JUDGMENT : Apurba Sinha Ray, J. 1. The judgment-debtor no. 2 Arun Subbaya Shetty has filed the GA No. 3 of 2024 praying for recalling the order dated 13.02.2024 on the ground that the said order seriously prejudices his interest as a judgment-debtor. Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, the learned senior counsel appearing for the judgment-debtor no. 2 has submitted that the judgment-debtor no. 1 and decree-holder in collusion with each other have persuaded the learned court in passing the order dated 13.02.2024 whereby the order dated 30.06.2022 and 17.08.2022 passed in EC No. 193 of 2022 have been modified and as a result of which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor no. 1 have truncated the relevant decree in respect of which both the judgment-debtor nos. 1 and 2 are jointly liable. The action of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor no. 1 reveals that the execution of the original decree has been divided into two parts and it is the intention of the decree- holder to release/relieve the judgment-debtor no. 1 from the scope of this execution case on the pretext that the judgment-debtor no. 1 has discharged his 50% liability in connection with the relevant decree. It is also alleged by Mr. Chakraborty that a plain and simple reading of the original decree would show that both the judgment-debtor nos. 1 and 2 are jointly liable and the liability of those judgment-debtors is not severable. It is further alleged that the judgment-debtor no. 1 is one of the employees of the decree-holder and with the connivance of the judgment-debtor no. 1 the decree-holder has gone beyond the scope of Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure . If the order dated 13.02.2024 is not recalled, the right and interest of the judgment-debtor no. 2 will be seriously prejudiced and he shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. The learned counsel Mr. Chakraborty has further submitted that this court while passing the order dated 13.02.2024 has gone beyond its jurisdiction and such course of action is not approved by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In this regard he has referred to the decision of A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 . 2. The learned counsel Ms. Sonal Shah, representing the decreeholder, has submitted that during pendency of the execution proceeding the judgment-debtor no. In this regard he has referred to the decision of A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 . 2. The learned counsel Ms. Sonal Shah, representing the decreeholder, has submitted that during pendency of the execution proceeding the judgment-debtor no. 1 has agreed to liquidate the decreetal amount in part and accordingly he has paid 2,31,00,000/- (Two crores thirty one lakhs) and on being satisfied, the decree-holder has not only conceded before the court on 13.02.2024 that the judgment-debtor no. 1 has liquidated his share of liability but has also submitted an affidavit containing terms and settlement in that regard. According to Ms. Shah, conditions as laid down in Order XXI Rule 2 have been duly complied with and the decree-holder has certified such payment made by the judgment-debtor no.1. The learned counsel has further submitted that the order dated 13.02.2024 was pronounced in presence of the learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 2 and at that time the learned counsel of the judgment-debtor 2 did not raise any objection. According to her, when an order was passed on consent of the parties, such order has gained certainty and cannot be withdrawn on the whims of another party who is not even caring to liquidate the decreetal dues inspite of his failed attempt at the Hon’ble Apex Court, and particularly, when such order dated 13.02.2024 was passed in presence of his learned counsel. 3. The learned counsel of the decree-holder has referred to a judicial decision reported in (1999) 4 SCC 396 (Budhia Swain & Ors. Vs. Gopinath Deb & Ors.) in support of her contention. 4. The learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 1 Ms. Labanyasree Sinha has submitted that as the matter has been settled between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor no. 1, he has paid a sum of rupees 2.31 crores in pro tanto satisfaction of the said decree and accordingly on the consent of the decree-holder, the order dated 30.06.2022 and 17.08.2022 have been modified allowing the judgment-debtor no. 1 to operate his bank account which was hitherto restricted and the status quo order in respect of the property as mentioned in paragraph 9(ii) of the relevant application was withdrawn. At the time of passing of the said order dated 13.02.2024, the learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 1 to operate his bank account which was hitherto restricted and the status quo order in respect of the property as mentioned in paragraph 9(ii) of the relevant application was withdrawn. At the time of passing of the said order dated 13.02.2024, the learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 2 was very much present and she did not raise any objection against the prayers for modification of the orders and withdrawal of the order of status quo as aforesaid. On the basis of such consent and no objection, the relevant order dated 13.02.2024 was passed. According to Ms. Sinha, the court was very much within its jurisdiction to pass such an order dated 13.02.2024. In