JUDGMENT : Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. 1. Heard Sri S.S. Bhatt, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri M. Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The appellants are the defendants and the respondents are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.10 of 2023 on the file of the VIII Additional District Judge, Chittoor, filed for division of suit schedule properties into 28 equal shares and to allot7/28 th share to the plaintiffs and for delivery of possession. 3. This appeal challenges the grant of temporary injunction in I.A.No.35 of 2023 in the suit directing the appellant defendants not to alienate the "A? schedule plaint properties to third parties till the disposal of the suit. 4. The case of the plaintiffs- respondents in brief is that one Syed Sab was the maternal grandfather of the plaintiffs. He had three (3) daughters namely Noorunissa, Pyaribi and Rahamathbi. He had two (2) sons namely Syed Abdulla and Syed Ghouse. The plaintiffs are the children of the late daughters namely Pyaribi and Rahamathbi. The defendants are the sons of Syed Sab; their children; the children of Noorunissa the deceased first daughter of Syed Sab; the daughter in law of late Rahamathbi widow of deceased son Zakir and their children. Plaintiffs? further case is that Syed Sab was the original owner, who purchased item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint "A? schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 25.04.1945 from one Bakshu Saheb and he also acquired Item No.3 and all the valuable in "B? schedule property. After the death of Syed Sab, the defendants 1 and 2, sons of Syed Sab and all the plaintiffs were jointly enjoying the suit schedule properties in which they were entitled to get their respective 7/28 th shares. 5. The case of the defendants/appellants in brief is that the defendants 1 and 2 are the absolute owners of the suit schedule properties and they had already given certain properties to their sisters, who sold the properties given to them to third parties. There is no joint family and no joint possession or enjoyment. Syed Sab during his lifetime made an oral gift dated 24.11.1969 wherein the Southern side half share in Sy.No.137/2 in an extent of Ac.2.03½ cents was given to the 1 st defendant and the Northern side half share for the same extent in Sy.No.137/2 was given to the 2 nd defendant. Syed Sab during his lifetime made an oral gift dated 24.11.1969 wherein the Southern side half share in Sy.No.137/2 in an extent of Ac.2.03½ cents was given to the 1 st defendant and the Northern side half share for the same extent in Sy.No.137/2 was given to the 2 nd defendant. The possession was delivered and they had accepted the gift. Their names were mutated in the revenue records. Since then and onwards defendants 1 and 2 have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. Subsequently, the 1 st defendant also purchased Ac.0-86 land in Sy.No.35, of No.59 Nerripalli village under registered sale deed dated 14.06.1976. Out of the said land, an extent of Ac.0.22 cents was subsequently shown as Sy.No.134/3C. The pattadar passbook and the title deed were also issued in favour of the 1 st defendant. They submitted that the plaintiffs had no right to claim partition or even temporary injunction. They had no prima facie case. It was also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. 6. In support of their respective cases, the plaintiffs filed the documents Exs.P.1 to P.25 and the respondents filed Exs.R.1 to R.22 as mentioned in detail in the impugned order and also brought on record vide memo dated 17.09.2004 by the appellants. 7. The learned court of VIII Additional District Judge, Chittoor, on consideration of the material filed before it Exs.P.1 to P.25 filed by the plaintiffs and Exs.R.1 to R.22 filed by the defendants, observed that it was undisputed that the plaint schedule property was the property acquired by Syed Sab. The relationship of the parties to Syed Sab was also undisputed. They were in joint possession and enjoyment. The defendants 1 and 2 (appellants 1 and 2) were managing the properties also on behalf of others. The plaintiffs had filed 25 documents including Ex.P.1 the certified copy of the sale deed in the name of Syed Sab, and Ex.P.2 to P.4 the certified extract of the revenue records. It showed that initially the name of Syed Sab was in the revenue record and later on it was mutated in the names of some of the defendants. The plaintiffs had filed 25 documents including Ex.P.1 the certified copy of the sale deed in the name of Syed Sab, and Ex.P.2 to P.4 the certified extract of the revenue records. It showed that initially the name of Syed Sab was in the revenue record and later on it was mutated in the names of some of the defendants. On consideration of such documents as also the certified copies of the registered partition deeds, gift settlement deeds and registered sale deeds, the learned court held that prima facie, the plaintiffs, were co-sharers having right and title to the plaint schedule properties. With respect to the defendant-appellants? case of oral gift and based thereon, they being the absolute owner, the learned court observed that the same having been denied by the plaintiffs? side and they also having pleaded that Syed Sab was not competent to make oral gift of all plaint schedule property, contrary to the Mohammedan Law, at the stage of consideration of interlocutory application, the merit of such contentions, of oral gift etc., could not be decided, which required decision during the trial based on evidence to be led. Similarly, with respect to the contention raised regarding execution of the partition deed the learned court observed that such plea could also not be decided at this stage. After recording the evidence on the respective sides, on issue being framed such plea deserved decision. 