JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) The present petition has been filed for quashing the FIR No. 159 of 2024 dated 14.11.2024 registered against the petitioner at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan (H.P) for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 137(2) and 64 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (“in short BNS”) and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. It has been asserted that the parties have entered into a compromise on 30.12.2024. It was agreed that marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.5 would be solemnised after attaining the age of majority. The informant, the mother of the victim, also agreed to the compromise. The victim had misled the petitioner by saying that she was aged 18 years, and this fact was also mentioned in the status report filed by the police. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petition be quashed based upon the compromise effected between the parties. 3. I have heard Mr R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3-State and Mr Raju Ram Rahi, learned counsel for respondents No. 4 & 5. 4. Mr R. L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the victim had misrepresented her age as 18 years. The parties have settled the matter, and the petitioner and the victim would solemnise the marriage after attaining the age of majority. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 5. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3-State, submitted that the misrepresentation made by the victim will not affect the liability of the petitioner. The offence committed by the petitioner is heinous and cannot be compromised. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. Mr Raju Ram Rahi, learned counsel for respondents No.4 & 5 adopted the submissions of Mr. R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The plea taken by the petitioner that the victim told him her incorrect age will not help him. In a classic case of Reg. R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The plea taken by the petitioner that the victim told him her incorrect age will not help him. In a classic case of Reg. V. Prince., [L.R.] 2 C.C.R. 154, the prisoner Prince unlawfully took an unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen years, out of the possession and against the will of her father. The Jury found that the girl went with the prisoner willingly; she had told the prisoner that she was aged 18 years, and the prisoner believed that she was aged 18 years, he had a reasonable cause for doing so. It was held that this finding recorded by the Jury would not help the prisoner. The act of the prisoner was unlawful per se and if the girl was found less than sixteen years, the representation by the girl or the belief of the prisoner were immaterial. Brett J observed: “Upon all the cases, I think it is proved that there can be no conviction for crime in England in the absence of a criminal mind or mens rea. Then comes the question, what is the true meaning of the phrase? I do not doubt that it exists where the prisoner knowingly does acts which would constitute a crime if the result were as he anticipated, but in which the result may not improbably end by bringing the offence within a more serious class of crime. If a man strikes with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and kills, the result makes the crime murder. The prisoner has run the risk. So, if a prisoner does the prohibited acts without caring to consider what the truth is as to facts — as if a prisoner were to abduct a girl under sixteen without caring to consider whether she was, in truth, under sixteen — he runs the risk. So if he, without abduction, defiles a girl who is, in fact, under ten years old, with a belief that she is between ten and twelve. If the facts were as he believed, he would be committing the lesser crime. Then, he runs the risk of his crime, resulting in greater crime. It is clear that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. If the facts were as he believed, he would be committing the lesser crime. Then, he runs the risk of his crime, resulting in greater crime. It is clear that ignorance of the law is not an excuse. It seems to me to follow that the maxim as to mens rea applies whenever the facts which are present to the prisoner's mind, and which he has reasonable ground to believe and does believe to be the facts, would, if true, make his acts no criminal offence at all. 9. Blackburn J observed: “It seems impossible to suppose that the intention of the legislature in those two sections could have been to make the crime depend upon the knowledge of the prisoner of the girl's actual age. It would produce the monstrous result that a man who had a carnal connection with a girl, in reality not quite ten years old, but whom he on reasonable grounds believed to be a little more than ten, was to escape altogether. He could not, in that view of the statute, be convicted of the felony, for he did not know her to be under ten. He could not be convicted of the misdemeanour, because she was in fact not above the age of ten. It seems to us that the intention of the legislature was to punish those who had bad connections with young girls, though with their consent unless the girl was, in fact, old enough to give valid consent. The man who has a connection with a child, relying on her consent, does it at his peril if she is below the statutable age.” 10. The man who has a connection with a child, relying on her consent, does it at his peril if she is below the statutable age.” 10. Bramwell B said: “I have used the word “knowingly;” but it will, perhaps, be said that here the prisoner not only did not do the act knowingly, but knew, as he would have said, or believed, that the fact was otherwise than such as would have made his act a crime; that here the prisoner did not say to himself, “I do not know how the fact is, whether she is under sixteen or not, and will