support of her contention Ms. Sinha has referred to several judicial decisions reported in 1954 SCC OnLine Cal 56 ( Ramnath Sarma Vs. Baidyanath Chatterjee ). Law weekly 1929 Privy Council 29 XXIX Part – 4, Page – 161 (Raja Shri Prakash Singh Vs. The Allahabad Bank Ltd.), 1973 SCC OnLine Pat 101 (Shyamlal Jagnani & Ors. Vs. Sunder Singh & Ors.), Volume XXXIV The Calcutta Weekly Notes 213 (Hridoy Mohan Sanyal Vs. Khagendra Nath Sanyal), 1956 SCC OnLine Pat 54 (Badri Narayan Singh & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Prasad Shroff & Ors.), 1963 SCC OnLine Cal 11 (Humayun Properties Ltd. Vs. Ferrazzinis (Private) Ltd.), 1964 SCC OnLine Cal 80 (Zeenutinnessa Begum Vs. Nawab Syed Waris Ali Meerza Saheb Bahadur), 1979 SCC OnLine Cal 33 (A.S. Mallick & Ors. Vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta), (2004) 2 MHLJ 626 (Dilipkumar Chimanlal Maniar Vs. Industrial Credit and Development Syndicate Limited & Ors.), 1933 SCC OnLine Pat 92 (Dina Misra & Ors. Vs. Ramdas Tiwary & Anr.), 1908 SCC OnLine Mad 85 (Mahomed Khan Bahadur Vs. Mohomed Munawar Sahib), 1948 SCC OnLine Cal 115 (Ramdas Mukherji Vs. Udat Chand Mahatab), 1959 SCC OnLine AP 87 (Sait Hemraj Ratanchand Firm By partner, Sait Veerchand Vs. Katta Subrahmanyam & Anr.). 5. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. A decree for a sum of Rs. 4,45,42,894.98 (Rupees Four Crore Forty Five Lakhs Forty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Four and Ninety Eight paisa only) was passed against the judgment-debtors namely, Ravishankar Ramachandran and Arun Subbaya Shetty on a judgment on admission. Katta Subrahmanyam & Anr.). 5. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. A decree for a sum of Rs. 4,45,42,894.98 (Rupees Four Crore Forty Five Lakhs Forty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Four and Ninety Eight paisa only) was passed against the judgment-debtors namely, Ravishankar Ramachandran and Arun Subbaya Shetty on a judgment on admission. Appeals against the decree travelled to the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court and thereafter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India being SLP (C) no. 10316 of 2022 but the judgment-debtors have failed in both the Hon’ble courts. Thereafter, in the instant execution application being EC No. 193 of 2022 was filed against the judgment-debtors. By an order dated 30.06.2022 the judgment-debtors were directed to maintain status quo in respect of the immovable properties referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) and (iii) and further by an order dated 17.08.2022 the judgment-debtors were restrained from operating their respective bank accounts referred to in paragraph 9(i) of the execution petition. Such orders of the Hon’ble Court have been extended from time to time. 6. From the record it transpires that on 13.02.2024 on the basis of submission of the learned counsel of the decree-holder and judgment- debtor no. 1 the following order was passed in the presence of the learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 2. “Learned Counsel for the decree-holder and judgment-debtor no. 1 have submitted that the judgment-debtor no. 1 has already paid Rs.2 crore 31 lakhs out of the decreetal amount. The learned Counsel for the decree-holder has submitted that her client has no objection if the relevant bank account of Mr. Ravishankar Ramchandran being the account number 05401300004336 of HDFC Bank is allowed to be operated by him. In view of such submissions, the order dated 17th August, 2022 in respect of the above bank account is modified by allowing the judgment-debtor no. 1 to operate the said bank account until further order. The learned Counsel for the decree-holder has further stated that her client has no objection if the status quo order in respect of the immovable properties referred in paragraph 9(ii) is withdrawn. In view of the submissions of the learned Counsel of the decree-holder, the status quo order passed on 30th June, 2022 in respect of immovable properties referred in paragraph 9(ii) of the execution application is withdrawn. In view of the submissions of the learned Counsel of the decree-holder, the status quo order passed on 30th June, 2022 in respect of immovable properties referred in paragraph 9(ii) of the execution application is withdrawn. The interim order in respect of other judgment-debtor is extended till further order. The learned Counsel for the judgment- debtor no. 2 has sought for an accommodation to file affidavit-in-reply in GA/2/2023 as her client is not available. List this matter on 20th February, 2024.” 7. Subsequently, the judgment-debtor no. 2 has taken out this application being GA 3 of 2024 praying for recalling the order dated 13.02.2024 on the grounds that there is no direction in the original decree that the liability of judgment-debtors is to the extent of 50% each of the decreetal amount, rather the liability upon the judgment- debtors is joint and not separate and, therefore, if the judgment-debtor no. 1 is allowed to operate his bank account and further the status quo order in respect of property mentioned in paragraph 9(ii) of the execution application is withdrawn, the decree-holder will try to execute the decree only against the judgment-debtor no. 2 and his assets, although the original decree indicates that the liability of both the judgment-debtors is joint and inseparable. 