8. Thus, considered, the learned trial court found that prima facie case was established. The balance of convenience was recorded in favour of the plaintiffs. If the injunction was not granted and the defendants executed the sale deeds in favour of the third parties, the learned court recorded that, irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiffs, also giving rise to multifarious litigation, and if temporary injunction was granted, there would be no irreparable loss to the defendants. The learned court granted temporary injunction not to alienate the plaint "A? schedule property, pending the suit. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was relinquishment deed, an unregistered one, and in view thereof, the plaintiffs were not entitled for the grant of temporary injunction. However, on this aspect, on a specific query made, learned counsel submitted that any such plea of relinquishment deed was not taken before the learned court. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was relinquishment deed, an unregistered one, and in view thereof, the plaintiffs were not entitled for the grant of temporary injunction. However, on this aspect, on a specific query made, learned counsel submitted that any such plea of relinquishment deed was not taken before the learned court. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that there was oral gift by Syed Sab infavour of the appellants 1 and 2 and in view thereof the appellants were the absolute owners and the plaintiffs had no right, title in the suit schedule property. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was no prima facie nor balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs, and if the temporary injunction was not granted, there would have been no irreparable injury to the plaintiffs/respondents. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant further referred to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, to contend that if any transfer takes place during pendency of the suit, the transferees would be bound by the doctrine of lis pendens and so, the learned court ought not to have granted the temporary injunction to restrain the alienation during the pendency of the suit. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the property belonged to Syed Sab. The plaintiffs are his legal heirs along with defendants 1 and 2. Consequently, they are all entitled along with the said defendants to a specified share as claimed. The oral gift is disputed. Syed Sab had no right even to make oral gift of the entire property. Consequently based on the case of oral gift, the plaintiffs? claim could not be denied. There was prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. The balance of convenience was also in their favour. If the temporary injunction was not granted and in the mean time during pendency of the suit the defendants transferred the suit property irreparable loss and injury would be caused, also giving rise to multiplicity of the proceedings. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the learned court was right in granting the temporary injunction, and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come in the way of grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 14. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record. 15. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the learned court was right in granting the temporary injunction, and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come in the way of grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 14. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record. 15. The following point arises for our consideration: “Whether the impugned order granting temporary injunction, suffers from any illegality and call for any interference?” 16. The Undisputed facts are that the suit schedule property belonged to Syed Sab. The parties are their legal heirs either directly or from direct descendents. Syed Sab was the common ancestor. The case of the appellants 1 and 2, to oppose the grant of temporary injunction, mainly, and as also argued before us, is on the ground that there was an oral gift in their favour which was acted upon, was accepted and the possession was also delivered. We, however, find that the plea of oral gift, was denied by the plaintiffs and it was also pleaded that Syed Sab under Mohammedan Law had no right to make the oral gift of the entire plaint schedule property. Syed Sab being the owner of the property and the plaintiffs also being descendents, prima facie, have the right in the suit schedule property in their respective shares; as may be determined during trial. The question if there was an oral gift, or such an oral gift could be of the entire plaint schedule property, or based on such an oral gift; the plaintiffs claim of share, could be defeated, are all questions which require determination during trial based on the evidence to be led by the parties. The appellants? case to exclude the plaintiffs-respondents from the suit schedule properties would depend upon by proving their case of the oral gift. At this stage of consideration of temporary injunction, in the undisputed facts, the prima facie case, was made out for grant of temporary injunction. 17. If during pendency of the suit, the appellants transferred the suit property or part thereof to third parties, that would also give rise to multiplicity of legal proceedings and complicate the suit proceedings. It would also give rise to the issue of the impleadment of the transferees, causing delay of the proceedings of the suit. 18. 17. If during pendency of the suit, the appellants transferred the suit property or part thereof to third parties, that would also give rise to multiplicity of legal proceedings and complicate the suit proceedings. It would also give rise to the issue of the impleadment of the transferees, causing delay of the proceedings of the suit. 18. In Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh , [ 1992 1 SCC 719 ] , the Hon?ble Apex Court clearly has held that grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that there should be prima facie case in favour of the applicants which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. 19. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P.Ltd , [ 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 ] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary and is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. 20. In Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi , [ (1993) 3 SCC 161 ] it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the grant of injunction is within the discretion of the court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles - ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him. Paragraph No.30, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, is being reproduced:- "30. It need not be said that primary object of filing a suit challenging the validity of the order of demolition is to restrain such demolition with the intervention of the court. In such a suit the plaintiff is more interested in getting an order of interim injunction. It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The court grants such relief according to the legal principles -- ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him." 21. We are of the view that the learned court was right in granting the temporary injunction on being satisfied with the existence of the ingredients for grant of temporary injunction. 22. We are of the view that the learned court was right in granting the temporary injunction on being satisfied with the existence of the ingredients for grant of temporary injunction. 22. So far as the submission with respect to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, is concerned that in view there of the learned trial court ought not to have granted the temporary injunction restraining the alienation during pendency of the suit, as any such alienation pending the suit shall be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, we are of the view that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come in the way of the exercise of judicious discretion of the court in allowing the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, if it finds that the case for grant of temporary injunction in consideration of the conditions, is made out. 23. In K. Ravi Prasad Reddy vs. G. Giridhar , [2022 SCC OnLine AP 135] , a Coordinate Bench of this Court, considered this aspect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and held as under in paragraphs 24 to 28: “24. From the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that Section 52 of T.P.Act although provides protection to the parties from transfers pendent lite, in as much as it makes such transfers subservient to the decree that may be passed in the suit, but it does not come in the way of passing an order of temporary injunction restraining alienation of the suit property during the pendency of the suit on the applicant satisfying all the three ingredients of prima facie, balance of convenience and causing irreparable loss or injury in his favour. 25. The distinction between Section 52 of T.P.Act and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, is that an order of temporary injunction is of pre- emptive nature restraining the act of alienation by party to the suit where there is such a danger, whereas Section 52 of T.P.Act comes into play after the alienation takes place during pendency of the suit. Section 52 of T.P.Act provides for the consequences of a transfer taking place pending litigation, i.e., that the pendent lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor(s) that may be finally determined by the court. Section 52 of T.P.Act does not come in the way of applicability of Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC. In other words, notwithstanding Section 52 of T.P.Act making the transfers during pendency of the suit subject to the ultimate decree that may be passed in the suit, the court may, pass an order of temporary injunction, if all the requisite pre- conditions for such grant are satisfied. If an order is passed and transfer is restrained, the question of applicability of Section 52 of T.P.Act will not arise as then there will be no transfer pending litigation. On the other hand, if the party does not apply for temporary injunction or if the application is rejected and the suit property is transferred pending 16 CPK,J & RNT,J CMA.Nos.43 & 45 of 2021 litigation, Section 52 of T.P.Act shall come into play and those transfers would abide by the ultimate result of the suit. 26. In Sm.Muktakesi Dawn and others v. Haripada Mazumdar and another ((1987) SCC OnLine Cal 51) the contention raised that an injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the suit property was absolutely unnecessary as no post-suit transfer by the defendant can adversely affect the result of the suit because of Section 52 of the T.P.Act whereunder all such transfers abide by the result of the suit, was rejected by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court holding that the court will in many cases interfere and preserve property in status quo during the pendency of a suit in which the rights to it are to be decided and though the purchaser pendent lite would not gain title. It is relevant to reproduce paragraphs Nos.4 and 5 as under: "4. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has secondly urged that an injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the suit property was absolutely unnecessary as no post-suit transfer by the defendant can adversely affect the result of the suit because of the provisions of Section 52 of the T. P, Act whereunder all such transfers cannot but abide by the result of the suit. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has secondly urged that an injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the suit property was absolutely unnecessary as no post-suit transfer by the defendant can adversely affect the result of the suit because of the provisions of Section 52 of the T. P, Act whereunder all such transfers cannot but abide by the result of the suit. It is true that the doctrine of lis pendens as enunciated in Section 52 of the T. P. Act takes care of all pendente lite transfers; but it may not always be good enough to take fullest care of the plaintiffs interest vis-a- vis such a transfer. The suit giving rise to the impugned order is one for specific performance of sale in respect of the suit property and if the defendant is not restrained from selling the property to a third party and accordingly a third party purchases the same bona fide for value without any notice of the pending litigation and spends a huge sum for the improvement thereof or for construction thereon, the equity in his favour may intervene to persuade the Court to decline, in the exercise of its discretion, the equitable relief of specific performance to the plaintiff at the trial and to award damages only in favour of the plaintiff. It must be noted that Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code clearly provides for interim injunction restraining the alienation or sale of the suit property and if the 1987 SCC Online Cal 51 17 CPK,J & RNT,J CMA.Nos.43 & 45 of 2021 doctrine of lis pendens as enacted in Section 52 of the T. P. Act was regarded to have provided all the panacea against pendente lite transfers, the Legislature would not have provided in Rule 1 for interim! injunction restraining the transfer of suit property. Rule 1 of Order 39, in our view, clearly demonstrates that, notwithstanding the Rule of lis pendens in Section 52 of the T. P. Act, there can be occasion for the grant of injunction restraining pendente lite transfers in a fit and proper case. 5. Mr. injunction restraining the transfer of suit property. Rule 1 of Order 39, in our view, clearly demonstrates that, notwithstanding the Rule of lis pendens in Section 52 of the T. P. Act, there can be occasion for the grant of injunction restraining pendente lite transfers in a fit and proper case. 5. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the respondents has drawn our attention to an old Division Bench decision of this Court in Promotha Nath v. Jagannath, (1913) 17 Cal LJ 427 where it has been observed that a Court will in many cases interfere and preserve property in status quo during the pendency of a suit in which the rights to it are to be decided and though the purchaser pendente lite would not gain title, the Court will prevent by injunction the embarrassment that would be caused to the original purchaser in his suit against the vendor. And it has been ruled there on the authority of Turner, LJ in Hadley v. London Bank of Scotland, (1865) 3 De GJ & S 63 at 70 that if there is a clear valid contract for transfer, the Court will not permit the transferor afterwards to transfer the legal estate to third person, although such third person would be affected by lis pendens. Mr. Muhkerjee has drawn our attention to Dr. S. C. Banerji's Tagore Law Lectures on Specific Relief (2nd Edition, page 592) where the decision in Promotha Nath (supra) has been approvingly referred to and also to Fry's Treatise on Specific Performance (6th Edition) where the same rule has been enunciated as a general principle on the authority of Turner, L.J., in Hadley v. London Bank of Scotland (supra). We accordingly reject this contention of Mr. Roy Choudhury that the impugned order of injunction restraining pendente lite transfer ought not to have been granted as the rule of lis pendens, as enacted in Section 52 of the T. P. Act, is there to take care of such transfer." 24. We accordingly reject this contention of Mr. Roy Choudhury that the impugned order of injunction restraining pendente lite transfer ought not to have been granted as the rule of lis pendens, as enacted in Section 52 of the T. P. Act, is there to take care of such transfer." 24. With respect to the exercise of appellate powers in relation to the exercise of discretion by the trial court in deciding an application for temporary injunction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P.Ltd. (supra) held that in such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. 25. In Esha Ekta Appartments Chs Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Mumbai , [ (2012) 4 SCC 689 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the scope of appellate court power to interfere in an interim order passed by the court at the first instance and held in paragraphs Nos.19, 20 and 21, which are re-produced, as under: "19. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The scope of the appellate court's power to interfere with an interim order passed by the court of first instance has been considered by this Court in several cases. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The scope of the appellate court's power to interfere with an interim order passed by the court of first instance has been considered by this Court in several cases. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (supra), the Court was called upon to consider the correctness of an order of injunction passed by the Division Bench of the High Court which had reversed the order of the learned Single Judge declining the respondent's prayer for interim relief. This Court set aside the order of the Division Bench and made the following observations: (SCC p. 733, para 14) "14. ... In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion." 26. In Skyline Education Institute (India) (P) Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani , [ (2012) 2 SCC 628 ] , the three-Judge Bench considered a somewhat similar question in the context of the refusal of the trial court and the High Court to pass an order of temporary injunction, referred to the judgments in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. , [(2012) 2 SCC 738] , N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. , [ (2020) 15 SCC 721 ] and observed: “22. , [ (2020) 15 SCC 721 ] and observed: “22. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity." 27. Thus, considered, we do not find any illegality in the order of the learned trial court nor any of the permissible ground to interfere with the order of grant of temporary injunction in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 28. The appeal lacks merits and is dismissed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.