take the chance,” but acted on the reasonable belief that she was over sixteen; and that though if he had done what he did, knowing or believing neither way, but hazarding it, there would be a mens rea, there is not one when, as he believes, he knows that she is over sixteen. It is impossible to suppose that, to bring the case within the statute, a person taking a girl out of her father's possession against his will is guilty of no offence unless he, the taker, knows she is under sixteen, that he would not be guilty if the jury were of opinion he knew neither one way nor the other. Let it be, then, that the question is whether he is guilty where he knows, as he thinks, that she is over sixteen. This introduces the necessity for reading the statute with some strange words introduced; as thus: “Whosoever shall take any unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen, and not believing her to be over the age of sixteen, out of the possession,” &c. Those words are not there, and the question is, whether we are bound to construe the statute as though they were, on account of the rule that the mens rea is necessary to make an act a crime. I am of the opinion that we are not, nor as though the word “knowingly” was there, and for the following reasons: The act forbidden is wrong in itself, if without lawful cause; I do not say illegal, but wrong. I have not lost sight of this, that though the statute probably principally aims at seduction for carnal purposes, the taking maybe by a female with a good motive. I have not lost sight of this, that though the statute probably principally aims at seduction for carnal purposes, the taking maybe by a female with a good motive. Nevertheless, though there may be such cases, which are not immoral in one sense, I say that the act forbidden is wrong” 11. Denman J said: “The belief that she was eighteen would be no justification to the defendant for taking her out of his possession, and against his will. By taking her, even with her own consent, he must at least have been guilty of aiding and abetting her in doing an unlawful act, viz. in escaping against the will of her natural guardian from his lawful care and charge. This, in my opinion, leaves him wholly without lawful excuse or justification for the act he did, even though he believed that the girl was eighteen, and therefore unable to allege that what he has done was not unlawfully done, within the meaning of the clause. In other words, having knowingly done a wrongful act, viz. in taking the girl away from the lawful possession of her father against his will, and in violation of his rights as guardian by nature, he cannot be heard to say that he thought the girl was of an age beyond that limited by the statute for the offence charged against him. He had wrongfully done the very thing contemplated by the legislature: He had wrongfully and knowingly violated the father's rights against the father's will. And he cannot set up a legal defence by merely proving that he thought he was committing a different kind of wrong from that which in fact he was committing.” 12. This judgment has become a locus classicus and is cited in all the law books on the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the fact that the victim represented herself age more than 18 years will not help the petitioner. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193 that the o punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is public and has an effect on the society. Such an offence cannot be quashed by taking recourse to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: - “25. Thus, in unambiguous terms, this Court held that before exercising the power under Section 482, Cr. Such an offence cannot be quashed by taking recourse to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: - “25. Thus, in unambiguous terms, this Court held that before exercising the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime besides observing and holding that heinous and serious offences could not be quashed even though a victim or victim's family and the offender had settled the dispute. This Court held that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society….. Xxxx 30. ….In that context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar v. State 2021 SCC Online Del 258 . Paragraph 12 therein, to the extent it is relevant reads thus: — “12. The father of the victim cannot be permitted to settle the dispute with the accused. He is not the victim and the courts have to safeguard and protect the interest of children against onslaught by bad forces. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused is being prosecuted for an offence that shocks the value system of a society and this is not a matter that can be permitted to be settled as a compoundable minor offence. Deterrence to others committing similar offence is a must and they cannot get a signal that anything and everything can be compromised……” 31. In view of the very object and purpose of enacting the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusions in paragraph 12 extracted above in the given case……. 32. In the decision relied on by the High Court to quash the proceedings viz., Gian Singh's case (supra) and the decision in Laxmi Narayan's case (supra) in unambiguous terms this Court held that the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash proceedings based on a compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which is not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. When an incident of the aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and have no serious impact on the society.” 14. When an incident of the aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and have no serious impact on the society.” 14. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR based on the compromise effected between the parties. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 15. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.