8. From the materials on record it transpires that judgment-debtor no. 1 is in the employment of the decree-holder long ago and such employment dates back to the date of the relevant decree. Therefore, it is needless to mention, such employment of judgment-debtor no. 1 with the decree-holder is well within the knowledge of the judgment- debtor no. 2 but he did not raise this issue on any previous occasion at all. However, if we go through the relevant decree we shall find that the liabilities of the judgment-debtors are joint and not severable. The excerpts of the decree is quoted herein below for proper adjudication of the matter:- “….it is ordered and decreed that the defendant/respondent no.1 Ravishankar Ramchandran and defendant/respondent no. 2 Arun Subbaya Shetty do pay to the plaintiff/petitioner Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited a sum of Rs.4,45,42,894.98 (Rupees Four Crore Forty Five Lakhs Forty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Four and Ninety Eight paisa only) and the application being G.A. No. 1035 of 2018 is allowed and disposed of accordingly.” 9. 2 Arun Subbaya Shetty do pay to the plaintiff/petitioner Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited a sum of Rs.4,45,42,894.98 (Rupees Four Crore Forty Five Lakhs Forty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Four and Ninety Eight paisa only) and the application being G.A. No. 1035 of 2018 is allowed and disposed of accordingly.” 9. From the above I find merits in the contention of the learned senior counsel Mr. Chakraborty that liability of both the judgment- debtors are joint and the decree does not show that the judgment- debtor no. 1 has only 50% liability for the satisfaction of the decree. But at the same time I find that though the judgment-debtor no. 2 along with judgment-debtor no. 1 have failed to make any inroad into the original decree even after taking the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there are materials on record to the effect that the judgment- debtor no. 2 is not at all willing till date to satisfy the decree which has been affirmed up to the Hon’ble Apex Court. Admittedly, it is found that the judgment-debtor no. 1 and the decree-holder have come to terms and they have filed terms of settlement before this court. However, these terms of settlement have not yet been accepted by this court. 10. I have considered the relevant judgments. It appears that in the case of Ramnath Sarma Vs. Baidyanath Chatterjee reported in 1954 SCC OnLine Cal 56, the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta has laid down as hereunder:- “18. In our view, the correct order to make would be to dismiss the objection filed by the respondent before the lower Court. The lower Court should have held that the adjustment not being certified and the application, which in effect asks the Court to record the said adjustment, having been made more than ninety days from the date of the said adjustment, the same could not be entertained by the Court. But the decree-holder having admitted before the Court and thereby brought to the notice of or certified to the Court that there was an agreement between the parties adjusting the decree and having admitted that he signed the document, on which the judgment-debtor also relied, the Court should have held that the decree-holder had certified the adjustment to the Court and should have proceeded to record the said adjustment under O. 21, R. 2, sub-r. (1). In such proceedings the lower Court should have gone into the question as to what the terms of the adjustment were.” 11. In Law weekly 1929 Privy Council 29 XXIX Part – 4, Page – 161 (Raja Shri Prakash Singh Vs. The Allahabad Bank Ltd.) Their Lordships have been pleased to deal with the provision under Order XXI Rule 2(1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure . The relevant observations are as hereunder:- “The terms of R. 2 (1) do not provide for any application being made by the decree-holder. The provision is that where money payable under a decree is paid out of Court to the satisfaction of the decree- holder, the decree-holder shall certify the payment to the Court and the Court shall record the same accordingly. The rule contemplates a simple procedure, viz., a certification of payment by the decree-holder to the Court and a record by the Court of the payment; it does not provide for any notice being given to the judgment-debtor. O. 21. R. 2 (2) provides an opportunity for the judgment-debtor to inform the Court of a payment made by him out of Court, and the procedure specified by this sub-rule is very different from the procedure referred to in Sub-R. 1. The judgment-debtor may inform the Court of the payment and apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show cause why such payment should not be recorded. Sub-R. 2 therefore does contemplate an application by the judgment-debtor; further it provides for notice being given to the decree-holder, it affords an opportunity for the decree-holder to appear, and it involves a judicial decision by the Court whether the payment should be recorded.” 