff" e) In so far stipulation that the time is essence of contract is concerned, the Division Bench of High Court of A.P. in Mohammed Ibrahim and Another v. Mohammed Abdul Razzak , [ 2007 (5) ALT 510 ] , has categorically held that mere mention in agreement that time is essence of contract does not make the same as essence of contract and it has to be decided taking into consideration, the intention of the parties, their conduct and the surrounding circumstances. In so far the burden of proof in cases of this nature, on the plaintiff is concerned, the High Court in this decision at Para No.25 has categorically enumerated as under :- "It is settled proposition of law that the burden of proof is generally on plaintiff. Decision should rest on rule as to burden of proof under law and also the admitted or proved circumstances of the case. The strict meaning of the word "onus probandi' is that if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burden is cast the issue must be found against him and only then the other party has the onus of rebuttal. The first principle of the Evidence Act is that a party who is to prove an allegation must do so. The Court cannot imagine evidence in the absence of it. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and is not assisted by any weakness, real or apparent in the case of the defendant. The defect in evidence of the party on whom the onus of proof lies cannot be cured by criticism of the evidence of the other party" f) Therefore, in the light of the settled legal position, the factual matrix of the present case has to be analyzed so as to ascertain whether the plaintiffs have proved their case against defendant No.1 warranting grant of decree for Specific Performance of contract of Ex.A127 in their favour. g) As per the recitals of the alleged agreement of sale, Ex.A127, the period prescribed for execution of the registered sale deed is 28-02-1999. As per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit has to be filed within a period of three years from the date fixed in the agreement. Thus, when the suit is filed on 09.01.2003, i.e., beyond the period of three years from the date fixed in the agreement, the suit is barred by limitation. h) Article 54 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: 54. For specific performance of a contract. Three years. The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. i) As per the provisions of the Limitation Act, the suit has to be filed within three years from the date fixed in the Agreement of Sale, i.e., Ex. A 127, and as the suit is filed beyond the period of limitation, the same is barred. j) As per the case of the plaintiffs, the period for execution of the registered sale deed and delivery of possession of the property was fixed as 28.02.1999. Though the period was fixed as 28.02.1999, it is pleaded by the plaintiffs that they got the balance of sale consideration within two weeks and requested to complete the sale transactions by 31.03.1998. Their subsequent plea was that the part possession of the property was delivered on 30.03.1998, Memorandum of Understanding was entered on 03.08.1998, the letter alleged to have been addressed for encashment of sale consideration was on 28.02.1999, cheques encashed were issued on 28.05.1999 and the extension of time was up to 31.08.1999 and further extension of was time up to 30.11.1999 and are filed by the plaintiffs to substantiate their plea. Thus, it is highly improbable that even before the period fixed for performance of the contract, the defendant No.1 had delivered the possession of the property and further entered into Memorandum of Understanding seeking extension of time. All these documents filed under Exs.A29 to A31 and Ex.36 dated 28.02.1999, are relied upon by the plaintiffs. It is pertinent to mention that in none of the above documents the sale consideration was mentioned and for the first time the sale consideration was mentioned in Ex.A45, dated 03.03.2000, wherein the defendant No.1 had sought for extension of time. All these documents filed under Exs.A29 to A31 and Ex.36 dated 28.02.1999, are relied upon by the plaintiffs. It is pertinent to mention that in none of the above documents the sale consideration was mentioned and for the first time the sale consideration was mentioned in Ex.A45, dated 03.03.2000, wherein the defendant No.1 had sought for extension of time. Thus, the above documents coupled with the oral evidence clearly shows that these documents are created by the plaintiffs and the said documents have been set up, after the notice is issued by defendant No.2 that the property was mortgaged in its favor. All the documents referred above are unilateral acts on the part of the defendant No.1 and there was no consensus-ad- idem and there was no reply from the plaintiffs agreeing for extension of time and hence the period has to be treated from 28.02.1998 and even the suit was filed on the basis of the agreement dated 28.02.1998. The plaintiffs even pleaded for alternative relief, though there is no specific prayer seeking for the relief, but an issue to that effect is framed by the trial Court. 20. READINESS AND WILLINGNESS: The trial court has failed to frame an issue as to whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, as to whether the agreement of sale is valid and binding, and as to whether that the suit is within the period of limitation. In the absence of framing of any issue on the above three aspects, the trial court is not justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance. Even the reasoning of the trial court in disbelieving the plea set up by the defendant No.1 that he has not executed the agreement of sale on 28-02-1998 on the ground that plaintiff No.2 was an attestor to the agreement of sale-cum-General Power of Attorney i.e., Ex. B1 executed in favour of K.Mallikarjuna Rao, who is a relative of plaintiffs. A specific plea was taken in the written statement of defendant No.1 and also P.W.1 was cross-examined and plaintiff No.2, being a signatory to the document, has not entered into the witness box. The trial Court has miserably failed to take into consideration of the evidence on record and held that the defendant No.1 has failed to prove that plaintiff No.2 signed as an attestor on Ex.B1. The trial Court has miserably failed to take into consideration of the evidence on record and held that the defendant No.1 has failed to prove that plaintiff No.2 signed as an attestor on Ex.B1. The trial court has negatived the plea set up by the defendant No.1 with regard to the money transactions only on the ground that plaintiff No.5 was introduced to the defendant No.1 in the year 1999 and the agreement of sale was executed in the year 1998. The trial Court has not taken into consideration that there is no confirmation regarding the receipt of the consideration and the witnesses have clearly stated that no consideration was paid in their presence. Therefore, the reasoning of the trial Court in decreeing the suit for specific performance without framing the issues in a proper manner is not correct. 21. Therefore, since the facts in the cases of P.Ramasubbamma Vs. Vijayalakshmi and others, 2022 (7) SCC 384 , Tirumalasetty Santhmma and others Vs.Yenuganti Venkaiah , [ 2013 (5) ALD 484 ] , Sughar Singh Vs. Hari Singh (dead) through L.Rs and others , [(2021)17 SCC 705] , Uppuluri Sita Ramaiah and others Vs. State Bank of India and others , [1983 SCC Online AP 39] and the judgment in S.A.No.1404 of 2017 and Crl.R.C.No.2595 of 2013, dated 5.9.2023 and the facts in the present case are distinguishable on facts, the said judgments are of no help to the plaintiffs. 22. In the result, the present appeals are allowed by setting aside the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.09 of 2003, dated 05.10.2020. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.