12. In the case of Hridoy Mohan Sanyal Vs. Khagendra Nath Sanyal reported in The Calcutta Weekly Notes Volume XXXIV page 213 the Hon’ble Court has been pleased to observe that there is no such provision in the present code and, therefore the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor can enter into any agreement for adjustment of a decree. In order to enable the executing court to execute the decree as adjusted the only requirement is that adjustment should be certified under Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code. 13. In the case of Badri Narayan Singh & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Prasad Shroff & Ors. In order to enable the executing court to execute the decree as adjusted the only requirement is that adjustment should be certified under Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code. 13. In the case of Badri Narayan Singh & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Prasad Shroff & Ors. reported in 1956 SCC OnLine Pat 54 the Hon’ble High Court has been pleased to discuss about the implication of order XXI Rule 2 and such discussion is quoted herein below:- “28. The bar, therefore, of non-certification would operate against the judgment- debtor, but the decree-holder has no disability in the matter. He can always tell the Court what amount he has received and the Court will not compel him thereafter to claim a large amount. Mr. Chatterji referred in this connection to the case of - Lakhi Narain Ganguli vs. Pelamani Dasi’, 20 Cal LJ 131 (AIR 1915 Cal 235) (H), for the proposition that a decree-holder can certify at any time. In my opinion, the argument is well- founded and the bar of O 21, R. 2 of the CPC, to which reference was made by Mr. J.C. Sinha, is in fact no bar against the decree-holder, if in fact he has received a certain amount towards the decretal dues and scales down his claim under the decree accordingly.” 14. In the case of Humayun Properties Ltd. Vs. Ferrazzinis (Priviate) Ltd. reported in 1963 SCC OnLine Cal 11 the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta’s observation is very much relevant so far as the present case is concerned. The relevant observation is quoted herein below:- “11….The only point that has to be decided is as to whether, by using an affidavit in reply, in the form set out above, it can be said that the judgment creditor has certified payments in terms of clause (i) of Order 21 Rule 2. Although no particular form is required for such certification by the judgment creditor, it is obvious that the facts must be capable of giving rise to the conclusion that it is the decree holder who has given such information.” 15. Paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judicial decision is also relevant for the case in hand. “12. The next case cited is a Bench decision of the Madras High Court Bapanna v. Vengayya, AIR 1937 Mad 511 . Paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judicial decision is also relevant for the case in hand. “12. The next case cited is a Bench decision of the Madras High Court Bapanna v. Vengayya, AIR 1937 Mad 511 . In that case, what happened was as follows: The decree holder obtained certain payments from the judgment debtor. He assigned the decree, and the assignee made an application for execution, with which was enclosed a document executed by the original decree holder, admitting certain payments. The question was whether such payments, although uncertified, could be taken notice of by the Court. Clearly the information was given to the Court by the assignee decree holder himself. Therefore it was rightly held that the Court could take notice of it. Horwili J., however, made a sweeping statement that the authorities on the subject established that it did not matter under what circumstances the payment by the judgment debtor was brought to the notice of the executing Court by the decree holder, such bringing to notice in any shape or form was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Order 21 Rule 2. The cases relied upon by the learned Judge for this sweeping proposition are the cases mentioned above, in all of which the information was given by the decree holder. In the affidavit in opposition filed by Sudhir Kumar Chatterjee it was stated that the defendant had throughout paid and the decree holder had accepted the rents for all the months from January, 1957 to December, 1957 and there was no default in the payment of rents in any of the months in 1957, although there was delay in making the payments. Waiver was pleaded. Naturally, the decree holder had to file an affidavit in reply. In paragraph 9 of the affidavit of Mr. Sarkies, the relevant part whereof has been set out above, he has merely argued that upon the admission of the ’deponent’ himself there was default and the decree holder was entitled to ask for possession. It is admitted that the word "deponent" refers to Sudhir Kumar Chatterjee. The position, therefore, is as follows: The decree holder files a tabular statement saying that there has been default and the right to possession has accrued. The judgment debtor says in his affidavit in opposition that payments have been made but the payments were not made in time, although accepted by the Judgment creditor. The position, therefore, is as follows: The decree holder files a tabular statement saying that there has been default and the right to possession has accrued. The judgment debtor says in his affidavit in opposition that payments have been made but the payments were not made in time, although accepted by the Judgment creditor. In answer, the judgment creditor says that upon the admission of the judgment debtor himself there has been default and the decree holder is entitled to execute for recovery of possession. It may be that from this statement it may be deduced that the decree holder was not denying payments. But I do not think that it could be said that the decree holder had given information to the Court in compliance with clause (i) of Order 21 R. 2, that is to say, that he has duly certified such payments to the Court, and the Court could take notice of the same.” 16. In the case of Zeenutinnessa Begum Vs. Nawab Syed Waris Ali Meerza Saheb Bahadur reported in 1964 SCC OnLine Cal 80 the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta has been pleased to distinguish between a decree-holder certifying a payment to court under sub-rule 1 of order XXI and a judgment-debtor doing the same under sub-rule 2. The paragraph 3 is quoted herein below:- “3. It has been pointed out by the Privy Council in Prakash Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. 56 Ind App 30 ( AIR 1929 PC 19 ) that there is a distinction between a decree-holder certifying a payment to court under sub-rule (1) , and a judgment-debtor doing the same under sub-rule (2). Under sub-rule (1), the decree-holder has merely to inform the court about payment. No application is necessary and upon such information being given, the court is bound to record the payment. There is no limitation for the decree-holder giving such information to court. In Eysuffzemen Sarkar v. Sanchla Lal, ILR 43 Cal 207: (AIR 1916 Cal 451) it has been pointed out that the decree holder need not make a formal application, but may simply inform the court of the payment in his application for execution of the decree. No particular form of recording the certification has been prescribed…..” 17. In the case of A.S. Mallick & Ors. Vs. No particular form of recording the certification has been prescribed…..” 17. In the case of A.S. Mallick & Ors. Vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta reported in 1979 SCC OnLine Cal 33 the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta has been pleased to observe as hereunder:- “11….In the case relied on by Mr. Mukherjee the record itself was not available and it was found as a fact that full satisfaction of the decree was certified by the decree holder in an application made by him. In that context, it was laid down by Sir Ashutosh Mookerji that the decree holder having certified the adjustment the court should recognise such adjustment even if recording thereof is not available to the court.” 18. In the case of Dilipkumar Chimanlal Maniar Vs. Industrial Credit and Development Syndicate Limited & Ors. reported in (2004) 2 MHLJ 626 the Hon’ble Court has dealt with the issue of certification and adjustment. Paragraph 9 of the said decision is quoted herein below:- “9. Insofar as the payment of Rs. 6,25,587/-, is concerned there is no admission made on behalf of the plaintiffs that they received the same in satisfaction of the decree. The record indicates that this amount was received by the plaintiff from the plaintiff’s assignees towards cart payment for the purchase of the decree though the pay order was made out at the behest of M/s Laxmi Construction Co. It cannot be lost sight of that by the time this payment was made, the Court had already passed an order permitting an assignment in favour of M/s Laxmi Construction Co. or their nominees. It may be that on the date of the said payment, M/s Laxmi Construction Co, were duty bound to honour their obligation as sureties but this by itself would not prevent them from investing money for the purchase of the decree. It was open for the defendants to move the executing Court for recording the payment or adjustment and they have failed to do so. In the absence of any clear certification by the plaintiff and also in the absence of any application for recording of the said payment, we are unable to hold that the defendants can obtain any benefit in respect of this amount and the said amount of Rs. 6,25,587/- cannot be marked as paid in satisfaction of the decree dated 09.01.1980.” 19. 6,25,587/- cannot be marked as paid in satisfaction of the decree dated 09.01.1980.” 19. In the case of Dina Misra & Ors. Vs. Ramdas Tiwary & Anr. Reported in 1933 SCC OnLine Pat 92 the Hon’ble High Court has also dealt with the issue of payment or adjustment according to the Hon’ble Court:- “2. The argument on behalf of the respondents before us is that the compromise in question was certainly not a payment of the decree nor was it an adjustment because it left the decree unaltered in amount and it could be put into execution against the other judgment- debtors and it is said that the words "payment or adjustment" are merely limited to a step which reduces or eliminates the amount for which the decree was passed, and therefore that the agreement can be used to bar the execution. On the other hand it is, I think, rightly contended that the word "adjustment" includes any step which alters the liability under the decree whether by reducing the amount recoverable or by reducing the number of persons against whom the decree would otherwise be executed.” 20. In the case of Mahomed Khan Bahadur Vs. Mohomed Munawar Sahib reported in 1908 SCC OnLine Mad 85 the Hon’ble High Court at Madras has also held the similar views. According to the Hon’ble Court:- “We agree with this decision under the section, if a decree, is adjusted in whole or in part, the adjustment must be certified and unless certified cannot be recognized. Where there is a money decree against two defendants, an agreement discharging one of them is, in our opinion, an adjustment in part of the decree and so requires to be certified. In Laldas v. Kishore (I.L.R, 22 Bom, 463) agreement set up was made before decree and all that was decided was that the existence and validity of such an agreement should be decided in execution under section 244, Civil Procedure Code. In Krishnamachariar v. Rukmani Ammal (15 M.L.J, 370) also the agreement referred to was also entered into before decree. We are not called upon to consider the effect of such agreements before decree in this case, but, when after decree, an agreement is made discharging some of the defendants, we think such an agreement is clearly an adjustment in part of the decree. The appeal is dismissed with costs. We are not called upon to consider the effect of such agreements before decree in this case, but, when after decree, an agreement is made discharging some of the defendants, we think such an agreement is clearly an adjustment in part of the decree. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The order staying sale in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 719 of 1908 is discharged.” 21. The Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta in the case of Ramdas Mukherji Vs. Udat Chand Mahatab reported in 1948 SCC OnLine Cal 115 has dealt with the issue of recording different liabilities of the different judgment-debtors. The relevant observation is herein below:- “The next question which has been urged is that the decree-holder cannot, at his option, break up the liability without the consent of the judgment-debtors. There is nothing in law to prevent a decree-holder from giving up part of his claim and executing his decree only for a portion. He certainly cannot split up his claim and ask for separate execution proceedings to be started in regard to each particular portion of the claim, but there is nothing to prevent him from starting execution proceedings with regard to part of the claim provided that he does not proceed with the other part. Subsequently, he is not allowed in law to proceed with the part which was not proceeded with before. Therefore, in the present case, there is nothing in law to prevent the decree-holder from relinquishing one-sixth share of the decretal dues and proceeding with five-sixths of his dues.” 22. The case law of Sait Hemraj Ratanchand Firm By partner, Sait Veerchand Vs. Katta Subrahmanyam & Anr. reported in 1959 SCC OnLine AP 87 the Hon’ble High Court has dealt with the issue of pre-decree arrangement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtors which is not relevant for the case in hand. 23. The judicial decision (1999) 4 SCC 396 (Budhia Swain & Ors. Vs. Gopinath Deb & Ors.) has dealt with the issue of recalling a previous order by the self-same court. 23. The judicial decision (1999) 4 SCC 396 (Budhia Swain & Ors. Vs. Gopinath Deb & Ors.) has dealt with the issue of recalling a previous order by the self-same court. As per above decision a tribunal or court may recall an order which it made on earlier occasion on certain grounds, namely, the proceedings culminating in the order suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction which is patent, or fraud or collusion have been used to obtain the judgment, or there has been a mistake by the court prejudicing a party, or a judgment has been rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. 24. I have also considered the judicial decision reported in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602 , the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that an MLA is not a public servant and, therefore, no sanction is required for his prosecution. The court accordingly set aside the relevant order of discharge of the accused made by the Special Judge and directed that the trial shall proceed further from the stage where the accused were discharged. The court further observed that by the prosecution launched against the appellant, his character and integrity came under a cloud, and that nearly two and half years had rolled by and the case had not moved further and that an expeditious trial was required for the interest of both the prosecution and the accused. The court gave a further direction withdrawing the said cases against the accused pending in the court of Special Judge and transferring the same to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the Chief Justice to assign the cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court for holding the trial from day to day. Subsequently, the matter came before the Supreme Court once again wherein the appellant questioned the High Court’s jurisdiction to try the case in violation of Article 14 and 21 and the provisions of the Act 46 of 1952. Subsequently, the matter came before the Supreme Court once again wherein the appellant questioned the High Court’s jurisdiction to try the case in violation of Article 14 and 21 and the provisions of the Act 46 of 1952. A two Judge Bench formulated several questions that arose for consideration and referred the matter for hearing by Bench of seven Judges of the Court on the points viz., i) whether the direction of the constitution Bench of Supreme Court on 16.02.1984 directing transfer of the case from Special Judge to the High Court are inoperative or illegal and ii) whether, if so the Supreme Court can and should recall, withdraw, revoke or set aside the same in the present proceedings. By a majority decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to suo moto direct withdrawal of case from the court of Special Judge and transfer thereof to the High Court for speedier trial. It was held that directions of the Bench of five Judges of Supreme Court given suo moto were in violation of fundamental rights and principles of natural justice and therefore the same were made without jurisdiction and hence a nullity. 25. From the above judicial decisions, it appears to me that if a payment is made out of court for the purpose of satisfying a decree from the side of the judgment-debtor, the parties are to follow certain procedures. If such payment is really made out of the court, it is the obligation of the decree-holder to certify such payment before the executing court and if such certification is received, the court should record such payment. From the above judicial decisions it is also clear that there is no particular form by which a certificate of payment is to be furnished by the decree-holder. In other words, actually there is no definite form by which the decree-holder is to certify the payment received from the judgment-debtor. Even oral admission of the decree- holder in court acknowledging such payment from the judgment- debtor can be accepted by the court for recording such payment. There is no need for the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor to file an appropriate application in each and every case under sub-Rule (i) of Rule 2 of XXI of the Code. Even oral admission of the decree- holder in court acknowledging such payment from the judgment- debtor can be accepted by the court for recording such payment. There is no need for the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor to file an appropriate application in each and every case under sub-Rule (i) of Rule 2 of XXI of the Code. In our case, it is found that on 13.02.2024, the decree-holder has admitted before the court in presence of learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 1 and also learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 2 that judgment-debtor no. 1 has paid a sum of Rs. 2.31 crores to satisfy the decree in part. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed to fortify such factum of payment. Accordingly, on the basis of submission of the learned counsel of both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor no.1, the court has recorded in its order dated 13.02.2024 that such payment was made on behalf of the judgment- debtor no. 1. It appears that although the learned counsel of judgment-debtor no. 2 was very much present but she chose not to raise any objection against such recording of payment made on behalf of the judgment-debtor no. 1 and certified by the decree-holder. 26. However, on the basis of consent of the decree-holder, the status quo order in respect of one property of the judgment-debtor no. 1 was withdrawn from the time being, and further the judgment-debtor no. 1 was also allowed to operate his relevant bank account, and at that point of time also the learned counsel of the judgment-debtor no. 2 did not raise any objection. 27. I again say, even at the cost of repetition, that from the relevant decree it appears that the liability of the judgment-debtor no. 1 and judgment-debtor no. 2 is joint and not severable, and further, neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor no. 1 has prayed for release/discharge of the judgment-debtor no. 1 from the instant execution case and , therefore by recording the factum of payment made on behalf of the judgment-debtor no. 1 and certified by the decree-holder under XXI, Rule 2 of the Code, the court has rightly dwelt on its jurisdiction , and as such there is no scope for recalling the order dated 13/02/2024 on that score alone. 1 and certified by the decree-holder under XXI, Rule 2 of the Code, the court has rightly dwelt on its jurisdiction , and as such there is no scope for recalling the order dated 13/02/2024 on that score alone. The case law of A.R. Antulay (supra) is not applicable in the case in hand since the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed an order without having jurisdiction to do so, but in this case this court has jurisdiction to record the payment by the judgment-debtor after being certified by the judgment creditor. As the relevant decree was passed acknowledging the joint liability of the judgment-debtor no. 1 and judgment-debtor no. 2 in satisfying the said decreetal amount, it is needless to mention that the order dated 13.02.2024 was passed without prejudice to the rights and obligation of the judgment-debtor no. 2. Further, the order of status quo and restraint order on bank accounts were previously imposed on the prayers of the decree holder. Now, if the decree holder chooses to withdraw such status quo order and restraint order partially knowing fully well that the liabilities of the judgment debtor nos. 1 and 2 are joint as per terms of the decree, let the decree-holder to do so at its own risk. As the order dated 13/02/2024 does not truncate the original decree as alleged, I am constrained to reject the prayer for recalling the said order. In fine, the GA 03/2024 is, thus, dismissed on contest. No costs. 28. The matter be released from this Bench. Liberty to mention before the appropriate Bench. 29. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this Judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.